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Abstract	
Supplier	relationships	and	performance	have	become	increasingly	important	in	agri-food	
supply	chains.	This	research	aimed	to	investigate	buyer-supplier	relationships	in	the	New	
Zealand	red	meat	industry.	Specifically,	this	meant	examining	how	relationship	quality,	as	
well	as	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	affect	supplier	performance.		
The	analysis	improved	the	conceptualisation	of	relationship	quality	by	bringing	together	
constructs	from	the	relationship	marketing	and	social	capital	literature.	This	established	that	
relationship	quality	and	social	capital	were	closely	related	constructs.	By	combining	social	
capital	and	relationship	quality	this	created	a	broader	measure	of	the	overall	strength	of	the	
relationship.	The	findings	show	that	improving	supplier	performance	requires	taking	into	
account	both	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes.	Furthermore,	relationship	
quality	played	a	significant	mediating	role	between	all	the	relationship	factors	and	supplier	
performance.		
The	implications	of	this	research	are	that	there	are	specific	ways	buyers	can	improve	
supplier	performance.	This	involves	identifying	and	selecting	suppliers	who	have	superior	
ability,	motivation	and	customer	focus.	They	also	need	to	avoid	selecting	suppliers	with	high	
levels	of	self-direction.	Improving	supplier	performance	also	involves	influencing	relationship	
attributes	and	improving	the	quality	of	relationships	with	suppliers.	In	particular,	processors	
need	to	ensure	that	suppliers	experience	positive	value	from	the	supply	relationship.	
Furthermore,	they	need	to	manage	the	interaction	between	specific	assets,	dependence	and	
use	of	coercive	power.		
Keywords:	Supplier	performance,	relationship	quality,	social	capital,	supplier	characteristics,	
buyer-supplier	relationships,	New	Zealand,	Red	meat	industry,		
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Chapter	1: Introduction	
1.1 Buyer-supplier	relationships	in	a	changing	global	marketplace	
Matt	Simister,	commercial	director	for	Tesco	Group	Food,	declared	in	2013	that,	“The	
transactional	model	of	supplier	relationships	is	too	wasteful	and	we	can	no	longer	afford	to	
do	this	in	today’s	multi-channel	world”	Alvarez,	Mcloughlin,	and	Shelman	(2014,	p.	1);	(Ulaga	
&	Eggert,	2006).	In	response	to	this	challenge,	Tesco	created	a	new	centralised	sourcing	
department	for	food,	and	appointed	Matt	Simister	as	its	head.	In	2014	Tesco	was	the	world’s	
third	largest	supermarket	with	US$102	billion	in	sales	and	6,700	stores	in	12	countries.	The	
goal	was	to	move	Tesco	away	from	its	historical	transactional	approach	to	buying,	which	
focused	on	short-term	cost	minimisation,	and	work	on	long-term	supplier	partnerships	that	
would	deliver	lower	total	costs	and	differentiated	products	(Alvarez	et	al.,	2014).	
The	need	to	develop	closer	relationships	with	suppliers	was	not	unique	to	Tesco.	The	
importance	of	relationships	between	buyers	and	suppliers	has	long	been	recognised	as	
essential	to	business	performance	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984;	Dyer	&	Singh,	1998;	Ganesan,	
1994;	Geyskens,	Steenkamp,	Scheer,	&	Kumar,	1996;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994).	This	is	
emphasised	by	Lambert	(2006)	who	argues	that	the	ultimate	success	of	an	individual	
business	is	based	on	its	ability	to	manage	and	integrate	the	company’s	complex	network	of	
relationships.	The	emphasis	on	relationship	management	has	also	been	influenced	by	the	
global	trend	towards	outsourcing.	As	a	result,	firms	are	increasing	their	reliance	on	external	
organisations	to	perform	critical	operations.	Consequently,	this	creates	greater	dependence	
on	the	performance,	and	behaviour	of	suppliers	(Christopher	&	Gattorna,	2005;	Praxmarer-
Carus,	Sucky,	&	Durst,	2013).	As	a	result,	the	quality	of	the	relationship	between	buyers	and	
suppliers	and	their	performance	has	become	a	critical	component	of	supply	chain	
performance.	Improving	relationship	quality	is	also	recognised	by	researchers	and	
practitioners	as	an	important	source	of	competitive	advantage	(Tracey	&	Vonderembse,	
2000;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).	Research	has	also	shown	that	improved	supplier	performance	
provides	buyers	with	a	competitive	advantage	through	benefits	such	as	lower	costs,	
improved	quality	and	technological	innovation	(Tracey	&	Vonderembse,	2000).		
The	move	away	from	market	transactions	has	also	been	noted	in	agri-food	supply	chains	
(Baker	&	Smyth,	2012;	White,	2000).	For	example,	referring	to	agri-food	supply	chains,	
Hobbs	and	Young	(2000)	identified	that,	“Changing	consumer	preferences,	biotechnology,	
information	technology,	environmental	pressures,	credit	and	risk	issues,	and	the	reduction	
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For	most	of	the	previous	decades	there	was	steady	food	price	inflation	and	a	long-term	
decline	in	nominal	prices	for	agricultural	products	(Figure	1-1),	(Angus,	Burgess,	Morris,	&	
Lingard,	2009).	This	period	of	stability	allowed	agri-food	supply	chains	to	adapt	to	the	
environment	of	steady	changes	that	were	characteristic	of	this	time	period.	As	agricultural	
investment	decisions	usually	take	time	to	implement	it	is	often	difficult	to	adapt	production	
and	processing	systems	in	the	short	term	(Gow	&	Swinnen,	1998).	Therefore,	the	rapid	
changes	that	are	characteristic	of	the	current	period	create	difficulties	for	all	parties	in	the	
supply	chain.	This	new	era	of	volatility	(Figure	1-1)	has	created	a	great	deal	more	risk	and	
uncertainty	in	the	supply	chain	which	has	led	to	a	lack	of	investment.	As	Matt	Simister	from	
Tesco	explained,	“It	throws	in	uncertainty,	which	has	led	to	volatility,	which	leads	to	a	lack	of	
investment	and	then	lack	of	innovation.	The	real	problem	we	see,	is	the	lack	of	confidence	to	
invest"	(Russell,	2013,	p.	1).	This	uncertainty	is	exacerbated	by	short-term	spot	market	
relationships	between	suppliers	and	buyers.	These	concerns	motivated	Tesco	and	other	food	
companies	to	seek	closer	relationships	with	their	suppliers,	as	well	as	selecting	suppliers	
based	on	performance	and	investing	in	their	development	(Hingley,	Lindgreen,	&	Casswell,	
2006).		
This	strategy	of	building	long-term	relationships	raises	a	number	of	questions	such	as:	
1) What	supplier	selection	criteria	should	be	used	to	identify	suppliers	that	have	the	
potential	to	form	higher	quality	relationships	and	improved	performance?	
2) What	do	companies	need	to	do	to	improve	the	relationships	with	their	suppliers	and	
improve	their	performance?	
These	questions	highlight	the	need	for	a	greater	understanding	of	the	nature	and	processes	
of	improving	supply	chain	relationships	and	performance.	These	issues	will	be	at	the	centre	
of	this	research.	
1.2 The	need	for	research	on	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	
The	growing	emphasis	on	relationships	and	supply	chain	performance	highlights	the	need	for	
research	on	supplier	relationship	management.	This	has	placed	relationship	management	at	
the	centre	of	organisational	research	(Schulze	&	Lees,	2014).	For	example,	recently	academic	
journals	have	dedicated	special	issues	on	the	topic	of	managing	and	developing	key	supplier	
relationships.	This	can	also	be	seen	in	a	review	of	research	on	import	activities	of	firms.	
Aykol,	Palihawadana,	and	Leonidou	(2013,	p.	231)	report	that,	“Relationships	between	
importers	and	exporters	were	the	dominant	field	of	research	within	importing	[…],	with	the	
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thrust	of	research	centring	on	behavioural	interactions	between	international	buyers	and	
sellers”.	Despite	reviewing	a	large	amount	of	existing	research	on	relationships,	Aykol	et	al.	
(2013)	highlighted	the	need	for	future	research	to	focus	on	relationship	quality.	The	need	
was	further	emphasised	by	Fawcett,	Fawcett,	Watson,	and	Magnan	(2012,	p.	44)	who	state	
that,	“Despite	intense	interest	in	the	collaborative	supply	chain,	researchers	know	relatively	
little	regarding	the	collaborative	process	through	which	companies	combine	and	configure	
resources	across	organisational	boundaries	to	create	distinctive	customer	value”.	Some	
authors	have	also	commented	on	the	lack	of	theoretical	clarity	in	relationship	quality	
research.	For	example,	Leonidou,	Samiee,	Aykol,	and	Talias	(2014),	in	a	meta-analysis	on	
exporter-importer	relationship	quality,	commented	that	the	research	is	characterised	by	
investigating	behavioural	relationships	from	diverse	and,	at	times,	antithetical,	theoretical	
angles.	This	has	created	an	unclear,	ambiguous	and,	sometimes,	confusing	picture	of	
relationship	quality.	Furthermore,	they	note	the	proliferation	of	constructs	and	
conceptualisations	used	by	researchers	and	the	need	to	develop	these	into	a	core	set	of	
constructs	(Leonidou	et	al.,	2014).	This	theoretical	diversity	was	also	identified	by	
Athanasopoulou	(2009)	who	reviewed	the	literature	on	relationship	quality	from	1987	to	
2007.	She	found	a	wide	variation	in	the	antecedents	and	dimensions	as	well	as	outcomes	of	
relationship	quality	with	no	commonly	accepted	framework.		
These	findings	highlight	a	number	of	points	regarding	the	current	state	of	research	on	
relationship	management.	First,	that	relationship	quality	is	an	important	area	of	research,	
and	there	are	still	large	knowledge	gaps	in	this	field.	Secondly,	that	there	is	little	consensus	
or	consistency	with	regard	to	the	theoretical	approaches	used	in	current	research.	Thirdly,	
given	the	wide	variety	of	concepts	and	constructs,	greater	clarity	in	defining	and	measuring	
these	is	needed.	This	research	will	aim	to	address	some	of	these	issues.	
	
1.3 The	importance	of	supplier	relationships	and	performance	in	agri-food	
supply	chains	
This	research	focuses	specifically	on	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	in	agri-
food	supply	chains.	For	example,	Krause	and	Ellram	(2014)	assert	that	it	is	important	to	focus	
on	relationships	within	specific	industries	in	order	to	better	understand	the	relational	
dynamics	in	strategic	buyer–supplier	relationships.	Furthermore,	Grimm,	Hofstetter,	and	
Sarkis	(2014)	argue	that	in	comparison	to	other	industries,	the	agri-food	industry	has	some	
unique	characteristics	resulting	from	the	production	and	distribution	of	vegetable-	and	
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animal-based	products	(Haasis	&	Ldic,	2008).	For	example,	Van	der	Vorst,	Van	Dongen,	
Nouguier,	and	Hilhorst	(2002,	p.	124)	list	a	number	of	unique	product	issues,	such	as	“shelf	
life	constraints,	variable	quality	and	quantity	in	the	supply	of	farm-based	inputs	due	to	
biological	variations,	seasonality,	random	factors	connected	with	weather	and	pests	and	
other	biological	hazards”.	These	factors	create	inelasticity	in	supply,	and	they	significantly	
increase	the	uncertainty	in	the	supply	chain,	which	can	impact	on	buyer-seller	relationships.	
Furthermore,	food	supply	chains	typically	comprise	a	wide	variety	of	different	participants,	
such	as	retailers,	wholesalers/distributors,	various	traders,	processors,	marketers/storage,	
farmers	and	farm	suppliers	(Roth	et	al.,	2008).	There	is	also,	frequently,	a	large	and	
fragmented	supply	base	(Haasis	&	Ldic,	2008).	This	makes	managing	supplier	relationships	
more	costly	and	complex.	Further	complexity	is	created	because	food	safety	and	
environmental	sustainability	are	important	concerns	for	both	stakeholders	and	consumers.	
These	issues	then	drive	regulatory	requirements	for	environmental	management	and	
traceability	in	all	stages	of	production,	processing	and	distribution	(Grimm	et	al.,	2014).		
Agricultural	production	also	has	significant	geographical	constraints	relating	to	soil,	climate	
and	land	availability.	Such	factors	mean	that	production	is	often	spread	over	a	large	
geographical	area	and	can	frequently	be	some	distance	from	consumer	markets.	These	
physical	constraints	results	in	product	distribution	over	large	physical	distances	often	
requiring	controlled	atmosphere	transportation	(Grimm	et	al.,	2014).	Another	feature	is	the	
inaccuracy	of	visual	assessment	of	quality.	Frequently,	eating	quality	can	only	be	assessed	
through	the	destructive	testing	of	the	product,	which	means	that	quality	testing	each	item	is	
not	feasible	(Roth,	Tsay,	Pullman,	&	Gray,	2008).	Consequently,	buyers	may	safeguard	
quality	by	investing	in	long-	term	relationships	with	trustworthy	suppliers	rather	than	
focusing	solely	on	price	through	transactional	relationships	(Grimm	et	al.,	2014;	Roth	et	al.,	
2008).	These	issues	also	give	rise	to	the	potential	for	opportunistic	behaviour.	Suppliers	and	
buyers	may	take	advantage	of	their	position	by	providing	incomplete	or	incorrect	
information	to	achieve	a	self-interested	gain	(Ziggers	&	Trienekens,	1999).	All	these	factors	
highlight	the	complexity	and	difficulty	of	managing	farmer	suppliers.	This	situation	is	
compounded	by	the	lack	of	published	research	on	buyer-supplier	relationships	in	the	agri-
food	industry.	All	this	emphasises	the	importance	of	buyer-supplier	relationship	
management	and	the	need	for	further	research	to	address	some	of	the	knowledge	gaps	in	
this	area.	
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1.3.1 Competitive	advantage	in	the	New	Zealand	agri-food	sector	
The	New	Zealand	agri-food	sector	faces	significant	challenges	to	maintain	its	competitive	
advantage	which	has	important	implications	for	supplier	relationships	and	performance.	The	
New	Zealand	agri-food	industry	has	focused	on	improving	productivity	and	efficiency	to	
preserve	its	position	as	one	of	the	world’s	most	efficient	agricultural	producers.	However,	
this	strategy	is	becoming	more	difficult	to	maintain	with	rising	land	and	production	costs	
(Figure	1-2)	as	well	as	regulatory	and	environmental	constraints	on	agricultural	
intensification.		
	
Figure	1-2:	National	average	real	price	per	hectare	of	New	Zealand	rural	land	1980	-	2010	
Source:	(Allan	&	Kerr,	2014)	
	
As	a	result,	many	New	Zealand	exporters	have	invested	in	increasing	product	value	through	
differentiation	(Porter,	1985),	requiring	a	greater	emphasis	on	delivering	products	that	meet	
the	needs	of	selected	high-value	consumers.	These	consumers	require	a	year-round	supply	
of	high-quality,	safe	food.	Also,	they	demand	food	that	aligns	with	their	personal	values.	
These	demands	include	credence	attributes	such	as	environmental	sustainability,	animal	
welfare	and	fair	trade,	as	well	as	local	and	organic	production	(Grunert,	2005;	Saunders,	
Guenther,	Tait,	&	Saunders,	2013).	
Meeting	these	requirements	is	difficult	within	the	constraints	of	New	Zealand’s	pasture-
based	agricultural	production	system	and	the	traditional	transactional	relationships	with	
suppliers.	It	requires	farmer	suppliers	who	have	the	ability	and	motivation	to	meet	these	
higher	specifications.	It	also	requires	a	significant	change	in	the	relationships	in	the	supply	
chain,	in	particular,	between	the	farmer	suppliers	and	the	processors	(buyers).	For	example,	
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the	New	Zealand	red	meat	sector	has	traditionally	relied	on	short-term	spot	market	
exchange	relationships	between	farmer	suppliers	and	buyer-processors	(McLeod,	Mair,	
Parker,	&	Belworthy,	2011).	While	these	type	of	relationships	may	be	efficient	for	large	
volumes	of	undifferentiated	products	they	are	less	effective	in	meeting	consumer	needs	for	
differentiated	products	(Sonka,	2003).		
In	a	spot	market	transaction,	there	is	little	information	flow	between	the	buyer	and	seller	
and	one	supplier	can	be	easily	substituted	for	another.	In	contrast,	long-term	collaborative	
relationships	enable	a	greater	flow	of	information	through	the	supply	chain.	Information	
transfer	is	necessary	with	differentiated	products	where	credence1	quality	attributes	valued	
by	consumers	are	not	visible	in	the	physical	product	at	the	point	of	purchase,	or	even	after	
consumption	(Dyer	&	Singh,	1998;	Nelson,	1970).	High	levels	of	information	flow	mean	
consumer	requirements	can	be	communicated	up	the	supply	chain	to	producers	as	well	as	
product	attributes	being	communicated	down	the	supply	chain	to	consumers	(Figure	1-3).	
Without	this	information	flow	credence	attributes,	such	as	country	of	origin,	often	get	
filtered	out	in	the	supply	chain	(Lees	&	Saunders,	2015).	The	importance	of	communication	
can	be	seen	with	New	Zealand’s	beef	and	dairy	exports	where	the	majority	are	exported	as	
unbranded	commodities	.	Spot	market	relationships	also	often	mean	there	is	little	
information	flow	from	consumers	back	to	producers.	Information	flow	between	buyers	and	
sellers	is	a	critical	factor	in	promoting	closer	relationships	and	improving	buyer	and	supplier	
performance	(Paulraj,	Lado,	&	Chen,	2008).	With	trusting	relationships	there	can	be	
improved	communication	and	therefore	a	better	match	of	supply	and	demand;	farmers	can	
adapt	the	timing	of	their	supply	and	product	specifications	to	consumer	demand	(Lees	&	
Nuthall,	2014).		
																																																																		
1	Credence	attributes	are	those	believed	by	a	consumer	to	be	present	in	a	product	even	though	they	are	not	
directly	observed	at	time	of	purchase	or	on	consuming	the	product.	Examples	include	food	safety,	animal	
welfare,	environmental	protection	and	cultural	authenticity.		
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Figure	1-3:	Information	flow	and	relationship	quality	in	the	New	Zealand	red	meat	supply	chain	
There	is	also	a	need	to	improve	supplier	performance.	Suppliers	need	to	have	the	ability	and	
commitment	to	meet	higher	product	specifications,	while	working	with	less	flexible	delivery	
schedules.	Improved	supplier	relationships	and	performance	would	mean	moving	from	a	
competitive	model	to	a	partnership	model	with	improved	relationship	quality	(Dwyer,	
Schurr,	&	Oh,	1987;	Jae-Nam	&	Young-Gul,	1999;	Srinivasan,	Mukherjee,	&	Gaur,	2011).	This	
shift	involves	relationships	based	on	mutual	trust,	openness,	and	where	the	responsibility,	
authority	and	decision	making	are	shared	more	evenly.	It	is	important	for	the	New	Zealand	
agri-food	sector	to	address	these	issues	in	order	to	maintain	a	competitive	advantage.	
1.4 Buyer-supplier	relationships	in	New	Zealand	red	meat	supply	chains		
This	research	focuses	on	processor-supplier	relationships	in	the	New	Zealand	red	meat	
sector.	These	relationships	are	important	as	agriculture,	including	the	red	meat	industry	is	a	
significant	part	of	the	New	Zealand	economy.	While	agriculture	is	responsible	for only 4.1%	
of	New	Zealand’s	GDP	(Index	Mundi,	2016),	it	accounts	for	70%	of	merchandise	exports	
(Ministry	of	Primary	Industries,	2016).	The	red	meat	sector	is	second	only	to	dairy	in	terms	of	
the	value	of	exports.	In	2016,	it	represented	11.9%	of	total	exports	(The	Treasury,	2016).	
New	Zealand	still	relies	on	a	small	number	of	key	markets	for	its	agricultural	exports,	despite	
significant	diversification	(	Table	1-1).	This	lack	of	market	diversification	makes	New	Zealand	
vulnerable	to	political	changes	and	increased	trade	barriers.	
	Table	1-1:	Proportion	of	NZ	main	agricultural	products	exported	
Product	 	Per	cent	exported	 Main	market	 	Per	cent	to	main	Market	
2015	
Dairy	products	 97	per	cent	 China	 28	per	cent	
Sheep	meat	 90	per	cent	 European	Union	 52	per	cent	
Beef	 80	per	cent	 USA	 45	per	cent	
Venison	 90	per	cent	 European	Union	 78	per	cent	
	
Source:(Statistics	New	Zealand,	2013)	
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As	well	as	the	importance	to	the	New	Zealand	economy	the	red	meat	industry	was	chosen	
because	it	has	particular	characteristics	that	add	to	the	difficulty	of	managing	buyer-supplier	
relationships.	Red	meat	production	in	New	Zealand	is	primarily	produced	on	un-irrigated	
pastures	with	little	use	of	supplements.	This	production	system	enables	low-cost,	year-round	
outdoor	grazing	that	produces	natural,	high-quality	meat	products.	However,	it	also	means	
that	production	is	highly	seasonal	with	significant	variations	due	to	the	climate	(Bensemann,	
Shadbolt,	&	Conforte,	2011;	McLeod	et	al.,	2011).	Changes	in	pasture	supply,	driven	by	
variations	in	temperature	and	rainfall,	play	an	major	role	in	supply	chain	dynamics	affecting	
price,	quality	and	timing	of	supply	(Bensemann	et	al.,	2011).	These	challenges	are	
compounded	by	seasonal	and	structural	overcapacity	in	the	processing2	sector.	Processing	
overcapacity	has	been	caused	by	falling	stock	numbers	and	has	resulted	in	a	highly	
competitive	procurement	environment.	Furthermore,	the	red	meat	industry	has	a	large	
number	of	processors	that	creates	a	diversity	of	supplier	relationships	providing	the	
variation	needed	for	the	research.	
The	problems	with	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	in	the	New	Zealand	red	
meat	industry	have	been	known	for	some	time.	As	recently	as	2014,	a	review	by	a	leading	
New	Zealand	bank	commented	that	the,	“Red	meat	industry	lacks	collaboration,	and	this	
shows	up	in	the	relationship	between	breeders	and	finishers,	farmers	and	meat	processors	
and	(downstream)	between	meat	traders	and	buyers	in	offshore	markets”	(ANZ,	2014,	p.	
10).	Another	report	by	McLeod	et	al.	(2011)	identified	that	the	sector	was	dominated	by	
commodity	supply	chains	as	opposed	to	differentiated	value	chains.	They	also	indicated	that	
to	address	the	industry’s	problems	there	needed	to	be	greater	trust	between	processors	and	
suppliers	as	well	as	incentives	so	that	one	part	of	the	supply	chain	did	not	profit	at	the	
expense	of	the	other.	
There	is,	however,	little	research	on	relationship	quality	in	the	red	meat	supply	chains.	
Furthermore,	what	little	research	there	is	does	not	address	the	issue	of	the	effect	of	
improvements	in	relationship	quality	on	supplier	performance	from	the	buyer’s	
perspective3.	Supplier	performance	from	the	processors’	perspective	involves	delivering	the	
right	quality	and	quantity	of	stock	when	required	as	well	as	being	loyal	to	the	buyer.	
Processors	also	want	suppliers	who	will	communicate	effectively,	and	be	financially	viable	
																																																																		
2		New	Zealand	sheep	numbers	peaked	in	1982,	with	a	total	of	70.3	million	sheep	this	had	fallen	to	29.5	million	
in	2015.	This	resulted	in	significant	overcapacity	in	meat	processing	plants.	
3	 Supplier	 performance	 is	 defined	 from	perspective	of	 the	buyer-processor.	 This	 is	 how	 the	buyer	processor	
would	rate	a	supplier’s	performance	in	terms	of	how	it	adds	value	to	their	business	and	their	customers.	
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and,	therefore,	sustainable	in	the	long	term.	To	achieve	these	goals,	processors	must	be	able	
to	identify	and	select	farmers	who	will	successfully	participate	in	customer-focused	supply	
chains	through	meeting	higher	product	specifications	and	delivery	schedules	required	by	
consumers.	They	also	want	high	levels	of	commitment	as	this	means	suppliers	are	willing	to	
adapt	to	meet	the	required	product	specifications.	Furthermore,	committed	suppliers	will	
make	relationship-specific	investments	and	exert	effort	to	satisfy	the	buyer	(Buxton	&	Tait,	
2012).	Long-term,	sustainable	partnerships	are	characterised	by	high	levels	of	trust,	
commitment,	transparency	and	integrity	and	require	a	high	level	of	collaboration	between	
all	parties	(Kwon	&	Suh,	2004).	These	are	also	important	factors	in	enabling	the	efficient	and	
effective	flow	of	information	and	allocation	of	resources	in	a	supply	chain	(Buxton	&	Tait,	
2012).	Consequently,	collaborative	supply	chain	relationships	reduce	risk	by	mitigating	
against	opportunism.	These	factors	mean	that	it	is	important	for	the	New	Zealand	agri-food	
industry	to	understand	how	to	develop	closer	relationships	with	suppliers,	and	how	to	
improve	their	performance.	
1.4.1 Research	objectives	
The	objective	of	the	research	is	to	investigate	how	buyers	can	improve	relationship	quality	
and	supplier	performance.	Specifically,	this	research	aims	to	understand	how	supplier	
characteristics	and	relationship	attributes,	as	well	as	relationship	quality	influence	supplier	
performance	(Figure	1-4).	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	this	study	aims	to	improve	the	
understanding	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	by	integrating	theories	on	
buyer-supplier	relationships	from	the	economic,	managerial	and	sociological	disciplines.	This	
research	also	intends	to	develop	greater	clarity	in	defining	and	measuring	the	dimensions	of	
relationship	quality.	It	will	also	address	the	issues	regarding	the	lack	of	consensus	or	
consistency	in	the	theoretical	approaches	to	research	on	buyer-seller	relationships.	Figure	
1-4	represents	a	broad	research	framework.	It	identifies	relationship	characteristics	and	
supplier	characteristics	as	significant	antecedents	to	relationship	quality	and	supplier	
performance.	Furthermore,	it	hypothesises	that	relationship	quality	is	a	key	meditating	
variable	in	this	relationship.		
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relatively	few	processors.	This	is	certainly	the	case	for	the	supplier	profitability	variable.	The	
research	did	however	include	the	buyer’s	perspective	in	the	qualitative	phase	of	the	
research.	The	supplier	performance	items	were	developed	from	the	literature	and	refined	
from	interviews	with	the	buyers.		
Thirdly,	from	a	methodological	perspective,	there	is	good	evidence	that	self-rating	provides	
valid	measures	of	performance.	Research	has	shown	that	though	the	absolute	values	may	
differ	the	causal	relationships	are	the	same	(Whipple,	Wiedmer,	&	Boyer,	2015).	This	was	
relevant	as	the	model	was	identifying	relationships	rather	than	trying	to	generalise	to	a	
population.	There	are	also	a	number	of	studies	that	use	self-rating	of	performance	to	
measure	supplier	performance	(Kee-Hung,	Cheng,	&	Yeung,	2005;	Lockamy	III	&	McCormack,	
2004;	Srinivasan,	Mukherjee,	&	Gaur).	Finally	there	is	specific	methodological	literature	
showing	that	self-rating	of	performance	can	be	an	accurate	method	to	evaluate	
performance	(Farh,	Werbel,	&	Bedeian,	1988;	Lindeman,	Sundvik,	&	Rouhiainen,	1995).	Self-
rating	can	also	avoid	potential	processor	biases	that	can	affect	the	data	(Kahneman,	2011).		
1.4.4 Contribution	of	this	research	
This	research	aims	to	add	to	the	overall	understanding	of	the	management	of	buyer-supplier	
relationships	by	addressing	theoretical	and	conceptual	issues	that	recent	authors	have	
highlighted.	Furthermore,	by	focusing	specifically	on	buyer-supplier	relationships	in	agri-food	
supply	chains,	this	study	contributes	to	understanding	the	unique	aspects	of	managing	the	
relationships	in	an	industry	with	a	large	number	of	geographically-dispersed	suppliers,	highly	
variable	production	systems	and	complex	product	characteristics	associated	with	plant	and	
animal	based	foods.	From	a	practical	perspective,	this	study	will	provide	practitioners	with	
tools	to	improve	the	quality	of	their	relationships	and	the	performance	of	their	suppliers.	It	
will	provide	them	with	a	greater	understanding	of	how	to	select	suppliers	who	have	the	
potential	to	be	high-quality	long-term	suppliers.	This	study	could	not	identify	any	previous	
literature	that	had	simultaneously	studied	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	
attributes,	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	in	agri-food	supplies	chains.		
1.5 Organisation	of	the	thesis	
Chapter	one	presents	the	context	of	the	research	issues.	Then	there	is	an	explanation	as	to	
why	it	is	important	to	address	the	context	of	the	New	Zealand	red	meat	sector.	Included	in	
this	chapter	are	the	objectives	of	the	research,	the	research	framework	and	the	contribution	
of	the	study.	In	chapter	two	relevant	literature	in	the	field	of	exchange	relationships	is	
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reviewed.	This	discusses	the	commonalities	and	differences	in	the	different	theoretical	
approaches	and	attempts	to	develop	a	common	frame	of	reference.	From	this	the	
framework	for	the	study	is	established	and	the	constructs	to	be	used	in	the	empirical	
research	are	identified.	Chapter	three	provides	a	review	of	the	concept	of	relationship	
quality	and	the	historical	development	of	the	construct.	It	also	looks	at	how	relationship	
quality	is	conceptualised	in	recent	research	and	how	it	is	related	to	social	capital.	Chapter	
four	develops	the	theoretical	framework	and	the	hypotheses	to	be	tested.	Chapter	five	
defines	the	constructs	that	emerged	from	the	theoretical	model	and	the	literature.	These	
are	used	for	developing	the	scale	measures.	Chapter	Six	includes	a	description	of	the	
research	design	and	the	methodology	utilised	in	the	data	analysis.	It	also	focuses	on	the	data	
preparation	and	the	tests	used	to	ensure	the	validity	and	suitability	of	the	data	for	analysis.	
Chapter	seven	contains	the	exploratory	factor	analysis	which	tests	the	validity	of	the	scale	
items.	Chapter	eight	tests	the	validity	of	the	scale	items	and	latent	constructs	by	applying	a	
confirmatory	factor	analysis.	Chapter	nine	aims	to	clarify	the	conceptualisation	and	
measurement	of	relationship	quality.	This	chapter	also	includes	the	SEM	that	explores	the	
antecedents	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	This	uses	the	results	from	
chapter	seven	and	chapter	eight	to	identify	the	significant	relationships	between	each	of	the	
supplier	and	relationship	variables,	relationship	quality	and	the	supplier	performance	
variables.	Chapter	ten	evaluates	the	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	and	
how	they	influence	supplier	performance	variable.	Chapter	11	identifies	the	antecedents	of	
each	of	the	supplier	performance	variables.	This	enables	a	picture	of	the	antecedents	for	
each	of	the	supplier	performance	variables	to	be	determined.	Finally,	in	chapter	12	an	in-
depth	analysis	and	discussion	of	the	results	are	given.	This	is	followed	by	the	theoretical	and	
managerial	implication	of	the	research	and	the	limitations	of	the	study	as	well	as	comments	
on	the	directions	for	future	research.	
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Chapter	2: Literature	review		
2.1 Introduction	
The	study	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	sits	within	the	broader	context	of	
buyer-seller	exchange	relationships.	This	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	the	literature	
covering	the	key	paradigms	and	theories	that	contribute	to	the	current	knowledge	of	
exchange	relationships.	It	identifies	that	in	the	context	of	buyer-supplier	relationships	there	
is	no	unified	theoretical	approach	to	inter-firm	exchange	relationships.	Researchers	typically	
draw	on	a	wide	range	of	theories	to	capture	the	complexity	of	exchange	relationships.	This	
leads	to	a	discussion	of	the	different	perspectives	from	the	economic	and	behavioural	
paradigms	and	how	these	can	produce	complimentary	views	on	exchange	relationships.	
Finally,	there	is	an	explanation	of	how	these	different	perspectives	can	be	synthesised	into	a	
multi-theoretical	view	that	can	produce	greater	understanding	than	any	single	
interpretation.	Therefore,	the	literature	review	provides	evidence	that	many	constructs	are	
in	fact	common	to	a	variety	of	theories.		
2.2 Literature	on	exchange	relationships	
The	task	of	identifying	a	common	theoretical	framework	for	exchange	relationship	is	
complicated	due	to	the	diversity	of	approaches	in	the	literature.	For	example,	Stern	and	
Reve	(1980)	describe	the	literature	on	distribution	channels	as	a	“disjointed	collage”,	they	
state	this	is,	“due,	in	part,	to	the	absence	of	a	framework	which	can	accommodate	the	
various	paradigms	and	orientations	employed”	(Stern	&	Reve,	1980,	p.	52).	This	sentiment	
has	also	been	echoed	by	more	recent	authors	in	reference	to	the	fields	of	exchange	
relationships	and	supply	chain	management	(Hald,	Cordón,	&	Vollmann,	2009;	Halldorsson,	
Kotzab,	Mikkola,	&	Skjøtt-Larsen,	2007;	Ireland	&	Webb,	2007;	Leonidou,	Palihawadana,	&	
Theodosiou,	2006;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2005).	In	the	view	of	these	authors,	the	phenomena	of	
inter-firm	exchange	relationships	do	not	sit	within	any	particular	academic	discipline	but	
draw	on	a	range	of	concepts	derived	from	management,	economics,	psychology	and	
sociology.	Moreover,	exchange	relationships	feature	in	diverse	bodies	of	literature,	such	as	
channel	marketing,	neoclassical	and	institutional	economics,	classical	and	relational	
contracting,	social	exchange,	supply	chain	management	as	well	as	organisational	and	
strategic	management	(Croom,	Romano,	&	Giannakis,	2000;	Hunt,	1983;	Stern	&	Reve,	
1980).	This	has	led	to	a	wide	range	of	definitions	and	theoretical	concepts	being	applied	to	
exchange	relationships.	In	response	to	this	situation	the	relevant	literature	is	reviewed	to	
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establish	the	theoretical	foundation	of	the	research.	The	review	takes	the	form	of	a	meta-
synthesis	which	is	consistent	with	the	position	of	Tranfield	and	Starkey	(1998,	p.	352)	who	
state	that	management	research	is,	“transdisciplinary	and,	as	such,	cannot	be	reduced	to	any	
sum	of	parts	framed	in	terms	of	contributions	to	associated	disciplines	(Tranfield	&	Starkey,	
1998,	p.	353)	.		
2.3 The	role	of	theory	and	paradigms	
The	multidisciplinary	approach	to	reviewing	the	literature	requires	an	understanding	of	the	
role	of	theory	and	paradigms.	Kuhn	(1970)	states	that	a	paradigm	includes	a	number	of	
specific	theories	that	depend	on	the	fundamental	beliefs	and	assumptions	of	the	particular	
scientific	community	to	which	they	belong.	These	include	symbolic	generalisations	and	
shared	values	or	criteria	for	use	in	theory	appraisal.	These	represent	the	way	of	thinking	of	a	
discipline	(Anderson,	1983;	Gioia	&	Pitre,	1990).	The	paradigm	is,	therefore,	the	overarching	
perspective	from	which	theories	are	established.	Theory,	on	the	other	hand,	provides	a	
more	detailed	picture	that	can	be	used	to	explain	and	predict	specific	phenomena.	Gioia	and	
Pitre	(1990),	for	example,	define	a	theory	as	a,	“coherent	description	or	explanation	of	
observed	or	experienced	phenomena”	(Gioia	&	Pitre,	1990,	p.	587).	This	is	consistent	with	
the	general	understanding	of	theory	as	a	meaningful	system	of	related	concepts	and	
observations,	from	which	are	derived	laws,	propositions	and	hypotheses.	(Bagozzi	&	Phillips,	
1982;	Hunt,	1983;	Zaltman,	Pinson,	&	Angelmar,	1973).		
What	constitutes	an	accepted	theory,	however,	is	often	dependent	on	the	particular	
dominant	paradigms	of	a	scientific	discipline.	It	is	important,	therefore,	to	make	explicit	the	
underlying	assumptions	and	methodology	of	the	research	approach.	This	research	uses	the	
abductive	approach	of	Harman	(1965,	p.	88)	who	proposes	that	theory	acceptance	should	be	
based	on	the	“inference	to	the	best	explanation”.	This	means	a	theory	is	accepted	if	it	is	the	
best	theory	available	to	explain	and	predict	the	phenomena	in	the	theory’s	domain4.	An	
accepted	theory,	therefore,	will	be	the	one	most	appropriate	for	guiding	actions	or	
interventions.	In	this	way,	theories	are	also	evaluated	for	their	ability	to	address	specific	
problems.	As	Popper	(1963,	p.	67)	states,	scientists	are	“not	students	of	subject	matter	but	
students	of	problems.	Problems	may	cut	right	across	the	borders	of	any	subject	matter	or	
discipline”.	This	practical	problem-solving	approach	is	also	in	line	with	the	assertion	of	Lewin	
																																																																		
4	Kuhn	argues	that	an	accepted	theory	is	only	accepted	until	a	new	and	better	theory	with	greater	explanatory	
power	comes	along.			
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(1951,	p.	169)	that,	“there	is	nothing	as	practical	as	a	good	theory”.	Good	theory	therefore,	
should	also	attempt	to	minimise	complexity	as	this	adds	to	understanding.	This	is	further	
explained	by	Kahneman	(2011,	p.	287)	who	states	that	in	“science	complexity	is	considered	a	
cost,	which	must	be	justified	by	a	sufficiently	rich	set	of	new	and	interesting	predictions	of	
facts	that	existing	theory	cannot	explain”.	Scientists,	holding	to	Kahneman’s	view,	use	
theories	as	a	bag	of	tools,	and	they	will	“not	take	on	the	burden	of	a	heavier	bag	unless	the	
new	tools	are	very	useful”	(Kahneman,	2011,	p.	288).	These	principles	were	adopted	as	a	
fundamental	approach	to	the	research	and,	in	particular,	the	literature	review.		
2.4 The	concept	of	exchange	relationships	and	the	theory	of	rational	choice	
Buyer-seller	exchange	relationships	are	a	fundamental	concept	in	economics,	marketing	and	
sociology.	In	economics,	exchange	relationships	were	initially	described	by	using	the	
concepts	of	the	division	of	labour,	gains	from	trade	and	comparative	advantage.	Adam	Smith	
in	1776	asserted	the	self-evident	benefits	of	exchange	when	he	declared	“the	aim	of	every	
prudent	master	of	a	family,	is	never	to	attempt	to	make	at	home	what	it	will	cost	him	more	
to	make	than	to	buy”.	These	benefits	were	further	developed	in	1817	by	David	Ricardo	using	
the	principle	of	comparative	advantage.	When	different	producers	(or	countries)	can	
produce	different	goods	with	a	lower	relative	opportunity	cost	(lower	relative	marginal	cost),	
then	all	parties	benefit	from	the	exchange,	even	if	one	party	has	an	absolute	advantage	in	
producing	all	goods	(Ricardo,	1817).	These	two	key	economic	principles	explain	how,	
through	specialisation	and	exchanging	goods,	both	parties	in	an	exchange	relationship	can	
be	better	off.		
Exchange	relationships	have	become	a	central	concept	in	a	number	of	disciplines	such	as	
marketing	and	supply	chain	management.	It	is	also	important	in	the	utilitarian	perspective5	
of	sociology	which	sees	human	interaction	primarily	as	an	exchange	process.	In	this	view,	
when	people	interact	they	seek	to	maximise	the	benefits	they	gain	from	the	interaction	and	
to	reduce	the	disadvantages	(Collins	&	Collins,	1994).	A	key	underlying	tenet	of	neo-classical	
economics,	marketing	and	utilitarian	sociology	is	rational	choice	theory	(Scott,	2000).	
Rational	choice	theory	uses	a	specific	definition	of	“rationality”	which	proposes	that	an	
individual	balances	the	costs	and	benefit	of	actions	and	makes	a	choice	based	on	maximising	
or	optimising	personal	advantage	(Friedman,	1953).	This	assumption	creates	the	important	
																																																																		
5	Within	sociology	utilitarianism	is	commonly	called	exchange	theory	or	rational	choice	theory		
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distinction	between	the	economic	and	behavioural	paradigms	in	inter-firm	exchange	
relationships.	These	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
2.5 Economic	and	behavioural	paradigms		
	This	review	classifies	theories	relating	to	the	nature	and	function	of	inter-firm	exchange	
relationships	that	have	developed	from	the	economic	and	behavioural	paradigms	(Stern	&	
Reve,	1980).	These	two	paradigms	have	significantly	different	assumptions	(Table	2-1)	and	
therefore	have	a	substantial	impact	on	the	way	exchange	relationships	are	understood.	
Table	2-1:	Comparison	of	the	assumptions	between	the	behavioural	and	economic	paradigms	
	 Economic	“rational	decision”	
making	assumptions		
Behavioural	decision-making	
assumptions	
Decision	making	assumptions	 Global	rationality,	maximisation	and	
optimisation,	full	knowledge	of	
preferences,	alternatives	and	
outcomes	
Bounded	rationality,	incomplete	
and	inaccurate	knowledge	about	
preferences	and	the	consequences	
of	actions	
View	of	the	firm	 Single	central	decision	maker	 Multiple	individual	and	coalitions	of	
decision	makers	with	different	goals	
Behavioural	theory	was	first	explained	in	the	writings	of	Cyert	and	March	(1963),	March	and	
Simon	(1958)	and	Simon	(1955),	it	has	a	distinct	view	of	the	firm	and	rational	decision	
making.	The	behavioural	model	is,	essentially,	“a	reaction	against	the	neoclassical	model	of	
economic	theory”	(Anderson,	1982,	p.	18).	It	has	a	fundamentally	different	view	of	
rationality	(Table	2-1).	The	concept	of	rationality	in	neoclassical	theory	is	described	as	
“global	rationality”,	“maximisation”,	“optimisation”	as	well	as	“perfect	rationality”	(Barros,	
2010,	p.	457).	It	“assumes	that	the	decision	maker	has	a	comprehensive,	consistent	utility	
function6,	knows	all	the	alternatives	that	are	available	for	choice,	can	compute	the	expected	
value	of	utility	associated	with	each	alternative,	and	chooses	the	alternative	that	maximises	
expected	utility”	(Simon,	Dematte,	&	Raffaele	Mattioli,	1997,	p.	17).	In	contrast	to	this,	the	
behavioural	approach	adopts	the	more	realistic	assumption	of	“bounded	rationality”	(Simon,	
1957,	p.	198).	This	position	is	based	on	observation	of	actual	human	behaviour.	It	assumes	
that	the	decision	maker	must	search	for	alternatives,	and	has	incomplete	and	inaccurate	
knowledge	about	the	consequences	of	actions	(Table	2-1).	They	therefore,	choose	actions	
that	are	satisfactory	rather	than	maximising.	The	objective	is	to	attain	some	realistic	target	
while	satisfying	certain	constraints	(Simon	et	al.,	1997).	This	model	of	decision	making	
(Simon,	1955,	p.	114)	is	called	"approximate	rationality”,	which	includes	the	concept	of	
																																																																		6	A	mathematical	function	which	ranks	alternatives	according	to	their	utility	to	an	individual.	
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satisficing7,	where	decision	makers	evaluate	the	options	sequentially	and	choose	satisfactory	
alternatives	based	on	some	aspirational	level	or	optimal	outcome.		
Furthermore,	the	behavioural	perspective	also	has	a	distinct	view	of	the	firm	(Table	2-1).	It	
sees	the	firm	as	a	“coalition	of	individuals”	(Anderson,	1982,	p.	18).	These	coalitions	are	
what	would	now	be	called	stakeholders	(Brenner	&	Cochran,	1993)	and	includes:	"Managers,	
workers,	stockholders,	suppliers,	customers,	lawyers,	tax	collectors,	regulatory	agencies,	etc.	
”	(Cyert	&	March,	1963,	p.	27).	This	is	an	important	distinction,	as	the	organisation	no	longer	
has	a	central	decision-maker8	who	has	a	singular	goal	that	can	be	maximised	through	
rational	decision-making.	Furthermore,	different	stakeholders	may	wish	the	organisation	to	
pursue	divergent	goals.	These	cannot	be	reduced	to	some	common	dimension	that	can	
produce	an	optimised	solution	(Anderson,	1982).	In	the	view	of	Cyert	and	March	(1963,	p.	
117),	goals	are	viewed	as:	“A	series	of	independent	aspiration-level	constraints	imposed	on	
the	organisation	by	the	members	of	the	organisational	coalition”.		
Anderson	(1982)	argues	that	these	two	approaches	come	from	two	distinctly	different	
research	traditions.	The	economic	approach	is	grounded	in	deductive	instrumentalism9	
(Figure	2-1).	In	this	approach,	the	ultimate	test	of	a	theory	is	its	ability	to	generate	useful	
predictions,	and	the	reality	of	its	assumptions	are	unrelated	to	its	validity	(Popper,	1963).	
This	is	exemplified	in	the	positive	economics	of	Friedman	(1953)	who	asserts	that:	“Truly	
important	and	significant	hypotheses	will	be	found	to	have	‘assumptions’	that	are	wildly	
inaccurate	descriptive	representations	of	reality,	and,	in	general,	the	more	significant	the	
theory,	the	more	unrealistic	the	assumptions	(in	this	sense)”	(p.	14).	
The	behavioural	approach,	in	contrast,	is	grounded	in	what	is	known	as	inductive	realism10	
where	theoretical	constructs	are	at	least	“approximately	true”	to	the	real	world	(Hunt,	2011,	
p.	159).	Inductive	methodology	is	used	for	developing	theory,	and	this	involves	observation	
(Anderson,	1982;	Cyert	&	March,	1963).	This	divergence	of	fundamental	research	paradigms	
identifies	the	difficulties	in	developing	a	common	theoretical	approach	to	exchange	
																																																																		
7	Satisficing	 is	 the	conception	of	diverse	decision	procedures.	The	decision	maker	does	not	have	to	 take	 into	
account	 all	 possible	behaviour	 alternatives.	Alternatives	 can	be	 sequentially	 found	out,	 by	 search	processes,	
search	being	interrupted	when	a	satisfactory	alternative	is	found	(De	Jong	&	Nooteboom,	2000).	
8	 The	 neoclassical	 economic	 decision	making	 is	 vested	 in	 an	 owner-entrepreneur	whose	 sole	 objective	 is	 to	
maximise	the	dollar	amount	of	the	firm's	single	period	profit	(De	Jong	&	Nooteboom,	2000).	
9	Instrumentalism:	the	conception	that	the	significant	factor	of	a	thing	is	its	value	as	an	instrument.	The	
doctrine	that	ideas	[theories]	are	instruments	of	action	and	that	their	usefulness	determines	their	truth	
(Barros,	2010).	
	
10	Realism:	Assumption	that	the	world	has	a	definite	and	mind-independent	structure.		
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relationships.	To	address	this,	the	research	adopts	a	meta-synthesis	approach	that	will	
attempt	to	develop	a	common	theoretical	perspective.	
2.6 Multiple	paradigms	and	meta-synthesis	approach	
This	section	explains	how	the	literature	on	supplier-buyer	relationships	was	evaluated	and	
outlines	how	the	divergent	behavioural	and	economic	paradigms	can	be	synthesised	into	a	
common	framework.	The	validity	of	this	approach	is	supported	in	existing	literature	for	
example,	Stern	and	Reve	(1980)	propose	that	there	is	value	in	both	paradigms.	They	suggest	
that	the	economic	and	behavioural	paradigms	should	be	viewed	as	complementary	
“because	the	former	deals	mainly	with	economic	outputs	while	the	latter	is	concerned	with	
behavioural	processes”	(p.	53).	Furthermore,	Rudner	(1966)	states	that	theory	should	
increase	understanding	through	a	structure	that	is	capable	of	both	explaining	(behavioural)	
and	predicting	(economic)	phenomena.	These	differences	can	be	seen	as	a	strength,	for	
example,	Gioia	and	Pitre	(1990)	contend	that	a	multi-paradigm	approach	has	the	potential	to	
generate	more	complete	knowledge	than	any	single	perspective.		
To	achieve	this	objective	a	meta-synthesis	approach	to	the	literature	review	was	adopted	
(Bair,	1999;	Walsh	&	Downe,	2005).	This	was	combined	with	the	meta-paradigm	theory	
building	approach	described	by	Gioia	and	Pitre	(1990)	and	Lewis	and	Grimes	(1999).	In	this	
process,	differences	are	not	glossed	over	as	these	become	opportunities	for	new	
understandings	and	perspectives	and	reflect	the	“tension	between	contradictory	and	
alternative	explanations”.	This	process	enables	a	richer,	more	holistic	and	contextualised	
view	of	supplier-	buyer	exchange	relationships	(Lewis	&	Grimes,	1999).		
2.7 Theoretical	perspectives	on	exchange	relationships	
The	following	section	looks	at	some	of	the	attempts	in	the	literature	to	build	a	multi-
theoretical	approach	to	supplier-buyer	exchange	relationship	originating	from	both	the	
behavioural	and	economic	paradigms.	Exchange	relationships	are	complex	socio-economic	
phenomena	and	the	concepts	cut	across	the	physical,	functional	and	legal	boundaries	of	
organisations	(Giannakis	&	Croom,	2004).	This	results	in	difficulties	in	defining	these	
concepts	and	also	explains	the	lack	of	a	singular	theoretical	framework	for	explaining	the	
nature	and	functions	of	these	relationships.		
Within	the	supply	chain	management	literature	there	are	some	studies	that	attempt	to	use	a	
multi-theoretical	approach.	For	example,	Halldorsson	et	al.	(2007)	presented	four	different	
theoretical	approaches	to	managing	supply	chains,	but	also	comment	that	there	is	no	unified	
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theory	of	supply	chain	management.	The	theories	used	by	Halldorsson	et	al.	(2007)	are:	
principle	agent	theory	(PAT),	transaction	cost	economics	(TCE),	network	theory	(NT)	and	the	
resource-based	view	(RBV).		
In	another	study,	Wulf	and	Odekerken-Schröder	(2001)	analyse	seven	theories	applying	to	
underlying	relationships	between	retailers	and	customers	in	marketing	channel	research.	
These	theories	are:	neoclassical	economic	theory	(NET),	transaction	cost	economics	(TCE),	
relational	contract	theory	(RCT),	social	exchange	theory	(SET),	equity	theory	(ET),	political	
economy	theory	(PET)	and	resource	dependency	theory	(RDP).	Furthermore,	in	the	context	
of	research	on	exporter-importer	relationships	quality	Leonidou	et	al.	(2014)	note	that	a	
wide	range	of	theoretical	perspectives	have	been	used.	The	most	frequent	are	transaction	
cost	economics	(TCE),	resource	dependency	theory	(RDT),	the	behavioural	paradigm	of	Cyert	
and	March	(1963)	and	network	theory	(NT).		
Ulaga	and	Eggert	(2005)	describe	a	rich	and	growing	body	of	research	focusing	on	buyer-
supplier	relationships	that	draw	on	variety	of	approaches	and	disciplines.	Examples	of	these	
include:	social	exchange	theory	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984),	transaction	cost	analysis	
(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992;	Rindfleisch	&	Heide,	1997;	Williamson,	1985)	relational	
contracting	(Lusch	&	Brown,	1996),	the	literature	on	power	and	dependence	(Frazier,	1983;	
Hunt,	Ray,	&	Van	Wood,	1985;	Stern	&	Reve,	1980),	and	the	resource-based	view	of	the	firm	
(Barney,	1991;	Hogan	&	Armstrong,	2001;	Jap,	2001;	Srivastava,	Shervani,	&	Fahey,	1999;	
Srivastava,	Fahey,	&	Christensen,	2001;	Srivastava,	Shervani,	&	Fahey,	1998).	This	
demonstrates	that	a	multiplicity	of	theories	have	been	used	to	explain	exchange	
relationships.	As	a	result,	this	literature	review	aims	to	consider	the	most	commonly	used	of	
these,	identify	the	commonalities	and	differences	that	can	enable	the	development	of	some	
common	constructs	which	can	be	used	to	evaluate	relationship	quality	and	supplier	
performance.		
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Figure	2-1:	Exchange	relationship	theories	and	paradigms	
Figure	2-1	provides	a	general	classification	of	the	different	theories	regarding	their	proximity	
to	behavioural	and	economic	paradigms.	It	should	be	noted	that	strict	classification	is	
difficult	as	sometimes	the	underlying	assumptions	are	not	made	explicit,	and	many	of	these	
theories	include	a	mixture	of	behavioural	and	economic	assumptions.	The	neoclassical	
economic	theory	is	the	only	approach	that	sits	entirely	within	the	economic	paradigm.	
Transaction	cost	economics	(TCE),	Agency	theory	(AT)	and	game	theory	(GT)	are	closely	
aligned	with	the	New	Institutional	economic	paradigm	and	attempt	to	reflect	real-world	
phenomena	by	including	the	behavioural	assumption	of	bounded	rationality.	The	other	
theories:	resource	theory	(RT),	the	relational	view	(RV),	contingency	theory	(CT),	social	
exchange	theory	(SET),	resource	dependence	theory	(RDT),	social	capital	theory	(SCT)	and	
network	theory	(NT)	include	more	behavioural	assumptions	though	to	varying	degrees	still	
incorporate	assumptions	from	the	economic	paradigm.		
From	these	different	perspectives,	a	wide	range	of	exchange	relationship	concepts	have	
been	identified	(Cannon	&	Perreault	Jr,	1999).	For	example,	trust	and	commitment	have	
consistently	been	identified	as	central	concepts	in	exchange	relationships	(Anderson	&	
Weitz,	1992;	Athanasopoulou,	2009;	Day,	Fawcett,	Fawcett,	&	Magnan,	2013;	Doney	&	
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Cannon,	1997;	Jain,	Khalil,	Johnston,	&	Cheng,	2013;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	
2005).	Other	important	concepts	are	power,	environmental	uncertainty	and	dependence	
(Belaya	&	Hanf,	2009;	Casciaro	&	Piskorski,	2005;	Cook	&	Emerson,	1978;	Jain	et	al.,	2013;	
Lusch	&	Ross,	1985;	Maloni	&	Benton,	2000;	Mohr,	Fisher,	&	Nevin,	1996;	Molm,	Peterson,	
&	Takahashi,	1999;	Ogbonna	&	Wilkinson,	1998;	Zhao,	Huo,	Flynn,	&	Yeung,	2008).	These	
factors	are	seen	to	influence	two	behaviours	that	are	central	to	exchange	relationships,	
opportunism	(Brown,	Dev,	&	Lee,	2000;	Hill,	1990;	John,	1984;	Wathne	&	Heide,	2000)	and	
collaboration	(Axelrod,	1984;	Carpenter,	Daniere,	&	Takahashi,	2004;	Hua	&	Li,	2008;	
Laaksonen,	Jarimo,	&	Kulmala,	2009;	Rindfleisch,	2000;	Skinner,	Gassenheimer,	&	Kelley,	
1992;	Svensson,	Mysen,	&	Payan,	2010).		
The	assertion	is	that	for	efficient	exchange,	partners	should	behave	cooperatively	and	
refrain	from	acting	opportunistically.	Therefore,	there	is	an	underlying	assumption	that	
cooperation	will	lead	to	improved	performance	(Noordewier,	John,	&	Nevin,	1990).	Table	
2-2	identifies	some	of	the	important	concepts	found	in	the	exchange	relationship	literature.		
Table	2-2:	List	of	exchange	relationship	concepts	identified	in	the	literature	
Common	exchange	relationship	concepts		
Trust	
Commitment	
Opportunism	
Collaboration	
Power	
Specific	assets	
Dependence	
Environmental	uncertainty	
In	the	next	section,	the	dominant	theoretical	perspectives	on	exchange	relationships	are	
reviewed.	Their	key	assumptions	and	exchange	relationship	constructs	are	identified.	
Following	this,	the	different	views	are	then	examined	in	terms	of	their	effects	on	relationship	
quality	and	supplier	performance.	
2.8 Economic	approaches	to	exchange	relationships	
This	section	reviews	the	main	theories	that	take	a	predominantly	economic	perspective	on	
supplier-buyer	exchange	relationships.	Other	than	neoclassical	economic	theory,	however,	
all	the	other	approaches	include	some	behavioural	assumptions.	These	will	be	identified	
along	with	the	economic	assumptions	and	the	constructs	that	are	associated	with	this.	This	
will	enable	the	identification	of	common	constructs	that	emerge	from	each	theory.	
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2.8.1 Neoclassical	economic	theory	
The	fundamental	focus	of	neoclassical	economic	theory	is	the	market	exchange	mechanism.	
As	mentioned	above,	economic	concepts,	to	some	degree,	influence	all	the	perspectives	of	
exchange	relationships.	The	term	“neoclassical”	first	came	into	use	in	1900	to	refer	to	a	
synthesis	based	on	the	classical	works	of	Adam	Smith,	David	Ricardo	and	John	S	Mills	
(Colander,	2000;	Veblen,	1900).	Today,	it	is	used	to	describe	both	the	dominant	economic	
theory	from	1870	to	the	1930s	as	well	as	modern	economics	in	contrast	to	heterodox	
economics.	(Colander,	2000;	Tabaro,	2010;	Weintraub,	1993).	
The	basic	assumptions	of	neoclassical	economics	are	that	(Colander,	2000;	Tabaro,	2010;	
Weintraub,	1993)	
1.	people	have	rational	preferences	among	outcomes,		
2.	individuals	maximise	utility	and	firms	maximise	profits,	and	
3.	people	act	independently	on	the	basis	of	full	and	relevant	information.	
Exchange	relationships	from	a	pure	neoclassical	economics	perspective	involve	only	discrete	
transactions	where	all	relevant	exchange	information	is	reflected	in	the	market	price,	which	
is	determined	by	the	quantity	supplied	and	customer	demand	(Webster,	1992).	
Furthermore,	the	neoclassical	economic	paradigm	focuses	on	market	equilibrium,	with	
perfect	competition	providing	ideal	resource	allocation	(Arndt,	1983;	Fischer,	2013).	
Performance	is	optimised	under	prefect	competition	as	resources	are	allocated	efficiently	
and	products	are	delivered	to	consumers	at	least	cost	(Arndt,	1983;	Fischer,	2013;	Houston	
&	Gassenheimer,	1987).	As	Webster	(1992)	explains,	“The	starting	point	of	this	analysis	is	a	
transaction	between	two	economic	actors	in	the	competitive	market	place.	Each	transaction	
is,	essentially,	independent	of	all	other	transactions,	guided	solely	by	the	price	mechanism	of	
the	free,	competitive	market	as	the	firm	seeks	to	buy	at	the	lowest	available	price”	(p.	5).		
The	focus	on	competitive	markets,	and	aggregate	supply	and	demand	means	economic	
theory	fails	to	account	for	non-market	based	exchange	behaviours	between	two	parties.	This	
is	despite	the	fact	that	most	exchange	relationships	involve	non-market	transactions,	where	
purchases	over	time	are	made	with	the	same	buyer	or	supplier	(Webster,	1992).	The	
assumptions	of	economics	theory	do	not	allow	for	long-term	exchange	relationships.	
Therefore,	concepts	like	relationship	quality	or	supplier	performance	are	not	relevant	as	all	
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exchanges	are	discrete	11,	anonymous	and	suppliers	are	homogeneous.	Furthermore,	many	
of	the	other	concepts	of	marketing	and	business,	such	as	branding,	product	differentiation	
and	interconnected	supply	chains,	do	not	fit	within	the	assumptions	of	neoclassical	
economic	theory.		
From	this	perspective,	there	is	no	need	to	consider	people,	relationships	or	social	processes,	
as	the	units	of	analysis	are	products,	prices,	costs,	firms	and	transactions	(Webster,	1992).	
Significantly,	when	economic	theory	attempts	to	incorporate	some	of	the	imperfections	of	
real	world	exchange	relationships,	it	loses	much	of	its	power	and	elegance	(Emerson,	1976).	
Therefore,	neoclassical	economics	can	only	deal	with	aggregated	exchange	relationships	
with	large	numbers	bargaining,	high	levels	of	competition,	homogeneous	products	and	
where	there	is	freely	available	market	and	product	information.	As	a	result,	the	economic	
model	has	difficulty	in	adding	to	an	understanding	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	
performance	due	to	its	basic	assumptions.	
Bounded	rationality	
Because	of	these	unrealistic	assumptions	neoclassical	economics	has	been	criticised	as	
lacking	real	world	explanatory	power	(Hunt	&	Morgan,	1995).	From	the	perspective	of	
business,	marketing	and	supply	chain	management,	individuals	do	not	act	independently,	
nor	do	they	operate	with	full	information,	nor	are	they	pure	profit	maximisers.	Accepting	
this	reality	raises	the	issue	of	what	to	do	if	some	of	the	assumptions	of	neoclassical	
economic	theory	are	relaxed.	For	example,	how	can	this	theory	deal	with	the	introduction	of	
the	behavioural	assumption	of	bounded	rationality	(Simon,	1955;	Williamson,	1979)?	
Bounded	rationality	is	a	combination	of	insufficient	information	that	limits	the	perception	of	
management	and	limits	the	capacity	for	information	processing.	With	bounded	rationality	
comes	the	possibility	that	individuals	will	take	advantage	of	asymmetric	knowledge	to	
behave	opportunistically.		
There	have	been	a	number	of	attempts	to	deal	with	these	issues	while	also	holding	to	some	
economic	rationality	assumptions.	In	the	following	theories,	many	assumptions	such	as	
perfect	information,	certainty,	and	profit	maximising	have	been	relaxed;	however,	the	core	
paradigm	of	neoclassical	economics	remains	(Arndt,	1983;	John	&	Reve,	2010)	The	main	
																																																																		
11	Discrete	exchange	is	a	single	one-off	exchange	with	no	repeats.	As	there	are	very	few	real-life	exchanges	that	
meet	these	criteria,	economics	attempts	to	 incorporate	 long	term	exchanges	simply	by	allowing	for	repeated	
exchange.		However,	the	assumption	of	anonymous	transactions	and	homogeneous	suppliers	means	that	these	
repeated	exchanges	cannot	be	seen	as	long-term	relationships.	
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theories	that	adopt	this	approach	are:	the	new	institutional	economic	theories	of	transaction	
costs	economics	(NIE)	(Coase,	1937;	Williamson,	1979),	agency	theory	(AT)	(Carlos,	1992;	
Eisenhardt,	1989),	game	theory	(GT)	(Axelrod,	1984;	Hill,	1990)	and	social	exchange	theory	
(SET)	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984;	Emerson,	1976;	Thibaut	&	Faucheux,	1965).	In	effect,	new	
institutional	economics	(NIE)	tries	to	address	some	of	the	assumptions	of	neoclassical	
economics	that	do	not	operate	in	the	real	world	by	incorporating	some	assumptions	from	
the	behavioural	paradigm.	Transaction	cost	economics	theory	(TCE)	is	one	of	the	main	
attempts	to	achieve	this	by	introducing	bounded	rationality	and	transaction	costs.	
2.8.2 Transaction	cost	economics	
Transaction	costs	are	a	central	concept	to	TCE.	The	concept	originated	with	Coase	(1937)	to	
explain	the	existence	of	firms.	He	identified	that	specialist	firms	could	allocate	resources	
more	efficiently	and,	therefore,	create	greater	value	than	larger	generalist	businesses	which	
affects	whether	firms	choose	to	make	or	buy	(Coase,	1937).	Building	on	Coase’s	ideas,	
Williamson	(1981,	p.	1537)	asserts	that,	"The	modern	corporation	is	mainly	to	be	understood	
as	the	product	of	a	series	of	organisational	innovations	that	have	had	the	purpose	and	effect	
of	economising	on	transaction	costs”.	In	this	way,	Williamson	uses	transaction	costs	to	
identify	why	firms	might	try	to	avoid	market	exchange	transactions.		
Transaction	cost	economics	incorporates	the	behavioural	assumption	of	bounded	rationality	
introduced	by	Simon	(1955),	as	well	incorporating	the	contingency	theory	(CT)	approach	of	
Thompson	(1967).	Both	of	these	ideas	were	influenced	by	the	work	of	Boulding	(1956)	who	
introduced	the	idea	of	general	systems	theory.	In	this	view,	organisations	are	open	systems	
that	manage	and	structure	themselves	to	adapt	to	environmental	circumstances	(Davis	&	
Cobb,	2010;	Zeld	&	Scott,	2003).	While	transaction	cost	economics	no	longer	has	the	
neoclassical	economic	assumption	of	perfect	information,	it	maintains	its	efficiency	and	
perfect	rationality	assumptions,	where	a	single	decision	maker	within	an	organisation	tries	
to	maximise	or	optimise	their	outcomes	(Barros,	2010).	As	emphasised	by	Ouchi	(1980,	p.	
130),	“The	transactions	cost	approach	explicitly	regards	efficiency	as	the	fundamental	
element	in	determining	the	nature	of	organisations”.	Williamson	defines	transaction	cost	
economics	is	an	“interdisciplinary	undertaking	that	joins	economics	with	aspects	of	
organisation	theory	and	overlaps	extensively	with	contract	law”	(Williamson,	1979,	p.	261).	
Therefore,	in	the	view	of	Williamson	and	other	authors,	“transaction	cost	theory	is	not	in	
conflict	with	economic	theory	but	complements	it”	.		
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The	idea	of	transaction	costs	is	that	there	are	not	only	costs	associated	with	the	price	paid,	
but	also	costs	associated	with	the	transaction	itself.	These	are	the	"cost	of	using	the	price	
mechanism”	(Coase,	1937,	p.	390).	Sako	(1992)	identifies	six	categories	of	transaction	costs	
search	costs	(finding	of	a	partner),	negotiation	costs	(agreements	about	the	deliveries),	
inventory	costs	(inventories	caused	by	the	product	flows	from	the	supplier	to	the	customer),	
monitoring	costs	(observation	of	contracts),	trust	building	costs	(creation	of	mutual	and	
proper	trust	and	expectations),	and	adjustment	costs	(responding	to	the	changing	
conditions).		
Opportunism	and	exchange	relationships	in	the	transaction	cost	framework	
The	assumptions	of	TCE	lead	to	a	specific	description	of	the	type	of	exchange	behaviours	
that	occur.	By	assuming	the	self-interest	and	the	profit	maximising	assumption	of	the	
economic	paradigm	with	bounded	rationality,	all	firms	should	behave	opportunistically.	
Williamson	(1975)	defines	this	as	“self-seeking	with	guile”(Williamson,	1975,	p.	6).	This	
classic	definition	of	opportunism	is	central	to	TCE,	and	Williamson	asserts	that	without	this	
“the	study	of	economic	organisation	is	pointless”	(Williamson,	1981,	p.	1545).	This	idea	of	
opportunism	has	significant	implications	for	supplier-buyer	relationships.	The	fundamental	
dilemma	in	these	relationships	is	that	different	parties	become	dependent	on	each	other.	In	
a	supply	chain,	for	example,	the	supplier	is	dependent	on	the	buyer	for	providing	a	market,	
and	the	buyer	is	dependent	on	the	supplier	for	a	product.	In	complex	supply	chains	many	
parties	may	become	interdependent.	When	there	is	asymmetrical	information,	there	is	a	risk	
of	opportunistic	behaviour	if	parties	are	driven	by	self-interest,	especially	guileful	self-
interest.		
According	to	transaction	cost	economics,	opportunism	can	occur	when	parties	become	
dependent.	This	can	arise	when	the	production	or	distribution	of	a	product	requires	a	
transaction-specific	asset.	These	transaction-specific	assets	are	assets	developed	specifically	
for	an	exchange	relationship	and	are	of	limited	or	no	use	for	alternative	relationships.	
Specific	assets	may	be	in	physical	assets,	such	as	the	location	of	plant	and	product	and	
process	technology	(tools	and	equipment),	as	well	as	human	resources	involving	specific	
knowledge	and	skills	relevant	to	a	specific	exchange	relationship	(Fynes,	Voss,	&	de	Búrca,	
2005;	Humphreys,	Li,	&	Chan,	2004).	The	dilemma	from	a	supplier-buyer	relationship	
perspective	is	that	specific	assets	are	important	for	productivity	and	efficiency,	as	improving	
these	require	investment	in	specialised	physical	and	human	assets.	These	specific	assets	
have	positive	benefits	by	enabling	firms	to	reduce	production	costs,	meet	customer	
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specifications	and	innovate	and	produce	differentiated	products	(Poppo	&	Zenger,	1997).	
However,	as	these	assets	by	definition	have	limited	alternative	uses	and,	as	the	parties	have	
incomplete	knowledge,	there	is	potential	for	the	dependent	party	to	be	taken	advantage	of.	
This	is	known	as	the	hold-out	problem.	Therefore,	risk	and	uncertainty	increase	in	exchange	
relationships	as	specific	assets	decrease	the	number	of	potential	alternative	partners.		
Williamson	(1985)	identifies	three	types	of	asset	specificity:	site	specificity,	physical	asset	
specificity	and	human	asset	specificity	(Dyer	&	Singh,	1998).	The	increase	in	these	
transaction-specific	assets	creates	the	problem	of	“small	numbers	bargaining”.	TCE	
introduces	the	idea	of	contracts	as	a	way	to	reduce	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour,	by	
specifying	requirements	and	behaviour.	However,	TCE	emphasises	that	it	is	impossible	to	
create	contracts	that	can	deal	with	all	potential	outcomes,	known	as	‘incomplete	
contracting’	(Klein,	Crawford,	&	Alchian,	1978).	Therefore,	as	parties	aim	to	reduce	
transaction	costs	involved	in	contracting	and	monitoring,	there	is	a	need	for	closer	
coordination.	This	involves	a	move	away	from	market	transaction	to	alternative	governance	
arrangements,	such	as	vertical	integration.	Therefore,	TCE	provides	some	explanation	for	
why	suppliers	and	buyers	seek	closer	relationships	through	various	forms	of	governance	
structures	and	identifies	transaction	costs	as	the	reason	for	these	closer	relationships	
Originally,	transaction	cost	economics	made	no	allowance	for	safeguarding	transaction-
specific	investments	other	than	with	vertical	integration	(Robicheaux	&	Coleman,	1994).	
Initially	Williamson	did	not	have	any	intermediate	forms	between	markets	and	hierarchies;	
however,	he	later	introduced	hybrid	modes	that	involve	long	term	contracts,	reciprocal	
trading,	regulation	and	franchising	(Williamson,	1991).	Ouchi	(1980)	identifies	that	both	
hierarchies	and	markets	can	be	inefficient	when	there	are	very	high	levels	of	performance	
ambiguity.	In	this	situation,	relational	governance	mechanisms,	such	as	hybrid	organisations	
are	more	efficient.	At	this	point,	relational	aspects	are	emphasised	in	TCE	and	are	seen	as	
hybrid	forms	of	governance	structure.	The	unique	aspect	of	these	hybrid	organisations	is	
that	they	develop	common	values	and	beliefs	and	can	to	function	efficiently	under	high	
levels	of	performance	ambiguity.	Common	values	and	beliefs	provide	a	harmony	of	interests	
that	reduce	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour	(Ouchi,	1980).	These	relational	exchanges	
develop	familiarity,	more	efficient	communication	and	develop	both	“institutional	and	
personal	trust”	(Williamson,	1979,	p.	240).	In	this	way,	transaction	cost	economics	moves	
into	the	sphere	of	social	relationships	with	a	clear	incorporation	of	assumptions	from	the	
behavioural	paradigm.	Although	TCE	acknowledges	the	existence	of	trust	in	supplier-buyer	
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relationships,	the	economic	basis	of	TCE	has,	“difficulty	explaining	the	formation	and	
maintenance	of	trust12”	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007,	p.	486).	TCE	also	identifies	basic	social	
norms	that	are	required	for	transactions	to	function;	these	are	norms	of	reciprocity	and	
norms	of	legitimate	power	(Williamson,	1979).	
TCE	to	some	degree	addresses	issues	of	power.	It	identifies	power	as	the	ability	to	influence	
firms	to	achieve	economic	gains,	and	that	all	exchange	relationships	will	have	one	firm	with	
a	greater	amount	of	power.	Furthermore,	if	the	weaker	firm	can	create	conditions	whereby	
the	more	powerful	firm	will	suffer	significant	costs	from	opportunistic	behaviour	it	can	then	
reduce	the	risk	of	the	more	powerful	firm	acting	opportunistically	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).		
In	summary,	the	TCE	perspective	explains	that	bounded	rationality	causes	transaction	costs	
to	occur	in	buyer-seller	relationships.	This	gives	rise	to	the	need	to	establish	governance	
mechanisms	to	reduce	opportunistic	behaviour.	Firms	seek	to	maximise	efficiency	by	
reducing	these	costs	through	choosing	market,	hierarchy	or	hybrid	forms	of	governance.	
Which	of	these	types	will	be	most	efficient	in	operation	will	depend	on	human	factors,	such	
as	goal	alignment,	the	risk	of	opportunism,	and	environmental	factors	such	as	complexity	
and	uncertainty.	TCE	is	strongly	grounded	in	the	economic	paradigm;	however,	it	
incorporates	some	significant	assumptions	from	the	behavioural	paradigm.	TCE	explicitly	
deals	with	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	through	transaction	costs	and	
hybrid	(relational)	governance	mechanisms.	It	is	the	difficulty	in	monitoring	performance	
that	contributes	to	transaction	costs.	This	leads	firms	to	move	away	from	market	
transactions	and	to	seek	governance	structures	to	minimise	transactions	costs.	Therefore,	in	
these,	relationship	quality	factors	such	as	trust,	common	goals	and	values	and	cooperation,	
become	important.	A	similar	but	alternative	approach	to	the	issues	of	bounded	rationality	
and	opportunism	is	expressed	through	agency	theory	(AT).		
2.8.3 Agency	theory	and	reducing	the	risk	of	opportunism	
AT	also	attempts	to	deal	with	the	uncertainty	introduced	by	bounded	rationality	in	exchange	
relationships.	It	does	this	by	focusing	on	different	forms	of	contracts	to	ensure	that	the	
agent	will	act	in	the	principal’s	best	interest,	rather	than	opportunistically.	An	agency	
relationship	may	be	defined	as	a	contract	under	which	one	or	more	persons,	the	principal(s),	
engage	another	person	(the	agent)	to	perform	some	service	on	their	behalf,	which	involves	
																																																																		
12	Williamson	defines	trust	between	parties	as	“calculated	risk”	and	not	on	personal	trust	between	individuals.	
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These	might	include	psychological	contracts,	auditing,	monitoring	and	third	party	audits	
(Eisenhardt,	1989).	AT	assumes	a	perfect	market	exists	and,	therefore,	ignores	issues	of	
power	and	resource	differences	in	supply	chain	relationships	(Hornibrook	&	Fearne,	2001).		
In	reality,	most	exchange	relationships	incorporate	both	behaviour	and	outcome	based	
governance.	The	“most	efficient	contract”	includes	the	right	mix	of	behavioural	and	
outcome-based	incentives	to	motivate	the	agent	to	act	in	the	interests	of	the	principal	
(Hornibrook	&	Fearne,	2001).	In	any	relationship,	there	is	a	potential	for	the	agent	to	expend	
some	of	the	principal's	resources	on	goals	based	on	self-interest.	Accordingly,	it	will	pay	the	
principal	to	provide	the	agent	with	incentives	and	to	incur	monitoring	costs	to	encourage	a	
convergence	of	interests	between	the	objectives	of	the	principal	and	those	of	the	agent.	
Despite	expenditures	of	this	type,	it	will	generally	be	impossible	to	ensure	that	all	the	agent's	
decisions	will	be	designed	to	maximise	the	principal's	welfare.	The	dollar	value	of	the	
reduction	in	welfare	experienced	by	the	principal,	along	with	the	expenditure	on	monitoring	
activities,	are	the	costs	of	the	agency	relationship	(Hornibrook	&	Fearne,	2001).		
2.8.4 Contributions	and	limitations	of	transaction	cost	economics	and	
principal	agent	theory	
Transaction	cost	economics	is	a	highly	influential	theory	in	economics	and	is	one	of	the	
predominant	theories	that	explain	a	firm’s	choice	of	governance	mechanisms	(Halldorsson	et	
al.,	2007).	Therefore,	it	makes	an	important	contribution	to	understanding	aspects	of	
relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	It	does	have	limitations,	however,	due	to	the	
embedded	assumptions	about	human	behaviour	and	the	static	view	of	the	firm’s	
boundaries.	There	are	also	significant	critiques	of	the	theory	and	its	empirical	evidence.	For	
example,	transaction	cost	economics	focuses	on	the	costs	associated	with	transactions	but	
does	not	take	into	account	the	additional	benefits	that	accrue	to	different	types	of	
governance	mechanisms	(Williamson,	2000).	TCE	also	assumes	that	the	parties	to	the	
transaction	are	risk	neutral	(Hornibrook	&	Fearne,	2001).	This	is	necessary,	as	the	TCE	only	
looks	at	the	characteristics	of	the	transaction	and	not	the	characteristics	of	the	parties	
involved.		
Both	Chiles	and	McMackin	(1996)	and	De	Jong	and	Nooteboom	(2000)	argue	that	TCE	offers	
a	limited	perspective	for	analysing	long-term	exchange	relationships	and	they	propose	that	
the	theory	should	be	extended.	They	also	note	that	TCE	has	an	incomplete	view	of	the	value	
each	partner	derives	from	the	other.	While	it	incorporates	specific	assets,	it	ignores	the	
complementary	resources	that	create	value	in	long-term	relationships.	It	focuses	on	the	
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reducing	transaction	costs	and	ignores	the	value	derived	from	the	learning	and	the	
development	of	competencies	developed	in	a	partnership.	They	also	emphasise	that	TCE	
does	not	take	into	account	how	exchange	relationships	develop	over	time	and	the	
importance	of	trust	in	reducing	transaction	costs	and	increasing	flexibility	(De	Jong	&	
Nooteboom,	2000).	Others	question	whether	TCE	prescribes	what	firms	should	do	to	
survive,	or	is	merely	descriptive	of	behaviour	(De	Jong	&	Nooteboom,	2000).		
Agency	theory	has	also	received	considerable	criticism.	For	example,	Perrow	(1986)	faults	
agency	theory	for	its	lack	of	focus	on	the	cooperative	aspects	of	human	interactions	and	
highlights	the	fact	that	most	people	are	not	self-interested	utility	maximisers.	This	is	further	
emphasised	by	authors	such	as		Donaldson	(1990)	who	move	away	from	the	assumptions	of	
opportunism	and	conflict	and	focus	on	relationships	involving	cooperation	and	coordination.	
In	a	similar	way	to	TCE	it	is	the	lack	of	congruence	between	the	assumptions	of	AT	and	real	
human	behaviour	that	is	the	main	focus	of	the	criticism	(Fontrodona	&	Sison,	2006).	
In	summary,	TCE	and	AT	provide	valuable	insight	into	the	reasons	why	different	types	of	
supplier-buyer	relationship	exist	They	also	identify	some	important	variables	that	are	
derived	from	these	theories	Table	2-3.	However,	TCE	and	AT	offer	only	a	limited	view	of	
these	relationships.	They	see	the	primary	goal	of	exchange	relationships	as	minimising	
transaction/agency	costs	involved	in	managing	the	risks	of	opportunistic	behaviour	in	
supplier-buyer	relations.	They	have	a	limited	view	of	the	value	created	through	exchange	
relationships,	especially	those	arising	from	the	sharing	of	resources	and	the	value	derived	
from	learning	and	developmental	competencies	(Chiles	&	McMackin,	1996).	As	a	result,	it	is	
necessary	to	include	other	theories	that	can	further	explain	the	dynamics	in	governance	
structures	and	inter-organisational	relationships.	(Halldorsson	et	al.,	2007).		
Table	2-3:	TCE	and	AT	variables	
Common	variables	
Specific	assets	
Governance	mechanism	
Environmental	uncertainty	
Transaction	costs	
Opportunism	
Calculative	trust	
Dependence	
Power	
2.8.5 Game	theory		
Game	theory	(GT)	also	sits	within	the	economic	paradigm	in	terms	of	the	individualistic,	self-
seeking,	efficiency-maximising	rules	of	rational	choice	theory.	This	theory	is	distinguished	
	 46	
from	neoclassical	economic	theory	by	the	assumption	of	interdependence	(Axelrod	&	
Hamilton,	1981;	Esmaeili,	Aryanezhad,	&	Zeephongsekul,	2009).	This	arises	because	the	
payoff	or	utility	of	any	strategy	depends	on	the	strategy	of	the	other	player	and,	because	of	
bounded	rationality,	it	is	not	possible	to	know	with	certainty	what	this	will	be	(McCartney,	
2007).	Although	GT	accepts	bounded	rationality	regarding	predicting	behavioural	outcomes	
of	the	exchange	partner,	it	also	accepts	the	rational	choice	assumptions	that	players	know	all	
the	possible	outcomes	and	all	potential	strategies	and	can	choose	an	optimal	solution.	GT	
shares	opportunistic	behaviour,	power	and	trust	with	transaction	cost	economics	but	can	
specifically	analyse	these	concepts	and	establish	conditions	in	which	trust	and	cooperation	
will	develop	as	opposed	to	opportunistic	behaviour.	This	theory	is,	therefore,	able	to	add	to	
our	knowledge	of	supplier-buyer	relationships	and	supplier	performance.	
For	example,	Axelrod	(1984)	looks	at	how	cooperation	can	become	established	by	
individuals	acting	with	self-interest	and	without	a	central	authority.	A	key	focus	of	this	
theory	is	an	analysis	of	the	payoff	to	cooperation	and	defection	(opportunistic	behaviour)	by	
two	individuals.	One	such	example	is	the	well-known	game,	“The	Prisoner’s	
Dilemma”(Axelrod,	1981).	In	this	game,	two	players	(prisoners)	are	accused	of	a	major	crime	
(they	are	guilty).	They	are	each	imprisoned	and	unable	to	communicate.	The	prisoners	
“dilemma”	is	that	each	must	choose	to	cooperate	or	defect	(behave	opportunistically).	Each	
must	make	the	choice	without	the	other	knowing	the	opponent’s	action.	The	authorities	
only	have	enough	evidence	to	convict	them	of	a	minor	crime	without	a	full	the	confession	of	
one	of	the	accused.	If	both	players	cooperate	and	stay	quiet	they	will	both	only	get	a	minor	
sentence	(mutual	cooperation	-	MC).	If	only	one	party	confesses	then	the	one	who	confesses	
goes	free	(unilateral	defection	-	UD)	and	the	other	party	gets	a	severe	sentence	(suckers	
payoff	-	SP).	If	both	confess	then	they	both	receive	a	moderate	sentence	(mutual	defection	-	
MD)	-	see	Table	2-4.	
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Table	2-4:	The	prisoners’	dilemma	
	 	 Player	Y	
	 	 Cooperate		 Defect	
(act	opportunistically)	
Player	X		
Cooperate		 R=3,	R=3	
Mutual	cooperation	
S=0,	T=5	
Unilateral	defection	
Defect	(act	
opportunistically)	
T=5,	S=0	
Unilateral	defection	
P=1,	P=1	
Mutual	defection	
	 	
T=	Temptation	or	reward	for	defecting	
R=	Reward	for	mutual	cooperation	
P=	Punishment	for	mutual	defection	
S=	Suckers	payoff	
	
By	assumption:	
T	>	R,	so	it	pays	to	defect	if	the	other	player	cooperates	
P	>	S,	so	it	pays	to	defect	if	the	other	player	defects	
R>	(S+T)/2,	To	ensure	that	an	even	chance	of	exploitation	or	being	exploited	is	not	as	
good	an	outcome	as	mutual	cooperation	
Source:	(Axelrod,	1981)		
The	dilemma	is	that	if	both	defect	(P=1)	then	they	are	both	are	less	well	off	than	if	they	
cooperate	(R=3).	Despite	this,	in	this	simple	game	of	the	prisoners’	dilemma,	it	always	pays	
to	defect	(confess)	whether	you	think	the	other	will	defect	or	cooperate.	You	will	either	go	
free	or	get	a	get	a	minor	sentence.	Therefore,	this	concludes	that	the	natural	state	of	things	
is	for	both	parties	to	act	opportunistically	and	shows	that	individual	rationality	leads	to	a	
worse	outcome,	and	that	opportunism	is	the	natural	state	of	being	in	supplier-buyer	
relationships.	This	is	despite	both	parties	knowing	cooperation	would	make	them	better	off.	
This	is	also	the	case	if	the	game	is	played	for	a	finite	number	of	times15.	Defection	will	be	the	
dominant	choice	for	self-interested	individuals,	and	each	will	get	less	than	they	both	could	
have	recieved	if	they	had	cooperated.	This	dilemma	relates	to	supplier-buyer	relationships	in	
that	cooperation	would	bring	greater	rewards	for	both	parties;	however,	the	short-term	
incentive	is	not	to	cooperate.		
Game	theory	and	the	emergence	of	cooperation	
The	value	of	game	theory	is	its	ability	to	offer	insights	into	the	possibility	of	cooperation	
emerging	in	supplier-buyer	relationships.	The	theory	emphasises	that	cooperation	is	only	
possible	if	the	value	of	future	payoffs	is	sufficiently	large	and	the	players	know	they	will	have	
an	ongoing	relationship.	The	long-term	incentive	for	mutual	cooperation	must	be	greater	
																																																																		
15	In	finite	games	there	will	always	be	a	last	move,	therefore,	the	players	knowing	that	it	is	the	last	game,	will	
defect,	because	they	anticipate	this	is	the	case	on	the	last	move	they	will	also	defect	on	the	second	to	last	move	
therefore,	as	long	as	the	players	know	the	games	are	finite	they	there	will	never	be	an	incentive	to	cooperate	
(Douven,	2011).	
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than	the	short-term	incentive	for	defection.	Axelrod	(1981)	shows	that	if	the	players	interact	
for	an	indefinite	number	of	times,	then	cooperation	can	emerge	because	the	reputation	
from	previous	encounters	is	carried	over.	For	example,	in	supplier-buyer	exchange	
relationships,	business	ethics	are	maintained	by	the	knowledge	that	future	interactions	are	
likely	to	be	affected	by	the	outcome	of	the	current	exchange.	This	is	known	as	the	Iterated	
Prisoner's	Dilemma	(Wu	&	Axelrod,	1995).	This	involves	a	sequence	of	interactions	where	
the	payoff	from	future	games	is	discounted,	based	on	the	standard	economic	assumption	of	
that	later	consumption	not	being	valued	as	much	as	earlier	consumption.	The	greater	the	
discount	factor,	the	less	important	the	future	outcomes	will	be.	Axelrod	(1981)	evaluated	
the	outcomes	of	many	different	strategies.	Using	computer	simulated	tournaments,	he	
showed	that	the	highest	average	benefit	score	was	attained	by	the	simplest	of	all	the	
strategies	submitted,	TIT	for	TAT.	This	strategy	involves	always	cooperating	and	then	
defecting	only	after	the	other	player	defects.	This	shows	that	if	one	party	is	first	to	behave	
opportunistically	then	the	other	player	will	punish	this.	Furthermore,	it	was	shown	that	if	
one	player	forgave	the	action	then	cooperation	could	be	re-established	and	this	improved	
the	overall	score.	In	multiplayer	games,	other	players	will	also	punish	opportunistic	
behaviour.	This	result	explains	the	natural	sanctions	that	exist	in	business	for	opportunistic	
behaviour	even	though	it	may	be	in	the	short-term	self-interest	to	do	so.	This	demonstrates	
an	important	principle	in	supplier-buyer	exchange	relationships	-	reciprocity.	This	is	that	
enlarging	the	shadow	of	the	future	and	making	the	interactions	more	frequent	or	more	
durable	can	promote	cooperation.	It	can	also	be	promoted	by	changing	the	payoffs.	
Sanctions	for	opportunistic	behaviour	may	be	formal,	or	informal,	laws	or	punishments	for	
defection.	This	helps	explain	the	mechanisms	in	TCE	and	AT	where	formal	and	informal	
governance	mechanisms	change	the	payoffs	provide	punishments	for	opportunistic	
behaviour	and	increase	the	benefits	of	long-term	cooperation.	
In	summary,	game	theory	offers	significant	insight	into	understanding	buyer-seller	exchange	
relationships.	It	uses	many	of	the	same	variables	as	TCE	and	AT	but	can	show	the	conditions	
under	which	cooperation	and	opportunism	occur	(Table	2-5).	It	can	model	long-term	
relationships	through	repeated	exchanges	and	the	effects	of	reputation.	Game	theory	does	
not	include	a	governance	mechanism	to	manage	opportunism	and	focuses	almost	entirely	
on	the	exchange	and	payoffs,	and	ignores	the	resources	and	capabilities	each	party	brings	to	
the	exchange.		
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Table	2-5:	Game	theory	variables	
Common	variables	
Payoffs	
Uncertainty	
Opportunism	
Cooperation	
Dependence	
Power	
Trust	
	
2.9 Organisational	and	resource	theories	
The	economic	approaches	described	in	the	previous	section	tend	to	focus	on	the	nature	of	
transactions.	The	nature	of	the	organisations	and	the	characteristics	of	the	exchange	parties	
themselves	are	secondary	considerations.	In	contrast,	the	organisational	and	strategic	
management	theories	focus	more	on	the	organisation.	In	doing	this,	they	focus	on	the	
characteristics	of	the	exchange	partners	and	their	interaction	with	the	external	environment.	
Contingency	theory	focuses,	specifically,	on	how	the	internal	environment	determines	
organisational	performance,	and	how	an	organisation’s	structure	fits	with	the	external	
environment.	The	resource	theories	take	this	further	and	focus	on	the	characteristics	of	the	
supplier-buyer	exchange	parties	and	how	resources	and	capabilities	can	improve	
performance	through	greater	competitive	advantage.	In	this	way,	these	theories	offer	
important	insights	for	this	research	about	supplier’s	characteristics	and	performance	as	well	
as	relationship	quality.	The	focus	on	the	exchange	partners’	characteristics	enables	an	
analysis	of	supplier	characteristics	as	an	antecedent	to	supplier	relationship	quality	and	
performance.	Furthermore,	relationship	quality	is	seen	as	a	valuable	relational	resource	that	
can	provide	competitive	advantage	to	rivals.	
2.9.1 Contingency	theory	
Contingency	theory	(CT)	explicitly	focuses	on	the	effect	of	the	external	environment	on	the	
performance	of	the	firm.	In	the	1960’s,	organisational	theories	moved	from	the	closed	
systems	of	the	bureaucratic	(Weber,	1958)	and	scientific	management	approaches	(Taylor,	
1967),	to	the	open	system	theory	view	that	identified	the	environmental	influences	
impacting	on	firms.	Contingency	theory	provides	a	main	framework	for	this.	It	recognises	the	
environment	in	which	a	business	operates	and	assumes	that	an	organisation’s	specific	
situation	(external	environment	and	internal	environment	such	as	technology,	size,	strategy)	
will	determine	the	organisational	performance	(Laaksonen	et	al.,	2009).	It	claims	that	the	
organisations’	characteristics	have	to	fit	its	context	(external	environment).	Aspects	of	CT	are	
also	found	in	TCE	and	the	major	strategic	management	theories.	For	example,	contingency	
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effects	arise	in	TCE	when	analysing	the	relationship	between	uncertainty,	specificity,	and	the	
transaction	costs.	TCE	governance	mechanisms	can	be	seen	as	a	way	firms	respond	to	these	
contingency	effects.	Contingency	theory	describes	the	environment	in	which	firms	operate	
in	terms	of:	stability,	complexity,	market	diversity	and	hostility	(Donaldson,	2001).	The	
theory	has	been	heavily	criticised	for	its	lack	of	clarity	with	its	theoretical	statements	and	
oversimplification	of	its	explanations	of	organisational	effectiveness	(Schoonhoven,	1981).	
Contingency	theory	also	does	not	specifically	deal	with	exchange	relationships	as	it	deals	
with	a	firm	as	a	whole.	The	main	variables	the	theory	contributes	to	are	the	external	and	
internal	environment	and	firm	performance	(Table	2-6).	
Table	2-6:	Contingency	theory	variables	
Common	variables	
External	environment	
Internal	environment	
Firm	performance	
2.10 Resource	theories	
Resource	theories	provide	important	insights	into	the	characteristics	and	performance	of	
firms.	They	do	this	by	analysing	the	resource	characteristics	of	the	exchange	partners.	The	
analysis	of	resource	endowments	has	a	long	history	in	economics,	but	this	has	typically	been	
applied	to	specific	categories	such	as	land,	labour	or	capital.	While	not	dealing	explicitly	with	
exchange	relationships,	exchange	of	resources	is	a	key	part	of	resource	theories.	The	view	of	
the	firm	as	a	collection	of	productive	resources	with	the	purpose	of	organising	its	own	
resources,	together	with	resources	from	outside	the	firm,	was	developed	by	the	seminal	
work	of	Penrose	(1959),	Wernerfelt	(1984)	and	Wernerfelt	(1995);	resource	theories	move	
significantly	further	from	the	core	assumptions	of	neoclassical	economics.	They	share	the	
rejection	of	perfect	knowledge	and	competition	with	TCE,	AT	and	GT,	however,	they	
explicitly	reject	the	assumptions	of	divisibility	and	immobility	of	resources16,	as	well	as	
rational	'“maximising”	decision	making.	They	adopt	the	behavioural	perspective	on	decision	
making	of	Cyert	and	March	(1963),	where	firms	are	a	“coalition	of	participants	with	
disparate	demands”	(p.	50)	and	different	coalition	members	want	the	organisation	to	pursue	
different	goals.	These	goals	include	economic	factors	as	well	as	non-economic	criteria.	
																																																																		16	TCE	implicitly	assumes	immobility	of	resources	in	its	view	of	relationship-specific	assets.	
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Resource	dependence	theory	(RDT)	introduces	the	concept	of	power	(not	just	rationality	or	
efficiency)	as	an	important	organisational	goal,	and	describes	how	firms	pursue	multiple	
strategies	to	enhance	their	autonomy	and	pursue	their	own	interests	(Davis	&	Cobb,	2010).	
	The	resource-based	view	(RBV)	adopts	a	multi-stakeholder	and	multiple	criteria	perspective	
on	firm	performance	(Barney,	1996;	Connolly,	Conlon,	&	Deutsch,	1980).	This	view	suggests	
that,	“different	types	of	firm	choose	different	criteria	for	evaluating	their	performance…”	
and	“…that	different	individuals	within	a	single	firm	choose	different	criteria	to	judge	a	firms	
performance”	(Barney,	1996,	p.	44).	Profit	maximisation	and	economic	efficiency	are	no	
longer	the	only	criteria.		
2.10.1 Resource	dependence	theory	and	the	importance	of	power		
Resource	dependence	theory	(RDT)	focuses	on	resources	and	the	dependence	and	power	
that	arises	from	the	need	for	critical	resources	from	outside	the	organisation.	With	a	focus	
on	power,	resource	dependency	theory	identifies	relationship	characteristics	as	an	
important	aspect	of	performance.	In	this	view,	exchange	relationships	involve	interactions	
by	firms	to	access	critical	resources.	The	central	proposition	is	that	an	organisation’s	survival	
depends	on	its	ability	to	obtain	critical	resources	from	the	external	environment	(Preffer	&	
Salancik,	1978).	RDT	recognises	that	goals	and	objectives	“emerge	as	constraints	imposed	by	
various	coalitions	of	interests”	(Anderson,	1982,	p.	19).	Davis	and	Cobb	(2010,	p.	5)	identify	
three	core	ideas	of	the	theory:		
(1)	Social	context	matters.	
(2)	Organisations	have	strategies	to	enhance	their	autonomy	and	pursue	interests.	
(3)	Power	(not	just	rationality	or	efficiency)	is	important	for	understanding	the	
internal	and	external	actions	of	organisations.	
It	is	the	emphasis	on	power	and	the	multiple	tactics	that	organisations	use	to	manage	
dependency	that	distinguishes	the	RDT	from	other	approaches,	such	as	TCE	and	the	RBV	
(Pfeffer,	2003).	Davis	and	Cobb	(2010)	argue	that	this	notion	of	exchange	based	power	was	
developed	from	concepts	of	power	and	dependency	established	by	Emerson	(1962).	This	
theory	identifies	that	the	source	of	power	is	control	over	resources	valued	by	other	parties	
that	are	not	available	elsewhere.	In	other	words,	dependency	arises	when	one	party	has	
scarce	resources	that	are	desired	by	the	other.	The	relationship	partner,	who	requires	
resources	the	other	party	has,	becomes	dependent	and	vulnerable	to	the	exercise	of	power.	
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Power	is,	therefore,	an	expression	of	dependence	and	is	related	to	how	critical	a	resource	is	
to	the	other	organisation	and	the	availability	of	alternatives	(Emerson	(1962).		
Interdependence	develops	when	each	party	is	reliant	on	the	other	for	scarce	resources	and	
acts	to	reduce	power	imbalances.	Dependence	is	a	function	of	the	criticality	of	a	resource	to	
the	organisation	and	the	availability	of	alternatives	(Davis	&	Cobb,	2010;	Emerson,	1962;	
Pfeffer	&	Salancik,	2003).	Building	on	this	there	has	been	considerable	literature	focusing	on	
different	types	of	power.	For	example	French	and	Raven	(1959),	identify	five	categories	of	
power:	reward,	coercive,	legitimate,	expert,	and	referent	power.	These	have	been	further	
divided	into	mediated	which	incorporates	reward,	coercive	and	legitimate	power	with	non-
mediated	power	referring	to	expert	and	referent	power	.	Mediated	power	is	actively	
exercised	by	the	more	powerful	organisation	whereas	non-mediated	power	reflects	the	
inherent	power	based	on	the	expertise	of	the	organisation	or	the	level	of	identification	the	
dependent	party	has	to	the	other	organisation.	
The	concepts	of	RDT	have	much	in	common	with	other	theories.	It	has	a	similar	view	of	
valuable	and	scarce	resources	as	the	RBV	(Barney,	1991).	They	also	relate	to	the	TCE	ideas	of	
relationship-specific	resources	and	the	consequent	dependence	that	creates	the	risk	of	
opportunism	in	exchange	relationships	(Barney	(1991).	Emerson	(1962)	further	
conceptualises	his	ideas	into	social	exchange	theory.	Therefore,	these	two	theories	have	
common	roots	and	attempt	to	explain	organisations’	responses	to	the	availability	and	
control	of	scarce	and	valuable	resources	and	the	power	and	dependencies	that	result	from	
this.	
2.10.2 Managing	effects	of	power	and	uncertainty	in	resource	dependence	
theory	
In	a	similar	way	to	TCE,	this	theory	focuses	on	governance	relations	with	the	exchange	
partners	that	minimise	uncertainty	and	dependence	and	maximise	autonomy	in	the	least	
constraining	way	(Dwyer	&	Welsh,	1985;	Stern	&	Reve,	1980;	Wulf	&	Odekerken-Schröder,	
2001).	Resource	dependency	theory	views	mergers	and	acquisitions	as	responses	to	
dependency	(Davis	&	Cobb,	2010)	whereas	transaction	cost	economics	focuses	on	increasing	
levels	of	vertical	integration	in	response	to	transaction	costs	(Pfeffer	&	Nowak,	1976).	Trust	
can	also	be	important	in	the	relationship,	as	there	is	a	significant	difference	in	a	dependence	
relationship	where	one	partner	trusts	the	more	powerful	party.	Despite	this,	RDT	tends	to	
focus	on	the	existence	and	use	of	power	to	control	others	rather	than	on	relationships	of	
trust	and	commitment	(Williamson,	1979).		
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In	RDT,	the	ultimate	goal	of	the	firm	is	survival,	and	this	is	achieved	through	formal	and/or	
semiformal	associations	with	other	companies	to	access	critical	resources.	Managing	these	
relationships	becomes	important	due	to	competing	and	conflicting	demands	of	the	different	
parties.	The	performance	of	exchange	relationships	has	frequently	been	evaluated	using	RDT	
to	explain	the	influence	of	relationship	quality	dimensions	with	both	economic	and	non-
economic	performance	outcomes	(Casciaro	&	Piskorski,	2005).	“Whereas	TCE	seeks	to	
manage	uncertainty	to	achieve	higher	levels	of	efficiency,	managing	uncertainty	in	resource	
dependency	theory	is	aimed	at	attaining	higher	levels	of	power”	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007,	p.	
486).	Resource	dependency	theory	is	one	of	the	first	major	organisational	theories	to	
identify	social	considerations	as	a	major	factor	in	how	organisations	decide	to	manage	
uncertainty.	Nevertheless,	the	theory	fails	to	distinguish	adequately	between	coercive	and	
non-coercive	power,	and	trust	is	visibly	absent	from	the	theory’s	stream	of	research.	
Therefore,	“resource	dependency	theory	lacks	the	necessary	components	to	fully	explain	
differences	among	socioeconomic	relations”	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007,	p.	486).	
RDT	adds	several	important	constructs	to	the	theoretical	synthesis	(Table	2-7).	From	the	
perspective	of	this	study,	this	theory	identifies	that	relationship	attributes,	such	as	power	
and	dependence,	are	important	aspects	of	performance,	as	are	supplier	characteristics,	in	
particular,	the	resources	embedded	in	the	relationships	between	the	supplier	and	the	buyer.	
Table	2-7:	Resource	dependency	theory	constructs	
Common	variables	
Resources	
Power	
Dependence	
2.10.3 Competitive	advantage	and	the	resource-based	theory	(view)	of	the	
firm	
The	resourced-based	theory	of	the	firm	(or	resource-based	view	RBV)	is	another	attempt	to	
move	beyond	the	traditional	economic	paradigm.	This	involves	an	integration	of	
“organisational	behaviour,	economics	and	strategic	management	disciplines”	(Ireland	&	
Webb,	2007,	p.	483).	Although	this	approach	does	not	explicitly	deal	with	exchange	
relationships,	it	does	so	indirectly	by	focusing	on	the	firm’s	resources	that	provide	the	
competitive	advantage.	Competitive	advantage	is	what	gives	firms	increased	profitability	
from	exchange	relationships.	Firms	establish	exchange	relationships	with	their	customers	
and	suppliers	who	are	influenced	by	the	resources	and	competitive	advantage	they	achieve.	
RBV	also	attempts	to	explain	the	development	of	a	firm’s	distinctive	competency.	It	can	be	
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argued	that	Coase	(1937)	introduced	the	idea	of	core	competencies	when	he	proposed	that	
specialist	firms	had	a	greater	capability	to	create	value	than	those	that	were	more	diversified	
(Webster,	1992).		
In	the	RBV,	it	is	these	core	competencies	and	other	difficult-to-copy	resources	that	provide	
economic	rents17	that	are,	therefore,	drivers	of	competitive	advantage	(Barney,	1991;	Coase,	
1937).	These	“competencies”	are	unique	combinations	of	basic	resources	such	as	financial,	
legal,	physical,	human,	organisational,	informational,	and	relational	resources	(Barney,	1991;	
Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999)	-	see	Table	2-8.	Reed	and	DeFillippi	(1990,	p.	90)	emphasise	that	
competitive	advantage	is	“only	realised	when	a	firm	combines	assortments	of	basic	
resources	in	such	a	way	that	they	achieve	a	unique	competency	or	capability	that	is	valued	in	
the	marketplace”.	Furthermore,	it	is	the	combining	of	external	resources	accessed	through	
partnerships,	that	when	combined	with	a	firm’s	internal	resources,	results	in	competitive	
advantage.	The	strategic	management	literature	takes	the	view	that	the	primary	objective	of	
strategy	is	to	create	a	competitive	advantage	(Prahalad	&	Hamel,	2006;	Webster,	1992).	
Competitive	advantage	is	defined	as	the	ability	to	produce	greater	economic	value	than	
competing	firms	(Barney,	1986;	Conner,	1991).	The	resource-based	view	accepts	the	
neoclassical	economic	view	that	firms	combine	resources	as	inputs	to	produce	products.	The	
distinctive	approach	of	the	RBV,	is	that	it	recognises	that	resources	are	neither	perfectly	
mobile,	divisible,	nor	are	firms	able	to	know	how	to	best	combine	resources	in	the	most	
efficient	manner.	The	RBV	takes	a	much	wider	view	of	resources	than	the	traditional,	land,	
labour	and	capital	resources	of	economics.	It	includes	these	resources,	but	identifies	the	
most	important	resources	as	the	intangible	capabilities	of	the	firm	(Croom	et	al.,	2000).	
Resources	and	capabilities	include	all	the	assets,	capabilities,	information,	knowledge	and	
management	processes	controlled	by	a	firm.	They	are	both	tangible	and	intangible	and	
include	physical	capital,	human	capital	and	organisational	capital	resources	(Conner,	1991;	
Porter,	1985)	-	see	Table	2-8.	
	 	
																																																																		
17	Economic	rents	are	“excess	returns”	above	the	“normal	levels”	that	are	generated	in	competitive	markets	
(Ouchi,	1980).	
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Table	2-8:	Firms’	basic	resources	that	can	be	combined	to	produce	competencies		
Financial	 Financial	resources	are	the	capital	that	the	firm	has	at	its	disposal.	This	can	be	cash	reserves	or	
as	cash	available	through	stock	issues,	loans,	bonds,	and	other	financial	instruments.	
Legal	 Legal	resources	are	assets	the	firm	uniquely	possesses	because	of	governmental	statute	or	a	
legally	binding	agreement	between	the	firm	and	another	party.	This	includes	contracts,	
exclusionary	licenses,	and	entitlements.	
Physical	 Physical	resources	are	tangible	assets,	(other	than	labour	and	cash),	that	are	used	by	the	firm	in	
production	and	marketing	goods	and	services.	Physical	resources	include:	raw	materials	
reserves,	machinery,	land,	and	production,	storage,	distribution,	service,	and	retailing	facilities.	
Human	 Human	resources	encompass	the	skills,	knowledge,	motivation	and	vision	of	the	firm’s	
employees.		
Organisational	 Organisational	resources	are	the	assets	the	firm	possesses	that	arise	from	the	organisation	
itself,	these	include	the	firm’s	culture	and	climate,	structure,	valued	brand	names,	
administrative	systems,	organisational	routines	and	systematic	processes	that	the	firm	acquires	
or	develops.		
Informational	 This	is	the	collective	(rather	than	personal)	knowledge	of	the	organisation	and	the	processes	
developed	for	organisational	learning.	
Relational	 Relational	resources	exist	between	individuals	and	groups	within	the	organisation	as	well	as	
between	the	organisation	eternal	partners.	
Adapted	from	(Barney,	1991)	
The	RBV	provides	a	complementary	view	to	TCA	in	identifying	the	importance	of	resources	
and	capabilities,	in	deciding	between	market	transactions	and	hybrid	or	hierarchal	
governance	structures	(Hunt	&	Morgan,	1995).	The	RBV	looks	at	the	resources	and	
capabilities	of	a	partner	in	relation	to	the	firms’	own	endowments	in	evaluating	make	or	buy	
decisions	(Barney,	1991;	Wernerfelt,	1984).	It	states	that	competitive	advantage	comes	from	
valuable	and	rare	resources	and	capabilities.	If	they	are	also	hard	to	imitate	and	not	
substitutable,	then	they	can	provide	a	long-term	competitive	advantage	(Barney,	1991).	
Managerial	requirements	include	the	organisational	ability	to	exploit	the	resources	and	their	
ongoing	maintenance	(Halldorsson	et	al.,	2007).	Resource-sharing	relationships,	which	are	
relationships	characterised	by	commitment,	trust	and	cooperation,	take	time	to	build	and	
must	be	developed	to	ensure	timely	access	to	the	resources	they	offer	(Cyert	&	March,	
1963).	
The	RBV	draws	on	the	behavioural	paradigm	in	that	it	takes	a	multi-stakeholder	view	of	
performance	(Mintzberg	&	Ahlstrand).	This	view	suggests	that	different	types	of	firms	
choose	different	criteria	for	evaluating	their	performance	and	that	different	individuals	
within	a	single	firm	choose	different	criteria	to	judge	a	firms	performance	(Morgan	&	Hunt,	
1999).	This	is	consistent	with	the	behavioural	perspective	of	March	and	Simon	(1958,	p.	153)	
that	firms	are	a	“coalition	of	participants	with	disparate	demands”	and	that	different	
coalition	members	want	the	organisation	to	pursue	different	goals	(Barney,	1986,	p.	50).		
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2.10.4 Cooperation	and	opportunism	in	the	resource-based	view	
The	RBV	regards	specific	assets,	in	particular,	human	assets,	as	being	critical	to	a	firm’s	
performance.	Firm-specific	assets	provide	valuable	knowledge	and	capabilities	(Chamberlin,	
1962;	Hofer	&	Schendel,	1978).	The	resource-based	view	acknowledges	the	importance	of	
relationship-specific	assets;	however,	it	does	not	specifically	focus	on	how	firms	avoid	
opportunistic	behaviour	as	in	AT	and	TCE.	In	this	way,	it	tends	to	focus	on	creating	value	and	
positive	advantage	rather	than	avoiding	negative	consequences	(Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999).	An	
optimistic	view	of	exchange	relationships	is	what	differentiates	the	RBV	from	TCE	and	the	
RDT.	Companies	realise	that,	“to	be	more	competitive,	they	must	have	access	to	valuable	
resources	and	that	relationships	often	offer	the	best	route	to	obtaining	these	resources”	
(Conner,	1991).	The	RBV	sees	all	different	organisational	forms	as	a	result	of	firms	seeking	to	
acquire	resources.	This	is	either	through	“purchases	in	the	marketplace	(transactional	
exchange),	the	acquisition	of	firms	having	resources	(vertical	integration),	creating	or	
developing	the	resources	internally,	or	through	partnership	with	other	organisations	
(relational	exchange)”	(Donaldson,	1990,	p.	373;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999).		
2.10.5 Extending	the	resource-based	view	through	the	relational	view	
The	relational	view	of	the	firm,	put	forward	by	Dwyer	et	al.	(1987);	Dyer	and	Singh	(1998);	
Lusch	and	Brown	(1996),	focuses	the	RBV	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	firm	to	encompass	
the	capabilities	and	resources	that	existed	within	a	firm’s	network	of	relationships.	It	is	these	
inter-firm	linkages	and	the	combination	of	resources	in	unique	ways	that	enable	them	to	
achieve	competitive	advantage.	In	this	view,	firms	engage	in	relationships	to	obtain	access	to	
complementary	resources	that	they	do	not	have	and	could	not,	or	would	not,	want	to	have	
(Dyer	&	Singh,	1998).	A	partner	can	offer	a	range	of	valuable	resources,	including	technical	
capability,	organisational	capability,	flexibility,	reliability,	knowledge,	innovative	capability,	
network	position,	international	presence	and	low	risk	of	discontinuity	(Dyer	&	Singh,	1998,	p.	
660).	This	places	supplier	characteristics	(human	resources),	relationship	attributes	and	
relationship	quality	(relational	resources)	as	fundamental	constructs	in	the	extended	RBV.	
Molina	and	Dyer	(1999)	suggest	that	strategic	alliances	allow	firms	to	procure	assets,	
competencies,	or	capabilities,	particularly	specialised	expertise	and	intangible	assets,	such	as	
reputation.	The	unique	combination	of	these	resources	means	that	these	combined	
resources	are	more	valuable,	rare	and	difficult	to	imitate	(Nooteboom,	De	Jong,	Vossen,	
Helper,	&	Sako,	2000).		
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Nooteboom	(1999)	identifies	that	competitive	advantage	in	partnerships	are	due	to:	
1) Investment	in	relationship	specific	assets.	
2) Substantial	knowledge	exchange,	including	knowledge	exchange	that	results	in	joint	
learning.	
3) The	combination	of	complementary,	but	scarce,	resources	or	capabilities	(typically	
through	multiple	functional	interfaces),	which	results	in	the	joint	creation	of	unique	new	
products,	services	or	technologies.	
4) Lower	transaction	costs	than	competitor	alliances,	owing	to	more	effective	governance	
mechanism.	
The	RBV	emphasises	resources	and	capabilities	as	central	to	creating	value	and	achieving	a	
competitive	advantage.	In	this	way,	it	focuses	on	the	characteristics	of	the	exchange	parties	
rather	than	the	nature	of	the	transaction.	The	RBV	also	takes	a	positive	view	of	accessing	
resources	in	exchange	relationships	and	avoids	focusing	on	the	risk	dependence	creates	and	
the	possibility	for	opportunistic	behaviour.	It	provides	a	more	in-depth	description	of	
resources	both	within	and	external	to	the	firm	and	how	these	can	improve	performance.	
Table	2-9:	Common	variables	from	RBV	
Common	variables	
Resources	
Capabilities	
Competitive	advantage	
Interdependence	
Trust	
Commitment	
Cooperation	
	
2.11 Sociological	theories	
This	section	focuses	on	the	sociological	theories	that	relate	to	supplier-buyer	relationships.	
The	main	theories	discussed	are	social	exchange	theory	(SET),	social	capital	theory	(SCT)	and	
network	theory	(NT).	These	theories	focus	on	relationships	and	see	economic	relationships	
as	a	subset	of	wider	human	social	interactions.	SET,	in	particular,	shares	many	assumptions	
with	neoclassical	economics	and	can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	apply	economic	theory	to	
social	relations.	It	focuses	mainly	on	the	exchange	transaction	but	broadens	the	objects	of	
the	exchange	to	include	social	factors,	such	as	status,	and	develops	a	wider	selection	of	
decision	criteria	to	include	non-economic	criteria,	such	as	altruism.	The	characteristics	of	the	
exchange	parties	and	their	relationship	are	explicitly	addressed.	Supplier-buyer	
characteristics	are	defined	in	terms	of	economic	and	non-economic	resources,	and	the	
nature	of	the	relationship	includes	aspects	of	power	and	interdependence.		
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SCT	and	the	NT	tend	to	be	descriptive	in	nature.	Social	capital	describes	both	the	nature	of	
the	network	of	relationships	and	the	assets	available	from	that	network.	There	is	a	strong	
focus	on	the	characteristics	of	the	relationships	between	parties,	and	these	are	seen	as	
resources	(capital)	available	to	improve	the	performance	of	both	parties	in	a	relationship.		
2.11.1 Social	exchange	theory	
Social	exchange	theory	(SET)	is	an	approach	that	focuses	specifically	on	various	kinds	of	
personal	and	group	exchange	relationships	and	has	been	used	extensively	in	organisational	
behavioural	research.	The	basic	assumption	of	SET	is	that	social	exchange	relationships	
involve	interactions	that	create	interdependency	and	obligations	(Cropanzano	&	Mitchell,	
2005;	Emerson,	1976).	Following	from	this,	SET	proposes	that	human	social	behaviour	can	
be	predicted	from	an	individual’s	values,	perceptions	of	alternative	behaviours,	expectations	
of	consequences	to	himself	and	others,	and	the	social	norms	that	individuals	use	to	decide	
(Meeker,	1971;	Thibaut	&	Faucheux,	1965).	Only	an	interdependent	relationship	is	defined	
as	a	social	exchange	as	it	requires	an	“exchange”	where	something	is	given	in	return	for	
something	else	(Cropanzano	&	Mitchell,	2005).	Social	exchange	theory	has	a	broader	view	of	
resources	than	the	economic	and	management	theories.	Resources	can	be	both	economic	
(money,	goods	and	services)	and	non-economic,	such	as	love,	status	and	information	(Foa	&	
Foa,	1980;	Foa	&	Foa,	1974).	In	this	way,	Emerson	(1976,	p.	347)	defines	a	resource	as	“an	
ability	possession,	or	another	attribute	of	an	actor	giving	him	the	capacity	to	reward	(or	
punish)	another	specified	actor”.	This	means	that	resources	are	defined	socially	and	are	the	
“attributes	of	the	relationship	between	actors”	(Emerson,	1976,	p.	348).	Foa	and	Foa	(1980)	
describe	six	types	of	exchange	resources:	love,	status,	information,	money,	goods	and	
services.	
Despite	its	sociological	origins,	SET	is	still	closely	aligned	with	neoclassical	economic	theory	
incorporating	efficiency	and	rationality	assumptions.	It	applies	an	“optimising”	decision-
making	framework	and	economic	assumptions	of	self-interest	and	utility	maximisation	to	
social	relationships	(Foa	&	Foa,	1980;	Foa	&	Foa,	1974).	In	fact,	Emerson	(1976,	p.	336)	
described	SET	as	the,	“economic	analysis	of	non-economic	social	situations”.	Arndt	(1983,	p.	
46)	added	that	the,	“maximising	man	notion	of	neoclassical	economics	is	a	central	part	of	
Social	Exchange	Theory”.	SET	does,	however,	have	significantly	different	assumptions	about	
the	“market”	of	exchange.	For	example,	rather	than	assumptions	of	perfect	competition	and	
discrete	transactions,	social	exchange	assumes	there	are	often	long-term	relationships	
between	multiple	parties,	without	equal	distribution	of	power	(Foa	&	Foa,	1980;	Foa	&	Foa,	
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1974).	Although	SET	has	a	basic	rationality	assumptions,	Emerson	(1976)	identified	that	
people	do	not	always	act	rationally;	therefore,	SET	has	developed	a	number	of	additional	
exchange	rules	including	“reciprocity,	altruism,	status	consistency	and	competition”	
(Meeker,	1971,	p.	485).	In	this	way,	different	decision	rules,	such	as	rationality,	altruism	and	
reciprocity,	are	seen	as	orientations	chosen	depending	on	the	type	of	social	relationship	
involved	in	the	exchange	(Arndt,	1983;	Cook,	1975;	Emerson,	1976).	Therefore,	the	choice	of	
a	rule	may	depend	on	such	things	as:	who	the	exchange	is	with,	if	it	is	a	long	or	short-term	
exchange	relationship,	and	the	power	balance	in	the	relationship.	In	this	way,	SET	focuses	on	
the	characteristics	of	the	exchange	parties	and	the	attributes	of	the	relationship.	In	a	similar	
way	to	resource	dependency	theory,	SET	has	a	focus	on	power.	In	fact,	power	and	justice	are	
the	two	of	the	most	researched	aspects	of	the	theory.	Emerson	(1976)	defines	power	in	
social	exchange	relationships	as	the	ability	to	influence	others’	action	or	to	get	more	per	unit	
exchanged.	This	concept	of	power	has	important	implications	for	the	study	of	supplier-buyer	
relationships	in	terms	of	the	determinations	of	price	and	margin.	SET	proposes	that	if	power	
is	unbalanced	in	an	exchange	relationship,	then	the	amount	the	more	powerful	party	gives	
up,	will	decrease	until	it	reaches	a	subsistence	level;	this	is	the	point	at	which	the	less	
powerful	party	will	either	leave	the	relationship	or	no	longer	be	able	to	participate	in	
exchange.	In	business	this	means	price	and	margin	decreases	to	near	break-even	point	(or	
below)	and,	in	a	social	relationship,	this	may	be	the	just	before	the	point	of	starvation	or	
migration	(defection)	(Emerson,	1976).	With	its	rationality	assumptions	and	the	concept	of	
evaluation	of	“comparison	levels”	the	theory	has	received	some	criticism.	This	is	because	it	is	
unlikely,	in	the	real	world,	firms	are	motivated	or	have	the	information	to	constantly	assess	
comparison	levels	and	alternatives	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	
2.11.2 Social	exchange	theory	and	the	relational	view		
Social	exchange	theory	(SET)	has	been	extensively	used	in	research	on	buyer-seller	
relationships	in	the	marketing	literature	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984;	Dwyer	&	Oh,	1987;	
Ganesan,	1994;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999).	The	theory	provides	insights	into	the	attractiveness	
of	different	relationships	based	on	comparing	outcomes	with	the	available	alternatives	
(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984;	Dwyer	&	Oh,	1987;	Ganesan,	1994;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999).	The	
theory	also	explicitly	explains	the	role	of	dependency	and	power	in	relationships	based	on	
the	outcomes	provided	by	the	partner	and	the	availability	of	comparable	alternatives	(Wulf	
&	Odekerken-Schröder,	2001).	SET	has	provided	a	valuable	development	of	what	has	been	
termed	the	“relational	view”	in	supply	chain	and	marketing	literature	in	making	the	
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exchange	relationship	the	focus	of	research	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984;	Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	
Ganesan,	1994;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999).	Although	Dyer	and	Singh	(1998,	p.	660)	identified	
trust	as,	“important	for	favourable	exchanges”,	the	concept	is	not	well	explored	in	this	
theory	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).		
Cooperation	is	an	important	focus.	Blau	(1964,	p.	876)	proposed	that,	“interdependence	
reduces	risk	and	encourages	cooperation”.	One	of	the,	“basic	tenets	of	SET	is	that	
relationships	evolve	over	time	into	trusting,	loyal,	and	mutual	commitments”.	SET	views	
cooperation	as	a	widely	used	and	frequently	employed	strategy	in	exchange	relationships.	In	
cooperative	strategies,	change	is	achieved	through	agreements	and	joint	planning	rather	
through	the	domination	of	one	party	over	the	other.	Some	level	of	interdependence	or	
power	sharing	is	seen	as	necessary	for	cooperation	to	occur.	“Each	party	must	hold	
something	of	value	for	the	other	party	and	be	capable	of	resisting	the	others'	demands.	Only	
then	can	cooperative	strategies	be	effective.	If	a	party	cannot	withhold	something	of	value	
from	another,	there	is	no	basis	for	the	latter	to	make	concessions.	Agreements	reached	
where	the	minimal	conditions	for	cooperative	exchange	are	absent	simply	express	and	
formalise	the	clear-cut	dominance	of	one	party	over	the	other.	This	does	not	mean	that	
equality	is	a	precondition	for	cooperative	strategies.	On	the	contrary,	exchange	between	
unequals	is	common	(MacNeil,	1980).	
Summarising	the	contribution	and	limitations	of	social	exchange	theory,	Cropanzano	and	
Mitchell	(2005,	p.	874)	assert	that	it	is,	“One	the	most	influential	conceptual	paradigms	in	
organisational	behaviour”.	SET	broadens	the	scope	of	exchange	relationships	by	including	
intangible	relational	resources	and	non-economic	decision	rules.	Despite	its	usefulness,	
theoretical	ambiguities	within	SET	remain.	As	a	result,	operationalisation	of	the	theory	relies	
on	an	incompletely	specified	set	of	ideas.	Despite	this	there	are	a	number	of	common	
concepts	(Table	2-10)	that	are	central	to	SET.	
Table	2-10:	Common	constructs	incorporated	into	social	exchange	theory	
Common	variables	
Resources	
Power	
Reward	
Dependence	
Trust	
Commitment	
Cooperation	
	 61	
These	variables	are	subject	to	different	decision	rules	dependent	on	the	type	of	social	
relationship	involved	in	the	exchange.	These	rules	include:	rationality,	reciprocity,	altruism,	
status	consistency	and	competition.	
2.11.3 Social	capital	and	network	theory	
Social	capital	(SC)	and	network	theory	(NT)	have	become	important	concepts	for	diverse	
areas	of	study,	such	as	public	health,	human	resource	studies	and	buyer-seller	relationships.	
The	concepts	grew	out	of	sociology	and	were	initially	described	by	Jacobs	(1965),	who	
referred	to	the	networks	of	community	relationships	developed	over	time	that	provided	a	
basis	for	trust,	cooperation	and	collective	action.	In	this	way,	the	social	capital	and	network	
perspectives	are	closely	intertwined.	Granovetter	(1992,	p.	33)	asserts	that,	“there	is	an	
increasing	sense	that	the	network	of	relationships	in	which	particular	exchanges	are	
embedded	have	properties	that	are	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	parts	and	outcomes	that	
cannot	be	explained	by	studying	its	parts	alone”.	Despite	this,	the	literature	has	paid	only	
limited	attention	to	social	capital	within	exchange	relationships	and	the	supply	chain	
context.	Krause,	Handfield,	and	Tyler	(2007)	define	social	capital	as	the	“resources	available	
to	actors	as	a	function	of	their	location	in	the	structure	of	their	social	relations”.	This	means	
that	SC	involves	both	the	network	and	the	resources	that	are	able	to	be	accessed	through	
that	network	(Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	In	the	same	way	as	the	RBV,	the	social	capital	
perspective	emphasises	that	relationship	resources	exist	beyond	the	boundaries	of	
individual	firms.	Furthermore,	along	with	TCE,	it	identifies	the	informal	governance	
mechanisms	used	to	mitigate	opportunistic	behaviours.	SC	describes	the	relationship-
specific	resources	that	enable	the	achievement	of	benefits	resulting	from	cooperative	
behaviour	and	is	concerned	with	the	nature	and	structure	of	the	resources	embedded	in	a	
person’s	network	of	relationships	(Burt,	1992;	Granovetter,	1973;	Lin,	Ensel,	&	Vaughn,	
1981;	Seibert,	2001).	
Social	capital	includes	the	actual	and	potential	resources	available	through,	and	derived	
from,	a	network	of	relationships	(Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	These	are	termed	‘capital’	
because,	as	with	other	forms	of	capital,	social	capital	is	a	long-lived	asset	and	is	both	
appropriable	and	convertible	(Adler	&	Kwon,	2002).	Social	capital	resources	can	be	
substituted	for	economic	resources	by	utilising	strong	connections	with	other	parties,	and	
these	connections	can	be	used	for	a	variety	of	uses	including	obtaining	economic	resources.	
It	has	similarities	to	the	resource-based	view	in	that	it	views	competitive	advantage	from	a	
resource	perspective.	SC	enables	buyers	and	suppliers	to	access	resources	located	in	their	
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relationships.	Unlike	other	forms	of	capital,	social	capital	is	jointly	owned	by	the	parties	in	
the	relationship	(Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	Committed	partners	have	a	greater	
understanding	of	why	the	relationship	exists	and	their	role	in	how	they	can	contribute	to	the	
attainment	of	compatible	goals.	In	this	manner,	goal	congruence	not	only	reduces	the	
likelihood	of	conflicts	(Jap,	2001)	but	also	improves	the	joint	returns	for	both	parties	because	
they	perceive	the	combined	potential	of	the	relationship	(Tsai	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	SC	is	closely	
aligned	with	the	concept	of	relationship	quality,	although	they	are	derived	from	different	
theoretical	backgrounds.	There	are	relatively	few	empirical	studies	relating	the	role	of	social	
capital	as	a	facilitator	of	relationship	quality	for	both	the	buyer’s	and	supplier’s	performance	
(Schulze	&	Lees,	2014;	Srinivasan	et	al.,	2011).	Studies	also	indicate	that	there	can	also	be	
downsides	to	social	capital.	Villena,	et	al	(2011)	builds	on	previous	research	(Gargiulo	&	
Benassi,	2000;	Granovetter,	1985;	Uzzi,	1997)	to	postulate	that	social	capital	has	both	bright	
and	dark	sides.	The	bright	side	comes	from	fostering	teamwork	and	reducing	undesirable	
behaviour,	both	of	which	can	positively	influence	performance.	In	contrast,	Villena,	et	al	
(2011)	also	argue	that	as	SC	increases,	the	rate	of	benefits	slow	down	and	rigidities	set	in.	
They	theorise	that	there	should	be	a	threshold	at	which	these	rigidities	offset	the	benefits	of	
social	capital,	and	beyond	which	buyer	performance	declines.	The	specific	dimensions	of	
social	capital	were	first	identified	by	Nahapiet	and	Ghoshal	(1998)	as	either	cognitive,	
relational	or	structural	(Tsai	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	
Cognitive	social	capital	
Cognitive	social	capital	(CSC)	involves	shared	vision,	goals	and	culture,	or	in	other	words,	
what	you	have	in	common	with	the	exchange	partners.	These	also	provide	a	shared	culture,	
which	provides	the	norms	of	behaviour	that	govern	relationships.	Similar	cultures	constrains	
undesirable	behaviour	incurred	from	the	collective	interests	(Coleman,	1988).	Cognitive	
social	capital	facilitates	the	exchange	of	resources	because	the	buyer	and	supplier	see	the	
potential	value	of	their	resource	integration	and	combination	(Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998;	
Tsai	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	It	provides	behavioural	norms	and	common	understanding	of	
collective	goals	that	encourage	joint	value	creation	by	exploiting	complementary	resources	
and	reduces	the	risk	of	opportunism	and	conflict	(Gulati,	Nohria,	&	Zaheer,	2000;	Inkpen	&	
Tsang,	2005;	Jap	&	Anderson,	2003;	Rossetti	&	Choi,	2005).	Benefits	include	improvements	
in	cycle	time,	cost,	quality,	delivery,	flexibility	and	new	product	development,	which	increase	
long-term	competitiveness	and	performance	(Hult,	Ketchen,	&	Slater,	2004).	There	can	
however,	be	performance	losses	due	to	high	levels	of	cognitive	social	capital.	Routines	and	
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characteristics	of	these	network	relationships.	Many	traditional	studies	of	supply	chain	
relationships	take	a	limited	linear	view	and	only	analyse	the	dyadic	relationships	between	
firms	in	the	supply	chain.	This	approach	ignores	the	complex	interdependencies	and	
relationships	between	firms	that	exist	in	a	larger	supply	network	(Halldorsson	et	al.,	2007).	
SCT	in	combination	with	NT	identify	the	way	individuals	and	groups	have	access	to	distinct	
resources	due	to	their	location	in	different	social	network	structures	(Halldorsson	et	al.,	
2007).	In	this	way,	these	theories	are	able	to	describe	supplier	characteristics	in	terms	of	the	
resources	they	provide	and	have	access	to	as	well	as	the	attributes	and	quality	of	the	
relationships	in	their	network.	The	structure	of	networks	may	vary	considerably,	and	this	has	
a	significant	effect	the	access	to	resources	for	different	individuals	or	groups	which	affects	
the	way	they	interact.	There	is	a	diversity	of	views	on	how	social	network	structures	affect	
network	behaviour	and	performance	outcomes.	There	are	also	differing	perspectives	on	
what	type	of	relationships	and	network	structures	are	more	conducive	to	cooperative	
behaviour	and	improved	supply	chain	performance	(Burt,	1992;	Burt,	2004;	Omta,	
Trienekens,	&	Beers,	2001).	SCT	and	NT	have	much	in	common	with	the	resource-based	view	
and	the	relational	view	and	share	many	common	constructs	(Table	2-11).	
Table	2-11:	Social	capital	and	network	theory	variables	
Common	variables	
Social	capital	resources	
Economic	resources	
Trust	
Network	structure	
Cooperation	
2.13 Summary	of	theoretical	approaches	
This	review	of	theoretical	approaches	shows	that	there	is	in	fact	a	significant	overlap	
between	the	economic,	managerial	and	sociological	theories.	Once	the	rigid	assumptions	of	
neoclassical	economics	are	relaxed,	the	human	psychological	and	sociological	factors	cannot	
be	ignored.	Each	approach	has	a	different	emphasis	but	they	share	many	common	elements.	
They	all	contribute	in	different	ways	to	understanding	the	supplier	characteristics,	
relationship	attributes	and	quality	and	supplier	performance.	
Transaction	cost	economics	focuses	on	the	nature	of	the	transaction,	transaction	costs	and	
governance	mechanisms,	while	AT	focuses	on	the	parties	to	the	transaction	and	the	costs	
involved	in	monitoring	the	relationship.	Both	AT	and	TCE	are	concerned	with	the	
management	of	opportunistic	behaviour	arising	in	a	relationship	when	one	party	engages	
the	services	of	an	independent	agent.	They	also	focus	on	the	different	costs	involved	in	
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moderating	opportunistic	behaviour	through	different	governance	mechanisms.	In	TCE,	
these	are	markets,	hybrids	or	hierarchies	and,	in	AT,	these	are	different	types	of	contract.	
TCE	and	AT	see	superior	performance	primarily	arising	from	minimising	production	costs	and	
the	costs	involved	in	managing	the	risks	of	opportunistic	behaviour	in	exchange	relations.	
The	review	has	shown	that	TCE	has	a	limited	view	of	the	value	created	through	exchange	
relationships,	especially	those	arising	from	the	sharing	of	resources	and	the	benefits	derived	
from	learning	and	developmental	competencies	(Lazzarini	et	al.,	2001).	Despite	this,	many	of	
the	constructs	are	common	to	the	other	theories	including:	relationship	specific	assets,	
uncertainty,	dependence,	power,	trust,	cooperation	and	opportunism,	and	relationship-
based	partnerships.	
The	RBV	looks	more	specifically	at	value	creation	and	emphasises	that	competitive	
advantage	(performance)	arises	from	resources	and	capabilities	that	are	located	with	the	
individual	firm	(Coleman,	1990).	The	relational	view	and	resource	dependency	theories	
extend	this	to	focus	on	the	resources	that	are	accessed	through	relationships	with	other	
parties.	The	RBV	also	shares	many	constructs	with	the	other	theories,	including:	resources,	
power,	interdependence,	trust,	commitment,	cooperation	and	competitive	advantage	
(performance).	
Social	exchange	and	social	capital	theories	combined	with	the	network	view	specifically	
analyse	the	structure,	nature	and	function	of	the	relationships	themselves.	Each	of	these	
theories	contributes	to	the	study	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	in	supply	
chains.	Although	these	approaches	focus	on	the	structure	of	the	relationship,	they	too	have	
common	theoretical	constructs.	These	include:	resources	(social	capital	and	economic),	trust	
and	cooperation.	Despite	the	apparent	differences	of	the	theories	in	the	literature	review,	
there	are,	in	fact,	many	similarities	and	they	share	many	constructs.	These	essentially,	
describe	the	same	concept	even	though	the	definitions	have	a	different	emphasis	and	
description.		
Table	2-12	demonstrates	this	by	showing	the	common	constructs	and	the	multiple	theories	
that	utilise	these.	Furthermore,	Table	2-13	describes	each	of	the	theories	discussed	in	the	
literature	review,	identifies	the	core	literature	relating	these,	the	theoretical	assumptions	
they	are	based	on	and	the	key	variables	associated	with	each	theory.	This	demonstrates	that	
many	of	these	ideas	are	common	to	a	variety	of	theories	and	this	provides	a	basis	for	the	
multi-theoretical	approach	of	this	research.		
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The	literature	review	was	able	to	show	that	other	than	neoclassical	economics	the	other	
theories,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	integrated	assumptions	from	the	behavioural	and	
economic	paradigms	(Table	2-13).	This	confirms	that	both	the	economic	and	behavioural	
paradigms	are	necessary	to	explain	exchange	relationships.	These	paradigms	should	be	seen	
as	complimentary	rather	than	in	competition	(Stern	&	Reve,	1980).	The	common	constructs	
identified	in	the	literature	review	can	be	used	in	the	measurement	of	the	supplier	and	
relationship	characteristics,	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	This	is	consistent	
with	the	views	of	Krackhardt	(1992)	and	Nelson	(1989)	who,	among	others,	recommend	a	
multi-theoretical	approach	as	they	believe	this	provides	greater	explanatory	power	than	a	
single	theory	approach.	The	theoretical	framework	of	this	research	will,	therefore,	draw	
constructs	from	each	of	these	approaches,	rather	than	limiting	variables	to	those	that	a	
particular	theory	focuses	on.		
Table	2-12	outlines	the	common	concepts	and	theoretical	connections.		
Table	2-12:	Common	concepts	and	theoretical	connections		
Construct	 Theories		
Trust	
Transaction	cost	economics	(calculative	trust),	game	theory,	relational	view,	
resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	
theory.	
Commitment	 Relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	theory.	
Satisfaction	 Relational	view.	
Specific	asset	resources	 Transaction	cost	economics,	game	theory,	the	relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	theory.	
Social	capital	resources	 The	relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	theory.	
Value	
Neoclassical	economics,	transaction	cost	economics	(calculative	trust),	game	
theory,	relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	
capital	theory,	network	theory.	
Dependence	
Relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	
theory,	network	theory,	resource	dependence	theory,	network	theory.	
Power	 Resource	dependence	theory,	political	economic	paradigm,	social	exchange	theory.	
External	environment	 Contingency	theory,	transaction	cost	economics,	network	theory,	political	economic	paradigm	
Opportunism	
Transaction	cost	economics,	agency	theory,	game	theory,	the	relational	view,	
resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	
theory.	
Cooperation	 The	relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	theory.	
Competitive	advantage	 The	relational	view,	resource-based	view,	social	exchange	theory,	social	capital	theory,	network	theory.	
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Table	2-13:	List	of	theories,	assumptions	and	variables		
	
	
	
Theories		 Assumptions	 Constructs	
Economic	theories	 	 	
Neoclassical	economic	theory	
(Becker,	1976;	Smith,	Cannan,	&	
Lerner,	1937;	Veblen,	1965)	
Perfect	information,	perfect	
competition,	mobile	resources,	
rational-maximising	decision	
making,	discrete	market-based	
transactions,	self-interest.	
Price,	marginal	cost,	marginal	
revenue,	marginal	utility,	rational	
agents,	profit,	equilibrium	and	
resources	(land,	labour,	capital).	
Transaction	cost	economics	
(Coase,	1937;	Williamson,	1979)	
Bounded	rationality,	efficiency,	
rational-maximising	decision	
making,	self-interest.	
Transaction	costs,	governance	
mechanism,	specific	assets,	
opportunism,	dependence,	power,	
environmental	uncertainty	and	
calculative	trust.	
Agency	theory	
(Carlos,	1992;	Eisenhardt,	1989;	
Jensen	&	Meckling,	1976)	
	
Bounded	rationality,	
Interdependence,	rational-choice	
decision	making,	self-interest.	
Contract	type	(behavioural	or	
outcome	based),	opportunism	and	
power.	
Game	theory	
(Axelrod,	1984;	Hill,	1990)	
Bounded	rationality,	
Interdependence,	rational	choice,	
decision	making,	self-interest.	
Payoffs,	uncertainty,	cooperation,	
opportunism,	dependence,	power	and	
trust.	
Managerial	theories	 	 	
Contingency	theory		
(Donaldson,	2001;	Galbraith,	1973;	
Lawrence	&	Lorsch,	1967)	
Rational	maximising	decision	
making.	
Internal	environment,	external	
environment	and	firm	performance.	
Resource	dependence	theory	 Sequential	satisficing	decision	
making,	bounded	rationality,	firm	as	
a	coalition	of	interests.	
Resources,	power	and	dependence.	
Resource	theory	(Resource-based	
view)	
(Barney,	1991;	Poppo	&	Zenger,	
1997;	Wernerfelt,	1984)	
Immobility	and	indivisibility	of	
resources,	bounded	rationality,	
Sequential	satisficing	decision	
making.	
Resources,	competitive	advantage,	
capabilities,	interdependence,	trust	
commitment	and	cooperation.	
Relational	view		
(Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	Dyer	&	Singh,	
1998;	Molina	&	Dyer,	1999;	Morgan	
&	Hunt,	1999)	
Immobility	and	indivisibility	of	
resources,	bounded	rationality,	
Sequential	satisficing	decision	
making.	
Resources	and	capabilities,	specific	
assets	and	competitive	Advantage.	
Sociological	theories	 	 	
Social	exchange	theory	
(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984;	Emerson,	
1976;	Thibaut	&	Faucheux,	1965)	
Rational-maximising	decision	
making	and	bounded	rationality.	
Reward,	resources,	comparison	level,	
reward,	power,	dependence,	trust,	
commitment	and	cooperation.	
Social	capital	theory	
(Granovetter,	1973;	Nahapiet	&	
Ghoshal,	1998)	
Rational-maximising	decision	
making	and	bounded	rationality.	
Interdependence	and	social	capital	
resources.	Economic	resources,	
cooperation	and	trust.	
(Industrial)	Network	theory	
(Håkansson	&	Snehota,	1989;	
Mattsson	&	Johanson,	1992)	
Bounded	rationality	and	sequential	
satisficing	decision	making.	
External	environment,	social	and	
physical	resources,	interdependence	
and	network	structure.	
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2.14 Literature	review	relationship	quality	
2.14.1 Introduction	
Relationship	quality	(RQ)	is	a	central	variable	in	this	research.	However,	it	is	often	poorly	
defined	and	is	used	with	a	variety	of	meanings	in	the	literature.	It	is,	therefore,	important	to	
clearly	define	this	term	in	the	context	of	supplier-buyer	relationships.	To	do	this,	it	is	
necessary	to	understand	the	variety	of	meanings	of	quality	and	the	development	of	the	use	
of	the	term	in	the	management	context.	Therefore,	this	section	covers,	the	origin	and	
development	of	the	relationship	quality	construct.	Later	sections	contain	definitions	of	the	
other	core	variables	used	in	the	study	and	how	they	are	measured.	Many	of	the	constructs	
used	in	this	research	have	diverse	meanings	in	the	literature	and	vary	in	the	way	they	are	
used	in	the	different	theories.	It	is,	therefore,	important	that	the	operationalisation	of	these	
constructs	is	clearly	defined.		
2.14.2 The	concept	of	quality	
The	concept	of	quality	is	a	complex,	multifaceted	and	elusive	construct	that	is	difficult	to	
define	(Elvers	&	Rosén,	2004;	Garvin,	1984;	Heyworth,	2007;	Parasuraman,	Zeithaml,	&	
Berry,	1985)	The	Oxford	Dictionary	defines	quality	as	“the	standard	of	something	as	
measured	against	other	things	of	a	similar	kind;	the	degree	of	excellence	of	something,	and	a	
distinctive	attribute	or	characteristic	possessed	by	someone	or	something”	(Oxford	
Dictionaries,	2015).	This	implies	that	quality	is	a	description	or	measure	of	the	characteristics	
or	attributes	a	thing	possesses.	Quality,	therefore,	needs	to	be	defined	with	regard	to	the	
specific	attribute	it	is	measuring	and	will	have	unique	dimensions	depending	on	the	
attributes	and	characteristics	of	the	thing	and	the	standards	that	are	applied	to	it	by	humans	
(Heyworth,	2007).	This	implies	that	there	is	no	absolute	measure	of	quality	as	it	is	a	social	
construct.	Therefore,	when	people	refer	to	relationship	quality	in	exchange	relationships,	
they	are	attempting	to	define	the	nature	and	characteristics	of	the	exchange	relationship	
and	the	relative	value	or	standards	placed	on	these	attributes.	Elvers	and	Rosén	(2004)	
explain	that	in	everyday	language	quality	refers	to	the	position	on	a	scale	of	bad-good-
excellent	that	a	user	places	on	a	specific	product,	both	in	regard	to	its	intended	use	and	in	
comparison,	to	products	that	are	similar.	
Within	business	management	literature	the	concept	of	quality	was	first	developed	in	relation	
to	product	quality	in	industrial	products	and	processes	in	the	United	States	and	Japan	
following	the	Second	World	War	(Heyworth,	2007).	A	further	development	of	the	quality	
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concept	arose	in	the	study	of	service	quality.	There	were	significant	characteristics,	however,	
that	made	service	quality	different	from	product	quality	(Parasuraman	et	al.,	1985).	In	
particular,	the	intangible	nature	of	services,	the	lack	of	consistency	in	delivery	and	that	
production	and	consumption	occurred	simultaneously	(Parasuraman	et	al.,	1985;	
Parasuraman,	Zeithaml,	&	Berry,	1988).	There	have	been	many	other	developments	in	the	
use	of	the	quality	concept	in	the	literature;	these	include,	quality	of	life	(Andrews	&	Withey,	
202),	data	and	information	quality	(Redman	&	Blanton,	1997)	and	relationship	quality	
(Athanasopoulou,	2009).		
2.14.3 Development	of	the	literature	on	relationship	quality	
The	actual	concept	of	relationship	quality	emerged	from	the	literature	on	relationship	
marketing	and	is	now	a	core	concept	within	the	marketing	discipline	with	similarities	to	
other	quality	constructs	already	discussed,	such	as	product	and	service	quality	(Leonidou	et	
al.,	2014).	Dwyer	et	al.	(1987)	were	one	of	the	first	to	refer	to	relationship	quality	in	
exchange	relationships	in	discussing	the	buyer's	interest	in	maintaining	a	“quality	
relationship”	(p.	14).	This	was	a	very	similar	concept	to	the	term	“relationship	climate”	used	
by	Reve	and	Stern	(1986)	.The	specific	use	of	the	term	“relationship	quality”	was	introduced	
by	Dwyer	and	Oh	(1987,	p.	348)	and	was	also	used	by	Crosby,	Evans	and	Cowles	(1990)	in	
research	on	service	quality.	Subsequently,	Robicheaux	and	Coleman	(1994)	referred	to	the	
concept	of	“relationship	quality”	(p	43)	in	their	analysis	of	marketing	channel	relationships.	
This	early	literature	(Crosby,	Evans,	&	Cowles,	1990;	Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	Kumar,	Scheer,	&	
Steenkamp,	1995)	focused	on	relationship	quality	from	the	customers’	or	buyers’	
perspectives	and	used	a	consumer/buyer	behaviour	approach	to	analysing	relationship	
quality	(Lages,	Lages,	&	Lages,	2005).	Subsequent	authors	have	studied	relationship	quality	
from	different	perspectives	as	well	as	at	different	stages	in	the	supply	chain	(Figure	2-4).	
Relationship	quality	in	supply	chain	relationships	differs	significantly	from	product	and	
service	quality	constructs	in	that	there	is	always	the	perspective	of	both	the	buyer	and	
suppler	on	relationship	quality.	In	contrast,	it	is	the	customers’/consumers’	perspective	that	
is	most	important	in	the	product	and	services	quality	construct.		
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Figure	2-4:	Differing	perspectives	on	relationship	quality	in	the	supply	chain	
Relationship	quality	has	now	been	studied	from	a	variety	of	contexts	and	supply	chain	
positions	(Figure	2-4).	For	example,	between	manufacturers/suppliers	and	
distributors/resellers	(Dorsch,	Swanson,	&	Kelley,	1998;	Kumar	et	al.,	1995),	service	firms	
and	their	customers	(Roberts,	Varki,	&	Brodie,	2003), between	salespeople	and	customers 
(Bejou,	Wray,	&	Ingram,	1996)	and	between	exporting	firms	their	importing	firm	partners	
(Lages	et	al.,	2005).		
2.14.4 Defining	relationship	quality	
Despite	the	complexity	of	the	relationship	quality	concept,	there	is	a	significant	consensus	in	
describing	the	concept.	It	has	been	defined	as	a	higher	order	construct	made	up	of	a	number	
of	distinct,	but	related,	dimensions	(Crosby	et	al.,	1990;	Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	Kumar	et	al.,	
1995;	Lages	et	al.,	2005).	Lages	et	al.	(2005,	p.	1041)	explain	that	relationship	quality	is	a	
construct	that,	“reflects	the	overall	strength	of	a	relation”.	The	most	common	dimensions	
used	to	define	relationship	quality	are	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction	(Crosby	et	al.,	
1990;	Dorsch	et	al.,	1998;	Hewett,	Money,	&	Sharma,	2002;	Schulze,	Spiller,	&	Theuvsen,	
2006;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2005).	Of	these	three,	trust	is	universally	included,	usually	with	
commitment	as	the	second	dimension;	however,	satisfaction	is	not	always	included.	For	
example,	Dwyer	et	al.	(1987)	comment	that	trust,	commitment	and	disengagement	are	
important	for	understanding	the	development	of	long-term	relationships	as	well	as	conflict.	
Kumar	et	al.	(1995)	use	trust,	commitment	and	two	other	constructs	to	represent	
engagement,	which	are:	willingness	to	invest	and	expectation	of	continuity.	Obadia	and	Vida	
(2011)	and	Leonidou	et	al.	(2014)	define	relationships	as	comprising	cooperation,	trust,	
commitment,	and	communication.	This	research	will	use	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction	
as	the	three	main	dimensions	of	relationships	quality	as	these	are	the	most	commonly	used	
variables.	Also,	as	explained	in	the	next	section,	these	are	attitudinal	variables	rather	than	
behavioural	variables.	This	research	interprets	relationship	quality	as	an	attitude	towards	
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the	buyer/processor	incorporating	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction,	which	leads	to	the	
behavioural	supplier	performance	outcomes.		
2.14.5 Cognitive	assessment,	affective	attitudes	and	behaviours	in	exchange	
relationships	
As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	one	of	the	reasons	for	the	lack	of	consistency	with	the	
dimensions	of	relationship	quality	is	that	many	authors	do	not	differentiate	between	
cognitive	variables,	affective	variables	and	behaviour	outcomes.	Cooperation,	opportunism,	
communication,	loyalty	and	delivery	quality	are	all	clearly	behaviours,	whereas	trust	and	
satisfaction	and	commitment	are	attitudes.	Few	authors	draw	on	psychological	frameworks	
to	differentiate	these.	An	exception	is	Ulaga	and	Eggert	(2006)	who	draw	on	the	Ajzen	and	
Fishbein	(1977)	theory	of	reasoned	action	to	differentiate	the	rational-cognitive	and	
performance	based	construct	‘relationship	value’	from	the	attitudinal-affective	relationship	
quality	concept.	They	conclude	that	the	cognitive	construct,	relationship	value,	is	an	
antecedent	to	relationship	quality,	including	commitment,	satisfaction	and	trust,	and	that	
these	lead	to	subsequent	exchange	relationships	behaviours.	In	this	way,	they	make	a	clear	
distinction	between	what	is	a	rational	evaluation	of	the	trade-offs	between	the	benefits	and	
sacrifices	of	the	exchange	relationship	and	how	these	influence	the	formation	of	affective	
attitudes	that	form	relationship	quality.	Furthermore,	they	make	a	distinction	between	
exchange	relationship	behaviours,	such	as	opportunism	and	cooperation,	and	the	affective	
attitudes	of	trust,	satisfaction	and	commitment	that	are	antecedents	of	these	behaviours	
(Ajzen	&	Fishbein,	1977;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).	In	the	same	way,	this	research	makes	a	clear	
separation	between	the	cognitive	assessment	of	relationship	value,	the	affective	attitudes	
involved	in	the	relationship	quality	construct	and	supplier	performance	as	behavioural	
outcomes.		
2.14.6 Social	capital	and	relationship	quality	
Social	capital	(SC)	and	relationship	quality	(RQ)	are	similar	concepts	that	have	originated	
from	quite	different	theoretical	backgrounds.	The	social	capital	concept	emerged	out	of	
sociology	and	was	originally	applied	to	networks	of	community	relationships.	In	contrast,	
relationship	quality	grew	out	of	the	service	quality	and	relational	marketing	literature.	This	
difference	means	there	has	been	little	research	on	how	these	two	concepts	relate	to	each	
other,	even	though	they	both	involve	an	evaluation	of	the	strength	and	quality	of	a	
relationship.	SC	borrows	the	concept	of	capital	from	economics,	and	it	originally	referred	to	
the	value	of	resources	that	were	available	to	a	partner.	It	is	now	more	commonly	used	to	
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refer	to	the	strength	of	a	relationship	between	partners.	In	this	way,	the	two	constructs	have	
become	more	closely	aligned.	Three	dimensions	define	social	capital:	relational	SC,	which	
includes	trust,	friendship,	and	reciprocity;	cognitive	SC	which	describes	shared	vision	and	
goals;	and	structural	SC,	which	describes	the	frequency	and	number	of	interactions	with	a	
partner.	The	first	two	of	these	are	very	closely	related	to	relational	quality.	The	third	
dimension,	which	is	structural	SC,	however,	is	more	related	to	network	theory,	and	provides	
a	valuable	evaluation	of	the	strength	of	the	relationships.		
Although	relationship	quality	has	developed	out	of	the	product	and	service	quality	literature,	
it	has	become	an	important	concept	in	the	study	of	exchange	relationships.	Furthermore,	
despite	the	variety	of	definitions	of	the	construct,	it	is	possible	to	identify	some	common	
dimensions,	which	can	be	further	clarified	when	understood	from	an	attitudinal	and	
behavioural	perspective.	This	leads	to	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction	being	the	
commonly	accepted	dimensions,	that	will	be	described	in	the	next	chapter.	Furthermore,	the	
definition	of	relationship	quality	shares	many	attributes	with	social	capital.	An	important	
part	of	this	research	will	be	to	investigate	if	these	are,	indeed,	separate	constructs.		
	
	 74	
Chapter	3: Hypothesis	development	
3.1 Theoretical	framework		
The	focus	of	the	research	was	to	identify	the	effects	of	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	
attributes	and	relationship	quality	on	supplier	performance.	To	achieve	this	supplier	
characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	relationship	were	defined	as	the	independent	
variables	with	supplier	performance	as	the	dependent	variable	(Figure	3-3).	The	theoretical	
framework	for	this	research	draws	on	the	literature	review	as	well	as	the	proposed	research	
framework	that	emerged	from	the	research	aims	and	research	questions	described	in	
chapter	one.		
Table	2-12	demonstrates	that	there	are	number	of	key	constructs	relating	to	exchange	
relationships	that	are	common	to	a	number	of	these	theories.	The	objective	of	the	literature	
review	was	to	identify	commonalities	in	the	different	theories	and	identify	how	they	can	be	
synthesised	into	a	new	theoretical	perspective.	The	common	dependent	variables	that	
emerged	from	the	research	were:	trust,	commitment,	satisfaction,	resources	(social	capital,	
specific	assets,	economic	and	social	resources)	value,	dependence,	power,	competitive	
advantage	(performance),	cooperation,	opportunism	and	the	external	environment	(	
Table	2-12).	These	variables	form	the	basis	of	the	scale	items	incorporated	into	the	survey	
instrument	used	for	the	data	collection.	These	variables	and	their	scale	items	are	described	
in	more	detail	in	chapter	5.	Resources	are	a	common	construct	in	nearly	all	of	the	theoretical	
approaches	from	the	neoclassical	economic	to	the	sociological	theories,	even	though	
definitions	of	what	is	classified	as	a	resource	vary	considerably.	From	this,	social	capital	and	
relational	resources	and	specific	assets	(resources)	emerge	as	central	concepts	to	the	study	
of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	The	theoretical	framework	identifies	how	a	
supplier’s	resources	and	capabilities	as	well	as	relationship	attributes	and	relationship	
quality	affect	the	independent	variable	supplier	performance	(competitive	advantage).	
Figure	3-1	describes	the	theoretical	framework	developed	by	Athanasopoulou	(2009)	to	
explain	relationship	quality,	buyer-supplier	characteristics	and	performance	outcomes.	This	
framework	also	includes	other	characteristics:	the	environment,	offer	characteristics,	
relational	benefits	and	satisfaction	(Athanasopoulou,	2009).		
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Table	3-1:	Hypotheses	proposed	based	on	theoretical	model	
Hypotheses		
H1a-g:	Relationship	quality	is	a	construct	with	sub-dimensions	of:	Structural	social	capital,	
relational/cognitive	social	capital,	trust,	commitment,	satisfaction	with	communication,	satisfaction	with	
price	and	satisfaction	with	the	organisation.	
H2a:	Social	capital	and	relationship	quality	are	distinct	constructs.	
H2	b,c:	Social	capital	made	up	of	sub-dimensions	of	structural	and	relational/cognitive	social	capital.	
H2g-1:	Satisfaction	is	made	up	of	sub-dimensions	that	include	satisfaction	with	performance,	
communication	and	price.	
H2d-i:	Relationship	quality	made	up	of	sub-dimensions	of	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction.		
H3a-g:	Relationship	quality	is	a	construct	that	consists	of	social	capital,	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction.		
H4a-g:	Social	capital	is	a	construct	that	consists	of	social	relationship	quality,	trust,	commitment	and	
satisfaction.		
H5a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	dependence	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H6a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	processor	dependence	on	delivery	quality,	
delivery	quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H7a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	specific	assets	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H8a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	quantity,	
supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H9a-e	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	net	value	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H10a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	customer	focus	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H11a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	ability	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H12a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	motivation	on	delivery	quality,	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
H13a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	self-direction	on	delivery	quality,	
delivery	quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
	
The	main	hypothesis	theorises	that	the	effects	of	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	
attributes	on	supplier	performance	are	fully	mediated	by	relationship	quality	(Figure	3-3).	
This	would	mean	that	relationship	quality	is	a	necessary	condition	for	both	supplier	
characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	to	effect	supplier	performance.	The	alternative	
model	proposes	that	relationship	quality	is	not	a	mediating	variable	and	therefore	there	are	
only	direct	effects	between	these	variables	and	supplier	performance.	Structural	equation	
modelling	will	test	both	these	models.	The	mediated	model	is	described	diagrammatically	in	
Figure	3-10.	This	shows	the	nine	primary	hypotheses,	H5	–	H13,	and	the	five	sub-hypotheses	
(a-e).	This	results	in	45	individual	hypotheses	for	the	mediated	model;	including	the	
alternative	direct	effects	model	where	there	were	90	separate	relationships	to	be	tested.	
This	demonstrates	the	power	of	structural	equation	modelling	as	a	technique	for	
simultaneously	evaluating	a	large	number	of	variables.	The	potential	complexity	of	this	does	
require	a	careful	description	of	the	results	and	the	conclusions	drawn	from	the	analyses.	
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a	rational	evaluation	of	the	benefits	and	costs	of	the	relationship.	Villena	et	al.	(2011)	
identify	that	these	costs	and	benefits	were	both	operational,	such	as	price	as	well	as	
strategic,	and	included	such	things	as	access	to	premium	markets	and	access	to	technical	
expertise.	The	scale	items	used	for	supplier	value	(Table	4-1	and	Table	4-2)	were	adapted	
from	Ulaga	and	Eggert	(2005)	and	Villena	et	al.	(2011)	
Table	4-1:	Scale	items	for	supplier	value	-	costs	and	risks	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Cost/benefit	 SuppCost1_Risk	 The	costs	and	risks	involved	in	supplying	[processor]	are	greater	
than	the	benefits	(Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).	
Compared	with	alternative	options,	supplying	our	[processor]	has	enabled	us	to:	
Flexibility	 SuppCost2_Flex	 Reduced	flexibility	in	our	farming	operation	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Cost	risk	 SuppCost3_Incr	 Increased	production	costs	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Stress	 SuppCost4_Stress	 Extra	management	effort	stress	(Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).	
Production	risk	 SuppCost7_ProdRisk	 Increased	production	risk	on	our	farm	(production	uncertainty).	
Financial	risk	 SuppCost5_LessProfit	 Reduced	farm	profitability	(Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).	
Price	risk	 SuppCost6_MktRisk	 Increased	market	risk	involved	in	selling	our	[PRODUCT]	(price	
uncertainty).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
	
Table	4-2:	Scale	items	for	supplier	value	-	benefits	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
	 Compared	with	alternative	options,	supplying	our	[processor]	has	enabled	us	to:	
Business	growth	 Value1_GrowBus	 Grow	our	farming	business.	
Premium	markets	 Value2_Premium	 Access	premium	markets	for	our	farm	products	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Access	to	
technologies	
Value3_NewTech	 Adopt	new	technologies	into	our	farming	system	(genetics,	crops	
etc.)	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Customer	
adaptation	
Value4_Customer	 Adapt	our	production	to	meet	the	requirements	of	customers	for	our	
products	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Costs	reduction	 Value5_ReduceCost	 Reduce	our	costs	of	production	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Financial	benefits	 Value6_Profit	 Increase	our	farm	profitability	(Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).	
Risk	reduction	 Value7_ProdRisk	 Reduce	the	production	risk	on	our	farm	(production	uncertainty).	
Price	risk	reduction	 Value8_MktRisk	 Reduce	the	market	risk	involved	in	selling	our	[product]		(price	
uncertainty).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
4.2.2 Power	
Power	is	an	important	variable	in	exchange	relationships	with	the	terms	power	and	control	
often	used	interchangeably	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	There	is	considerable	evidence	that	
an	imbalance	in	the	power	balance	between	exchange	partners	results	in	inequality	in	
exchange	benefits	(Molm,	1997).	Power	is	a	multi-dimensional	construct	generally	
recognised	as	being	either	coercive	or	non-coercive	in	nature	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	
Coercive	power	involves	the	ability	to	inflict	negative	outcomes	through	punishment	or	
threats	of	sanctions,	and	non-coercive	power	is	the	ability	to	provide	rewards	(Molm,	1997).	
Sources	of	power	have	also	been	categorised	as	mediated	and	unmediated	(Table	4-3).	On	
the	one	hand,	mediated	power	sources	are	specifically	administered	or	threatened	by	an	
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agent,	whereas	non-mediated	sources	are	not	directly	administered	by	the	agent	but	
naturally	exist	in	business	relationships	independent	of	specific	actions.	Mediated	power	
sources,	for	example,	include	reward,	coercive	and	legal	legitimate	(Maloni	&	Benton,	2000).		
These	mediated	bases	of	power	represent	the	competitive	and	negative	uses	of	the	power	
traditionally	associated	with	organisational	theory.	On	the	other	hand,	non-mediated	power	
sources	are	more	positive	in	orientation	and	they	include	expert,	referent,	and	legitimate	
power	(Benton	&	Maloni,	2005;	Brown,	Lusch,	&	Nicholson,	1995;	Maloni	&	Benton,	2000).	
The	use	of	coercive	power	has	a	negative	effect	on	relationship	quality	and,	in	particular,	on	
the	levels	of	commitment.	(Brown	et	al.,	1995).		
Table	4-3:	Bases	and	types	of	power	in	exchange	relationships	
Type	of	
Power	
Power	base	 Description	 Exchange	relationship	example		
Mediated	
Reward	 Buyer	has	ability	to	mediate	
rewards	to	supplier.	
Buyer	can	give	increased	business	to	supplier	
or	preferential	terms.	
Coercive	 Buyer	has	the	ability	to	
mediate	punishment	to	
supplier.	
Buyer	can	cancel	business	or	reduce	volume	
purchased.	
Non-	
mediated	
Expert	 Buyer	has	knowledge,	
expertise	or	skills	desired	by	
the	supplier.	
The	buyer	knows	what	the	customer	wants	or	
has	knowledge	or	expertise	in	designing	or	
distributing	new	products	to	final	customers.	
Referent		 Supplier	values	identification	
with	the	customer.	
Supplier	wants	to	be	associated	with	the	
buyer	due	to	organisational	culture,	business	
success	or	management	style.	
Legitimate	 The	supplier	believes	the	
buyer	has	a	natural	right	to	
influence.		
Supplier	views	itself	as	a	subsidiary	or	
subservient	to	the	buyer	due	to	the	
supplier/buyer	relationship	and	therefore	has	
the	right	to	expect	things	done	according	to	its	
requirements.		
Legal	
legitimate	
Buyer	has	the	judiciary	right	
to	influence	supplier.	
Supplier	and	buyer	have	a	formal	sales	
contract	or	operate	as	a	legal	entity.	
Adapted	from	Maloni	and	Benton	(2000)	and	(Zhao	et	al.,	2008)	
	
The	scale	items	were	selected	to	represent	mediated	power,	which	include	both	reward	
power	and	coercive	power.	The	processor-mediated	power	scale	(Table	4-4)	was	adapted	
from	Brown	et	al.	(1995).		
Table	4-4:	Scale	items	for	processor-mediated	power	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Reward	
power	
	
Power1_Treat	 If	we	did	not	do	what	our	processor	asked	we	would	not	have	received	very	
good	treatment	from	them	(Brown	et	al.,	1995).	
Reward	
power	
	
Power2_Favour	 We	felt	that	by	going	along	with	what	our	processor	asked,	we	would	have	
been	favoured	on	other	occasions	(Brown	et	al.,	1995).	
Coercive	
power	
Power3_Profit	 Our	processor	has	hinted	that	they	would	take	certain	action	that	would	
affect	our	profitability	if	we	did	not	go	along	with	their	requests	(Brown	et	
al.,	1995).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
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4.2.3 Specific	assets	
Specific	assets	are	those	that	are	of	limited	use	in	alternative	supply	relationships.	These	
include	physical	assets,	site	assets,	human	assets	and	other	dedicated	assets	(Williamson,	
1979).	The	dilemma	with	specific	assets	is	that	efficient	production	requires	investment	in	
physical	and	human	assets.	Customising	and	developing	specific	assets	enable	firms	to	
reduce	production	costs,	meet	product	specifications,	innovate	and	produce	differentiated	
products	(Dyer,	1996;	Ebers	&	Semrau,	2015).	However,	it	also	results	in	dependence	and	
this	creates	the	potential	for	opportunistic	behaviour.	The	scale	items	for	specific	
investments	(Table	4-5)	were	adapted	from	Ebers	and	Semrau	(2015).		
Table	4-5:	Scale	items	for	specific	assets	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Investments	 SpecInv1_Reqs	 We	have	made	significant	investments	in	our	farm	business	in	order	to	
specifically	meet	the	requirements	of	our	processor	(Kumar	et	al.,	
1995).	
Knowledge	 SpecInv2_Know	 There	has	been	a	significant	amount	of	specific	knowledge	we	have	had	
to	learn	in	order	to	specifically	meet	the	requirements	of	supplying	our	
processor.	
Modification	 SpecInv3_Modify	 We	have	made	significant	modifications	our	farming	system	specifically	
to	meet	the	requirements	of	supplying	the	our	processor	(Kumar	et	al.,	
1995).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
4.2.4 Dependence	
Dependence	is	a	central	concept	in	buyer-seller	exchange	relationships	(Andaleeb,	1995).	It	
is	defined	as	the	extent	to	which	partners	need	each	other	to	achieve	their	goals.	Critical	to	
dependence	is	the	importance	of	the	resources	provided	by	another	party	and	the	number	
of	alternatives	available.	Dependence	and	commitment	are	positively	correlated.	If	the	
supplier	is	highly	dependent,	he	may	continue	to	maintain	the	relationship	and	remain	
committed	no	matter	which	kind	of	influence	strategy	is	used	(Andaleeb,	1995;	Ghijsen,	
Semeijn,	&	Ernstson,	2010).	The	scale	items	for	dependence	(Table	4-6	and	Table	4-7)	were	
adapted	from	Ghijsen	et	al.	(2010).	
Table	4-6:	Scale	items	for	buyer	dependence	
Code	 Description	
ProcDepend1	 Our	current	our	processor	is	more	dependent	on	us	than	we	are	on	them.	
ProcDepend2	 Regarding	your	[processor]:	Our	[processor]	is	very	dependent	on	us.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
Table	4-7:	Scale	items	for	supplier	dependence	
Code	 	 Description	
SuppDepend1	 As	a	business,	we	feel	very	dependent	on	our	[processor].	
SuppDepend2	 We	are	more	dependent	on	current	our	processor	than	they	are	on	us.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
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Table	4-8	presents	descriptive	variables	that	were	used	in	the	analysis	and	provided	an	
alternative	measure	of	dependence	to	the	scale	items.	
Table	4-8:	Descriptive	variables	for	supplier	dependence	
Code	 Description	
SuppDep%_Inc	 Approximately	what	%	of	your	total	farm	income	comes	from	your	[processor]?		
SuppOptions	 How	many	other	companies	are	there	in	your	area	that	you	could	potentially	supply	your	
[product]	to?		
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4.3 Supplier	characteristics	
Supplier	characteristics	represent	specific	attributes	that	suppliers	have	that	may	influence	
relationship	quality	and/or	supplier	performance	(Figure	3-4).	
4.3.1 Customer	focus	
Suppliers	are	considered	to	be	customer-oriented	when	they	perform	behaviours	with	the	
goal	of	increasing	long-term	customer	satisfaction	(Dorsch	et	al.,	1998).	The	scale	items	in	
Table	4-9	were	adapted	from	Narver,	Slater,	and	MacLachlan	(2004).	
Table	4-9:	Scale	items	for	supplier	customer	focus	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Customer	
needs	
Customer9_Underst	 We	try	to	understand	customers	to	recognise	their	needs	
months	or	even	years	before	the	majority	of	the	market	may	
recognise	them	(Narver	et	al.,	2004).	
Customer1_Needs	 We	continually	try	to	understand	the	needs	of	our	customers	
even	ones	of	which	they	are	unaware	(Narver	et	al.,	2004).	
Customer2_Soln	 We	try	incorporate	solutions	to	future	customer	needs	into	to	
farming	operation.	
Customer	
adaptation	
Customer3_Mod	 We	are	willing	to	modify	our	production	practices	to	meet	
customer	requirements	even	if	it	increases	our	costs.	
Customer7_Reqs	 We	have	made	significant	changes	to	our	farming	operation	to	
better	meet	customer	requirements.	
Customer	
connection	
Customer4_know	 It	is	important	for	me	to	know	who	the	customer	of	our	
[product]	is.	
Market	
innovation	
Customer5_Inn_Mkt	 We	are	always	looking	for	innovative	ways	to	market	our	
products		
Product	
differentiation	
Customer8_Diff	 We	are	always	looking	for	ways	to	differentiate	our	farm	
products	and	gain	a	premium	price.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
4.3.2 Supplier	motivation	
Motivation	is	an	important	aspect	of	supplier	capability.	Suppliers	may	possess	significant	
abilities	that	can	be	used	to	meet	customers’	needs;	however,	unless	they	are	motivated	to	
achieve	this	they	are	unlikely	to	deliver	to	the	buyers’	specifications.	Supplier	motivation	is	
defined	as	the	willingness	to	exert	high	levels	of	effort	to	enhance	performance	and	develop	
long-term	relationships	(Sang	Chin,	Yeung,	&	Fai	Pun,	2006).	There	were	no	existing	scales	
for	supplier	motivation	in	the	agri-food	industry.	Therefore	the	scale	items	were	developed	
following	the	procedure	of	(Churchill,	1979).	These	items	focused	on	motivation	to	improve	
farm	performance	and	stock	quality.	
	 89	
	
	
Table	4-10:	scale	items	for	supplier	motivation		
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Farm		 SuppPerF1_Farm		 We	continually	strive	to	improve	our	farm	performance.	
Quality	stock	
SuppPerF2_QLStock
	 	
We	continually	strive	to	improve	the	quality	of	our	stock.	
SuppPerF5_NoPremium
	 	
We	would	aim	to	produce	the	best	quality	stock	even	if	we	
were	not	able	to	get	a	premium	for	it.	
Animal	
production	
SuppPerF3_Yield	 	 We	continually	try	to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	
improving	yields	(animal	production).	
Efficiency	 SuppPerF6_Effic	 We	have	consistently	managed	to	improve	our	farm	efficiency	
Higher	market	
returns	
SuppPerF7_ImpReturns
	 	
Regarding	you	and	your	farm	business?	We	continually	try	to	
improve	our	farm	performance	by	achieving	higher	market	
returns	for	our	products.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
4.3.3 Supplier	ability	
Supplier	ability	is	very	context	specific	and	is	relative	to	the	ability	of	other	suppliers.	
Farming	is	also	a	practical	enterprise	that	involves	considerable	tacit	knowledge.	Supplier	
ability	scales	was	developed	to	cover	specific	ability	outcomes	for	delivery	of	stock	numbers	
when	required,	improving	farm	efficiency,	and	implementation	of	new	technology.	They	
were	also	required	to	self-assess	their	overall	farm	management	ability.	Though	self-
assessment	of	these	scale	items	by	individual	farmers	is	likely	to	produce	inflated	values	the	
relative	values	are	likely	to	produce	consistent	differences	in	ability.	
Code	 Description	
SuppAbil1_Qual	
Compared	to	other	farmers	how	would	you	rate	your	ability	to	deliver	the	
numbers	of	stock	when	required.	
SuppAbil2_Mgmt	
Compared	to	other	farmers	how	would	you	rate	your	overall	farm	
management	skills.	
SuppSuppAbil3_Eff	
Compared	to	other	farmers	how	would	you	rate	your	ability	to	reduce	
production	costs	and	increase	farm	efficiency.	
SuppAbil4_Inn	
Compared	to	other	farmers	how	would	you	rate	your	ability	to	implement	
innovation	and	new	technology.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	
disagree.	
4.3.4 Self-direction	
The	concept	of	self-direction	is	derived	from	the	work	of	Schwartz	(1992)	who	describes	ten	
universal	values	which	include:	power,	achievement,	hedonism,	universalism,	benevolence,	
self-direction,	tradition,	conformity	and	security.	Schwartz	and	Bilsky	(1990)	define	self-
direction	as	independent	thought	and	action	involving	choosing,	creating	and	exploring.	In	
this	way,	self-directed	suppliers	have	independent	thought	and	action	and	have	a	greater	
sense	of	mastery	and	control	over	their	destiny.	Self-direction	is	similar	to	the	concept	of	
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internal	locus	of	control.	People	with	an	internal	locus	of	control	attribute	causality	to	
themselves,	and	believe	they	have	agency	over	circumstances	(Albert	&	Dahling,	2016;	
Lefcourt,	2014).	The	scale	items	for	self-direction	are	shown	in	Table	4-11	
Table	4-11:	Scale	items	for	supplier	self-direction	
Code	 Description	
SelfDirect1_ProfitR	 The	reverse	of:	the	main	things	that	affect	our	farm	profitability	are	outside	of	my	
control	(eg	weather,	price).	
SelfDirect2_ProdR	 The	reverse	of:	the	years	when	the	farm	has	shown	poor	production	or	profit	have	
been	due	to	circumstance	totally	out	of	my	control.	
SelfDirect3_ConstrR	 The	reverse	of:	there	is	little	room	to	make	improvements	in	our	farm	operation	due	
to	natural	production	constraints.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
	
4.4 Relationship	quality	factors	
This	section	defines	each	of	the	three	dimensions	of	relationship	quality:	trust,	commitment	
and	satisfaction.	Relationship	quality	is	distinct	from	relationship	attributes	(see	section	4.2).	
Relationship	quality	reflects	the	overall	strength	and	quality	of	a	relationship,	whereas	
relationship	attributes	describe	specific	characteristic	such	as	dependence	and	power	that	
contribute	to	relationship	quality.	
4.4.1 Trust		
Trust	is	the	most	researched	aspect	of	relationship	quality	and	is	frequently	used	as	the	
central	construct	to	assess	the	quality	of	buyer-supplier	relationships.	It	is	recognised	as	a	
important	factor	that	decreases	uncertainty	in	exchange	relationships	(Geyskens	et	al.,	1996;	
Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994).	Despite	this,	there	is	no	agreed	definition	of	trust.	It	is	understood	to	
be	a	complex,	multi-dimensional	construct.	The	various	aspects	of	trust	described	in	the	
literature	are:	
1. Contractual	trust,	competence	trust	and	goodwill	trust	(Sako,	1992).		
2. Trust	in	a	partner	and	trust	in	a	situation	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	
3. Narrow	scope	trust	(interpersonal	and	firm	specific	trust)	and	broad	scope	trust,	
which	includes	system	and	generalised	trust	(Grayson,	Johnson,	&	Chen,	2008).	
4. Process,	characteristic	and	institution	based	trust	(Zucker,	1986).	
5. Real	trust	and	credible	commitments/substitutes	for	trust	(Williamson,	1995).	
This	complex	and	inconsistent	taxonomy	makes	research	on	trust	in	exchange	relationships	
difficult.	Nevertheless,	within	these	definitions	two	distinctive	aspects	of	trust	are	described	
(see	Table	4-12).	These	are	what	Grayson	et	al.	(2008)	calls	“narrow	scope	trust”,	which	
includes	interpersonal	and	firm	specific	trust,	and	“broad	scope	trust”,	which	includes	
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system	and	generalised	trust.	Broad	based	trust	is	trust	in	the	social	context	in	which	the	
relationship	takes	place.	Narrow	scope	trust	refers	to	specific	trust	in	an	individual	firm	and	
their	representatives	(Grayson	et	al.,	2008).	This	contains	the	character	and	competence	
dimensions	of	trust,	which	include	goodwill,	benevolence,	honesty,	reliability,	integrity	and	
delivery	to	promise.	Under	broad-based	trust	Grayson	et	al.	(2008,	p.	242)	describe	
“generalised	trust”,	which	refers	to	trust	in	people	and	the	tendency	to	trust	all	members	of	
a	social	system	regardless	of	sector	or	context.	This	reflects	societal	beliefs	about	
relationship	norms	and	is	learned	through	multiple	interactions	over	time.	The	important	
relationship	between	the	two	types	of	trust	is	that	broad-based	trust	supports	the	formation	
of	competence	and	goodwill	trust	in	relationships.	A	significant	feature	of	goodwill	trust	is	
that	it	only	develops	in	long-term	relationships	through	repeated	exchanges	(Ireland	&	
Webb,	2007).	This	research	focuses	on	narrow-based	trust	(Table	4-13).	This	is	because	
broad-scope	trust	is	a	more	generalised	form	of	trust	provided	by	a	social	system	and	does	
not	have	the	interpersonal	aspects	of	trust	relevant	to	exchange	relationships.	
Table	4-12:	Types	of	trust:	Broad	scope	and	narrow	scope		
Broad	scope	trust,	(Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	
Reference	 Type	of	trust	 Description	
(Ireland	&	Webb,	
2007)	
Trust	in	a	situation	 Reliance	on	a	partner	because	the	transaction	facilitates	efforts	to	achieve	
efficiency	goals	and	the	expected	benefits	of	the	transaction.	This	exceeds	the	
expected	costs.	
(Zucker,	1986)	 Institution-based	trust	 Tied	to	formal	societal	structures,	based	on	individual	or	firm-specific	attributes	
or	on	intermediary	mechanisms.	
(Williamson,	1995)	 Credible	commitments	
(substitutes	for	trust)	
Use	of	contracts,	bonds,	hostages,	information	disclosure	rules	and	specialised	
dispute	settlements.	
(Sako,	1992)	 Contractual	trust	 Will	the	other	party	carry	out	Its	contractual	agreement,	and	“goodwill	trust”	
(Will	the	other	party	make	an	open-ended	commitment	to	take	initiatives	for	
mutual	benefit	while	refraining	from	taking	unfair	advantage?		
Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	 System	trust	 The	belief	that	third	parties	will	publicise	or	impose	punishments	on	
untrustworthy	behaviour.	
Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	 Generalised	trust	 Trust	in	all	members	of	a	social	system	based	on	beliefs	about	relationship	
norms	learned	through	multiple	interactions	over	time	that	means.	
Narrow	scope	trust	
Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	 Interpersonal	trust	 Trust	that	in	individual	relationship	partner	through	the	process	of	information	
gathering	over	time.	
Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	 Firm-specific	trust	 Trust	in	an	organisational	relationship	partner	through	the	process	of	
information	gathering	over	time.	
(Ireland	&	Webb,	
2007)	
Trust	in	a	partner	 Where	partners	willingly	exceed	the	minimum	requirements	of	a	relationship	to	
increase	the	likelihood	of	success	for	all	partners.	
(Zucker,	1986),	 Process-based	trust	 Based	on	past	or	expected	exchange.	
(Zucker,	1986),	 Characteristic	trust	 Based	on	a	person,	and	on	social	characteristics.	
(Sako,	1992)	 Competence	trust	 That	the	other	party	capable	of	doing	what	it	says	it	will	do.	
(Sako,	1992)	 Goodwill	trust	 That	the	other	party	make	an	open-ended	commitment	to	take	initiatives	for	
mutual	benefit	while	refraining	from	taking	unfair	advantage.	
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Table	4-13:	Definitions	of	trust:	Narrow	based	
Narrow	scope	trust,	(Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	
Reference	 Type	of	trust	 Description	
(Blau,	1964)	 "The	belief	that	a	party's	word	or	promise	is	reliable	and	a	party	will	fulfil	his/her	obligations	in	an	
exchange	relationship”	(p.	940).	
Reliability,	
performance	to	promise	
(Zand,	1972)	 “Actions	that	(a)	increase	one’s	vulnerability,	(b)	to	another	whose	behaviour	is	not	under	one’s	
control,	(c)	in	a	situation	in	which	the	penalty	(disutility)	one	suffers	if	the	other	abuses	that	
vulnerability	is	greater	than	the	benefit	(utility)	one	gains	if	the	other	does	not	abuse	that	vulnerability”	
(p.230).	
Vulnerability	
(Zucker,	1986)	 A	set	of	expectations	shared	by	all	those	involved	in	the	exchange	(p.	54)	 Shared	expectations	
(Gambetta,	1988)	 “The	probability	that	a	person	with	whom	we	are	in	contact	will	perform	an	action	that	is	beneficial	or	
at	least	not	detrimental	is	high	enough	for	us	to	consider	engaging	in	some	form	of	cooperation	with	
him”	(p.	217).	
Expectation	of	benefit	
(Bradach	&	Eccles,	1989)	 “Expectation	that	one's	exchange	partner	will	not	act	opportunistically”	(p.	104).	 Non-exploitation	
(Mishra	&	Morrissey,	
1990)	
“One	party’s	willingness	to	be	vulnerable	to	another	party	based	on	the	belief	that	the	latter	party	is:	
(a)	competent;	(b)	open;	(c)	concerned;	and	(d)	reliable”	(p.	265).	
Vulnerability,	
competence,	reliability,	
concern,	openness	
(Anderson	&	Narus,	1990)	 “Belief	that	another	company	will	perform	actions	that	will	result	in	positive	outcomes	for	the	firm	as	
well	as	not	take	unexpected	that	would	result	in	negative	outcomes”	(p.	45).	
Performance	to	promise,	
non-	exploitation	
(Sako,	1992)	 “A	state	of	mind,	an	expectation	held	by	an	economic	agent	about	another,	that	the	other	behaves	or	
responds	in	a	predictable	and	mutually	acceptable	manner”	(p.39).	
Predictable,	mutually	
acceptable	behaviour	
(Moorman,	Deshpandé,	&	
Zaltman,	1993)	
“A	willingness	to	rely	on	an	exchange	partner	in	whom	one	has	confidence”	(p.	23).	 Confidence,	reliability	
(Barney	&	Hansen,	1994)	 “The	mutual	confidence	that	no	party	to	the	exchange	will	exploit	another’s	vulnerabilities”	(p.176).	 Confidence,	vulnerability,	
non-	exploitation	
(Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994)	 “When	one	party	has	confidence	in	an	exchange	partner's	reliability	and	integrity”	(p.	23).	 Confidence,	reliability,	
integrity	
(Mayer,	Davis,	&	
Schoorman,	1995)	
“The	willingness	of	a	party	to	be	vulnerable	to	the	actions	of	another	party	based	on	the	expectation	
that	the	other	will	perform	a	particular	action	important	to	the	trustor,	irrespective	of	the	ability	to	
monitor	or	control	that	other	party”	(p.	712).	
Vulnerability,	
performance	to	promise	
(Ring	&	van	de	Ven,	1992)	 “The	perceived	credibility	and	benevolence	of	a	target	of	trust.	Expectancy	that	the	partner's	word	or	
written	statement	can	be	relied	on.	One	partner	is	genuinely	interested	in	the	other	partner's	welfare	
and	motivated	to	seek	joint	gain”	(p.	488).	
Credibility,	benevolence,	
goodwill	
(Rousseau,	Sitkin,	Burt,	&	
Camerer,	1998)	
“Trust	is	a	psychological	state	comprising	the	intention	to	accept	vulnerability	based	upon	positive	
expectations	of	the	intentions	or	behaviours	of	another”	(p.	395).	
Vulnerability,	positive	
expectation	
(Geyskens,	Steenkamp,	&	
Kumar,	1998)	
“The	extent	to	which	a	firm	believes	that	its	exchange	partner	is	honest	and	or	benevolent”	(p.	225).	 Honesty,	benevolence	
(Bhattacharya,	Devinney,	
&	Pillutla,	1998)	
“Trust	is	an	expectancy	of	positive	(or	nonnegative)	outcomes	that	one	can	receive	based	on	the	
expected	action	of	another	party	in	an	interaction	characterized	by	uncertainty”	(p.	462).	
Uncertainty,	positive	
expectation	
(Rousseau	et	al.,	1998)	 “The	expectation	that	an	actor	(1)	can	be	relied	on	to	fulfil	obligations,	(2)	will	behave	in	a	predictable	
manner,	and	(3)	will	act	and	negotiate	fairly	when	the	possibility	for	opportunism	is	present”	(p.	395).	
Predictability,	reliability,	
fairness	
(Doney	&	Cannon,	1997)	 “Confidence	that	the	other	party	in	the	exchange	relationship	will	not	exploit	its	vulnerabilities”	(p.	36).	 Non-exploitation,	
vulnerability	
(Zaheer	et	al.,	1998)	 “A	decision	to	rely	on	another	joint	venture	party	under	a	condition	of	risk”	(p.	43)	 Reliance,	Risk	
(Dyer	&	Chu,	2003)	 “The	expectation	that	a	partner	intends	to	fulfil	their	role	in	the	relationship.	Expectation	that	partners	
have	the	ability	to	fulfil	their	roles”	(p.58).	
Reliability,	competence	
(Inkpen	&	Currall,	2004)	 “The	expectation	held	by	one	firm	that	another	will	not	exploit	its	vulnerabilities	when	faced	with	the	
opportunity	to	do	so”	(p.	588).	
Vulnerability,	non-
exploitation	
(Lui	&	Ngo,	2004)	 “Decision	to	rely	on	a	partner	with	the	expectation	that	the	partner	will	act	according	to	a	common	
agreement.	Belief	that	a	given	partner	has	the	managerial	and	technical	capabilities	to	properly	
perform	a	given	set	of	tasks”	(p.	474).	
Competence,	goodwill,	
reliability	
(Krishnan,	Martin,	&	
Noorderhaven,	2006)	
“Belief	in	the	other	party	being	honest,	dependable	or	reliable	and,	second,	the	belief	that	the	other	
party	would	not	take	advantage	of	an	opportunity	to	gain	at	the	other	party’s	expense,	given	the	
chance”	(p.	895).	
Honesty,	dependability,	
reliability,	non-
exploitation	
(Sako,	2006)	 “Trust	is	an	expectation	held	by	an	agent	that	its	trading	partner	will	behave	in	a	mutually	acceptable	
manner	(Including	an	expectation	that	neither	party	will	exploit	the	other’s	vulnerabilities”	(p.	3).	
Goodwill,	competence,	
performance	to	
expectations,	vulnerability	
(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007)	 “A	psychological	state	where	a	party	is	willingly	vulnerable	to	the	behaviour	of	another	party	because	
of	expected	cooperation	or	benevolence	from	that	other	party”	(p.	484).	
Vulnerability,	
cooperation,	benevolence	
(Gattiker,	Huang,	&	
Schwarz,	2007)	
“Belief	that	an	exchange	partner	is	benevolent	and	honest”	(p.	5).	 Benevolence,	honesty	
(McCarter	&	Northcraft,	
2007)	
“A	type	of	expectation	that	one’s	exchange	partner	will	not	act	opportunistically	even	when	it	is	not	
possible	to	monitor	that	partner”	(p.	501).	
Non-exploitation	
(Grayson	et	al.,	2008)	 “Belief	that	an	exchange	partner	is	benevolent	and	honest”	(p.242)	 Benevolence,	honesty	
(Puranam	&	Vanneste,	
2009)	
“Expectation	that	an	exchange	partner	will	not	behave	opportunistically,	even	when	such	behaviour	
cannot	be	detected	by	the	victim”	(p.11).	
Non-exploitation	
(Hill,	Eckerd,	Wilson,	&	
Greer,	2009)	
“Consists	of	two	distinct	measures	benevolence	and	dependability”	(p.	285).	 Benevolence,	
dependability	
(Nyaga,	Whipple,	&	Lynch,	
2010)	
“Trust	refers	to	the	extent	to	which	relationship	partners	perceive	each	other	as	credible	and	
benevolent”	(p.	104).	
Credibility,	benevolence	
(Day	et	al.,	2013)	 “A	function	of	credibility	and	benevolence.	Trust	is	the	confidence	that	each	party	in	a	relationship	will	
perform	as	promised	and	genuinely	take	each	other's	welfare	into	consideration	as	each	makes	
decisions”	(p.	153).	
Credibility,	benevolence	
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Table	4-13	provides	a	summary	of	the	various	definitions	of	narrow-based	trust	described	in	
the	literature.	These	cover	a	wide	variety	of	concepts,	with	reliability,	performance	to	
promise,	credibility,	benevolence,	honesty	and	goodwill	being	the	most	common.	Following	
this	review	of	the	different	descriptions	of	trust	(Table	4-13)	the	research	builds	on	the	
original	definition	of	Blau	(1964,	p.	940)	for	interpersonal,	and	firm	specific	trust	which	is	
“the	belief	that	a	party's	word	or	promise	is	reliable	and	a	party	will	fulfil	his/her	obligations	
in	an	exchange	relationship”.	
This	definition	incorporates	the	dimensions	relating	to	credibility,	honesty	and	competence	
as	well	as	benevolence	or	goodwill	(Mishra,	1996;	Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	Credibility	and	
competence	refer	to	the	belief	that	the	other	party	has	the	ability	to	perform	the	required	
task	effectively	and	efficiently;	and	benevolence,	goodwill	and	honesty	means	they	can	trust	
their	intentions	and	motivations	(Ganesan,	1994).	Benevolence	implies	the	belief	that	each	
partner	will	act	in	the	best	interest	of	the	other.	This	also	includes	the	expectation	that	the	
other	party	will	not	take	advantage	of	the	others’	vulnerability	or	dependence	and	will	
behave	in	a	way	that	is	honest,	sincere	and	fair	(Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	Sako,	1992).	
Benevolence	is	also	the	extent	to	which	one	partner	is	genuinely	interested	in	the	other	
party’s	welfare	and	is	motivated	to	seek	joint	gains.	This	means	partners	can	rely	on	one	
another	despite	an	ongoing	potential	for	opportunistic	behaviour	(Handfield	&	Bechtel,	
2002).	In	fact,	Barney	and	Hansen	(1994)	define	trust	as	the	opposite	of	opportunism.	Risk	
and	vulnerability	are	important	aspects	of	narrow	scope	trust,	as	highlighted	by	Rousseau	et	
al.	(1998,	p.	395),	who	define	trust	as	a	“psychological	state	comprising	the	intention	to	
accept	vulnerability	based	upon	positive	expectations	of	the	intentions	or	behaviour	of	
another”.	Furthermore,	Granovetter	(1985)	identifies	that	“trust	engendered	by	personal	
relations	presents,	by	its	very	existence,	enhanced	opportunity	for	malfeasance”	(p.	491).	
These	definitions	of	trust	provided	the	basis	for	developing	the	scale	items	for	measuring	
trust	as	a	latent	variable.	The	scale	items	were	adapted	from	(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992;	
Kumar	et	al.,	1995;	Sako	&	Helper,	1998;	Tsai	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	These	items	were	selected	
to	cover	the	three	dimensions	of	trust,	which	included	honesty,	benevolence	and	goodwill,	
as	well	as	competence	(Table	4-14).	
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Table	4-14:	Scale	items	for	trust	
	
	
The	literature	provides	extensive	evidence	of	the	benefits	of	this	form	of	trust.	It	reduces	
transaction	costs	by	reducing	the	need	for	contractual	governance	and	provides	greater	
flexibility	in	dealing	with	unforeseen	circumstances,	while	providing	benefits	to	both	parties	
(Dyer	&	Chu,	2003;	Ganesan,	1994;	Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	It	can	also	increase	performance	
regardless	of	the	governance	mode	(Gulati	&	Nickerson,	2008).	Furthermore,	trusting	
relationships	are	a	valuable	resource	which	are	“difficult	to	imitate	due	to	the	socially	
complex	and	rare	nature	of	trust.	Thus,	the	parties	of	the	relationship	can	gain	competitive	
advantage”	through	developing	trust	(Laaksonen	et	al.,	2009,	p.	86).	Trust	can	be	costly	and	
difficult	to	achieve	but	is	an	essential	foundation	for	collaboration	and	can	increase	
information	sharing,	inter-firm	learning,	joint	problem	solving	and	shared	planning	(Day	et	
al.,	2013;	Fawcett,	Jones,	&	Fawcett,	2012;	Gulati	&	Singh,	1998;	Ireland	&	Webb,	2007;	
Palmatier,	Dant,	&	Grewal,	2007).		
4.4.2 Commitment	
Similar	to	trust,	commitment	is	consistently	understood	to	be	an	essential	indicator	of	
relationship	quality	and	reflects	the	positive	value	of	the	relationship	(Geyskens	et	al.,	1998).	
It	is	considered	a	measure	of	the	desire	for	the	relationship	to	continue	and	the	willingness	
to	make	an	effort	on	the	other	party’s	behalf.	This	comes	through	in	the	definition	of	
Geyskens,	Steenkamp,	and	Kumar	(1999),	who	define	commitment	as	a	“desire	to	continue	
the	relationship	in	the	future	and	a	willingness	to	make	short-term	sacrifices	to	maintain	the	
relationship”	(p.	225).	Based	on	this	definition,	relationship	commitment	involves	an	
expectation	that	the	relationship	will	continue,	and	with	the	desire	to	maintain	and	
strengthen	the	relationship.	This	implies	more	than	just	a	short-term	evaluation	of	benefits	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Honesty	
Trust1_Expl	 Even	if	our	processor	gives	us	a	rather	unlikely	explanation	we	are	confident	that	they	are	telling	the	truth	(Kumar,	Scheer,	&	Steenkamp,	1995).	
Trust8_HonComm	 Communications	from	our	[processor]	are	open	and	honest.	
Trust9_InformComm	 I	feel	informed	about	the	organisation	and	the	activities	of	[processor].	
Benevolence
/Goodwill	
Trust2_Welfare	 When	making	important	decisions,	our	[processor]	is	always	concerned	about	our	welfare	(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992;	Kumar	et	al.,	1995).	
Trust3_Agree	 We	can	rely	on	our	processor	to	help	us	in	ways	not	required	by	our	agreement	with	them	(Sako	&	Helper,	1998).	
Trust4_Fair	 We	believe	that	our	processor	will	always	treat	us	fairly	(Sako	&	Helper,	1998).	
Trust5_Advantage	 We	can	rely	on	our	processor	without	any	fear	they	will	take	advantage	of	us	even	if	the	opportunity	arises	(Tsai	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	
Trust	-	
competence	 Trust6_Returns	
	We	can	rely	on	our	processor	to	always	deliver	the	best	returns	from	the	
market.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
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and	costs.	It	reflects	a	willingness	to	invest	financial,	physical	or	relational	resources	in	a	
relationship	and	make	short-term	sacrifices	to	achieve	long-term	benefits	(Geyskens	et	al.,	
1998;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994;	Wilson,	1995).		
In	addition	to	these	descriptions,	the	literature	recognises	a	range	other	definitions	of	
commitment	(Table	4-15).	Early	research	on	commitment	in	exchange	relationships	tended	
to	use	a	one-dimensional	measure	of	the	construct	(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992,	p.	19).	This	is	
no	longer	the	case,	as	commitment	is	now	recognised	as	a	multi-dimensional	construct	
(Geyskens	et	al.,	1996).	Mowday,	Steers,	and	Porter	(1979)	identified	that	organisational	
commitment	had	both	an	attitudinal	and	behavioural	component.	The	attitudinal	
component	“represents	a	state	in	which	an	individual	identifies	with	a	particular	
organisation	and	its	goals	and	wishes	to	maintain	membership	in	order	to	facilitate	these	
goals”	(Mowday	et	al.,	1979,	p.	225).	The	behavioural	aspects	relate	to	behaviours	that	
exceed	formal	or	normal	expectations.	This	multi-dimensional	definition	is	explained	by	
Mowday	et	al.	(1979,	p.	225)	as	being	“predicated	on	three	independent	foundations	
compliance	or	instrumental	involvement	for	specific	extrinsic	rewards,	identification	or	
involvement	based	on	a	desire	for	affiliation	and	internalisation	or	involvement	predicated	
on	congruence	between	individual	and	organisational	values”	(p.	225).	This	was	later	refined	
into	two	dimensions	to	reflect	an	affective	and	calculative	component	(Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	
Ghijsen	et	al.,	2010;	Hunt	&	Morgan,	1995;	Jain	et	al.,	2013;	Moorman	et	al.,	1993;	
Parasuraman	et	al.,	1988;	Wilson,	1995).		
The	affective	aspect	is	also	referred	to	as	a	normative	commitment	(Andaleeb,	1996;	
Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992;	Geiger	et	al.,	2012;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994)	and	incorporates	
concepts	of	loyalty,	commitment	and	the	forsaking	of	alternatives	(Bendapudi	&	Berry,	1997;	
Geyskens	et	al.,	1996;	Gundlach,	Achrol,	&	Mentzer,	1995).	This	type	of	commitment	is	
based	on	social	and	psychological	attachment	to	an	exchange	partner	based	on	feelings	of	
identification,	loyalty	and	affiliation	(Brown	et	al.,	1995).	It	reflects	a	desire	to	want	to	stay	in	
the	relationship.	Calculative	commitment	or	instrumental	commitment,	on	the	other	hand,	
indicates	a	need	to	stay	in	the	relationship	(Gundlach	et	al.,	1995,	p.	79).	It	is	based	on	
pragmatic	considerations	that	involve	the	instrumental	evaluation	of	the	benefits	of	staying	
against	the	costs	of	leaving	(Geyskens	et	al.,	1996;	Gounaris,	2005).	This	may	mean	there	are	
constraints	to	leaving,	or	a	dependency	on,	the	relationship	(Geyskens	et	al.,	1996).	The	
distinction	between	these	two	types	of	commitment	is	important,	however,	as	research	
shows	that	most	relationships	involve	normative	and	calculative	aspects.	As	explained	by	
O'Reilly	and	Chatman	(1986,	p.	497),	commitment	can,	“result	from	value	congruence,	
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financial	investments,	effective	reward	and	control	systems,	or	a	simple	lack	of	opportunity	
to	move”.	
Table	4-15:	Definitions	of	commitment		
Authors	(s)	 Definition	 Dimensions	
(O'Reilly	&	Chatman,	1986)	 “The	psychological	attachment	felt	by	the	person	for	the	organization;	it	
will	reflect	the	degree	to	which	the	individual	internalises	or	adopts	
characteristics	or	perspectives	of	the	organisation”	(p.	493).	
Internalisation,	
psychological	
attachment	
(Dwyer,	Schurr,	and	Oh	
1987)	
"An	implicit	or	explicit	pledge	of	relational	continuity	between	exchange	
partners”	(p.	19).	
Pledge	to	continue	
(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992)	 “A	desire	to	develop	a	stable	relationship,	a	willingness	to	make	short-
term	sacrifices	to	maintain	the	relationship,	and	a	confidence	in	the	
stability	of	the	relationship”	(p.	19).	
Desire	to	develop,	
willingness	to	sacrifice		
(Moorman,	Zaltman,	&	
Deshpande,	1992)	
“As	an	enduring	desire	to	maintain	a	valued	relationship”	(p.	316).	 Desire	to	maintain	
(Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994)	 “An	exchange	partner	believing	that	an	ongoing	relationship	with	
another	is	so	important	as	to	warrant	maximum	efforts	at	maintaining	it;	
that	is,	the	committed	party	believes	the	relationship	is	worth	working	
on	to	ensure	that	it	endures	indefinitely”	(p.	23).	
Maximum	effort,	
desire	to	maintain	
(Gundlach	et	al.,	1995)	 “First,	commitment	is	defined	to	possess	an	input	or	instrumental	
component,	that	is,	an	affirmative	action	taken	by	one	party	that	creates	
a	self-interest	stake	in	the	relationship	and	demonstrates	something,	
more	than	a	mere	promise.	Second,	commitment	includes	an	attitudinal	
component	signifying	an	enduring	intention	by	the	parties	to	develop	
and	maintain	a	stable	long-term	relationship	Third,	commitment	is	
thought	to	embrace	a	temporal	dimension,	highlighting	the	fact	that	
commitment	means	something	only	over	the	long	term”	(p.	79).	
Input/instrumental	–	
self-interest,	
attitudinal	–	desire	to	
maintain,	temporal	
(Andaleeb,	1996)	 “A	willingness	to	make	a	greater	investment	in	the	relationship	and	a	
desire	to	continue	the	relationship”	(p.	85).	
Willingness	to	invest,	
desire	to	continue	
(Geyskens	et	al.,	1996)	 “A	channel	member's	intention	to	continue	the	relationship”	(p.304).	 Intention	to	continue	
(Monczka,	Petersen,	
Handfield,	&	Ragatz,	1998)	
	“The	willingness	of	buyers	and	suppliers	to	exert	effort	on	behalf	of	the	
relationship”	(p.	557).	
Exert	effort	
(Walter,	Mueller,	&	Helfert,	
2000)	
“Three	different	dimensions:	affective	commitment	describes	a	positive	
attitude	towards	the	future	existence	of	the	relationship.	Instrumental	
commitment	is	shown	whenever	some	form	of	investment	(time,	other	
resources)	in	the	relationship	is	made.	Finally,	the	temporal	dimension	
of	commitment	indicates	that	the	relationship	exists	over	time”	(p.3).	
Affective,	
instrumental,	
temporal	
(Gustafsson,	Johnson,	&	
Roos,	2005)	
“Two	dimensions	of	relationship	commitment:	affective	commitment	
and	calculative,	or	continuance,	commitment”	(p.	211).	
Affective,	calculative	
continuance	
(Fullerton,	2003)	 “Affective	commitment	is	rooted	in	identification,	shared	values,	
belongingness,	dedication,	and	similarity	[…]	Switching	costs,	
dependence	and	lack	of	choice	are	at	the	core	of	the	continuance	
commitment	construct	in	marketing	relationships”	(p.	335).	
Identification,	shared	
values,	belonging,	
dedication,	switching	
costs,	dependence,	
lack	of	choice	
(Park,	Lee,	Lee,	&	Truex,	
2012)	
“A	continued	desire	to	maintain	a	relationship	of	value	exchange	and	is	
a	psychological	state	predisposing	an	organisation	toward	maintaining	
the	relationship	over	long	term”	(p.	460).	
	
(Meyer	&	Allen,	1991)	 Affective	commitment	addresses	the	idea	of	individuals	‘wanting’	to	
stay.	Calculative	commitment	involves	individuals	feeling	that	they	
‘have’	to	stay;	for	example,	perhaps	they	have	a	contract,	perceive	high	
switching	costs,	or	feel	there	are	no	reasonable	alternatives	available.	
They	are	locked	in	(i.e.,	constraint	based).	Finally,	normative	
commitment	involves	individuals	feeling	that	they	‘should’’	stay	in	a	
relationship	due	to	a	moral	or	personal	obligation,	that	is,	based	on	
social	pressure.	
Affective,	calculative,	
normative	
	
These	definitions	of	commitment	(Table	4-15)	have	some	common	features,	including	a	
willingness	to	invest,	desire	to	continue	and	identification.	These	three	dimensions	were	
developed	into	the	scale	items	to	measure	commitment	as	a	latent	variable.	These	focus	on	
the	affective	aspects	of	commitment	rather	than	calculative	commitment.	This	is	because	
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affective	commitment	reflects	a	partner’s	desire	to	stay	in	the	relationship	due	to	a	sense	of	
shared	goals	and	belonging	rather	than	they	having	to	stay	because	of	a	calculative	
commitment.	The	calculative	aspects	are	incorporated	into	the	supplier	dependence	
construct.	The	measurement	items	(Table	4-16)	were	adapted	from	(Kumar	et	al.,	1995;	Sako	
&	Helper,	1998;	Tsai	&	Ghoshal,	1998;	Villena	et	al.)	
Table	4-16:	Commitment	scale	items	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Expectation	of	
continuity	 Commit1_RelLongTerm	
We	expect	our	relationship	with	our	[processor]	to	continue	for	a	
long	time	(Sako	&	Helper,	1998).	
Identification	 Commit3_Proud	 We	are	proud	to	tell	other	farmers	that	we	are	a	supplier	to	our	[processor].	
Willingness	to	
Invest	
	
	
Willingness	to	
Invest	
	
Commit2_Resources	
We	are	willing	to	dedicate	time,	effort	and	resources	to	support	
our	[processor]	in	growing	their	markets	and	sales	(Tsai	&	
Ghoshal,	1998).	
Commit4_LTInvest	
We	are	willing	to	make	long	term	investments	and	changes	to	
our	farm	to	better	meet	the	requirements	of	our	[processor]	and	
their	customers	(Kumar	et	al.,	1995;	Villena	et	al.)	.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from	strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
	
4.4.3 Satisfaction	
Satisfaction	is	the	third	dimension	of	relationship	quality	used	in	this	research.	It	is	an	
important	concept	within	exchange	relationships	and	is	a	central	tenant	of	relationship	
marketing,	as	well	as	channel	and	organisational	research.	Most	definitions	of	satisfaction	
focus	on	an	overall	evaluation	of	the	relationship	(see	Table	4-17).	For	example,	Dwyer	and	
Oh	(1987)	draw	on	the	conceptualisation	of	Ruekert	and	Churchill	Jr	(1984,	p.	227)	who	
define	satisfaction	as	the	overall	assessment	of	the	characteristics	of	the	relationship,	which	
are	“rewarding,	profitable,	instrumental	and	satisfying	or	frustrating,	problematic,	inhibiting,	
or	unsatisfying”.	In	this,	way	satisfaction	is	a	summary	psychological	state	that	involves	the	
evaluation	of	the	past	outcomes	of	the	relationship	(Andaleeb,	1996;	Oliver,	2010).	It	is	
multi-dimensional	and	incorporates	economic	and	non-economic	psychological	aspects	
including	social	interaction	and	financial	performance	as	well	as	features	of	the	service	and	
assistance	provided	by	the	partner	(Gassenheimer	&	Ramsey,	1994;	Geyskens	et	al.,	1999;	
Homburg	&	Rudolph,	2001;	Ruekert	&	Churchill	Jr,	1984).	These	aspects	are	evaluated	in	
terms	conformity	or	disconformity	with	expectations	(Oliver,	2010;	Parasuraman	et	al.,	
1988;	Wilson,	1995).	Scheer	and	Stern	(1992),	as	well	as	Ulaga	and	Eggert	(2006),	specifically	
emphasise	an	overall	positive	evaluation	and	approval	of	the	relationship	performance	
against	some	comparison	or	standard.	This	standard	can	reflect	different	dimensions	of	the	
relationship;	for	example,	Dwyer	and	Oh	(1987)	define	satisfaction	as	“a	feeling	of	equity	
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with	the	supply	chain	relationship	no	matter	what	power	imbalances	exist	between/in	the	
buyer–seller	dyad”.	The	economic	evaluation	includes	evaluation	of	the	financial	rewards	
and	considers	such	things	as	volume	and	margins	and	overall	achievement	of	goals.	The	non-
economic	aspects	relate	to	the	how	the	parties	relate	on	a	personal	level,	that	means	they	
enjoy	working	together (Geyskens	et	al.,	1999). 
Table	4-17:	Definitions	of	satisfaction	
Author(s)	 Definition	 Dimensions	
Ruekert	and	Churchill	Jr	
(1984)	
“Overall	assessment	of	the	characteristics	of	the	relationship	which	
are	“rewarding,	profitable,	instrumental	and	satisfying	or	
frustrating,	problematic,	inhibiting,	or	unsatisfying”	(p.	227).	
Overall	appraisal	of	
positive	and	negative	
(Scheer	&	Stern,	1992)	 “The	overall	approval	of	and	positive	affect	towards	another	party”	
(p.	133).	
Positive	affective	state	
(Bendapudi	&	Berry,	
1997)	
	
“Positive	affective	state	resulting	from	the	appraisal	of	all	aspects	of	
a	firm's	working	relationship	with	another	firm”	(p.	2).	
Positive	affective	state,	
overall	appraisal	
(Geyskens	et	al.,	1999)	 “As	a	positive	affective	state	resulting	from	the	appraisal	of	all	
aspects	of	a	firm's	working	relationship”	(p.	224).	
Positive	affective	state,	
overall	appraisal	
(Benton	&	Maloni,	2005)	 “A	feeling	of	equity	with	the	supply	chain	relationship	no	matter	
what	Power	imbalances	exist	between	the	buyer–seller	dyad”	(p.	2).	
Feeling	of	equity	
(Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006)	 “An	affective	state	of	mind	resulting	from	the	appraisal	of	all	
relevant	aspects	of	the	business	relationships”	(p.	316).	
Affective	state,	overall	
appraisal	
	
 
Table	4-17	identifies	some	common	themes	in	the	definition	of	satisfaction.	These	are	a	
positive	affective	state	based	on	an	overall	appraisal	of	the	relationship.	As	this	definition	is	
still	rather	general,	to	operationalise	the	measurement	of	commitment	it	was	necessary	to	
identify	existing	scale	items	that	could	be	adapted.	Also,	this	generalised	description	of	
satisfaction	is	likely	to	be	due	to	the	fact	that	satisfaction	tends	to	be	context	specific,	and	
hence	scale	items	were	adapted	to	the	context	agri-food	supply	chains.	The	scale	items	were	
based	on	three	dimensions	of	satisfaction,	which	included	satisfaction	with	price,	
satisfaction	with	support	and	communication	and	satisfaction	with	the	performance	of	the	
buyer.	These	items	were	adapted	from	Anderson	and	Weitz	(1992);	Kumar	et	al.	(1995);	
Anderson	and	Narus	(1984);	Micheels	and	Gow	(2011)	and	Nooteboom,	Casson,	and	Godley	
(2000).		
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Table	4-18:	Scale	items	for	satisfaction	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Satisfaction	with	price	
Price	
Expectations	
Satisf9_Returns	 How	would	you	rate	the	actual	returns	you	achieve	from	
supplying	your	[processor],	compared	to	what	you	would	
expect	to	achieve	for	your	animals	(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992)?	
Price	satisfaction	 Satisf10_PriceStock	 The	returns	we	received	for	our	stock	were	satisfactory	last	
year	(Anderson	&	Weitz,	1992;	Kumar	et	al.,	1995).	
Satisf4_Price	 The	price	received	for	the	animals	you	supply.	
Price	Structure	 Satisf5_PriceSched	 The	seasonal	structure	of	the	pricing	schedule.	
Satisfaction	with	support	and	communication	
Supply	manager	 Satisf6_Support	 The	support	provided	by	the	stock	buyer/supply	manager.	
Quantity	 Satisf7_CommQuant	 The	quantity;	(amount,	frequency)	of	communication.	
Timeliness	 Satisf8_CommQual	 The	timeliness	of	communication.	
Satisfaction	with	performance	
Net	return	 Satisf1_NetReturn	 Net	return	to	supplying	stock	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	
Support	services	 Satisf2_Support	 Support	services	provided	(Micheels	&	Gow,	2011).	
Policies	 Satisf3_Policies	 Having	reasonable	policies	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	
Processor	
competence		
ProcAbil1_Mktg	 Their	marketing	and	sales	skills	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	
ProcAbil2_SChain	 Their	skills	for	improving	quality	and	efficiency	in	the	supply	
chain	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	
ProcAbil3_Prem	 Their	ability	to	get	a	premium	price	from	the	market	
(Nooteboom,	Casson,	et	al.,	2000).	
These	items	were	measured	using	6	point	Likert	scales	that	ranged	from	very	satisfied	to	very	dissatisfied,	much	
better	to	much	worse	and	far	short	of	expectations	to	far	exceeds	expectations.	
4.4.4 Social	capital	
An	important	aspect	of	this	research	is	to	evaluate	the	difference	between	social	capital	and	
relationship	quality	constructs.	Having	described	the	three	dimensions	of	relationship	quality	
above	it	was,	therefore,	important	to	clearly	define	social	capital.	The	literature	at	times	
represents	social	capital	as	a	closely	related	concept	to	relationship	quality,	utilising	a	
construct	referred	to	as	relational	capital.	Both	SC	and	relationship	quality	represent	
valuable	assets	that	can	provide	competitive	advantage	(Granovetter,	1992;	Lawson	et	al.,	
2008).	Social	capital	is	defined	by	Carey,	Lawson,	and	Krause	(2011,	p.	5).	as	the	“sum	of	the	
actual	and	potential	resources	embedded	within,	available	through,	and	derived	from	the	
network	of	relationships	possessed	by	an	individual	or	social	unit”.	This	is	consistent	with	
most	other	definitions.	While	these	definitions	of	social	capital	focus	more	on	access	to	
resources	in	the	social	network	(Table	4-19),	the	measurements	used	for	social	capital	are	
closely	aligned	to	measurements	of	relationship	quality.	This	may	partly	be	due	to	the	
difficulty	in	measuring	the	resources	in	a	network	and	then	deciding	which	of	them	are	
available	to	the	other	parties	in	the	network.		
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Table	4-19:	Definitions	of	social	capital	
Author(s)	 Definition	
(Baker,	1990)	 “A	resource	that	actors	derive	from	specific	social	structure	and	then	use	to	
pursue	their	interest”	(p	619).	
(Bourdieu	&	Wacquant,	1992)	 “The	sum	of	resources,	actual	or	virtual,	that	accrue	to	an	individual	or	group	
by	virtue	of	possessing	a	durable	network	of	more	or	less	institutionalised	
relationships	of	mutual	acquaintance	and	recognition”	(p	119).	
(Burt,	1992)	 “Friends	colleagues,	and	more	general	contacts	through	whom	you	receive	
opportunities	to	use	your	financial	and	human	capital”	(p	9).	
(Knoke,	1999)	 “The	process	by	which	social	actors	create	and	mobilise	their	network	of	
connections	within	and	between	organisations	to	gain	access	to	other	social	
actor’s	resources”	(p	18).	
(Portes,	1998)	 “The	ability	of	actors	to	secure	benefits	by	virtue	of	membership	of	social	
networks	or	other	social	structures”	(p	6).	
(Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998)	 “The	sum	of	actual	and	potential	resources	embedded	within,	available	
through	and	derived	from	a	network	of	relationships	possessed	by	an	
individual	or	social	unit.	Social	capital	thus	comprises	both	the	network	and	
assets	that	may	be	mobilised	through	the	network”	(p	243).	
(Woolcock,	1998)	 “The	information,	trust,	and	norms	of	reciprocity	inhering	in	one's	social	
networks”	(p.153).	
	
Nahapiet	and	Ghoshal	(1998)	propose	three	dimensions	of	social	capital	cognitive,	structural	
and	relational. The	relational	dimension	is	the	most	similar	in	conception	to	relationship	
quality.	This	is	defined	as	the	assets	that	are	embedded	in	personal	relationships	developed	
with	each	other	through	a	history	of	interactions,	leading	to	relations	of	trust,	obligation	and	
reciprocity	(Lawson	et	al.,	2008).	Kale,	Singh,	and	Perlmutter	(2000) define	the	relational	
dimension	of	social	capital	as	close	interpersonal	interactions,	trust,	friendship,	respect	and	
reciprocity.	This	definition	is	close	to	the	trust	dimension	of	relationship	quality.	The	
structural	dimension	refers	to	the	structural	configuration,	diversity,	centrality	and	
boundary-spanning	roles	of	network	participants (Carey	et	al.,	2011;	Lawson	et	al.,	2008;	
Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998).	The	cognitive	dimension	incorporates	the	resources	providing	
the	parties	with	shared	representations,	interpretations	and	systems	of	meaning	(Lawson	et	
al.,	2008).	The	current	research	is	novel	in	that	there	have	been	few	studies	that	focus	on	
the	suppliers’	perspectives	of	social	capital	(Whipple,	Wiedmer,	&	K.	Boyer,	2015)	and	it	is	
rare	for	studies	to	link	social	capital	to	relationship	quality	in	exchange	relationships.		
Based	on	the	three	dimensions,	social	capital	was	operationalised	using	ten	scale	items	
adapted	from	Villena	et	al.	(2011)	and	Nooteboom,	Casson,	et	al.	(2000)	incorporating	
cognitive,	relational	and	structural	social	capital	(Table	4-20).	
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Table	4-20:	Scale	items	for	social	capital	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Cognitive	
Mutual	goals	
and	values	
C.SocCap1_Goals	 Having	compatible	goals	and	objectives	(Nooteboom,	Casson,	et	al.,	2000).	
C.SocCap2_Values	 Having	similar	values	(Nooteboom,	Casson,	et	al.,	2000).	
Relational	
	
Personal	
bonds	
R.SocCap3_Bonds	 Having	strong	personal	bonds	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
R.SocCap4_Friend	 Involving	personal	friendship	between	both	parties	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
R.SocCap5_Friend	 Involving	a	close	personal	interaction	between	both	parties	(Villena	et	al.,	
2011).	
R.SocCap6_Pers	 Involving	give	and	take	(reciprocity)	between	both	parties	(Villena	et	al.,	
2011).	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 Having	strong	mutual	trust	between	both	parties	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Structural	
Interaction	 S.SocCap8_Funct	 Interaction	between	different	functions	of	staff	in	both	businesses	
(technical,	admin,	marketing,	etc.)	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
S.SocCap9_Level	 	 	Interaction	between	different	levels	of	staff	in	both	businesses	
(management,	technical,	admin)	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
S.SocCap10_Freq		 Frequent	and	intensive	interaction	between	both	parties	(Villena	et	al.,	
2011).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
	
These	scale	items	enabled	social	capital	to	be	measured	in	a	way	that	would	establish	if	
social	capital	and	relationship	quality	were	distinct	or	related	constructs.	As	relationship	
quality	and	social	capital	are	critical	to	this	research,	it	was	important	to	ensure	that	these	
scale	items	are	clearly	defined	to	ensure	accurate	measurement	of	the	latent	constructs.	The	
following	sections	describe	the	remaining	constructs	and	their	measurement	items.		
4.4.5 Opportunism	
Opportunism	is	an	important	concept	in	exchange	relationships	and	has	been	a	topic	of	
much	discussion.	Williamson	(1985)	defines	opportunism	as	“Self-interest	seeking	with	
guile”	(p.	30).	This	definition	specifically	implies	deceit	and	a	violation	of	explicit	or	implicit	
promises	about	appropriate	or	required	behaviour	(John,	1984;	MacNeil,	1980).	Although	
opportunism	has	been	used	as	a	basis	for	many	studies	of	inter-firm	relationships	(Anderson	
&	Weitz,	1992;	Dwyer	&	Oh,	1987;	Heide	&	John,	1992;	Maitland,	Bryson,	&	Van	de	Ven,	
1985),	there	is	concern	as	to	whether	opportunism	is	a	correct	description	of	human	
behaviour	(Wathne	&	Heide,	2000).	Maitland	et	al.	(1985)	argue	that	it	is	important	to	
distinguish	between	attitudes	and	behaviours,	where	attitudes	represent	an	inclination	or	
tendency	not	the	actual	behaviour.	Furthermore,	they	recommend	that	opportunism	should	
be	treated	as	an	attitudinal	variable.	This	is	because	actual	opportunistic	behaviour	is	rare,	
as	opposed	to	an	inclination	to	opportunism,	and	therefore	difficult	to	measure.	
Furthermore,	opportunism	has	been	identified	as	the	inverse	of	trust	(Barney	&	Hansen,	
1994;	Dorsch	et	al.,	1998;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994).	This	means	that	the	perceived	likelihood	of	
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opportunism	can	be	captured	through	measuring	trust	in	the	exchange	partner.	This	enables	
the	attitudinal	aspect	of	opportunism	to	be	captured.	This	is	the	approach	taken	in	this	
research.	It	is	assumed	that	the	propensity	for	opportunistic	behaviour	is	incorporated	in	the	
concept	of	trust,	with	lack	of	trust	being	highly	correlated	to	the	perceived	risk	of	
opportunistic	behaviour.	This	is	similar	to	the	work	of	(Laaksonen	et	al.,	2009)	who	that	
found	that	relationship	quality	was	inversely	related	to	opportunistic	tendencies.	
4.5 Supplier	performance	factors	
Supplier	performance	is	the	dependent	variable	used	in	this	study	(Figure	3-4).	There	is	
considerable	literature	on	the	importance	of	relationship	quality	to	improving	supplier	
performance.	Supplier	performance	came	out	the	literature	on	supplier	development	
(Dorsch	et	al.,	1998),	which	describes	the	efforts	of	manufacturers	to	improve	supplier	
performance.	Supplier	development	is	defined	as	any	effort	of	a	buying	firm	to	increase	the	
performance	and/or	capabilities	of	their	suppliers	to	meet	the	buying	firm's	supply	needs	
(Wilson,	1995).	Supplier	performance,	therefore,	is	most	often	from	the	buyer’s	perspective	
and	refers	to	a	supplier’s	improvements	in	communication,	product	quality,	delivery	timing	
and	reliability	that	benefits	the	buying	firm	(Laaksonen	et	al.,	2009).	As	supplier	performance	
is	highly	context	specific,	the	supplier	performance	items	were	developed	from	the	literature	
and	refined	from	interviews	with	the	buyers.	The	supplier	performance	items	identified	
were	communication,	quality,	reliability,	loyalty	and	profitability.	Each	of	these	will	be	
discussed	in	the	following	section	with	the	scale	items	developed.	The	performance	items	
used	in	this	research	were	delivery	quality,	delivery	quantity,	loyalty,	communication	and	
profitability.		
4.5.1 Cooperation	
Cooperation	is	often	used	as	an	evaluation	of	supplier	performance.	Anderson	and	Narus	
(1990,	p.	45)	define	cooperation	as	“similar	or	complementary	coordinated	actions	taken	by	
firms	in	interdependent	relationships	to	achieve	mutual	outcomes	or	singular	outcomes	with	
expected	reciprocation	over	time”.	This	means	that	firms	work	together	to	achieve	mutual	
goals	(Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994)	and	that	the	actual	cooperative	behaviours	will	depend	on	the	
specific	outcomes	desired	by	each	party.	This	makes	measuring	cooperation	as	an	
independent	construct	problematic	as	it	becomes	highly	context	specific.	Therefore,	the	
approach	taken	with	this	research	was	to	focus	on	context	specific	supplier	performance	
outcomes	desired	by	the	buyer/processor.	This	assumes	that	these	are	outcomes	and	
objectives	required	by	the	buyer	and,	therefore,	they	define	what	the	buyer	might	consider	
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cooperative	behaviours.	In	this	way,	cooperation	is	not	included	as	a	latent	construct	but	is	
assumed	to	be	captured	in	the	specific	supplier	performance	constructs.	These	include	
communication,	loyalty	and	delivery	quality	and	quantity.	
4.5.2 Supplier	communication	
The	first	of	the	supplier	performance	outcomes	is	communication	and	information	sharing,	
which	are	important	aspects	of	cooperative	behaviour	and	supplier	performance.	Anderson	
and	Narus	(1990,	p.	44)	defined	communication	as	“the	formal	as	well	as	informal	sharing	of	
meaningful	and	timely	information	between	firms”.	Effective	supplier	communication	(as	
well	as	buyer	communication)	is	an	essential	coordinating	activity	in	food	supply	chains	and	
is	critical	to	the	overall	supply	chain	performance.	Information	from	suppliers	enables	firms	
to	respond	to	customers’	needs,	reduce	inventory	costs	and	improve	competitive	advantage	
(Stank,	Crum,	&	Arango,	1999).	In	agri-food	supply	chains,	production	volume,	timing	and	
quality,	can	be	highly	variable	and	affected	by	environmental	factors	as	well	as	management	
decisions.	The	effective	flow	of	production	information	from	suppliers	can	benefit	buyers	
through	reduced	variation	and	sorting	costs	and	better	ability	to	meet	customer	
requirements	(Micheels	&	Gow,	2011).	The	supplier	communication	scale	items	(Table	4-21)	
were	adapted	from	those	used	by	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1990).	
Table	4-21:	Scale	items	for	supplier	communication	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Production	
plans	
SuppComm_Inform1	 Keeping	our	[processor]	informed	on	our	production	plans	is	very	
important	to	us	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1984).	
	
Problems	
SuppComm_Inform2		We	always	let	our	[processor]	know	as	soon	as	possible	of	any	unexpected	
problems	with	things	such	as,	delivery	or	[product]	quality	(Anderson	&	
Narus,	1984).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
4.5.3 Supplier	profitability	
There	are	a	number	of	studies	that	refer	to	supplier	performance	and	financial	sustainability	
(Katsikeas,	Paparoidamis,	&	Katsikea,	2004;	Maloni	&	Benton,	2000{Maestrini,	2017	#8933).	
Furthermore,	the	buyers	interviewed	identified	supplier	profitability	as	an	important	
performance	criterion.	These	buyers	wanted	profitable	suppliers	to	ensure	they	have	long-
term	sustainable	partners	who	are	able	to	reinvest	in	their	business	and	improve	their	long-
term	performance.	This	provides	buyers	with	a	long	term	of	security	of	supply	at	a	
sustainable	cost.	Despite	the	focus	on	profitability	buyers	did	not	want	their	suppliers	to	
have	above	normal	profitability	as	this	would	indicate	that	buyer	is	paying	excessive	prices	
for	the	supplier’s	product.	Subjective	measures	of	financial	performance	and	profitability	
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were	used	due	to	the	difficulty	of	collecting	and	comparing	objective	financial	data.	This	
approach	was	supported	by	Dess	and	Robinson	(1984)	who	showed	that	there	is	a	strong	
correlation	between	self-reported	subjective	measures	and	objective	measures	of	financial	
performance.	The	scale	items	for	supplier	profitability	(Table	4-22)	were	adapted	from	items	
used	by	(Micheels	&	Gow,	2011).	These	involved	three	dimensions	namely	profitability,	
overall	performance	and	financial	performance.	
Table	4-22:	Scale	items	for	supplier	profitability		
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
	
	
Profitability		
FarmPerf1_Profit	 The	profitability	of	our	[product]	operation	was	not	satisfactory	
last	year	(Anderson	&	Narus,	1990).	
FarmPerf2_CompProfit	 Compared	other	[product]	farmers	how	would	you	evaluate:	
The	profitability	of	your	[product]	operation	over	the	last	3	
years?		
Overall	performance	 FarmPef3_SatProdn	 We	were	very	satisfied	with	the	overall	performance	of	our	
[product]	operation	last	year	(Micheels	&	Gow,	2011).	
Financial	performance	
	
	
FarmPef4_SatFin	 We	were	very	satisfied	with	the	overall	financial	performance	
of	our	[product]	operation	last	year	(Micheels	&	Gow,	2011).	
These	items	were	measured	using	five	point	Likert	scales	that	ranged	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree	and	
much	higher	to	much	lower	
4.5.4 Supplier	loyalty	
Supplier	loyalty	was	included	as	a	supplier	performance	item.	This	is	because	loyalty	is	
defined	as	a	behavioural	outcome.	In	this	perspective	loyalty	measures	the	supplier’s	
ongoing	supply	to	the	buyer.	This	makes	supplier	loyalty	different	from	commitment.	Loyalty	
goes	beyond	calculative	commitment	and	means	that	a	supplier	will	continue	to	support	a	
buyer	even	when	it	may	no	longer	be	economically	rational	to	do	so	(Table	4-23).	Loyalty	is	
defined	as	a	state	of	attachment	that	is	experienced	as	an	allegiance	or	faithfulness	(Gilliland	
&	Bello,	2002).	If	a	supplier	has	a	strong	sense	of	loyalty	towards	a	buyer	then	the	supplier	
may	sacrifice	short-term	benefits	to	achieve	long-term	objectives.	(Gilliland	&	Bello,	2002).	A	
loyal	supplier	will	try	to	resolve	conflict	in	the	relationship	rather	than	exiting.	A	
fundamental	component	of	loyalty	is	the	forsaking	of	alternatives	and	becoming	less	
sensitive	to	price,	at	least	in	the	short	term.	The	scale	items	for	loyalty	(Table	4-23)	were	
adapted	from	Liu,	Li,	and	Zhang	(2010)	and	Bensemann	et	al.	(2011).	
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Table	4-23:	Scale	items	for	supplier	loyalty	
Code	 Description	
CommitL1_OptRev
	 	
Reverse	score	of:	It	is	important	to	have	more	than	one	option	to	sell	our	stock	
(Bensemann	et	al.,	2011).	
CommitL2_PriceComp	 How	would	you	react	if	one	of	[processor]	competitors	consistently	offered	a	
higher	price	for	animals	of	equal	quality/specifications?	
CommitL3_PriceRev	 Reverse	score	of:	If	the	price	was	good	it	doesn’t	matter	who	we	supply	our	
stock	(Bensemann	et	al.,	2011).	
CommitL4_SpotMktR	 Reverse	score	of:	You	will	always	get	better	prices	over	the	season	if	you	play	
the	market	(Bensemann	et	al.,	2011).	
CommitL_5_SuplOne	 It	is	important	to	us	to	be	committed	to	one	company	to	supply	our	stock	
(Bensemann	et	al.,	2011).	
These	items	were	measured	using	6	point	Likert	scales	that	ranged	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree	
and	switch	to	a	competitor	as	soon	as	technically	feasible	to	a	competitor’s	price	would	have	no	influence	on	
our	current	commitment	to	our	[processor].	
	
Many	of	these	items	relate	to	the	choice	to	continue	to	supply	despite	a	difference	price	and	
the	importance	of	loyalty	to	a	single	buyer	as	well	as	a	choice	to	be	committed	to	a	buyer	
rather	than	participating	in	the	spot	market.		
4.5.5 Delivery	quality	and	quantity		
Delivery	to	specific	quality	specifications	and	reliable	delivery	are	important	aspects	of	
supplier	performance.	Meeting	quality	specifications	reduces	sorting	costs	and	ensures	the	
buyer	can	meet	their	customers’	requirements.	Having	suppliers	with	the	ability	to	achieve	
quality	standards	is,	therefore,	a	key	factor	in	achieving	a	competitive	advantage	and,	
therefore,	superior	performance	for	the	buyer.	Quality	is	highly	context-specific,	therefore,	
the	dimensions	of	quality	were	specifically	developed	to	define	quality	from	a	stock	delivery	
perspective.	Reliable	delivery	of	the	required	numbers	of	stock	is	important	to	meet	
customers’	requirements	for	consistent	supply	and	efficiency	of	plant	operations.	The	scale	
items	were,	therefore,	developed	to	incorporate	delivery	reliability	in	terms	of	numbers	of	
animals	and	quality	required	(Table	4-24).		
Table	4-24:	Scale	items	for	delivery	quality	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Quantity	 QualDel_Numbers	 We	always	deliver	the	number	of	animals	we	agree	to	supply	to	our	
[processor].	
Quality	 QualDel_Quality	 We	always	deliver	the	quality	of	animals	our	[processor]	requires.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
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4.6 Controls	
To	ensure	the	robustness	of	results,	the	study	included	a	number	of	control	variables.	The	
control	variables	include	farm	characteristics	which	relate	to	the	tangible	assets	owned	by	
the	supplier.	These	can	have	a	significant	effect	on	performance.	They	were	treated	as	
controls,	because	the	study	looked	specifically	at	relationship	and	human	resources	and	
their	effect	on	supplier	performance.	Other	control	variables	included	governance	
mechanisms,	including	contract	supply	and	supplier	vertical	integration	through	owning	
shares	in	the	processor.	The	farm	characteristics	include	farm	financial	resources,	climate,	
farm	type,	farm	size,	location,	management	role,	farmer	age	and	education.	External	
environmental	uncertainty	was	also	treated	as	a	control.	These	are	variables	that	are	not	
part	of	the	theoretical	model	that	need	controlling	as	they	have	an	impact	on	the	model.	
4.6.1 External:	Environmental	uncertainty	
The	external	environment	refers	to	contexts	and	situations	that	occur	outside	the	firm.	This	
includes	significant	factors	outside	the	organisation	that	can	affect	its	performance	including	
market	conditions,	and	economic	and	political	issues.	Environmental	uncertainty	refers	to	
the	rate	of	change	and	the	degree	of	instability	in	the	environment	(Wang,	Yeung,	&	Zhang,	
2011;	Yeung,	Lee,	Yeung,	&	Cheng,	2013).	An	important	part	of	environmental	uncertainty	is	
the	extent	to	which	market	demand	changes	rapidly	(Geyskens	et	al.,	1998).	As	well	as	this	
within	an	agricultural	context	the	variability	of	production	also	effects	the	uncertainty	of	the	
external	environment.	Therefore,	scale	items	were	developed	for	both	market	uncertainty	
(Table	4-25)	and	production	uncertainty	(Table	4-26).	The	scale	items	for	environment	
uncertainty	were	adapted	from	Wang	et	al.	(2011),	Ganesan	(1994),	Villena	et	al.	(2011)	and	
Nooteboom,	De	Jong,	et	al.	(2000)	
Table	4-25:	Scale	items	for	environmental	uncertainty	–	market	uncertainty	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	
Competition	 UncertMkt1_Comp	 The	nature	of	competition	in	the	international	market	for	
[product]	is	intense	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
Consumer	needs	 UncertMkt2_Cust	 There	are	rapid	changes	in	consumer	needs	and	preferences	for	[product]	is	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	
Price	 UncertMkt3_Price	 The	market	price	for	New	Zealand	[product]	on	the	international	market	is	highly	volatile	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
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Table	4-26:	Scale	items	for	environmental	uncertainty	-	production	uncertainty	
How	Much	certainty	is	there	in:	
UncertProd1_8mthR	 Reverse	of	The	numbers	and	weight	of	the	animals	you	can	supply	to	[processor]	
8	months	ahead?	(De	Jong	&	Nooteboom,	2000).	
UncertProd2_Cost3yR	 Reverse	of	Your	production	costs	over	3	years	(De	Jong	&	Nooteboom,	2000).	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	extremely	uncertain	to	fairly	certain.	
4.6.2 Farm	financial	risk	
Farm	debt	is	an	important	control	variable	as	it	affects	the	supplier’s	ability	to	take	risks	and	
relates	to	the	financial	resources	of	the	supplier.	This	was	controlled	for	as	a	lack	of	financial	
resources	may	limit	a	supplier’s	ability	to	meet	supplier	performance	criteria.	Three	items	
were	used	debt	servicing	as	percentage	of	total	farm	income,	the	proportion	of	non-farm	
income	relative	to	total	gross	income,	and	total	farm	debt	as	a	percentage	of	total	farm	
assets	(Table	4-27).	
Table	4-27:	Farm	debt	and	off-farm	income	items	
Code	 Description	
RiskDbtAsset	 Total	farm	debt	as	percentage	of	total	farm	assets	(%).	
RiskDbtServ	 Debt	servicing	as	a	percentage	of	total	farm	income	(%).	
RiskOffFarmInc	 Proportion	of	non-farm	income	as	percentage	of	your	total	gross	income	(farm	and	
non-farm)	(%).	
	
4.6.3 Climate	
Climate	has	a	significant	effect	on	the	ease	with	which	suppliers	can	meet	high	product	
specifications	and	maintain	consistent	delivery	schedules.	Suppliers	that	have	dry	summer	
climate	or	cold	winters	and	spring	will	find	it	more	difficult	to	deliver	consistent	quality	and	
numbers	of	stock	(Table	4-28).	Climate	is	also	part	of	the	farm	physical	(tangible)	resources	
and,	as	these	are	not	included	in	the	theoretical	model,	they	were	included	in	the	control	
variables.	Three	measures	for	climate	were	developed	that	focus	on	measuring	the	
favourability	of	these	three	seasons.	For	spring	and	winter,	temperature	was	most	important	
whereas,	in	summer,	the	degree	of	dryness	was	most	significant.		
Table	4-28:	Climate	index	
Code	 Description	
Clim_SPRG	 Spring	temperature	of	your	[product]	is	unit.	
Clim_SUM	 Summer	climate	of	your	[product]	is	unit.	
Clim_WINT	 Winter	temperature	of	[product]	is	unit.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scales	that	ranged	from:	Spring	–	Extremely	cold	to	
warm,	Summer	–	Extremely	summer	dry	to	summer	moist	and	winter	–	Extremely	cold	to	warm.	
	
4.6.4 Supplier	decision	making	influence	
The	level	of	the	supplier’s	influence	on	strategic	and	operational	decision	is	likely	to	affect	
the	perception	of	the	relationship	with	the	processor.	A	supplier	with	low	levels	of	decision	
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making	influence	may	have	little	choice	of	the	processor	and/or	the	level	of	supplier	
performance	(Table	4-29).	For	this	reason	it	was	included	as	a	control	variable	to	ensure	this	
factor	was	accounted	for	in	the	results.	
Table	4-29:	Scale	items	for	decision	making	influence		
Code	 Description	
Infl1_Strat	 How	much	influence	do	you	have	in	the	decision	making	on	the	farm?	-	for	long	term,	
strategic	decisions.	
Infl2_Tact	 How	much	influence	do	you	have	in	the	decision	making	on	the	farm?	-	for	day	to	day	
(tactical)	management	decisions.	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	7	point	scale	the	ranged	from:	All	to	none.	
4.6.5 Descriptive	farm	and	farmer	characteristics	
A	number	of	other	variables	were	included	in	the	survey	(see	section	5.4.1)	to	support	the	
analysis	of	the	data.	These	were	included	to	provide	descriptive	information	about	the	farm	
and	the	supplier.	These	included	such	things	as	ownership	structure,	region,	type	of	farm,	
supplier,	age,	education	and	experience,	farm	size,	and	years	supplying	the	processor	(Table	
4-30).	
Table	4-30:	Farmer	and	farm	business	characteristics	
Code	 Description	
Ownership	 	 Which	best	describes	the	ownership	arrangement	of	your	farm?	
Region	 	 	 What	region	is	your	farm	located?	
Role	 	 	 What	role	best	describes	you?	
SuppYrs_Product		 How	many	years	have	you	supplied	your	current	[product]	to	your	[processor]?	
Type	Farm	 	 What	type	of	operation	is	your	farm?	
Yrs_Age	 	 	 Age	in	years?	
Yrs_CFarm	 	 Experience?	Total	years	on	your	current	farm?	
Yrs_Farm	 	 Total	years	farming?	Years.	
LabourUnits	 Full	time	labour	units	are	working	on	your	farm	(including	yourself)?	
LocationIsland	 Farm	location	(North	Island/South	Island).	
LStockBuyer	 Livestock	buyer	an	employee	of	your	[processor]	or	are	they	an	independent	livestock	
buyer?	
FarmSize_TotUnit	 Total	farm	size	per	unit.	
FarmSize_Prod	 Farm	Size	[product]	Effective	Area	(Hectares).	
FarmSize_Total	 Farm	Effective	Area	(Hectares).	
EduMax	 What/	was	the	highest	level	of	education	you	attained?	
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4.6.6 Governance	mechanism:	Contracts	and	shareholding	
Contracts	and	shareholding	are	an	important	governance	mechanisms	that	can	affect	the	
relationship	between	the	supplier	and	buyer.	It	was	necessary,	therefore,	to	control	for	the	
impact	of	these	on	supplier	relationship	quality	and	performance.	The	items	covered	
whether	they	supplied	product	on	contract	as	well	as	the	percentage	that	was	supplied	on	
contract.	Ownership	of	shares	by	the	supplier	and	length	of	time	owning	shares	were	also	
taken	into	account	(Table	4-31).	
Table	4-31:	Contracted	supply	measurements	
Code	 Description	
Contract_Y_N	 In	the	last	year	have	you	supplied	[product]	on	contract	(with	quality/and/or	delivery	
specifications)	to	your	[processor].	
ContractPct	 What	%	of	your	[product]	sales	were	supplied	on	contract?	
Shares_Yes_No
	 	
Is	your	farm	business	a	shareholder	in	your	current	[product]	[processor]?	
SharesYrs
	 	
How	many	years	has	your	farm	business	been	a	shareholder	of	your/[processor]?	
4.6.7 Communication	from	processor	
Communication	from	the	processor	is	likely	to	affect	the	quality	of	the	supplier	relationship	
with	the	processor.	As	the	study	only	looked	at	supplier	factors	this	was	included	as	a	control	
variable.	The	frequency	of	both	face-to-face	communication	and	communication	by	phone,	
email	or	text	were	measured	(Table	4-32).	
Table	4-32:	Processor	communication	measurements	
Code	 Description	
CommFace	 How	often	would	you	have	face	to	face	contact	with	someone	from	
[processor]?	
CommPhone	 How	often	would	you	have	contact	with	someone	from	[processor]	(by	phone,	
email	or	text)?	
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Chapter	5: Research	design	and	methods	
5.1 Introduction	
This	chapter	describes	the	research	design	and	methods	used	to	develop	and	test	the	
theoretical	model	and	its	associated	hypotheses.	The	research	involved	both	qualitative	and	
quantitative	research	methods.		The	qualitative	research	enabled	a	more	in-depth	study	of	
the	supplier	and	relationship	characteristics,	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	
This	also	enabled	the	incorporation	of	the	buyer’s	perspective	on	supplier	performance	
which	was	not	included	in	the	quantitative	research.	The	quantitative	research	was	able	to	
measure	the	relationships	and	test	the	hypotheses	between	the	constructs	by	providing	
tests	for	statistical	significance	and	model	fit.	
The	chapter	also	explains	the	sampling	method,	questionnaire	development,	methods	used	
for	the	data	collection	and	preparation,	as	well	as	tests	for	normality.	The	first	part	discusses	
the	qualitative	research	phase	and	how	this	relates	to	the	rest	of	the	research.	The	second	
part	explains	the	development	of	the	survey	instrument	and	the	method	used	to	ensure	
validity	of	the	measures	used	in	the	questionnaire.	The	final	section	looks	at	the	data	
collection,	including	the	sample	size	and	methods	used	in	the	data	preparation.	
5.2 Qualitative	research	
As	previously	mentioned,	there	is	a	lack	of	established	theory	and	empirical	results	for	the	
interactions	between	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	attributes,	relationship	quality	
and	supplier	performance,	especially	in	the	agri-food	context.	Therefore,	the	initial	phase	of	
the	research	employed	an	explorative	case	study	approach	informed	by	the	literature	
review.	This	method	was	used	in	order	to	gain	insight	into	the	complex	factors	that	
contribute	to	the	formation	of	high-quality	supply	relationships.	A	multiple	case	studies	
method	was	used	as	this	has	advantages	in	identifying	patterns	as	well	as	enabling	the	
triangulation	of	the	results	(Yin,	2003).		
The	purpose	of	the	case	study	research	phase	was	to	support	the	development	of	a	
theoretical	framework	in	conjunction	with	the	literature.	The	literature	review	identified	the	
main	theories	and	constructs	related	to	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	in	
supply	chains.	The	exploratory	case	studies	attempted	to	verify	the	theoretical	constructs	
from	the	literature	and	identify	any	additional	constructs.	From	this,	the	theoretical	
framework	was	further	refined.	The	case	studies,	like	experiments,	are	generalisable	to	a	
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theoretical	proposition,	but	not	to	populations.	The	goal	of	this	phase	of	the	research	is	to	
expand	and	generalise	theories	or	analytical	generalisations,	not	to	attempt	to	make	
statistical	generalisations	(Yin,	2003).	
5.2.1 Qualitative	data	collection	
	
The	first	stage	of	data	collection	involved	in-depth	semi-structured	interviews	with	25	
farmer	suppliers.	The	interviews	took	between	sixty	and	ninety	minutes.	The	interview	
questions	included	topics	that	were	based	on	the	plan	of	the	enquiry.	The	aim	was	to	
establish	rapport	and	develop	a	conversation	in	which	the	interviewer	provided	the	general	
direction	of	the	discussion	with	the	ability	to	pursue	specific	topics	raised	by	the	respondent	
(Babbie,	2012).	Indirect	questioning	was	used,	as	appropriate,	to	avoid	social	desirability	bias	
(Fisher,	1993).These	face-to-face,	on-site	interviews	were	complemented	by	secondary	data,	
such	as	published	company	information,	supply	agreements	and	newspaper	reports.	Other	
secondary	data	included	observations	at	supplier	field	days	and	informal	personal	
communication	with	suppliers	and	company	personnel.	Secondary	data	provided	additional	
information	and	validation	of	the	interview	data.	
The	25	supplier	interviews	were	recorded,	transcribed	and	then	coded	using	Nvivo	research	
software,	which	enabled	the	organisation	and	analysis	of	unstructured	qualitative	data.	The	
interviewees	were	selected	from	the	company’s	supplier	database	and	were	chosen	to	
provide	a	diversity	of	farmer	and	farm	types.	A	unique	feature	of	case	study	research	is	the	
ability	for	there	to	be	an	overlap	between	data	collection	and	analysis.	Constructs	and	their	
relationships	can	be	adjusted	as	the	research	progresses.	As	themes	emerged	from	the	
research	new	cases	as	well	as	additional	data	sources	and	interview	questions	were	added	
(Barratt,	Choi,	&	Li,	2011).		
The	study	also	adopted	the	perspective	of	Hatch	(2002)	whereby	the	qualitative	data	
analysis	is	a	systematic	search	for	meaning.	The	data	from	the	interviews	included	written	
notes	and	sound	recordings.	This	was	analysed	using	thematic	content	analysis	(TCA)	to	look	
for	patterns	across	cases	to	identify	themes,	relationships,	develop	explanations	and	build	a	
logical	chain	of	evidence	(Babbie,	2012;	Leech	&	Onwuegbuzie,	2007;	Miles	&	Huberman,	
1994).	The	case	analysis	enabled	the	description	of	emerging	constructs	and	their	
relationships	through	detailed	descriptive	write-ups	of	each	case.	Secondly,	cross	case	
analysis	was	able	to	compare	and	contrast	the	patterns	emerging	from	the	detailed	case	
write-ups	(Yin,	2003).	Furthermore,	the	write-up	of	the	interviews	and	case	studies	were	
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sent	to	the	processors	and	the	suppliers	interviewed.	This	enabled	further	validation	of	the	
results	as	well	as	ensuring	that	the	theoretical	constructs	were	related	to	the	company	and	
supplier	experience.	
The	semi-structured	interviews	were	undertaken	with	suppliers	from	three	New	Zealand	
agri-food	exporting	companies	between	May	2012	and	October	2014.	A	purposeful	sampling	
method	was	used	to	ensure	the	companies	interviewed	covered	a	range	products,	and	
markets	(Patton,	2005).	The	companies	selected	all	had	a	focused-differentiation	strategy18	
(Porter,	1985)	and	the	products	exported	included,	beef,	lamb	and	venison;	their	key	
markets	were	in	the	European	Union,	North	America,	Asia	and	the	Middle	East.	The	
companies	were	accessed	by	approaching	key	personnel	within	these	companies	and	
explaining	the	purpose	of	the	research.	The	suppliers	were	selected	by	the	companies	to	
provide	a	range	of	suppliers	with	different	characteristics,	relationship	quality	and	
performance.	The	suppliers	were	also	required	to	meet	high	product	specifications	in	terms	
of	timing	of	delivery,	food	safety.	The	number	of	interviewees	was	determined	by	assessing	
when	little	new	information	was	being	added	by	each	additional	case.		
5.2.2 Validity	–	qualitative	research	
Although	the	study	was	exploratory	in	nature,	it	was	still	important	to	ensure	validity.	
Establishing	validity	for	qualitative	research	is	a	complex,	ill-defined	procedure	with	a	range	
of		different	perspectives	(Creswell	&	Miller,	2000).	To	address	this	the	methodology	of	Cho	
and	Trent	(2006)	was	adopted.	In	their	view	validity	considerations	need	to	be	present	
throughout	the	research	process.	They	highlight	the	need	for	an	ongoing	consideration	of	
the	researcher’s	concerns,	safeguards	and	contradictions.	This	perspective	of	validity	is	
known	as	transformational	validity	and	adopts	the	view	that	the	data	can	neither	be	valid	or	
invalid	however	what	is	most	important	is	the	validity	of	the	inferences	drawn	from	the	data	
(Hammersley	&	Atkinson,	2007).	In	contrast,	transactional	validity	involves	abstract	
strategies	that	apply	procedures	such	as	bracketing,	triangulation	and	member	checking.	The	
weakness	of	these	abstract	techniques	is	when	it	is	believed	that	by	employing	these	
techniques	validity	is	assured	(Maxwell,	1992).		
Transformational	validity	involved	both	interpretive	validity	and	theoretical	validity.	
Interpretive	validity	involves	identifying	“what	objects,	events	and	behaviours	mean	to	the	
people	actually	engaged	in	and	with	them”	(Maxwell,	1992,	p.	288).	This	seeks	to	
																																																																		18	This	was	judged	by	whether	they	were	selling	branded	products.	
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comprehend	the	data	through	the	participants’	perspective	and	categories.	Accordingly	the	
study	focused	on	interpreting	the	data	in	the	language	of	the	interviewees	and	as	much	as	
possible	using	their	own	words	and	concepts	(Maxwell,	1992).	Another	important	aspect	of	
transformational	validity	is	the	necessity	for	the	researcher	to	make	explicit	their	own	lens	
which	includes	the	assumptions,	beliefs	and	biases.	In	this	research,	the	researcher	was	
aware	of	his	interest	in	developing	and	promoting	high	value	agri-food	supply	chains	and	
involvement	in	researching	and	teaching	on	this	topic.	
The	research	also	applied	the	principles	of	transactional	validity.	Member	checking	was	
carried	out	during	the	interviews.	This	involved	reflected	back	the	interviewees’	comments	
to	gain	agreement	regarding	the	accuracy	and	meaning	of	their	statements.	Triangulation	of	
sources	as	described	by	Patton	(1999)	was	used	which	involved	checking	for	the	consistency	
of	different	data	sources.	In	particular	the	perspectives	and	experiences	of	different	cases	
and	interviewees	were	evaluated	for	consistency	among	responses	(Creswell	&	Miller,	2000).		
External	validity	was	achieved	through	proximity	and	similarity	(in	the	selection	of	
companies	that	had	similar	strategies	but	different	products	and	markets	(Campbell,	1986).	
Internal	validity	was	assured	through	the	number	of	supplier	informants	selected	within	
each	group	and	selection	of	suppliers	that	had	a	broad	range	of	perspectives.		
5.3 Results	of	qualitative	research	
The	results	of	these	interviews	identified	that	the	main	factors	that	attracted	suppliers	to	
these	supply	chains	were	increased	price	certainty,	premium	prices	and	relationship	quality.	
Many	suppliers	wanted	to	break	away	from	the	agricultural	commodity	cycle,	which	they	
saw	as	disconnected	from	customer	demands	and	characterised	by	price	volatility.	They	saw	
themselves	as	better	than	average	producers	with	the	ability	to	produce	high-quality	
products.	They	valued	the	relationship	with	the	companies	they	supplied	as	this	gave	them	
access	to	premium	markets	where	they	felt	they	would	be	rewarded	for	their	efforts.	There	
was	a	high	level	of	trust	in	these	relationships	which	was	built	on	openness	and	transparency	
in	communications	as	well	as	confidence	in	the	character	of	the	company	personnel.	The	
success	of	differentiated	agri-food	supply	chains	requires	capable	and	committed	suppliers	
(Micheels	&	Gow,	2010).	Companies	that	are	developing	a	differentiated	strategy	need	to	
identify	suppliers	who	have	the	ability	to	produce	high-quality	products	and	want	to	be	
involved	in	a	customer-focused	supply	chain.	For	suppliers,	this	enables	them	access	to	
premium	markets.	The	interviews	with	the	companies	defined	the	supplier	performance	
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constructs	used	in	the	qualitative	research.	These	were	reliable	delivery	of	required	quality	
and	quantity	of	stock,	communication,	loyalty	and	profitability.	These	interviews	confirmed	
that	constructs	such	as	relationship	quality,	supplier	ability	and	motivation,	customer	focus	
and	supplier	net	benefit,	were	important	factors	in	the	theoretical	model.	The	qualitative	
phase	of	the	research	supported	the	development	of	the	survey	instrument,	especially	
where	there	were	no	established	measurement	items	in	the	literature.	More	detail	on	the	
results	of	the	quantitative	research	have	been	published	by	Lees	and	Nuthall	(2014).	
5.4 Quantitative	research	
The	quantitative	research	involved	the	development	of	a	survey	instrument	that	could	
measure	the	scale	items	to	enable	calculation	of	the	latent	constructs	though	factor	analysis.	
The	constructs	developed	from	the	factor	analysis	were	tested	by	confirmatory	factor	
analysis	and	provided	the	inputs	into	the	structural	equation	modelling	(SEM)	analysis.	SEM	
was	chosen	for	this	research	due	to	its	ability	to	analyse	a	large	number	interrelated	
relationships	in	a	single	analysis.	It	also	enables	the	analysis	of	relationships	between	latent	
constructs.	SEM	involves	a	combination	of	factor	analysis	and	multiple	regression	analysis.	
5.4.1 Development	of	the	survey	instrument	
Based	on	Churchill	(1979),	the	development	of	the	survey	instrument	followed	a	four	step	
process.	An	extensive	literature	review	was	conducted	to	obtain	the	initial	pool	of	scale	
items.	Following	this,	as	described	above,	interviews	were	carried	out	with	farmers	supplying	
beef,	venison	and	sheep	meat	to	processing	marketing	companies.	Interviews	were	also	held	
with	selected	processing	company	personnel.	These	interviews	helped	in	choosing	a	specific	
number	of	scale	items	to	be	used	in	developing	a	pre-test	survey.	The	pre-test	survey	was	
sent	to	processing/marketing	company	personnel	and	also	administered	in	person	to	10	
farmer	suppliers.	This	enabled	the	survey	to	be	tested	for	structure,	readability,	ambiguity	
and	overall	completeness.	A	copy	of	the	final	survey	can	be	found	in	Appendix	G.	
5.4.2 Construct	validity	
Ensuring	construct	validity	is	important	for	establishing	the	quality	of	the	research.	Construct	
validity	confirms	that	the	measures	used	reflect	the	concept	being	measured.	Without	this,	
it	is	impossible	to	know	to	what	degree	the	scale	measures	actually	relate	to	the	theoretical	
constructs	(Calder,	Phillips,	&	Tybout,	1982).	By	establishing	construct	validity,	legitimate	
inferences	can	be	made	from	the	measures	to	the	theoretical	constructs	(Hair,	Black,	Babin,	
&	Anderson,	2010).	Construct	validity	is	described	by	Netemeyer,	Bearden,	and	Sharma	
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(2003)	as	the	“overarching	quality	of	a	research	study,	with	other	categories	of	validity	
subsumed	under	construct	validity”	(p71).	It	involves	establishing	that	the	constructs	
measure	the	direction	and	size	of	the	effect	of	the	constructs	and	are	not	affected	by	factors	
from	the	domain	of	other	constructs	or	the	error	variance	(Netemeyer	et	al.,	2003).	
Construct	validity	cannot	be	directly	assessed	but	is	inferred	from	the	quality	of	the	
procedures	in	the	development	and	validation	of	the	scale	measures.	Content,	face	and	
criterion	validity	are	three	essential	criteria	for	establishing	construct	validity	(Netemeyer	et	
al.,	2003).	
5.4.3 Content	and	face	validity	
The	process	recommended	by	Churchill	(1979)	was	followed	to	ensure	content	and	face	
validity.	Content	and	face	validity	refer	to	how	well	the	constructs	are	translated	into	the	
scale	items	used	in	the	survey	instrument	(Netemeyer	et	al.,	2003).	The	literature	review	
was	used	to	define	the	domains	of	the	constructs	and	to	obtain	an	initial	pool	of	scale	items	
used	in	previous	research.	This	process	ensured	that	the	domains	were	clearly	defined	and,	
where	possible,	had	been	validated	in	previous	research.	It	also	ensured	that	the	scale	items	
adequately	represented	the	dimensions	of	each	of	the	constructs.	Convergent	and	
discriminate	validity	were	assessed	in	the	measurement	model	during	confirmatory	factor	
analysis,	see	Table	6-13	Table	6-16.	
5.4.4 Criterion	validity	
Establishing	criterion	validity	involved	using	measures	external	to	the	measurement	
instrument	to	support	the	validity	of	the	instrument.	The	survey	was	first	administered	to	
supplier	groups	that	were	delivering	to	higher	product	specifications	and	under	contract	
supply	arrangements.	These	specific	groups	require	greater	trust	and	commitment	than	is	
normal	for	meat	industry	suppliers,	enabling	an	evaluation	of	predictive	validity	(Figure	5-1).	
The	survey	also	measured	factors,	such	as	length	of	supply,	type	of	supply	arrangement	and	
ownership	of	shares,	which	also	provided	some	external	validity	by	correlating	with	the	
theoretical	constructs.		
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Figure	5-1:	Comparison	of	level	of	trust	for	different	supplier	groups	and	sheep	and	beef	industry	
average19	
	
Figure	5-1	is	an	example	of	the	measuring	trust	for	five	different	supplier	groups	and	
comparing	them	to	the	New	Zealand	sheep	and	beef	industry	average20.	These	companies	
represent	those	selected	for	the	qualitative	research21.	The	graphs	for	commitment	and	
satisfaction	are	shown	in	Appendix	A	(Figure	A.	5	&	Figure	A.	6.)	These	results	indicated	that	
the	measures	have	sufficient	criterion	validity	as	they	correctly	identified	the	differences	
between	the	supplier	groups	and	the	average	for	the	sheep	and	beef	industry.			 	
																																																																		
19	Results	from	the	main	survey.	
20	Data	from	the	main	survey.	The	methodology	for	development	the	trust	scale	is	explained	in	section		4.4.1.	
21	Some	companies	had	more	than	one	supplier	group.	
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Table	5-1	also	provides	further	evidence	of	criterion	validity.	Ownership	of	shares,	supplying	
stock	on	contract	and	the	percentage	of	stock	sold	under	contract	were	all	predictors	of	
higher	levels	of	commitment.	This	is	the	case	with	each	of	these	factors	having	significantly	
higher	levels	of	commitment.	Ownership	of	shares	has	a	small	but	significant	(p<.05)	
difference	on	commitment.	Suppliers	who	own	shares	had	a	higher	level	of	commitment	
than	those	who	do	not.	There	was	a	larger	and	more	significant	difference	(P<0.001)	and	(p<	
0.01)	between	supplier	who	have	contracted	supply.		
Table	5-1:	Relationship	between	commitment	and	share	ownership	and	contracted	supply	from	supplier	
survey.	Independent	sample	t-test.	
		 Ownership	of	shares	 Mean	of	commitment	scores	 P-value	
Commitment	
Yes	 3.6		
0.037**	
No	 3.5	
		 Supply	on	contract	 Mean	of	commitment	scores	 P-value	
Commitment	 Yes	 3.7	 0.000***	
		 No	 3.4	 		
		 %	supply	on	contract	 Mean	of	commitment	scores	 P-value	
Commitment	
0	–	50%	 3.6	
0.004***	
50	–	100%	 3.8	
The	mean	score	represents	the	mean	of	the	commitment	scores.	These	ranged	from	1	=	low	
commitment	to	6	=	high	commitment.	Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
5.5 Operationalisation	of	constructs	
Where	possible,	the	study	used	existing	measures	validated	in	previously	published	studies	
as	this	enhances	the	content	validity	of	the	measures.	Where	there	were	no	adequate	
established	measures	of	constructs	new	measures	were	developed	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).		
5.5.1 Sample	size	
The	choice	of	the	appropriate	sample	size	for	the	research	was	an	important	but	a	complex	
consideration	both	for	the	proposed	factor	analysis	(FA)	and	the	structural	equation	
modelling	(SEM)	techniques.	While	there	are	good	guidelines	for	sample	sizes	in	factor	
analysis,	this	is	not	the	case	for	SEM.	Factor	analysis	requires	5-10	subjects	per	
measurement	item	(Hair	et	al.,	2010;	Nunnally,	Bernstein,	&	Berge,	1967).	In	contrast,	the	
literature	gives	no	clear	answer	to	how	large	a	sample	size	should	be	for	SEM.	There	are,	
however,	some	considerations	and	rules	of	thumb	that	can	be	used.	SEM	modelling	requires	
larger	sample	sizes	than	other	multivariate	techniques	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	DeVellis	(2012),	
Leisa	Reinecke	and	Pearcy	(2001)	and	Spector	(1992)	suggest	SEM	samples	sizes	ranging	
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from	100	–	300	while	Kline	(2005)	recommends	an	ideal	sample	size	to	parameter	ratio	in	
the	range	of	10:1	to	20:1.		
Hair	et	al.	(2010)	identified	five	considerations	that	affect	the	required	sample	size	for	SEM.	
These	are	the	multivariate	normality	of	the	data,	the	estimation	technique,	model	
complexity,	the	numbers	of	missing	data	and	the	average	error	variance	among	the	
reflective	indicators.	To	avoid	the	problem	of	deviation	from	normality	he	recommends	15	
respondents	for	each	parameter	estimate	in	the	model.	The	common	SEM	estimation	
technique,	maximum	likelihood	estimation	(MLE),	will	provide	a	valid	result	with	a	minimum	
sample	size	of	50	under	ideal	conditions.	However,	with	factors	such	as	measurement	error	
and	missing,	data	sample	sizes	in	the	range	of	100-400	are	recommended	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	
More	complex	models	require	larger	samples	because	of	a	larger	number	of	indicator	
variables	and	constructs.	Larger	sample	sizes	are	also	necessary	where	there	are	constructs	
with	fewer	than	three	indicator	variables	or	where	multi-group	analysis	is	required	(Hair	et	
al.,	2010).	Larger	sample	sizes	are	also	recommended	if	communalities	(variation	among	
indicator	variables)	are	lower	than	recommended.	If	factor	loadings	were	less	than	0.7	and	
the	communalities	less	than	0.5	then	larger	sample	sizes	were	required	(Enders	&	Bandalos,	
2001;	Hair	et	al.,	2010).		
Based	on	the	summary	recommendations	of	Hair	et	al.	(2010),	a	minimum	sample	size	of	
500	was	chosen	due	to	the	large	number	of	constructs,	some	with	lower	communalities,	and	
there	being	some	constructs	with	fewer	than	three	measured	items.	This	study	has	88	
variables	to	be	factor	analysed;	this	required	a	sample	size	of	440	-	880	for	the	factor	
analysis	and	880	-	1760	for	the	structural	equation	model.	The	final	sample	size	was	838	
usable	responses	from	the	survey,	which	was	considered	adequate	for	the	factor	analysis	
and	within	the	range	of	880	-	1760	for	the	structural	equations	model.		
5.5.2 Data	collection	
The	sampling	frame	for	the	survey	was	the	New	Zealand	AsureQuality	registered	farmers’	
database.	A	stratified	sample	of	5944	farmers	was	provided	by	AsureQuality.	This	provided	
postal	addresses	for	farmers	in	the	research	sample.	There	were	only	a	small	number	of	
farmers	in	the	sample	who	had	email	addresses	and	many	of	these	were	inaccurate,	so	a	
postal	survey	was	considered	the	most	suitable.	As	well	as	this,	Pennings,	Irwin,	and	Good	
(2002)	identified	a	number	of	advantages	of	a	postal	survey	compared	with	other	types	of	
data	collection	such	as	telephone	and	face	to	face	interviews.	Furthermore,	research	has	
shown	that	email	or	online	surveys	achieve	a	lower	response	rate	than	paper	surveys	(Shih	&	
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Fan,	2008).	Farms	in	the	sample	had	to	be	over	30	ha	to	ensure	they	were	commercial	
operators.	The	sample	was	stratified	according	to	location,	size	and	farm	type	using	Statistics	
New	Zealand	data	to	ensure	representativeness.	
The	research	used	a	stratified	probability	sampling	method.	Stratification	was	used	to	
improve	the	degree	of	representativeness	by	decreasing	the	probability	of	sampling	error.	
The	mail	survey	was	sent	to	farmers	between	October	2013	and	March	2014.	A	letter	was	
sent	with	the	survey	explaining	the	purpose	of	the	research,	together	with	a	free-post	return	
envelope.	A	follow	up	survey	was	sent	out	to	farmers	who	had	not	returned	the	survey	to	
increase	the	sample	size	and	enable	testing	of	non-response	bias.	
5.6 	Data	preparation		
This	section	describes	the	data	preparation	and	the	tests	used	to	evaluate	the	quality	of	the	
data.	Also,	the	data	is	analysed	in	terms	of	key	descriptive	criteria.	The	first	section	describes	
the	methods	used	to	prepare	the	data	and	explains	how	issues	such	as	outliers	and	missing	
data	were	addressed.	It	also	describes	the	tests	undertaken	to	ensure	the	data	met	the	
criteria	for	normality.	Following	this,	the	next	section	evaluates	the	response	rate	for	the	
survey	and	checks	for	non-response	bias.	The	data	is	also	assessed	for	representativeness.	
Finally,	a	descriptive	analysis	describes	some	of	the	key	characteristics	of	the	survey	
respondents.		
5.6.1 Outlier	detection	
Analysis	to	identify	outliers	was	based	on	standard	deviations	from	mean	values.	Babbie	
(1992)	recommends	that	for	a	large	sample	size	only	values	greater	than	four	standard	
deviations	should	be	considered	outliers.	Based	on	this	criterion	there	were	no	outliers	in	
this	sample.	Unengaged	responses	were	identified	by	calculating	the	standard	deviation	of	
for	the	responses	of	each	case	(Babbie,	1992).	Where	there	were	very	low	standard	
deviations	in	responses	these	cases	were	deleted.	None	of	the	responses	met	the	criteria	for	
deletion.		
5.6.2 Missing	data	
Cases	with	more	than	50%	missing	data	were	also	excluded.	This	resulted	in	the	rejection	of	
36	cases.	The	remainder	of	the	missing	data	was	dealt	with	by	pairwise	deletion.	This	
method	attempts	to	use	all	available	data	and	discards	data	on	a	variable	by	variable	basis.		
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5.6.3 Normality	test	
Normality	is	an	important	criterion	for	SEM;	this	was	tested	for	using	a	Kurtosis	test	(Hair	et	
al.,	2010).	The	data	presented	below	are	for	variables	that	had	kurtosis	values	>2	or	<	-2.	A	
rule	of	thumb	suggested	by	Kline	(2005)	was	that	a	KI	>	10	or	KI	<	-10	suggested	a	problem	
with	the	assumption	of	normality.	Some	of	the	social	capital	variables:	C.SocCap1C_Goal,	
C.SocCap2_Values,	R.SocCap5_Personal,	R.SocCap6_Recip,	R.SocCap7_Trust	had	slightly	
higher	kurtosis	values	(Table	5-2).	This	indicated	that	the	data	in	these	variables	were	more	
tightly	clustered	around	the	mean	than	in	a	normal	distribution.	The	values	were	all	below	
the	value	of	10	suggested	by	Kline	(2005);	therefore,	overall,	the	assumption	of	sufficient	
normality	for	SEM	was	accepted.	
Table	5-2	Kurtosis	analysis:	Variables	with	normality	concerns	
	Variables	
N	
Kurtosis	
Valid	 Missing	
Shares	Yrs	 451	 495	 2.1	
C.SocCap1_Goal	 933	 13	 7.8	
C.SocCap2_Values	 932	 14	 7.5	
R.SocCap3_Bond	 930	 16	 4.1	
R.SocCap4_Friend	 928	 18	 4.3	
R.SocCap5_Personal	 928	 18	 5.0	
R.SocCap6_Recip	 929	 17	 5.1	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 930	 16	 5.6	
	
These	tests	for	validity,	evaluation	of	research	methods	and	data	collection	provide	good	
evidence	that	the	data	is	suitable	to	progress	with	factor	analysis	and	the	structural	equation	
modelling.	
5.6.4 Response	rate	
The	survey	had	an	overall	response	rate	of	20	percent	(Table	5-3)	with	14%	usable	replies.	
The	surveys	were	mailed	out	twice	to	maximise	the	response	rate	and	to	enable	an	
estimation	of	non-response	bias	(see	section	5.6.6).	5944	surveys	were	sent	out	in	the	first	
mail	out	and	4720	in	the	second	mail	out.	A	total	of	688	surveys	were	returned	in	the	first	
mail	out,	representing	a	12%	total	response	rate.	The	second	mail	out	was	done	six	weeks	
later,	and	a	further	537	surveys	were	returned	(11%	total	response	rate).	This	brought	the	
combined	total	response	rate	up	to	20%	Table	5-3.	The	data	was	also	tested	for	non-
response	bias	to	provide	further	evaluation	of	the	representativeness	of	the	data	(see	
section	5.6.6).		
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This	response	rate	was	lower	than	some	previous	surveys	of	farmers	in	New	Zealand.	For	
example,	Stafford,	Mellor,	and	McMeekan	(2000)	and	Old	and	Nuthall	(2014)	surveying	New	
Zealand	dairy	farmers	achieved	a	usable	response	rate	of	27%	and	36%	respectively.	In	
another	study	surveying	sheep	and	beef	farmers,	Bensemann	et	al.	(2011)	achieved	a	28%	
usable	response	rate.	The	low	response	rate	may	have	been	affected	by	the	length	of	the	
survey	and	the	time	of	year	the	survey	was	sent	out	(Pennings	et	al.,	2002).		
	
Table	5-3:	Survey	response	rate	
	 First	time	 Second	time		 	 Total	
mailed	out	
Total	
Response	
Rate	
Farm	Type	 Complete	 Incomplete	 Complete	 Incomplete	 Total	
Deer	 112	 31	 50	 49	 242	 833	 29%	
Beef	 75	 31	 73	 54	 233	 1707	 14%	
Sheep	&	Beef	 344	 75	 184	 127	 730	 3404	 21%	
Total	 531	 137	 307	 230	 1205	 5944	 20%	
	
Despite	the	lower	response	rate,	it	was	considered	sufficient	for	the	purpose	of	the	principle	
component	analysis	and	structural	equation	modelling.	This	was	because	the	data	was	not	
being	used	to	estimate	parameters	for	the	total	population	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	Furthermore,	
Cook,	Heath,	and	Thompson	(2000)	argue	that	the	representativeness	of	the	replies	is	more	
important	than	response	rate	see	Table	5-4,	Table	5-5,	Table	5-7,	Figure	5-2	and	Figure	5-3	
for	representativeness.	Furthermore,	Morton,	Bandara,	Robinson,	and	Carr	(2012)	explain	
that	a	low	response	rate	does	not	mean	low	validity	but	only	that	there	is	a	greater	risk	of	
this	and	that	response	rates	on	their	own	are	not	good	proxies	for	study	validity.	
The	survey	response	rates	are	shown	in	Table	5-3.	The	response	rate	was	highest	for	the	
deer	farmers	followed	by	the	sheep	and	then	the	beef	producers.	The	lowest	response	rate	
was	for	the	beef	farmers.	This	is	likely	to	be	because	many	farms	are	mixed	sheep	and	beef	
with	relatively	few	specialist	beef	operators.	The	database	did	not	always	classify	these	
farmers	accurately	as	some	farmers	may	classify	themselves	differently	to	the	Agribase	data.	
Furthermore,	some	specialist	beef	farmers	produce	replacement	heifers	for	the	dairy	
industry	and,	as	they	do	not	supply	a	processor	they	may	not	have	completed	the	survey.	
This	indicated	that	the	actual	response	rate	for	beef	farmers	might	have	been	higher	than	
recorded.	This	would	also	increase	the	overall	response	rate	for	the	survey.	
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5.6.5 Representativeness	
Representativeness	of	the	sample	was	tested	by	comparing	the	survey	responses	against	the	
Agribase	stratified	farmer	data.	These	were	compared	with	farm	size	and	regional	
distribution.	These	two	variables	were	the	only	individual	data	other	than	postal	addresses	
provided	in	the	Agribase	data.		
	
Table	5-4:	Chi	Square	test	for	differences	between	the	AgriBase	database	and	the	survey	
responses.	
Region	 AgriBase	data	base	 Survey	responses	
Auckland	 8.5%a	 1.8%b	
Bay	of	Plenty	 3.4%a	 3.2%a	
Canterbury	 18.8%a	 16.2%a	
Gisborne	 3.9%a	 3.9%a	
Hawke's	Bay	 7.4%a	 10.4%b	
Nelson-Marlborough	 4.8%a	 5.4%a	
Northland	 5.6%a	 4.3%a	
Otago	 8.6%a	 13.6%b	
Southland	 10.8%a	 13.8%b	
Taranaki	 3.2%a	 1.4%b	
Waikato	 9.5%a	 10.1%a	
Wanganui-Manawatu	 10.4%a	 12.2%a	
Wellington	 3.8%a	 3.4%a	
West	Coast	 1.3%a	 0.3%b	
Each	subscript	letter	denotes	a	subset	of	Agribase	and	survey	categories	whose	column	
proportions	do	not	differ	significantly	from	each	other	at	the	.05	level.	Regions	with	a	
different	subscript	letter	are	significantly	different	at	the	O.05	level.	
	
Table	5-4	compares	the	regional	distribution	of	the	stratified	sample	from	the	Agribase	data	
and	the	actual	regional	distribution	of	the	survey	responses.	Five	of	the	regions	have	a	
statistical	difference	between	the	AgriBase	data	and	the	survey	responses.	Of	these	regions	
Hawkes	Bay,	Otago	and	Southland	are	over-represented	compared	to	the	Agribase	data	and	
Taranaki,	Auckland	and	the	West	Coast	are	under-represented	Table	5-4.		
Table	5-5:	Independent	t-test:	Comparing	mean	farm	size.	
Source	of	data	 N	 Mean	farm	size	 P.	(2-tailed)	
AgriBase	database	 5900	 490.41	 0.554	
Survey	responses	 824	 521.00	 0.524	
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Table	5-6:	Chi	Square	comparison	of	farm	size	classification	for	the	2012	agricultural	census,	the	survey	data	
base	and	the	survey	responses	
Farm	Size	class	 Agricultural	
Census	2012	
Agribase	 Survey	 Follow	Up	
Survey	
10	to	19ha	 	 	 1.0%b	 1.6%b	
20	to	39ha	 	 	 1.2%b	 2.1%b	
40	to	59ha	 1%	 	 3.1%b	 5.8%b	
60	to	79ha	 4%	 11.6%a	 5.9%b	 6.2%b	
80	to	89ha	 5%	 5.1%a	 4.2%a	 2.9%a	
100	to	199ha	 17%	 27.7%a	 23.5%b	 22.2%a,b	
200	to	399ha	 31%	 28.1%a	 30.8%a	 28.8%a	
400	to	599ha	 13%	 10.6%a	 10.6%a	 10.7%a	
600	to	799ha	 8%	 4.9%a	 5.7%a	 4.1%a	
800	to	999ha	 4%	 3.1%a	 3.1%a	 2.5%a	
1000	to	1999ha	 11%	 5.6%a	 7.0%a	 5.8%a	
2000	to	3999ha	 4%	 1.8%a	 1.9%a	 5.3%b	
4000ha+	 3%	 1.4%a	 1.9%a	 2.1%a	
 For all	variables	with	the	same	letter,	the	difference	between	the	means	is	not	
statistically	significant.	
	
	
An	independent	t-test	comparing	mean	farm	size	(Table	5-5)	between	the	Agribase	database	
and	the	survey	responses	showed	there	is	no	significant	difference	between	mean	farm	size	
at	the	0.05	level	(Table	5-5).	A	chi	square	test	was	also	completed	comparing	the	Agribase	
data	for	farm	size	and	the	survey	responses	(Table	5-6).	This	showed	there	were	only	two	
categories	had	a	significant	difference.	These	were	60	–	79	ha	and	100	–	199	ha.	The	
Agribase	sample	was	stratified	according	to	the	Statistics	New	Zealand	farm	census	data.	
This	was	to	ensure	that	the	survey	mail	out	was	representative	to	this	sample	frame.	The	
over-representation	of	the	smaller	farms	may	be	a	result	of	these	farms	being	more	likely	to	
be	owner	managers	and,	therefore,	more	engaged	in	the	survey.	There	were	also	difficulties	
in	accurately	recording	farm	size	because	many	farms	have	multiple	blocks	and	multiple	
ownerships;	this	indicated	the	sample	is	a	good	representation	of	farm	size.	There	may	also	
inaccuracies	in	the	stratification	of	the	Agribase	data	supplied.	Given	these	issues	discussed	
above	the	representativeness	of	the	survey	was	considered	sufficient	for	the	factor	analysis	
and	SEM.	Further	analysis	was	undertaken	to	compare	the	census	data	with	farm	size	for	
each	of	the	farm	types	included	in	the	survey.	This	enabled	the	proportion	of	farm	sizes	for	
each	farm	type	to	be	evaluated.	There	was	an	excellent	representation	of	farm	sizes	for	
specialised	sheep	and	sheep	and	beef	farms	(Table	A:	6,	Table	A:	7	and	Table	A:	8).	This	was	
further	assessed	by	farm	type	and	regional	distribution	(Figure	5-2,	Table	A:	10	Table	A:	11	
and	Table	A:	12).	
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represented	by	4%.	The	differences	may	be	due	to	the	survey	respondents	only	identifying	
their	primary	processor	as	many	farmers	supplied	more	than	one	processor,	this	likely	
explained	some	of	the	differences.	These	tests	for	representativeness	showed	that	there	
was	a	good	distribution	of	responses	across	farm	size,	processor	and	region,	indicating	that	
the	survey	responses	had	acceptable	representativeness.		
5.6.6 Non-response	bias	
The	survey	was	also	assessed	for	non-response	bias	by	comparing	respondents	from	the	first	
mail	out	of	the	surveys	with	respondents	from	the	follow	up	mail	out.	This	assumed	that	the	
responders	who	did	not	reply	until	they	received	a	second	survey	required	more	
encouragement	to	respond	and	were,	therefore,	more	like	non-responders	(Armstrong	&	
Overton,	1977).	The	non-response	bias	was	assessed	by	a	one-way	ANOVA.		
Table	5-7:	One	way	ANOVA	test	comparing	means	of	farm	size	
	 N	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 F	 P.	
Agribase	data	 5900	 490.41	 1406.76	 0.275	 0.76	
Survey	 581	 533.44	 1396.12	 	 	
Follow-up	 252	 512.84	 932.70	 	 	
Total	 6733	 494.96	 1390.91	 	 	
	
The	one-way	ANOVA	test	confirmed	that	there	was	no	statistical	difference	between	the	
means	farm	size	of	the	Agribase	data,	the	sample	and	the	second	survey	responses	(Table	
5-7).	Further	comparisons	were	evaluated	between	farm	management	role,	farmer	age	
(Figure	5-3)	and	stage	of	the	business	cycle.	Paired	sample	t-tests	were	used	to	identify	and	
significant	differences.	The	results	showed	there	were	no	significant	differences	in	any	of	
these	variables,	indicating	that	there	was	no	statistical	difference	between	the	early	and	late	
responders	to	the	survey.		
	 126	
	
Figure	5-3:	Comparison	of	mean	age	of	farmers	from	first	mail	out	and	follow	up.	
The	second	method	involved	testing	for	differences	in	the	mean	scores	of	the	variables	
measured	in	the	survey.	Significant	differences	in	the	values	between	the	first	survey	and	
the	follow	up	survey	can	signify	non-response	bias.	A	total	of	245	variables	were	selected,	
and	the	initial	and	follow-up	responses	were	compared	using	a	paired	sample	t-test.	Of	
these,	16	(7%)	were	found	to	have	a	significant	difference	(Table	5-8).	This	suggests	that	for	
93	percent	of	the	variables	there	was	no	significant	difference	between	the	two	mail	outs.	
There	was,	however,	a	significant	difference	for	the	some	of	the	social	capital	variables	
(Table	5-8).	These	early	responders	were	less	likely	to	use	the	spot	market	(SpotMkt),	were	
more	likely	to	be	willing	to	make	long-term	investments	(Commit4_LTInvest),	had	greater	
farm	management	ability	(SuppAbil2_Mgmt,	SuppAbil2_Efficiency,	SuppAbiI4_Inn)	and	were	
less	independent	(SuppIndep2),	as	shown	in	Table	5-8.	These	results	suggest	a	slight	bias	in	
the	first	mail	out	towards	suppliers	that	have	a	strong	connection	and	commitment	to	their	
processor.	The	low	number	of	variables	with	significant	differences	indicated	that	although	
there	was	a	difference	in	these	variables	this	difference	did	not	affect	the	values	of	the	other	
variables.	
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Table	5-8:	Variables	with	significant	difference	between	initial	survey	and	follow-up	(2	tailed	T-
test)	
	
	
Based	on	these	analyses,	it	was	concluded	that	non-response	bias	was	not	a	significant	
problem	with	the	data.	Some	caution	may	be	necessary	in	using	the	social	capital	variables.	
The	differences	in	these	variables	were	less	important	as	the	data	were	primarily	being	used	
for	to	develop	a	theoretical	model	and	not	to	generalise	an	established	model	to	a	new	
population	or	use	descriptive	statistics	to	generalise	to	a	larger	population.		
5.7 Descriptive	analysis	
This	section	describes	some	of	the	characteristics	of	the	respondents	and	their	farm	
businesses.	This	was	to	establish	that	the	sampling	succeeded	in	providing	sufficient	
variation	in	the	respondents	in	terms	of	personal	and	farm	characteristics.	This	also	gives	
insight	into	the	characteristics	of	the	suppliers,	which	may	enable	a	better	interpretation	of	
the	results.		
	
	
	
Variable	
First	Mail	Out:	
Mean	score	
Follow-up:	
Mean	score	 p-value	
P	
SpotMkt	 2.9	 3.2	 0.006	 **	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 4.3	 4.0	 0.003	 ***	
R.SocCap6_Recip	 4.3	 3.9	 0.001	 ***	
R.SocCap_Personal	 4.4	 4.0	 0.001	 ***	
R.SocCap_Friend	 4.2	 3.9	 0.018	 **	
C.SocCap_Bonds	 4.1	 3.7	 0.002	 **	
C.SoCap_Values	 4.5	 4.1	 0.001	 ***	
C.SocCap1_Goals	 4.6	 4.2	 0.001	 ***	
ProcAbil2_SChain	 4.5	 4.3	 0.008	 **	
CostFocus	 3.9	 4.1	 0.019	 **	
SuppAbil2_Mgmt	 3.8	 3.6	 0.038	 **	
SuppAbil2_Efficiency	 3.5	 3.2	 0.008	 **	
SuppAbiI4_Inn	 3.5	 3.2	 0.006	 **	
Commit4_LTInvest	 4.4	 4.2	 0.041	 **	
SuppPerf1_Farm	 5.2	 5.0	 0.004	 **	
SuppIndep2	 3.4	 3.7	 0.004	 **	
The	scores	represent	the	mean	score	for	each	variable.	These	ranged	from	1	=	
low	to	5	=	high		
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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5.7.1 Supplier	characteristics	
Suppliers	were	classified	based	on	education	level,	gender	and	age.	
	Table	5-9:	Education	levels	
Highest	Education	level	attained	 %	 Average	Age	(years)	
Primary	school	 5%	 61	
Secondary	school		 46%	 61	
Post	school	certificate	or	other	non-university	diploma	 5%	 52	
University	Diploma	 17%	 54	
University	Bachelor	degree	 16%	 51	
Postgraduate	university	degree	 3%	 51	
	
Table	5-10:	Gender	of	respondents	
Gender	 %	of	respondents	
Male	 93%	
Female	 7%	
	
Although	93%	of	the	respondent	were	male	(Table	5-10),	those	surveyed	varied	significantly	
in	educational	level	and	other	characteristics.	While	36%	of	respondents	had	a	university	
diploma	or	degree,	there	were	a	significant	number	who	had	left	school	and	gone	farming	
without	any	further	education	(Table	5-9).	This	group,	at	51%,	was	the	majority	of	the	
respondents	(	Table	5-9).	These	farmers	who	had	only	primary	or	secondary	education	were	
more	likely	to	be	older	farmers	with	an	average	age	of	61	years.	University-educated	
respondents	were	much	younger	than	those	with	no	post-secondary	education	by	an	
average	of	10	years,	at	51	years.	This	indicated	that	there	was	a	trend	for	younger	farmers	to	
be	more	educated	and	more	likely	to	have	a	university	qualification.	It	also	showed	that	the	
sample	succeeded	in	capturing	significant	variation	in	these	characteristics.	
5.7.2 Farm	business	characteristics	
The	farm	business	characteristics	were	categorised	by	farm	size,	labour	units,	location,	farm	
class	and	ownership	type	as	well	as	their	management	role	(Table	5-11	to	Table	5-21).	In	
addition,	the	shareholding	in	their	processor23	and	the	length	of	time	supplying	their	current	
processor	was	used	to	categorise	the	respondents.		
																																																																		
23	 There	 are	 no	 publicly-listed	 processors,	 therefore,	 this	 demonstrates	 the	 level	 of	 membership	 of	 the	
cooperatives.	
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Table	5-11:	ANOVA	analysis	comparing	mean	farm	size	and	full-time	labour	units	for	lamb	beef	and	
venison	
Farm	type	 N	 Mean	of	full	time	labour	units	 Std.	Deviation	 P	
Beef	 143	 2.4	 5.8	 0.609	
Sheep	 535	 3.2	 26.3	 	
Deer	 155	 1.3	 0.9	 	
Total	 833	 2.7	 21.2	 	
	
Farm	Type	 N	 Mean	of	farm	size	 Std.	Deviation	 P	
Beef	 136	 276.4	 380.9	 0.255	
Sheep	 498	 991.9	 7298.2	 	
Deer	 155	 284.7	 958.2	 	
Total	 789	 729.6	 5823.8	 	
	
The	size	of	farms	varied	considerably	with	a	mean	area	of	729	ha	(Table	5-11).	Despite	this,	
the	ANOVA	analysis	showed	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	the	mean	of	farm	size	
between	the	beef,	sheep	and	deer	farms.	The	sheep	farms	had	the	largest	mean	farm	size	
but	also	had	the	largest	standard	deviation.	The	mean	of	full-time	labour	units	across	all	
farms	was	2.7.	Sheep	farms	had	the	highest	number	of	labour	units	at	3.2	and	deer	farms	
the	least	with	a	mean	of	1.3.	The	ANOVA	analysis	(Table	5-11)	confirmed	that	there	was	no	
significant	difference	between	the	means	of	the	labour	units	implying	that	all	farm	types	had	
similar	staff	numbers.		
The	respondents	were	split	fairly	evenly	between	the	North	and	South	Islands	with	a	slight	
majority	of	52%	in	the	North	Island	(Table	5-12).	The	largest	number	of	respondents	were	
from	Southland,	Otago,	Canterbury,	Manawatu-Wanganui,	and	Hawkes	Bay	(Table	A:	4).	
Table	5-12:	Location	of	respondents	
Farm	Location	 %	
North	Island	 52	%	
South	Island	 48%	
Table	5-13:	North	Island	farm	type	
North	Island	Farm	Class	 %	
Hard	(elevated)	Hill	Country	 8%	
Hill	Country	 31%	
Intensive	Finishing	 61%	
Table	5-14:	South	Island	farm	type	
South	Island	Farm	Class	 %	
High	Country	 8%	
Finishing	Breeding	 72%	
Intensive	Finishing	 10%	
Mixed	Cropping/Livestock	Finishing	 10%	
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The	farm	class	classifications	were	developed	by	the	Meat	and	Wool	Economic	Service	
(MWES)	to	group	farms	into	similar	types.	This	showed	that	the	North	Island	respondents	
had	farm	types	that	were	predominantly	intensive	finishing	farms	(61%).	In	contrast,	South	
Island	farms	were	predominantly	finishing	breeding	farms	(Table	5-14)	with	only	a	small	
proportion	of	intensive	finishing	farms	(10%).		
Table	5-15:	Type	of	farm	ownership	
Ownership	Type	 %	
Corporate	Farm	 3%	
Family	farm	 88%	
Maori	trust/corporation	 1%	
Other	 8%	
Table	5-16:	Respondents’	role	in	farm	business	
Role	 %	
Farm	Owner	and	Manager	 70%	
Farm	Owner24	 23%	
Farm	Manager	 5%	
Other	 3%	
	
Table	5-15	and	Table	5-16	show	the	types	of	farm	ownership	and	the	roles	of	the	
respondents	in	the	farm	business.	The	majority	of	the	farms	were	family	farms	(88%)	with	
predominantly	the	farmer	being	both	the	owner	and	the	manager	of	the	farm	(70%).	This	is	
consistent	with	the	results	from	a	survey	by	Old	and	Nuthall	(2014)	.	They	found	similar	
proportions	of	farms	were	run	by	traditional	farmers.	Family	farms	with	owner	managers	
tended	to	have	a	more	significant	relationship	with	the	processor,	as	owners	they	can	make	
both	strategic	and	management	decision	themselves	without	reference	to	anyone	else.		
Table	5-17:	Length	of	share	ownership	
Length	of	time	 %	
0	–	4	years	 25%	
5	-	10	years	 35%	
10	-	20	years	 40%	
Table	5-18:	Length	of	time	supplying	current	processor	
Years	supplying	[processor]	 %	
0	–	4	years	 19%	
5	-	10	years	 31%	
10	-	20	years	 20%	
20+	 30%	
Table	5-18	describes	aspects	of	the	relationship	with	the	processor.	There	was	an	even	split	
between	those	who	owned	shares	(48%)	in	their	processor	and	those	who	did	not	(52%).	As	
there	are	no	listed	or	farmer-owned	companies	in	the	meat	sector,	this	indicates	that	close	
to	50%	of	farmers	supplied	one	of	the	two	cooperative	processors:	The	Alliance	Group	and	
																																																																		24	Farm	owner	who	has	no	involvement	in	day	to	day	management	of	the	farm.	
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Silver	Fern	Farms.	Of	these	shareholders,	the	largest	proportion	(40%)	had	owned	shares	for	
more	than	ten	years.	There	were,	however,	a	significant	number	in	the	sample	who	had	
owned	shares	for	fewer	than	five	years	(25%).	The	proportion	of	farmers	had	been	suppliers	
to	their	processors	for	different	lengths	of	time	was	relatively	even	(Table	5-18).	A	significant	
proportion	of	the	respondents	(19%)	had	been	supplying	their	processor	for	fewer	than	five	
years.	Although	nearly	a	third	of	farmers	had	supplied	their	processor	for	more	than	twenty	
years,	50	per	cent	had	supplied	for	fewer	than	ten	years.	This	indicated	that	the	data	
provided	a	good	representation	of	the	different	characteristics	of	the	processor	relationship,	
including	cooperative	shareholding	and	length	of	the	supply	relationship.		
Table	5-19:	Proportion	of	debt	and	off	farm	income	
Description	 Mean	
%	
S.D.	
Total	farm	debt	as	percentage	of	total	farm	assets	 16%	 17.8%	
Debt	servicing	as	a	percentage	of	total	farm	income	 14%	 15.9%	
Proportion	of	non-farm	income	as	percentage	of	total	gross	income	 14%	 22.8%	
	
The	sample	had	considerable	variation	in	debt	and	off	farm	income	profiles	(Table	5-19).	The	
mean	debt	to	asset	ratio	was	relatively	low,	at	16	%,	and	debt	servicing	was	14%	of	total	
farm	income.	Off	farm	income	was	low,	at	14%	of	income	with	a	large	standard	deviation.	
Significantly,	more	than	a	third	of	the	sample	(36.6%)	had	no	off-farm	income,	and	30%	had	
no	debt.	These	results	confirmed	other	research	that	has	shown	the	sheep	and	beef	farms	
have	low	levels	of	debt	compared	to	other	farm	types,	such	as	dairy	farming.	
Table	5-20:	Stage	of	the	business	cycle	
Stage	 %	
Entry	 2%	
Growth/Expansion	 30%	
Consolidation	 42%	
Exit	 27%	
The	sample	had	considerable	numbers	in	the	growth/expansion,	consolidation	and	exit	
stages	of	the	business	cycle.	There	was	a	low	proportion	in	the	entry	stage.	This	low	figure,	
combined	with	the	significant	number	about	to	exit	the	industry,	illustrated	the	difficulty	in	
the	meat	industry	of	attracting	younger	farmers	and	new	entrants	to	the	industry.	The	older	
age	of	the	sheep	and	beef	farmers	would	also	mean	that	many	were	looking	to	exit	the	
industry	or	pass	on	the	farm	to	the	next	generation.	
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Table	5-21:	Supplied	stock	on	contract	in	last	year	
Supplied	stock	on	contract	 %	
Percentage	of	farmer	who	supply	some	stock	on	contract	 38.5%	
Percentage	of	total	stock	supplied	under	contract25	(mean)	 49%	
The	proportion	of	stock	sold	on	contract	gives	a	significant	indicator	of	a	closer	relationship	
with	the	processor.	It	was	important,	therefore,	to	have	sufficient	variation	in	this	factor.	
Nearly	40%	of	the	sample	had	supplied	at	least	some	stock	on	contract	in	the	last	year	and	
these	farmers	supplied	almost	50%	of	their	stock	on	contract	(Table	5-21).	This	indicated	
that	approximately	19%	of	all	stock	were	supplied	under	contract	to	processors.	Many	
farmers	sold	a	proportion	of	their	stock	on	contract	but	also	sold	some	on	the	spot	market	
to	give	themselves	greater	flexibility	to	manage	climate	risk.		
5.8 Conclusion	
This	chapter	outlined	the	research	methodology,	data	collection	and	tests	for	validity	for	
both	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	research.	The	issue	of	most	concern	was	the	response	
rate	compared	to	other	surveys	of	New	Zealand	farmers.	This	was	not	considered	a	
significant	problem	as	SEM	is	not	trying	to	estimate	parameters	for	the	whole	population.	
Furthermore,	the	analysis	confirmed	sufficient	representativeness	of	the	data	which	is	
considered	a	more	important	test	than	the	sample	size.	The	results	also	showed	sufficient	
evidence	that	non-response	bias	was	not	a	problem.	The	descriptive	analysis	indicated	that	
there	was	sufficient	variation	in	the	data	to	provide	a	good	basis	for	the	SEM.	Therefore,	the	
results	show	acceptable	validity	and	representativeness	was	achieved,	and	there	was	
sufficient	variability	to	provide	a	good	data	set	for	the	EFA	and	SEM	analysis.	
	
	
																																																																		
25	Average	percentage	of	stock	supplied	on	contract	by	those	suppliers	who	commit	to	a	contract.	
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Chapter	6: Methodology	and	analysis:		Exploratory	factor	
analysis	(EFA)	and	confirmatory	factor	analysis	(CFA)	
6.1 Introduction	
This	chapter	contains	the	EFA	and	the	CFA.	The	EFA	tests	the	scale	items	developed	in	
chapter	5	and	the	latent	constructs	they	aim	to	measure.	The	EFA	enables	the	identification	
of	the	common	underlying	variables.	The	analysis	identifies	the	common	variance	in	the	
scale	measures,	and	this	enables	the	loading	of	these	variables	onto	common	factors	(Table	
6-2).	These	factors	are	later	tested	using	CFA.	The	CFA	tests	the	factor	structure	developed	
in	the	EFA	and	enables	an	assessment	of	discriminant	and	convergent	validly	as	well	as	
reliability.	This	provides	the	latent	factors	for	the	SEM	analysis	in	chapter	8.	
6.2 Uni-dimensionality,	construct	reliability	and	internal	consistency		
The	EFA	tests	for	both	construct	reliability	and	internal	consistency.	These	tests	identify	how	
interrelated	each	of	the	scale	items	are.	A	two-step	process	was	used	to	test	construct	
reliability.	The	first	step	used	the	exploratory	factor	analysis	(EFA)	to	test	for	uni-
dimensionality	of	the	scales.	This	required	all	items	to	load	onto	a	single	factor,	although	
Hair	et	al.	(2010)	note	that	it	is	common	for	individual	items	to	have	moderate	loadings	onto	
more	than	one	factor.	Next,	Cronbach’s	Alpha	was	calculated	as	a	measure	of	reliability.	
Cronbach’s	Alpha	measures	the	internal	consistency	of	the	scale	items.	There	are	a	variety	of	
acceptable	alpha	values	reported	in	the	literature,	ranging	from	0.70	to	0.95	(Tavakol	&	
Dennick,	2011).	Values	as	low	as	0.60	are	considered	acceptable	in	exploratory	research	
(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	The	number	of	items	in	a	scale	also	significantly	affect	the	Alpha	value	
(Meyers,	Gamst,	&	Guarino,	2006)	with	more	scale	items	increasing	the	value	of	Cronbach’s	
Alpha.	Inter-item	correlations	were	also	evaluated	to	ensure	that	items	with	low	correlation	
to	other	items	in	the	factor	were	removed.	Items	were	only	retained	if	they	were	above	the	
cut	off	of	0.30	(Flynn,	Schroeder,	&	Sakakibara,	1994).	Because	of	the	large	number	of	
factors,	the	EFA	was	analysed	with	two	separate	sets	of	items	and	constructs.	The	first	set	
focused	on	relationship	measures	(Table	6-2)	with	the	second	set	comprising	the	supplier	
factors	(Table	6-6).	
6.3 Relationship	and	supplier	factors	
The	scale	items	were	divided	into	two	groups	due	to	the	large	number	of	measures.	The	
groups	were	divided	into	supplier	factors	and	relationship	factors.	These	groups	were	
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selected	to	ensure	that	constructs	that	may	be	correlated	would	be	tested	in	the	same	
analysis	in	order	to	determine	if	they	were	distinct	constructs.	The	relationship	factors	
included	the	measures	of	relationship	attributes	and	relationship	quality.	The	supplier	
factors	included	the	supplier	characteristics	and	supplier	performance	constructs.	
Alternative	groupings	were	also	tested	to	ensure	that	there	was	consistency	in	the	results	
and	provide	additional	evidence	for	the	number	of	constructs	(Cudeck,	2000).	This	analysis	
showed	no	difference	in	the	factor	structure	and	the	measures	of	internal	consistency.	See	-	
Appendix	B	(Table	B:	3).	
6.4 Exploratory	factor	analysis	and	confirmatory	factor	analysis	
The	EFA	was	used	to	identify	the	pattern	of	correlations	between	the	scale	items.	This	
enabled	the	data	to	be	reduced	to	latent	factors	based	on	the	underlying	structure	of	the	
data	(Cudeck,	2000).	In	the	EFA	the	scale	items	were	allowed	to	freely	load	onto	the	latent	
constructs	and	cross	load	onto	multiple	constructs.	These	factors	were	further	tested	in	the	
CFA	(Figure	6-1	and	Figure	6-2).	This	enabled	confirmation	of	the	validity	of	these	factors	
that	were	then	used	in	the	SEM.	The	EFA	analysis	was	carried	out	using	IBM®	SPSS®	software	
using	Principal	Component	Analysis	(Kim,	2008)	with	a	Varimax	rotation	(Fabrigar,	Wegener,	
MacCallum,	&	Strahan,	1999).	The	number	of	factors	was	determined	by	including	only	
factors	with	Eigenvalues	greater	than	one	(Kaiser,	1960)	as	well	as	an	evaluation	of	the	scree	
plots	(Cattell,	1966)	-	see	Appendix	B	(	Figure	B	1	and	Figure	B	2).	The	EFA	enabled	testing	for	
reliability,	or	internal	consistency	using	Cronbach’s	Alpha.	This	measured	the	level	of	shared	
covariance	between	the	scale	items	that	make	up	the	common	factors.	Cronbach’s	Alpha	
values	above	0.60	were	considered	acceptable	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	In	contrast	to	the	EFA,	the	
CFA	required	the	scale	measures	to	be	fixed	in	terms	of	the	latent	factors	they	load	onto.	
In	contrast	to	the	EFA	the	CFA	model,	or	measurement	model,	required	the	indicator	
variable	to	load	onto	the	specified	latent	constructs;	the	model	shows	the	covariance	
between	the	latent	constructs.	This	enabled	the	factor	structure	to	be	tested	for	the	
goodness-of-fit	between	the	measurement	model	and	the	data.	The	CFA	also	enabled	
calculation	of	additional	validity	measures.	These	included	convergent	validity	and	
discriminant	validity	scores	as	well	as	an	alternative	reliability	measure	to	Cronbach’s	Alpha	
which	is	the	Composite	Reliability	(CR)	score.	Furthermore,	the	factor	loadings	on	each	
construct	were	evaluated	to	identify	items	that	have	low	correlations	with	the	constructs.	
Items	with	factor	loading	below	0.50	were	considered	candidates	for	deletion	to	improve	
the	validity	of	the	construct	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	The	CFA	was	analysed	using	IBM®	SPSS®	Amos	
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v22	software.	Once	the	CFA	met	the	acceptable	values	of	goodness-of-fit	,	reliability	and	
validity	these	constructs	were	then	able	to	be	used	in	the	SEM	(Table	6-11	and	Table	6-14).	
6.4.1 Analysis	of	relationship	factors	
The	EFA	for	the	relationship	factors	produced	an	11-factor	solution	(Table	6-1).	These	factors	
all	had	an	Eigen	value	greater	than	1.0,	and	the	11	factors	explained	72%	of	the	variance.	
Factors	with	an	Eigen	value	below	one	were	excluded	from	the	analysis.	This	level	of	
variance	explained	was	well	above	the	60%	cut-off	measure	that	is	commonly	used	in	the	
social	sciences	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	All	communalities	were	above	0.52	(Table	B:	1).	The	scree	
plot	for	the	factor	analysis	is	shown	in	Figure	B	1.	
Table	6-1:	Percentage	of	variance	explained	by	relationship	factors	
	 Rotation	Sums	of	Squared	Loadings	
	Factor	
number		 Total	 %	of	Variance	 Cumulative	%	
1	 6.9	 12.3	 12.3	
2	 5.5	 9.8	 22.1	
3	 4.9	 8.7	 30.8	
4	 4.7	 8.3	 39.1	
5	 4.4	 7.9	 47.1	
6	 2.9	 5.2	 52.2	
7	 2.6	 4.6	 56.8	
8	 2.5	 4.4	 61.2	
9	 2.4	 4.2	 65.4	
10	 2.1	 3.8	 69.2	
11	 1.7	 3.0	 72.1	
	
Most	of	the	factor	loadings	(Table	6-2)	were	in	the	range	of	0.60	(C.SocCap10_Freq)	to	0.87	
(C.SocCap2_Values)	indicating	a	high	correlation	between	the	variables	and	their	associated	
latent	factors	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	There	were	some	items	with	lower	factor	loadings,	ranging	
from	0.52	to	0.60.	These	items	and	their	factor	loadings	are	shown	in	Table	6-2.	The	
Cronbach’s	Alpha	values	for	the	relationship	factors	indicated	an	acceptable	level	of	internal	
consistency.	The	majority	of	values	were	above	0.80	with	only	two	factors	with	values	below	
this.		 	
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Table	6-2:	Constructs,	items	and	exploratory	factor	analysis	for	relationship	factors26	
Construct	and	measures	 Factor	Loadings	
Cronbach's	
Alpha	
Composite27	
Reliability	(CR)	
1.	Social	capital	Cognitive	and	Relational	 0.97	 0.97	
C.SocCap2_Values	 0.87	 		 	
R.SocCap5_Pers	 0.87	 		 	
C.SocCap1_Goals	 0.86	 		 	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 0.86	 		 	
R.SocCap6_Recip	 0.85	 		 	
R.SocCap4_Friend	 0.85	 		 	
C.SocCap3_Bonds	 0.85	 		 	
2.	Social	capital	-	structural	 0.91	 0.91	
S.SocCap8_Funct	 0.72	 		 	
S.SocCap9_Level	 0.72	 		 	
C.SocCap10_Freq	 0.60	 		 	
3.	Supplier	Value	 0.92	 0.91	
Value5_ReduceCost	 0.76	 		 	
Value7_ProdRisk	 0.75	 		 	
Value6_Profit	 0.74	 		 	
Value1_GrowBus	 0.72	 		 	
Value3_NewTech	 0.68	 		 	
Value4_Customer	 0.68	 		 	
Value8_MktRisk	 0.66	 		 	
Value2_Premium	 0.65	 		 	
4.	Costs	and	Risks	 0.91	 0.91	
SuppCost7_ProdRisk	 0.85	 		 	
SuppCost3_Incr	 0.85	 		 	
SuppCost4_Stress	 0.82	 		 	
SuppCost5_LessProfit	 0.82	 		 	
SuppCost2_Flex	 0.78	 		 	
SuppCost6_MktRisk	 0.72	 		 	
5.	Trust	and	Commitment	 0.93	 0.92	
Trust5_Advantge	 0.66	 		 	
Trust2_Welfare	 0.66	 		 	
Trust1_Expl	 0.66	 		 	
Trust4_Fair	 0.65	 		 	
Trust6_Returns	 0.63	 		 	
Trust3_Agree	 0.63	 		 	
Commit1_RelLongTerm	 0.57	 		 	
Commit3_Proud	 0.57	 		 	
Commit2_Resource	 0.52	 		 	
Extraction	Method:	Principal	Component	Analysis.	Rotation	Method:	Varimax	with	
Kaiser	Normalisation.	Rotation	converged	in	eight	iterations.	Total	variance	explained	by	
11	factors	72%,	All	variables	had	communalities	of	greater	than	0.5	
	
																																																																		26	The	definition	of	these	constructs	can	be	found	in	Appendix	-	Table	C:	1	
27	The	value	for	composite	reliability	is	derived	from	the	CFA.	It	is	presented	here	with	Cronbach's	Alpha	as	they	
both	measure	the	internal	consistency	or	the	amount	to	which	the	measure	of	a	construct	are	inter-related	or	
measure	the	same	thing	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	
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Table	6-3:	Constructs,	items	exploratory	factor	analysis	for	relationship	factors	-	continued	
Construct	and	measures	 Factor	Loadings	
Cronbach's	
Alpha	
Composite	
Reliability	CR)	
6.	Supplier	loyalty	 	 0.75	 0.73	
CommitL3_PriceRev	 0.76	 		 	
CommitL1_OptRev	 0.71	 		 	
CommitL4_SpotMktR	 0.70	 		 	
CommitL5_SuplOne	 0.67	 		 	
7.	Satisfaction	with	buyer	 	 0.91	 0.91	
ProcAbi1_Mktg	 0.78	 		 	
ProcAbil3_Prem	 0.78	 		 	
ProcAbil2_SChain	 0.78	 		 	
Satisf1_NetReturn	 0.76	 		 	
Satisf3_Policies	 0.68	 		 	
Satisf2_Support	 0.64	 		 	
8.	Satisfaction	with	price	 	 0.82	 0.79	
Satisf10_PriceStock	 0.74	 		 	
Satisf4_Price	 0.73	 		 	
Satisf9_Ep$Expect	 0.71	 		 	
Satisf5_PriceSched	 0.65	 		 	
9.	Satisfaction	with	communication	 0.88	 0.87	
Satisf7_CommQuant	 0.78	 		 	
Satisf8_CommQual	 0.77	 		 	
Satisf6_Support	 0.71	 		 	
10.	Supplier	specific	assets	 	 0.81	 0.85	
SpecInv3_Modify	 0.82	 		 	
SpecInv2_Know	 0.74	 		 	
SpecInv1_Reqs	 0.72	 		 	
11.	Buyer	Power	 	 0.63	 0.59	
Power1_Treat	 0.79	 		 	
Power2_Favoured	 0.76	 		 	
Power3_Profit	 0.52	 		 	
Extraction	Method:	Principal	Component	Analysis.	Rotation	Method:	Varimax	with	Kaiser	
Normalisation.	Rotation	converged	in	eight	iterations.	Total	variance	explained	by	11	factors	72%,	
All	variables	had	communalities	of	greater	than	0.5.	
	
	Table	6-4:	Relationship	factor	scale	items	with	low	factor	loading	
	 	
Scale	item		 Description	 Factor	loading	
Power3_Profit		
	
Our	[processor]	has	hinted	that	they	would	take	certain	action	that	
would	affect	our	profitability	if	we	did	not	go	along	with	their	
requests.	
0.52	
Commit1_RelLongTerm	 We	expect	our	relationship	with	our	[processor]	to	continue	for	a	long	
time.	
0.57	
Commit3_Proud		 We	are	proud	to	tell	other	farmers	we	are	a	supplier	to	our	
[processor].	
0.57	
Commit2_Resource	 We	are	willing	to	dedicate	time,	effort	and	resources	to	support	our	
[processor]	in	growing	their	markets	and	sales.	
0.52	
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	Even	though	the	items	in	Table	6-4	had	low	factor	loading	compared	to	the	other	factors,	
they	were	still	considered	acceptable	due	to	the	large	sample	size.	Therefore	these	were	
retained	in	the	analysis.	Hair	et	al.	(2010)	states	that,	with	a	sample	size	of	over	350,	factor	
loadings	as	low	as	0.30	are	considered	significant.	Items	with	high	cross	loading	were	also	
removed	from	the	analysis.	
The	EFA	resulted	in	the	scale	items	for	cognitive	social	capital	and	relational	social	capital	
loading	onto	the	same	factor.	This	also	occurred	for	the	trust	and	commitment	scale	items	
(Table	6-2).	This	result	signified	that	these	variables	were	highly	correlated	and	the	EFA	was	
not	able	to	separate	them	into	distinct	factors.	Furthermore,	this	suggests	that	the	relational	
and	cognitive	dimensions	of	social	capital	(SC)	may,	in	fact,	form	a	single	construct.	This	
would	represent	the	type	or	quality	of	the	relationship	connections	whereas	structural	SC	
represented	the	structure	of	the	connections.	The	fact	that	trust	and	commitment	loaded	
onto	a	single	factor	also	indicated	that	these	constructs	were	also	highly	correlated	and	are	
difficult	to	separate	as	distinct	factors.	These	issues	were	further	evaluated	in	the	CFA	by	
testing	for	discriminant	validity.	
6.4.2 Analysis	of	supplier	factors	
The	EFA	for	the	supplier	factors	produced	a	nine-factor	solution	and	explained	62%	of	the	
variance	(Table	6-5).	Scree	plot	for	the	factor	analysis	is	shown	in	Figure	B	2.	The	factor	
analysis	resulted	in	nine	factors	when	factors	when	Eigen	value	below	one	were	excluded.	
Table	6-5:	Percentage	of	variance	explained	by	supplier	factors	
	 Rotation	Sums	of	Squared	Loadings	 	
Factor	 Total	 %	of	Variance	 Cumulative	%	
1	 3.2	 10.1	 10.1	
2	 3.0	 9.4	 19.5	
3	 2.8	 8.7	 28.2	
4	 2.0	 6.1	 34.3	
5	 1.9	 5.9	 40.2	
6	 1.8	 5.8	 46.0	
7	 1.8	 5.6	 51.6	
8	 1.7	 5.3	 56.9	
9	 1.7	 5.2	 62.2	
	
The	factor	loadings	ranged	from	0.43	(SuppPerf8_QLMkt)	to	0.91	(ProcDepend1).	Most	of	
the	factor	loadings	were	above	0.70	with	only	six	items	loadings	below	0.60	(Table	6-7).	All	
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factors	had	Eigen	values	greater	than	one,	and	the	nine	factors	explained	62.5%	of	the	
variance.		
These	variables	confirmed	the	validity	of	the	scales	developed	from	the	literature	and	
described	in	chapter	five.	Furthermore,	they	provided	the	measures	for	the	latent	constructs	
in	the	theoretical	model,	as	shown	in	Figure	3-9.	The	factor	loadings	below	0.60	related	to	
customer	focus	and	supplier	performance	(Table	6-7).	As	with	the	relationship	factor	EFA,	
these	values	were	still	above	the	0.30	level	considered	significant	for	large	sample	sizes	(Hair	
et	al.,	2010)	and	therefore	were	retained	in	the	analysis.	The	values	of	Cronbach's	Alpha	
ranged	from	0.68	(environmental	uncertainty)	to	0.91.	(Supplier	ability).	These	values	were	
all	above	the	value	of	0.60	considered	acceptable	for	exploratory	research	and	close	to	the	
0.70	cut	off	for	more	robust	analysis.		
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Table	6-6:	Constructs,	items	and	exploratory	factor	analysis	for	supplier	factors28	
Construct	and	measures	 Factor	Loadings	
Cronbach's	
Alpha	
Composite	
Reliability	(CR)	
1.	Supplier	Ability	 	 0.91	 0.91	
SuppAbil2_Mgmt	 0.88	 	 	
SuppAbil3_Effic	 0.87	 	 	
SuppAbil1_Quality	 0.82	 	 	
SuppAbiI4_Inn	 0.82	 	 	
2.	Customer	Focus	 	 0.80	 0.83	
Customer2_Soln	 0.79	 	 	
Costomer1_Needs	 0.79	 	 	
Customer4_know	 0.63	 	 	
Customer3_Mod	 0.61	 	 	
Customer7_Reqs	 0.56	 	 	
Customer5_InnMkt	 0.54	 	 	
3.	Supplier	performance	 	 0.82	 0.80	
SuppPerf1_Farm	 0.79	 	 	
SuppPerf2_QLStock	 0.76	 	 	
SuppPerf3_Yield	 0.69	 	 	
SuppPerf4_AWelfare	 0.62	 	 	
SuppPerf5_NoPremium	 0.56	 	 	
SuppPerf6_Effic	 0.53	 	 	
SuppPerf7_ImpReturn	 0.49	 	 	
SuppPerf8_QLMkt	 0.43	 	 	
4.	Self-direction	 	 0.69	 0.66	
SelfDirect2_Prod	 0.79	 	 	
SelfDirect1_Profit	 0.78	 	 	
SelfDirect3_Constr	 0.69	 	 	
5.	Farm	profitability	 	 0.68	 0.75	
FarmPerf4_SatFin	 0.89	 	 	
FarmPerf1_ProfitR	 0.81	 	 	
FarmPerf3_SatProd	 0.61	 	 	
6.	Environmental	uncertainty	 0.68	 0.69	
UncertMkt2_Cust	 0.80	 	 	
UncertMkt1_Comp	 0.77	 	 	
UncertMkt3_Price	 0.72	 	 	
7.	Supplier	dependence	 	 0.85	 0.80	
SuppDepend2	 0.89	 	 	
SuppDepend1	 0.87	 	 	
8.	Supplier	communication	 0.80	 0.84	
SuppComm_Inform2	 0.86	 	 	
SuppComm_Inform1	 0.82	 	 	
9.	Processor	dependence	 	 	
ProcDepend1	 0.91	 0.83	 0.80	
ProcDepend2	 0.88	 	 	
Extraction	Method:	Principal	Component	Analysis.	Rotation	Method:	Varimax	with	Kaiser	
Normalisation.	Rotation	converged	in	six	iterations.	Total	variance	explained	62%	
	
	 	
																																																																		28	The	definition	of	these	constructs	can	be	found	in	Appendix	Table	C:	1	
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Table	6-7:	Supplier	scale	items	with	low	factor	loading	
Scale	item		 Description	 Factor	Loading	
SuppPerfF7_ImpReturns	 Regarding	yourself	and	your	farm	business.	We	continually	try	
to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	achieving	higher	market	
returns	for	our	products.	
0.49	
SuppPerf8_Cust_QLMarket	 Our	farm	business	operates	in	a	market	where	above	average	
quality	is	important.	
0.43	
SuppPerf5_NoPrem	 We	would	aim	to	produce	the	best	quality	stock	even	if	we	were	
unable	to	get	a	premium	for	it.	
0.56	
SuppPerf6_Efficiency	 We	have	consistently	managed	to	improve	our	farm	efficiency	 0.53	
Customer7_Reqs	 We	have	made	significant	changes	to	our	farming	operation	to	
better	meet	customer	requirements.	
0.56	
Customer5_InnMkt	 We	are	always	looking	for	innovative	ways	to	market	our	
products.	
0.54	
	
Table	6-8	lists	the	common	latent	variables	that	were	identified	in	the	EFA	and	their	internal	
consistency	values.	These	factors	match	the	constructs	described	in	chapter	four	and	the	
values	for	internal	consistency	indicated	that	the	scale	items	for	these	constructs	correctly	
identified	the	latent	factors	they	were	measuring.	
	Table	6-8:	Common	latent	variables	identified	in	the	exploratory	factor	analysis	
Relationship	factors	 Cronbach's	alpha	
Social	capital	-	cognitive	and	relational	
Social	capital	–	structural	
Supplier	value	
Costs	and	Risks	
Trust	and	Commitment	
Supplier	loyalty	
Satisfaction	with	buyer	
Satisfaction	with	price	
Satisfaction	with	communication	
Supplier	specific	assets	
Buyer	power	
0.97	
0.91	
0.92	
0.91	
0.93	
0.75	
0.91	
0.82	
0.88	
0.81	
0.63	
Supplier	factors	 Cronbach's	alpha	
Supplier	ability	
Customer	focus	
Supplier	performance	
Self-direction	
Farm	profitability	
Environmental	uncertainty	
Supplier	dependence	
Supplier	communication	
Processor	dependence	
0.91	
0.80	
0.82	
0.69	
0.68	
0.68	
0.85	
0.80	
0.83	
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6.4.3 Conclusion:	Exploratory	factor	analysis	
The	results	of	these	two	EFA	provided	good	evidence	for	uni-dimensionality	of	the	
constructs	and	confirmed	the	accuracy	of	the	scale	measures	developed	in	chapter	four.	The	
EFA	was	able	to	use	the	scales	items	and	identify	a	number	of	latent	factors.	These	factors	
showed	sufficient	internal	consistency	to	be	used	in	the	CFA.	There	were	some	latent	
variables	that	loaded	onto	the	same	factor.	These	were	tested	for	discriminate	validity	in	the	
CFA	as	outlined	in	the	next	chapter.	
6.5 Measurement	model	and	confirmatory	factor	analysis	
This	section	describes	the	testing	of	the	constructs	using	confirmatory	factor	analysis	(CFA).	
This	enabled	further	testing	of	how	well	the	measured	variables	represent	the	latent	
constructs.	This	was	undertaken	using	IBM®	SPSS®	Amos	v22	software.	The	creation	of	a	
measurement	model	enabled	testing	of	the	measurement	theory	developed	in	the	EFA	by	
specifying	the	relationships	between	the	measurement	items	and	the	latent	constructs	(Hair	
et	al.,	2010).	In	contrast	to	the	EFA,	the	CFA	requires	the	scale	measures	to	be	fixed	in	terms	
of	the	latent	factors	they	load	onto.	In	the	CFA	model,	the	measured	indicator	variables	load	
onto	the	specified	latent	constructs,	and	the	model	shows	the	covariance	between	the	
latent	constructs.	
6.5.1 Testing	of	measurement	model	validity	
The	CFA	was	run	to	test	for	model	fit	as	well	as	validity	measures,	including	discriminant	
validity,	convergent	validity	and	reliability.	The	results	of	these	tests	indicate	whether	the	
measurement	model	is	sufficiently	valid	to	be	used	in	the	subsequent	structural	equation	
model	(chapter	8).		
According	to	Hair	et	al.	(2010)	measurement	model	validity	depends	on	establishing	an	
acceptable	goodness-of-fit	as	well	as	finding	evidence	of	construct	validity.	There	are	a	
number	of	fit	indexes	that	are	used	to	assess	measurement	model	validity,	although	there	is	
no	one	index	that	is	more	preferable.	Because	of	this,	several	of	the	goodness-of-fit	indexes	
were	used	to	assess	model	fit.	These	are	outlined	in	Table	6-9	with	the	relative	advantages	
and	disadvantages	of	each	index	discussed.		
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Table	6-9:	Model	fit	criteria	
Fit	index	 Acceptable	Threshold	 Description	
Chi-square/df	(cmin/df)	
Normed	Chi-square	
A	low	value	of	!"	relative	to	
degrees	of	freedom	with	an	
insignificant	p	value	(p>0.05).	
Ratio	should	be	less	than	3:1.	
Significant	p	values	are	expected	with	
sample	size	over	250	and	more	than	12	
observed	variables	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	
Root	Mean	Square	Error	
of	Approximation	
(RMSEA)	
Values	less	than	0.07	(Steiger,	
2007).	Values	less	than	0.05	
represent	excellent	fit	(Hair	et	al.,	
2010).	
Has	a	known	distribution	and	favours	
simple	models?	
Comparative	Fit	Indexes	
(CFI)		
Values	greater	than	0.95.	 Normed	0-1	range.	Greater	than	0.92	are	
acceptable	for	sample	size	above	250	and	
more	than	12	observed	variables	(Hair	et	
al.,	2010).	
SRMR	 SRMR	less	than	0.08	(Hu	&	
Bentler,	1999).	
Standardised	version	of	Root	Mean	Square	
Residual.	Easier	to	interpret	due	to	
standardised	value.	
P	Close	 A	non-significant	value	of	P-close	
indicates	a	good	fit	>	0.05	
(Kenny,	2015).	
PCLOSE	is	a	‘p	value’	for	testing	the	null	
hypothesis	that	the	population	RMSEA	is	
no	greater	than	0.05	(Browne,	Cudeck,	
Bollen,	&	Long,	1993).	
Adapted	from	(Hair	et	al.,	2010;	Hooper,	Coughlan,	&	Mullen,	2008)	
Amos	software	was	used	to	evaluate	construct	validity	and	estimate	the	model	fit	for	the	
measurement	model.	The	model	fit	values	for	the	measurement	model	for	the	relationship	
factors	(Table	6-11)	and	supplier	factors	(Table	6-14)	were	all	within	the	recommended	
range	for	good	model	fit.	All	the	composite	reliability	(CR)	scores	were	greater	than	0.70,	
other	than	the	CR	for	power.	
6.6 Model	modification	
Model	modification	was	used	to	improve	model	fit	by	making	adjustments	to	the	
specification	of	the	model.	Considerable	care	was	taken	with	this	as	Hair	et	al.	(2010)	
cautions	against	attempting	to	improve	model	fit	at	the	expense	of	being	consistent	with	
theory.	In	particular,	reducing	the	number	of	items	per	construct	needs	to	be	well	justified.	
Taking	these	warnings	into	account,	model	modification	was	undertaken	only	where	it	was	
felt	there	was	theoretical	justification	and	this	was	carefully	documented	together	with	the	
reasons	for	the	modification.	
6.6.1 Modification	indices	
Modification	indices	estimate	the	amount	by	which	a	model’s	Chi-Squared	can	be	reduced	
when	a	constraint	in	the	model	that	is	fixed-to-zero	(no	correlation)	is	removed	from	the	
model	and	is	freely	estimated.	The	higher	the	modification	index,	the	greater	the	
improvement	in	overall	fit	that	will	be	achieved	by	adding	a	path	to	the	model.	It	is	
considered	acceptable	to	co-vary	the	error	terms	for	measures	on	the	same	latent	construct.	
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Therefore,	to	improve	model	fit,	high	modification	indexes	were	identified.	Where	these	
were	between	error	terms	that	were	on	the	same	construct,	a	correlation	path	was	
introduced	to	improve	model	fit.	
6.6.2 Standardised	residuals	
A	residual	is	the	difference	between	the	covariance	in	the	observed	and	estimated	models.	
Standardised	residuals	enable	comparisons	between	variables	that	have	different	units	of	
measure	(Byrne,	2000).	Standardised	residuals	are	similar	to	z-scores	as	they	are	calculated	
by	dividing	the	residual	by	the	standard	error.	They,	therefore,	represent	the	number	the	
observed	residuals	are	from	zero,	which	would	represent	a	perfectly	matched	model.	Values	
greater	than	2.58	are	considered	large	and	suggest	a	misfit	of	the	model	(Jöreskog,	1993).		
6.6.3 Construct	reliability	and	construct	validity	
The	reliability	and	validity	of	the	constructs	were	evaluated	using	the	measurement	model.	
Validity	means	the	construct	accurately	measures	what	it	is	supposed	to	measure;	reliability	
refers	to	the	consistency	and	stability	of	the	measurement	of	the	construct.	“Reliability	is	an	
inverse	index	of	the	measurement	error”	(Meyers	et	al.,	2006,	p.	721).	Without	establishing	
construct	reliability	and	validity	the	results	of	the	research	are	compromised.	Reliability	is	
most	commonly	measured	by	Cronbach’s	Alpha.	In	addition	to	Cronbach’s	Alpha,	Construct	
Reliability	(CR)	is	commonly	used	with	SEM	models	as	a	measure	of	reliability.	CR	is	squared	
sum	of	the	factor	loadings	for	each	construct	and	the	sum	of	the	error	variance.		
CR	=	 (%&'	()	)*+,(-	.(*/012%)4%&'	()	)*+,(-	.(*/012% 45(%&'	()	6--(-	7*-0*1+6)	
It	therefore	represents	the	percentage	of	variance	due	to	the	factor	loadings	in	a	similar	way	
to	Cronbach’s	Alpha.	Cronbach’s	Alpha	has	been	criticised	for	underestimating	true	
reliability,	however,	quantitative	analysis	has	shown	that	the	difference	was	not	of	great	
significance	(Peterson	&	Kim,	2013).	In	this	research	both	Cronbach’s	Alpha	and	construct	
reliability	are	reported	(Table	6-2	and	Table	6-3).	
6.6.4 Discriminant	validity		
The	latent	variables	were	also	tested	for	discriminant	validity.	This	measures	how	different	a	
construct	is	from	the	other	constructs.	Discriminant	validity	is	demonstrated	if	the	inter-
correlations	between	the	latent	constructs	are	not	too	high.	The	approach	of	Kline	(2005)	
and	Hair	et	al.	(2010)	was	used	to	evaluate	discriminant	validity	(Table	6-10).	This	involved	
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comparing	the	average	variance	extracted	(AVE)29	for	each	of	the	two	constructs	with	the	
square	of	the	correlation	between	these	constructs.	The	AVE	should	be	greater	than	O.50	as	
this	indicates	that	the	latent	factor	explains	more	than	50%	of	the	variance.	The	latent	
construct	should	also	explain	the	items	it	measures	better	than	it	measures	any	other	
construct.	Therefore,	the	squared	correlation	between	the	constructs,	or	average	shared	
variance	(ASV),	should	be	greater	than	the	average	variance	extracted	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).		
6.6.5 Convergent	validity	
Convergent	validity	is	based	on	the	variance	extracted	by	the	construct	(Table	6-10).	The	AVE	
should	be	above	0.50.	This	indicates	that	the	construct	converges,	or	the	scale	items	share	a	
high	proportion	of	common	variance	(Hair	et	al.,	2010).	An	AVE	below	0.50	indicates	that	the	
variance	explained	by	the	construct	is	less	than	the	error	variance.	The	size	of	the	factor	
loading	is	also	an	important	consideration	for	convergent	validity	as	high	loadings	indicate	
good	convergence.	Hair	et	al.	(2010)	recommend	that	all	factor	loadings	should	be	
statistically	significant	and	individual	loadings	should	be	at	least	0.50	and,	ideally,	greater	
than	0.70.		
Table	6-10:	Reliability	and	validity	criteria	for	CFA	
Reliability	 Critical	ratio	(CR)	>	0.7	
Convergent	Validity	
	
Average	variance	explained	(AVE)	>	0.5	
Statistically	significant	factor	loadings	
Factor	loading	minimum	0.50	and	ideally	>0.70	
Discriminant	Validity	
	
	
Maximum	shared	variance	(MSV)	<	AVE	
Average	shared	variance	(ASV)	<	AVE		
Square	root	of	AVE	greater	than	inter-construct	correlations	
(Hair	et	al.,	2010)	
	
6.7 Model	fit	for	the	measurement	model	
In	this	CFA	model,	supplier	costs	and	risk	and	supplier	benefits	were	combined	to	produce	
one	factor	that	was	labelled	as	supplier	net	value.	This	was	calculated	as	supplier	benefits	
minus	supplier	costs	and	risks.	This	was	done	to	reduce	the	number	of	factors	and	to	
produce	one	construct	that	measured	the	perceived	net	value	of	the	relationship.	The	
relational	and	cognitive	social	capital	constructs	were	left	as	one	factor	in	accordance	with	
the	EFA	results.	Trust	and	commitment,	however,	were	separated	into	discrete	constructs	in	
the	model	as	there	was	good	theoretical	evidence	that	these	were	distinct	constructs	
(Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994).	These	two	factors	would	also	be	tested	for	discriminant	validity	in	
the	CFA.		
																																																																		
29	This	is	the	mean	of	the	variance	extracted	by	the	items	that	load	onto	a	factor.	
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The	measurement	model	for	the	relationship	factors	(Figure	6-1)	showed	an	excellent	model	
fit.	The	model	was	within	the	threshold	values	on	all	the	goodness-of-fit,	except	for	GFI	
(Table	6-11).	
Table	6-11:	Model	fit	criteria	for	relationship	factors	
CFA	Model	Relationship	Factors	
Measure	 Measurement	Model	 Threshold	
Chi-square/df	(cmin/df)	 2.76	 <	3	good	
CFI	 0.94	 >	0.95	great;	>0.9	traditional	
GFI	 0.87	 >	0.95	
AGFI	 0.85	 >	0.80	
RMSEA	 0.04	 <	0.05	good;	0.05-0.10	moderate	
PCLOSE	 0.99	 >	0.05	
	
Table	6-12:	Measurement	statistics	(after	item	deletions)	
		 CR	 AVE	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	
1.	ProcDependence		 0.81	 0.68	 0.83	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
2.	Trust		 0.93	 0.69	 0.15	 0.83	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
3.	SocialCap_RelCog	 0.97	 0.82	 0.16	 0.67	 0.91	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
4.	Commitment	 0.81	 0.58	 0.11	 0.78	 0.55	 0.76	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
5.	Value		 0.91	 0.56	 0.29	 0.65	 0.48	 0.61	 0.75	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
6.	Cost		 0.91	 0.64	 0.13	 -0.41	 -0.19	 -0.45	 -0.26	 0.80	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
7.	SatisfactionPerform	 0.91	 0.62	 0.12	 0.59	 0.46	 0.55	 0.54	 -0.32	 0.79	 		 		 		 		 		 		
8.	SocialCap_Stuct	 0.91	 0.77	 0.27	 0.65	 0.58	 0.52	 0.61	 -0.18	 0.47	 0.88	 		 		 		 		 		
9.	SatisfactComm	 0.87	 0.69	 0.03	 0.55	 0.45	 0.53	 0.44	 -0.34	 0.49	 0.53	 0.83	 		 		 		 		
10.	SpecificInvest	 0.85	 0.65	 0.36	 0.13	 0.14	 0.16	 0.42	 0.29	 0.10	 0.32	 0.05	 0.81	 		 		 		
11.	Loyalty		 0.73	 0.48	 0.09	 0.44	 0.32	 0.52	 0.41	 -0.40	 0.32	 0.34	 0.34	 0.12	 0.69	 		 		
12.	SatisfactionPrice	 0.79	 0.56	 -0.05	 0.63	 0.41	 0.48	 0.52	 -0.42	 0.50	 0.39	 0.50	 -0.11	 0.24	 0.75	 		
13.	Power	 0.59	 0.42	 0.29	 -0.27	 -0.14	 -0.28	 -0.02	 0.56	 -0.24	 -0.04	 -0.27	 0.53	 -0.22	 -0.30	 0.65	
Notes	(1)	the	diagonal	entries	express	the	variance	extracted.	The	figures	underneath	the	diagonal	is	the	correlation	between	constructs.	
	
There	were	a	number	of	validity	concerns	where	the	criteria	for	discriminant	and	convergent	
validity	were	not	met.	The	power	construct	initially	had	an	AVE	of	0.32	and	a	composite	
reliability	score	of	0.56.	The	loyalty	construct	initially	had	an	AVE	of	0.43.	For	both	of	these,	
the	square	root	of	the	AVE	was	less	than	the	absolute	value	of	the	correlation	with	another	
factor.	The	decision	was	made	to	delete	some	items	to	improve	discriminant	validity.	The	
item	deletions	were	based	on	measures	with	low	factor	loadings.	Power1_Treat	with	loading	
of	0.54	was	removed	from	the	power	construct	and	CMT_L1OptR	with	weighting	of	0.54	
deleted	from	loyalty	(Table	6-12).	
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Table	6-13:	Validity	concerns	in	relationship	constructs	
Construct	 Validity	concern	
Loyalty	 Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	loyalty	is	less	than	0.50.	
Power	 Reliability:	the	CR	for	Power	is	less	than	0.70.	
Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	power	is	less	than	0.50.	
	
Following	these	deletions	there	were	still	some	validity	concerns	(Table	6-13).	Although	
these	concerns	remained,	Hair	et	al.	(2010)	emphasise	that	the	thresholds	rules	were	only	
guidelines	and	suggests	that	more	flexibility	was	acceptable	especially	when	undertaking	
exploratory	research.	Following	the	deletions,	loyalty	had	an	AVE	of	0.48,	which	was	just	
below	the	suggested	cut	off	of	0.5.	In	a	similar	way,	power	had	an	AVE	of	0.42,	which	was	
significantly	closer	to	the	0.50	cut	off	than	before	the	item	deletions	(Table	6-2).	Power	also	
had	a	composite	reliability	score	of	0.59,	which	was	substantially	lower	than	the	0.70	
recommended.	This	indicated	that	there	were	some	validity	issues	with	the	power	construct	
and	it	was	only	suitable	to	be	used	in	exploratory	research	and	therefore	should	be	treated	
with	caution	in	making	definitive	predictions.	The	commitment	construct	also	had	some	
issues	with	discriminant	validity;	however,	this	was	because	of	the	high	correlation	between	
commitment	and	trust,	which	was	0.78.	The	square	root	of	the	AVE	for	commitment	was	
0.74,	which	was	close	to	the	value	of	the	correlation	between	trust	and	commitment.	These	
values	indicate	that	the	criteria	for	discriminant	validity	is	close	to	being	met.		
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Table	6-15:	Shared	variance,	variance	extracted	and	correlations	between	constructs	for	the	
supplier	factors	(before	item	deletions)		
	 CR	 AVE	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	
1.	ProcDependence	 0.78	 0.64	 0.80	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
2.	SuppMotivation	 0.81	 0.38	 0.13	 0.62	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
3.	SupplierAbility	 0.91	 0.71	 0.14	 0.47	 0.84	 		 		 		 		 		 		
4.	CustomerFocus	 0.81	 0.48	 0.19	 0.38	 0.24	 0.70	 		 		 		 		 		
5.	SelfDirect	 0.69	 0.43	 0.13	 0.11	 -0.15	 -0.01	 0.66	 		 		 		 		
6.	SupplierProfit	 0.75	 0.53	 0.01	 -0.10	 -0.01	 0.04	 -0.11	 0.72	 		 		 		
7.	SupplierComm	 0.84	 0.73	 0.22	 0.38	 0.24	 0.34	 0.00	 0.02	 0.85	 		 		
8.	MarketUncertanty	 0.68	 0.42	 0.19	 0.20	 0.07	 0.23	 0.12	 0.01	 0.13	 0.65	 		
9.	SuppDependence	 0.80	 0.67	 0.21	 0.13	 -0.01	 0.12	 0.24	 -0.07	 0.29	 0.09	 0.82	
Notes	(1)	the	diagonal	entries	express	the	variance	extracted,	the	figures	underneath	the	diagonal	is	the	correlation	
between	constructs.	
	
Table	6-16:	Validity	concerns	supplier	constructs	(before	item	deletions)	
	
The	data	in	Table	6-15	identified	some	validity	issues	(Table	6-15).	Reliability	was	an	issue	for	
both	self-direction	and	market	uncertainty,	although	the	composite	reliable	value	for	self-
direction	was	0.69	and	the	value	for	market	uncertainty	was	0.68,	both	of	which	were	very	
close	to	the	composite	reliability	threshold	of	0.70	indicating	that	they	both	have	reasonable	
reliability.	There	were	convergent	validity	issues	for	customer	focus,	supplier	motivation,	
self-direction	and	market	uncertainty.	The	value	for	customer	focus	was	0.48,	which	was	
very	close	to	the	0.50	threshold	and,	therefore,	not	a	significant	issue.	However,	the	values	
for	supplier	motivation,	self-direction	and	market	uncertainty	were	all	below	0.44,	with	the	
lowest	being	supplier	motivation.	As	a	result,	items	were	considered	for	deletion	on	these	
constructs	based	on	low	factor	loadings.	One	item	was	deleted	from	the	self-direction	
construct.	This	item	was	“Selfdirect3_Constraint”	(factor	loading:	0.58).	Deleting	this	
increased	AVE	from	0.43	to	0.49.	One	item	was	deleted	from	the	market	uncertainty	
construct.	This	was	“UncertMkt3_Price”	(factor	loading:	0.55)	and	this	increased	AVE	from	
0.42	to	0.55.	Two	items	were	deleted	from	supplier	motivation	construct;	these	were	
Construct	 Validity	concern	
Supplier	Motivation	 Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	supplier	motivation	is	less	than	0.50.	
Customer	Focus	 Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	customer	focus	is	less	than	0.50.	
Self-	direction	 Reliability:	the	CR	for	self-direction	is	less	than	0.70.	
Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	self-direction	is	less	than	0.50.	
Market	Uncertainty	 Reliability:	the	CR	for	market	uncertainty	is	less	than	0.70.	
Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	market	uncertainty	is	less	than	0.50.	
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“SuppPerf4_AWelfare”	(factor	loading:	0.51)	and	SuppPerf5_NoPremium	(factor	loading:	
0.46),	which	increased	the	AVE	for	from	0.38	to	0.45	(Table	6-17).	
Table	6-17:	Shared	variance,	variance	extracted	and	correlations	between	constructs	for	supplier	
factors	(after	item	deletions)	
	 CR	 AVE	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	
1.	SupplierDependence	 0.78	 0.64	 0.80	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
2.	SuppMotivation	 0.80	 0.45	 0.14	 0.67	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
3.	SupplierAbility	 0.91	 0.71	 0.14	 0.49	 0.84	 		 		 		 		 		 		
4.	CustomerFocus	 0.83	 0.56	 0.19	 0.38	 0.24	 0.75	 		 		 		 		 		
5.	SelfDirect	 0.66	 0.49	 0.13	 0.16	 -0.12	 0.01	 0.70	 		 		 		 		
6.	SupplierProfit	 0.75	 0.53	 0.01	 -0.10	 -0.01	 0.04	 -0.11	 0.73	 		 		 		
7.	SupplierComm	 0.84	 0.73	 0.22	 0.36	 0.24	 0.33	 0.01	 0.02	 0.85	 		 		
8.	MarketUncertainty	 0.69	 0.55	 0.20	 0.15	 0.08	 0.21	 0.09	 0.04	 0.11	 0.74	 		
9.	SupplierDependence	 0.80	 0.67	 0.21	 0.13	 -0.01	 0.12	 0.22	 -0.06	 0.29	 0.05	 0.82	
	
Table	6-18:	Validity	concerns	following	item	deletions	
Following	the	item	deletions,	there	were	still	some	validity	concerns	even	though	most	
values	had	significantly	increased	(Table	6-18).	Supplier	motivation	had	an	AVE	of	0.45,	still	
below	the	0.50	cut	off.	In	contrast,	self-direction	had	AVE	of	0.49,	which	was	very	close	to	
.50.	There	were	reliability	issues	for	both	self-direction	and	market	uncertainty.	This	was	
only	an	issue	for	self-direction	with	a	composite	reliability	score	of	0.66.	The	score	for	
market	uncertainty	was	0.69,	which	was	only	marginally	below	the	0.70	cut	off.	
Following	the	deletion	of	these	items	the	validity	of	the	model	was	considered	acceptable.	
This	was	on	the	basis	of	the	assertion	of	Malhotra	and	Dash	(2011)	who	noted	that,	"AVE	is	a	
more	conservative	measure	than	CR.	On	the	basis	of	CR	alone,	the	researcher	may	conclude	
that	the	convergent	validity	of	the	construct	is	adequate,	even	though	more	than	50%	of	the	
variance	is	due	to	error”	(Malhotra	and	Dash,	2011,	p.702).	Furthermore,	Ping	(2007)	
explains	that	a	low	AVE	may	be	acceptable	for	first	time	exploratory	models	that	are	
incorporating	new	measures.	
Construct	 Validity	concern	
Supplier	motivation	 Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	supplier	motivation	is	less	than	0.50	
Self-direction	 Reliability:	the	CR	for	self-direction	is	less	than	0.70.	
Convergent	Validity:	the	AVE	for	self-direction	is	less	than	0.50.	
Market	uncertainty	
Reliability:	the	CR	for	market	uncertainty	is	less	than	0.70.	
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6.8.2 Invariance	testing		
Appendix	C	presents	the	data	from	the	analyse	(invariance	test)	to	see	if	the	model	
produced	the	same	results	across	the	sheep	beef	and	venison	groups.	If	the	constructs	do	
not	meet	the	test	of	invariance	then	they	may	be	measuring	different	latent	constructs	for	
each	group.	This	showed	that	the	factor	structure	and	loadings	are	sufficiently	equivalent	
across	the	three	groups.	
6.8.3 Conclusion:	Confirmatory	factor	analysis	
This	chapter	presents	the	results	of	the	CFA.	The	majority	of	the	constructs	showed	
sufficient	discriminant	and	convergent	validity	as	well	as	reliability.	There	were	some	latent	
factors	that	did	not	meet	these	criteria.	These	were	addressed	by	deleting	some	items	with	
low	factor	loadings.	Following	these	item	deletions	there	was	a	significant	increase	in	these	
variables,	however	there	were	still	some	marginally	below	the	recommended	values.	These	
were	considered	to	be	acceptable	to	use	in	the	SEM.	
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Chapter	7: Data	analysis	–	structural	equation	modelling	
7.1 Introduction	
This	chapter	addresses	the	objectives	of	the	research,	as	outlined	in	section	1.4.1.	These	
objectives	aim	to	determine	how	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	
contribute	to	both	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	It	also	seeks	to	clarify	the	
measurement	of	relationship	quality	in	relation	to	social	capital.	The	results	also	identify	the	
role	played	by	relationship	quality	in	mediating	the	interactions	between	supplier	
characteristics,	the	relationship	attributes	and	supplier	performance.		
7.2 Structural	equation	modelling	
There	are	a	number	of	software	packages	available	for	SEM,	including	LISREL,	EQS	and	
AMOS.	IBM	SPSS	AMOS	v	22.0	was	used	for	this	study	because	of	the	ease	of	use,	the	
graphical	interface	and	the	ability	to	organise	the	output	through	Microsoft	Windows	
programs	(Byrne,	2000).		
7.3 Relationship	quality:	Definition	and	measurement	
The	definition	of	relationship	quality	and	its	measurement	was	a	key	part	of	the	research	
objectives.	One	specific	aspect	of	this	was	to	clarify	the	relationship	between	social	capital	
(SC)	and	relationship	quality	(RQ).	As	discussed	in	the	literature	review,	social	capital	is	
closely	related	to	relationship	quality.	This	link	can	be	seen	by	evaluating	the	scale	items	that	
researchers	have	used	to	measure	SC.	Those	used	for	cognitive	and	relational	social	capital	
are	closely	aligned	to	measurements	of	relationship	quality	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	This	
research	tested	four	different	models	involving	relationship	quality	and	social	capital.	These	
were:	
• Relational/cognitive	and	structural	social	capital	are	dimensions	of	relationship	
quality	along	with	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction	(Model	1	-	Figure	7-1).	
• Relationship	quality	and	social	capital	are	separate	and	distinct	constructs	(Model	2	-	
Figure	7-2).	
• Social	capital	is	a	sub-dimension	of	relationship	quality	(Model	3	-	Figure	7-3).	
• Relationship	quality	is	a	sub-dimension	social	capital	(Model	4	-	Figure	7-4).	
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	Table	7-3:	Model	fit	criteria	comparing	different	models	
Measure	
Model	1:	
Lower	order	
model	
Model	2:	
RQ	and	SC	
distinct	
constructs	
Model	3:		
SC	dimension	
of	RQ	
Model	4	RQ	
dimension	
of	SC	 Threshold	
Chi-square/df	
(cmin/df)	 3.6	 3.5	 3.5	 3.8	 <	3	good	
CFI	 0.96	 0.96	 0.96	 0.96	 >	0.95	great;	>0.9	traditional	
GFI	 0.90	 0.91	 0.91	 0.89	 >	0.95	good		
AGFI	 0.89	 0.89	 0.89	 0.88	 >	0.80	good	
RMSEA	 0.05	 0.05	 0.05	 0.54	 <	0.05	good;	0.05-0.10	moderate	
PCLOSE	 0.14	 0.28	 0.28	 0.01	 >	0.05	good	
		
Comparing	the	four	different	models	based	on	model	fit	indexes	(Table	7-3)	revealed	that	
there	was	little	difference	between	the	models	in	terms	of	model	fit	other	than	for	Model	1	
and	4.	Model	4	had	the	lowest	goodness-of-fit	values	of	all	the	models.	Model	1	also	had	a	
lower	goodness-of-fit	compared	to	model	two	and	three.	This	shows	that	Model	1	and	4	
explained	less	of	the	variance	in	the	data	than	the	other	two	models.	All	four	models	had	
acceptable	fit	indexes	which	suggest	that	any	of	the	models	could	be	justified	based	on	
goodness-of-fit.	This	result	explains	why	the	concept	of	relationship	quality,	as	described	in	
the	literature,	is	a	complex,	multifaceted	and	a	somewhat	elusive	construct	(Crosby	et	al.,	
1990;	Garvin,	1984).	This	was	especially	so	when	SC	was	incorporated	with	RQ.		
What	this	suggested	is,	firstly,	that	there	are	multiple	ways	of	conceptualising	relationship	
quality	and	social	capital	and	that	no	one	structure	emerging	as	significantly	more	accurate	
than	another.	Secondly,	that	social	capital	is	a	closely	related	construct	to	relationship	
quality.	There	was	some	evidence	that	SC	was	a	dimension	of	RQ	rather	than	a	separate	and	
independent	construct	(or	vice	versa).	
To	determine	which	model	to	incorporate	into	the	SEM	model,	the	perspective	of	Hair	et	al.	
(2010)	was	used	in	which	the	ultimate	criterion	for	determining	a	higher	order	model	was	
theory.	This	perspective	also	meant	that	simpler	lower	order	models	should	be	chosen	
unless	there	were	strong	theoretical	and	empirical	reasons	for	choosing	a	higher	order	
model.	Based	on	this	criterion,	Model	3	was	selected	as	the	preferred	model	as	it	had	one	of	
the	best	goodness-of-fit	and	relatively	simple	structure.	Model	1	was	rejected	as	it	had	lower	
goodness-of-fit	indicators	and	lower	factor	loading.	Model	2	was	also	rejected,	as	it	assumed	
SC	and	RQ	were	separate	constructs,	but	this	was	not	supported	by	the	lack	of	discriminant	
validity	(Table	7-2)	and	the	high	standardised	correlation	of	0.91.	Model	3	had	less	
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no	statistically	significant	direct	effect,	but	a	significant	indirect	effect	occurred	through	the	
mediator.	
Testing	the	theoretical	model	involved	a	five-step	process.	Firstly,	in	Model	1	(Figure	7-6),	all	
the	supplier	and	relationship	variables	were	tested	loading	onto	relationship	quality.	The	
statistically	significant	paths	identified	which	of	these	variables	were	antecedents	of	
relationship	quality.	Testing	this	model	was	important	theoretically	as	it	contributed	to	an	
understanding	of	supplier	and	relationship	factors	that	influenced	relationship	quality.	It	is	
also	of	value	to	practitioners	who	desired	to	improve	relationship	quality	among	their	
suppliers.	Secondly,	Model	2	(Figure	7-7),	was	tested	with	full	mediation	by	relationship	
quality	and	no	direct	effects.	Thirdly,	Model	3	(Figure	7-8)	represented	the	null	hypothesis	
where	all	the	supplier	and	relationship	variables	loaded	directly	onto	the	supplier	
performance	constructs	with	no	mediation	by	relationship	quality.	Fourthly,	in	model	4	
mediation	by	relationship	quality	was	tested	in	the	presence	of	the	direct	effects	(Figure	
7-9);	this,	in	effect,	combined	Models	2	and	3.	Model	four	enabled	the	mediated	(indirect	
effects)	of	relationship	quality	to	be	identified.	Also,	this	revealed	how	the	direct	effects	
changed	when	relationship	quality	was	included	in	the	model.	Finally,	by	identifying	the	
significant	paths	in	model	four	and	removing	any	non-significant	paths,	the	antecedents	for	
each	of	the	supplier	performance	variables	could	be	specified	including	both	the	mediated	
and	direct	effects.	Model	five	represents	this	re-specified	mode	(Figure	7-10).	Each	model	
was	compared	based	on	goodness-of-fit	criteria.	Comparing	these	rival	models	was	based	on	
the	growing	consensus	among	structural	equation	modelling	practitioners	that	rival	models	
should	be	compared	rather	than	just	the	one	model	proposed	(Bollen	&	Long,	1992;	Morgan	
&	Hunt,	1994).	
7.4.1 Structural	Model	1:	Antecedents	of	relationship	quality	
Model	1	identified	which	of	the	independent	variables	were	antecedents	of	relationship	
quality.	This	was	achieved	by	testing	the	strength	and	significance	of	the	supplier	and	
relationship	variables	with	relationship	quality	as	the	dependent	variable.	
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The	results	of	the	structural	equation	Model	1	demonstrated	a	reasonable	model	fit	(Table	
7-4).	The	model	met,	or	was	close	to	meeting,	all	the	model	fit	criteria.	Furthermore,	the	
supplier	and	relationship	variables	explained	60%	of	the	variance	in	relationship	quality	(R2	=	
0.60).	This	result	indicates	that	these	antecedent	variables	explain	a	considerable	amount	of	
the	variation	relationship	quality.	However,	nearly	all	of	the	significant	antecedent	variables	
were	relationship	attributes	(Table	7-5).	Customer	focus	was	the	only	supplier	characteristic	
that	was	a	significant	antecedent	to	relationship	quality.	The	remaining	supplier	
characteristics	including	supplier	ability,	motivation	and	self-direction	had	small,	non-
significant	effects	on	relationship	quality.	This	suggests	that	the	characteristics	of	suppliers	
had	little	effect	on	relationship	quality	other	than	their	level	of	customer	focus.	Relationship	
quality	is	therefore	primarily	affected	by	the	attributes	of	the	relationship	with	the	
processor,	including	dependence,	specific	assets,	power	and	net	value.	Therefore,	buyers	
seeking	to	improve	the	quality	of	their	relationships	with	suppliers	needed	to	focus	on	the	
relationship	attributes	rather	than	supplier’s	characteristics.		
Supplier	net	value	had	the	strongest	effect	on	relationship	quality	(0.46***).	Suggesting	that	
experiencing	positive	value	from	the	relationship	is	a	fundamental	driver	of	relationship	
quality.	These	benefits	and	costs	are	not	directly	financial	but	involved	such	things	as	access	
to	new	technology,	reduction	of	production	costs,	access	to	premium	markets	and	reducing	
risk	and	uncertainty	in	production	and	product	marketing.	The	costs	and	risks	included	such	
things	as	reduced	flexibility,	increased	uncertainty	in	marketing,	greater	production	risk	and	
increase	in	production	costs	as	well	as	increased	management	effort	and	stress.	
Supplier	and	processor	dependence,	specific	assets	all	had	a	positive	impact	on	relationship	
quality	with	power	having	a	substantial	negative	impact	(Table	7-5).	All	these	relationship	
variables	were	also	somewhat	related.	For	example,	there	was	a	significant	correlation	
between	specific	assets	and	supplier	dependence	(0.49***),	processor	dependence	and	
supplier	dependence	(0.10***),	power	and	specific	assets	(0.68***).		
7.4.2 Structural	Model	2:	Indirect	effect	fully	mediated	by	relationship	
quality	
Structural	Model	2	hypothesised	that	there	was	full	mediation	by	relationship	quality	with	
no	direct	effects.	These	relationships	are	presented	in	Figure	7-7	and	Table	7-6.	The	input	
values	to	relationship	quality	in	this	model	were	the	same	values	as	in	Model	1.	As	these	
represented	the	antecedents	of	relationship	quality,	the	value	of	these	did	not	change	across	
the	different	models.	
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Table	7-7:	Model	fit	for	mediated	model	2	(indirect	effects	only)	
Measure	 Structural	Model	(mediated)	 Threshold	
Chi-square/df	(cmin/df)	 5.5	 <	3	good	
CFI	 0.82	 >	0.95	great;	>0.9	traditional	
GFI	 0.91	 >	0.95	good	
AGFI	 0.87	 >	0.80	good	
RMSEA	 0.068	 <	0.05	good;	0.05-0.10	moderate	
PCLOSE	 0.00	 >	0.05	good	
	
Table	7-8:	Squared	multiple	correlations	(R2)	for	the	mediated	model	(indirect	effects)	
Supplier	performance	variables	 	 	 Estimate	(R2)	
Supplier	communication	 	 	 0.17	
Supplier	profit	 	 	 0.10	
Loyalty	 	 	 0.40	
Delivery	quality	 	 	 0.02	
Delivery	quantity	 	 	 0.04	
	
The	(R2)	values	were	low	for	delivery	quality,	delivery	quantity.	In	contrast,	supplier	
communication,	profitability	and	loyalty	had	higher	values.	This	suggests	that	relationship	
quality	does	not	significantly	affect	the	quality	variables.	Furthermore,	the	model	fit	criteria	
for	this	model	were	close	but	not	within	the	fit	criteria.	This	suggests	that	this	model	was	not	
a	good	representation	of	the	data.	This	may	be	because	a	number	of	these	effects	were	
direct	with	no	mediation.	This	will	be	analysed	with	the	subsequent	the	models.	
7.4.3 Structural	Model	3:	Direct	effects	without	mediation	
As	already	explained,	testing	the	theoretical	model	required	evaluating	the	model	for	direct	
effects	with	and	without	any	mediation	by	relationship	quality.	Structural	Model	2	(Figure	
7-8)	evaluated	only	a	fully	mediated	model	with	only	indirect	effects	of	the	supplier	and	the	
relationship	variables	on	supplier	performance.	Model	3	represents	the	null	hypothesis	
where	each	of	the	independent	variables	loaded	directly	onto	each	of	the	supplier	
performance	variables.		
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The	results	of	testing	the	unmediated	model	showed	a	substantial	increase	in	the	R2	values	
compared	to	the	mediated	model	(Table	7-13).	The	R2	values	now	ranged	from	0.16	for	
delivery	quality,	to	0.42	for	supplier	loyalty,	implying	that	these	variables	explained	between	
16	to	42%	of	the	variation	in	the	supplier	performance	variables	(Table	7-10).	Delivery	
quality	and	quantity	had	the	greatest	increase	in	R2	values.	Supplier	communication	and	
profitability	also	had	meaningful	increases.	In	contrast,	loyalty	had	only	a	small	increase.	This	
result	indicates	there	were	likely	to	be	significant	indirect	effects	between	these	variables	
and	supplier	performance.	Furthermore,	there	was	a	substantial	improvement	in	model	fit.	
There	was	now	an	acceptable	model	fit	(Table	7-9)	with	all	the	model	fit	indices	within	or	
close	to	the	model	fit	criteria.	This	was	evidence	that	there	were	significant	indirect	effects	
that	affected	supplier	performance	independent	of	relationship	quality.		
Table	7-11:	Model	3	-	standardised	direct	effects	(without	relationship	quality	as	mediator)		
		 	Relationship	attributes	 	Supplier	characteristics	
Supplier	
ability	
Supplier	
dependence	
Processor	
dependence	
Specific	
assets	 Power	
Supplier	
net	value	
Supplier	
motivation	
Self-	
direct	
Customer	
focus	
Supplier	
communication	 0.23***	 0.11**	 0.05	(ns)	 0.16***	 0.06	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.26***	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.15***	
Supplier	profit	 0.24***	 -0.16***	 0.05	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 -0.10*	 0.02	(ns)	 -0.15***	 0.17***	 0.01	(ns)	
Supplier	loyalty	 0.31***	 0.20***	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.22***	 -0.42***	 0.03	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 0.08**	 0.03	(ns)	
Delivery	quality	 0.04	(ns)	 0.06	(ns)	 -0.04	(ns)	 0.04	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 0.11***	 0.21***	 -0.18***	 0.09*	
Delivery	
quantity	 0.07	(ns)	 0.04	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	
0.02	
(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 0.11	***	 0.23***	 -0.13***	 0.00	(ns)	
	Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*.	Values	in	bold	represent	significant	effects	on	supplier	performance	variables	
p<0.01.		
Table	7-11	demonstrates	the	strength	and	significance	of	the	unmediated	direct	effects	
tested	in	Model	3.	This	showed	there	were	a	number	of	significant	direct	effects	between	
the	supplier	and	relationship	variables	and	supplier	performance.	These	ranged	from	-
0.42***	for	the	influence	of	power	on	supplier	loyalty	to	0.09*	for	the	effect	of	customer	
focus	on	delivery	quality.		
There	were	significant	differences	in	the	number	and	strength	of	the	relationship	and	
supplier	variables	affecting	supplier	performance.	For	example,	processor	dependence	had	
no	direct	effect	on	any	of	the	supplier	performance	variables,	whereas	supplier	motivation	
and	self-direction	had	the	greatest	impact,	affecting	four	of	the	five	supplier	performance	
variables.	The	direction	of	the	effects	was	also	not	always	consistent.	Some	factors	(supplier	
motivation,	supplier	dependence	and	supplier	net	value)	had	positive	impacts,	while	other	
variables	had	negative	relationships.	The	initial	evaluation	of	these	results	suggests	that	the	
influence	of	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	on	supplier	performance	is	
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complex	and	multifaceted.	This	is	consistent	with	the	reports	of	Hunt	and	Davis	(2008)	and	
Morgan	and	Hunt	(1999)	who	emphasised	that	relational	resources	can	provide	sustained	
competitive	advantage,	specifically	because	of	the	complexity	and	casual	ambiguity	involved	
in	their	development.		
Despite	this	complexity,	some	patterns	emerged.	For	example,	the	results	showed	that	
performance	attributes	that	involve	meeting	physical	requirements,	such	as	quality	of	stock	
and	timing	were	strongly	affected	by	supplier	characteristics,	such	as	ability	and	motivation.	
The	other	performance	attributes	that	were	less	physical	in	nature,	such	as	communication	
and	loyalty,	were	influenced	more	by	the	attributes	of	the	relationship.	In	Model	4,	these	
results	will	be	evaluated	with	the	inclusion	of	relationship	quality	as	a	mediator.		
7.4.4 Structural	Model	4:	Indirect	effects	of	relationship	quality	(with	direct	
effects)	
Model	4	(Figure	7-9)	tested	the	effect	of	adding	relationship	quality	as	a	mediator	to	Model	
3.	This	aimed	to	analyse	how	the	presence	of	relationship	quality	affected	the	direct	
relationships	identified	in	the	previous	model,	and	also	to	identify	the	strength	of	the	
indirect	(mediated)	relationships.	The	path	coefficients	for	the	direct	effects	are	not	shown	
in	Figure	7-9	for	simplicity	purposes	but	are	presented	in	Table	7-14.		
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Table	7-13:	Squared	multiple	correlations	(R2)	for	mediated	model	(indirect	effects)	and	for	the	
unmediated	model	(direct	Effects)	
Supplier	performance	
variables	
Estimate	(R2)	Model	2	
indirect	effects	
Estimate		
(R2)	Model	3	direct	
effects	
Estimate		
(R2)	Model	4	
direct	and	indirect	effects	
supplier	communication	 0.17	 0.32	 0.32	
Supplier	Profit	 0.10	 0.22	 0.23	
Loyalty	 0.40	 0.42	 0.48	
delivery	quality	 0.02	 0.20	 0.19	
Delivery	Quantity	 0.04	 0.16	 0.15	
	
Table	7-13	compares	the	R2	values	for	each	of	the	three	models.	Model	2	has	the	lowest	R2	
values,	which	suggest	that	relationship	quality	on	its	own	explained	less	variance	than	either	
the	unmediated	model	or	the	model	with	direct	and	indirect	effects	combined.	Model	4,	
which	combined	both	the	indirect	effects	and	the	direct	effects,	had	the	same,	or	higher,	R2	
values	for	supplier	communication,	profitability	and	loyalty	but	slightly	lower	values	for	
delivery	quality	and	quantity.	These	results	show	that	relationship	quality	plays	a	significant	
role	in	the	first	three	variables	but	has	little	effect	on	the	quality	variables.		
Table	7-14:	Model	4	-	standardised	direct	effects	(with	relationship	quality	as	mediator)	on	supplier	
performance	
		 Relationship	Attributes	 	Supplier	Characteristics	
Supplier	
net	value	
Supplier	
dependence	
Processor	
dependence	
Specific	
assets	
Power	 Supplier	
ability	
Supplier	
motivation	
Self-	
direction	
Customer	
focus	
Relationship	
quality	
Relationship	
quality	
0.46***	 0.10***	 0.12***	 0.27***	 -0.47***	 0.00	(ns)	 -0.04	(ns)	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.19***	 	
Supplier	
communication	
0.13***	 0.09**	 0.02	(ns)	 0.10*	 0.04	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.27***	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.10**	 0.21***	
Supplier	profit	 0.13**	 -0.18***	 0.02	(ns)	 -0.03	(ns)	 0.02	(ns)	 0.02	(ns)	 -0.14***	 0.17***	 -0.05	(ns)	 0.24***	
Supplier	loyalty	 0.13***	 0.16***	 -0.05	(ns)	 0.11**	 -0.24***	 0.03	(ns)	 0.05	(ns)	 0.09***	 -0.04	(ns)	 0.38***	
Delivery	quality	 0.02(ns)	 0.06	(ns)	 -0.05	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 0.11**	 0.21***	 -0.18***	 0.09**	 0.04	
Delivery	
quantity	
0.01	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 -0.03	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	 0.09	(ns)	 0.11**	 0.24***	 -0.13***	 -0.02	(ns)	 0.13***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*.	Values	in	shaded	boxes	represent	values	that	have	changed	with	mediation	by	
relationship	quality.	
Overall,	there	was	good	explanatory	power	in	all	three	models.	Model	4	explained	nearly	a	
quarter	of	the	variation	in	supplier	profitability,	almost	half	of	the	variation	in	supplier	
loyalty	and	a	third	of	the	variation	in	supplier	communication.	Delivery	quality	and	quantity,	
had	lower	R2	values	although,	at	16	and	20%,	they	still	represented	a	significant	amount	of	
variation	explained.	Table	7-14	shows	the	direct	effects	of	Model	3	with	the	introduction	of	
relationship	quality	as	a	mediator.	The	indirect	effects	in	Model	3	are	shown	in	Table	7-15.	
Both	of	these	included	the	indirect	and	direct	effects	together.	Without	the	inclusion	of	
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relationship	quality,	the	direct	effects	include	their	influence	on	relationship	quality.	Where	
there	was	mediation	by	relationship	quality	then	the	value	of	the	direct	effect	will	decrease	
as	the	contribution	of	relationship	quality	was	separated	out.	and	Table	7-17	show	that	
there	was	significant	mediation	by	relationship	quality	between	the	supplier	and	relationship	
characteristics	and	supplier	performance.	The	shaded	boxes	in	Table	7-17	and	Table	7-16	
identify	the	variables	where	the	effect	has	changed	with	the	influence	of	relationship	
quality.	These	results	showed	that	relationship	quality	played	a	role	in	nearly	all	of	the	
associations	between	the	relationship	attributes,	supplier	characteristics	and	supplier	
performance.	The	only	variables	that	had	no	mediation	effect	were:	
1. Supplier	ability	with	delivery	quality	and	quantity.	
2. Supplier	motivation	with	delivery	quantity,	profitability.	
3. Self-direction	with	supplier	profitability	and	delivery	quality.	
4. Customer	focus	with	communication	and	delivery	quality.	
5. Power	and	supplier	loyalty.	
	
Table	7-15:	Model	3	-	standardised	indirect	(mediated)	effects	on	supplier	performance	
		
	Variable	
Relationship	Attributes	 	Supplier	Characteristics	
Supplier	
net	value	
Supplier	
dependence	
Processor	
dependence	
Specific	
assets	 Power	
Supplier	
ability	
Supplier	
motivation	
Self-
direct	
Customer	
focus	
Supplier	
communication	 0.10***	 0.02***	 0.03***	 0.06***	 -0.10***	 0.00	(ns)	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.04***	
Supplier	profit	 0.11***	 0.02***	 0.03***	 0.07***	 -0.11***	 0.00	(ns)	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.05***	
Supplier	loyalty	 0.18***	 0.04***	 0.05***	 0.11***	 -0.18***	 0.00	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.07***	
Delivery	quality	 0.02	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	
Delivery	
quantity	 0.06**	 0.01**	 0.02**	 0.04**	 -0.06**	 0.00	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 0.02**	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
7.4.5 Influence	of	supplier	characteristics	on	performance	
This	section	shows	the	impact	of	mediation	on	the	effects	of	supplier	characteristics	on	
supplier	performance.	This	is	shown	in	Table	7-16,	firstly,	by	presenting	the	size	of	the	direct	
effect	without	mediation	and,	secondly,	by	showing	how	this	direct	effect	changes	with	
mediation	by	relationship	quality.	It	also	shows	the	indirect	effect	that	occurs	through	
relationship	quality	when	no	direct	effects	exist.	
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Table	7-16	Supplier	characteristics	and	performance	variables	(with	and	without	mediation)	
The	supplier	characteristics	had	only	one	relationship	that	resulted	in	partial	mediation.	This	
occurs	in	the	relationship	between	customer	focus	and	supplier	communication.	Partial	
mediation	occurred	because	the	direct	effect	decreased	in	value	and	significance	with	the	
inclusion	of	relationship	quality,	but	there	was	still	a	significant	direct	effect.	Relationship	
quality	was,	therefore,	a	necessary	prerequisite	for	a	portion	of	the	effect	of	customer	focus	
on	supplier	communication.	There	were	no	mediated	effects	between	customer	focus	and	
delivery	quality;	however,	indirect	effects	occurred	between	customer	focus	and	the	
remaining	supplier	performance	variables.	This	outcome	means	that	for	these	variables	
there	was	no	direct	effect	but	a	significant	relationship	occurred	indirectly	through	the	
mediator.	As	a	result,	the	effect	on	these	specific	supplier	performance	variables	only	
occurred	through	relationship	quality.	
The	rest	of	the	supplier	characteristics	had	no	mediation	effects.	Some	variables	had	no	
effect.	These	were	supplier	ability	on	loyalty,	communication,	profitability	and	self-direction	
on	communication	as	well	as	supplier	motivation	on	communication.	These	results	show	
that	relationship	quality	play	only	a	minor	role	in	the	effects	of	supplier	characteristics	on	
supplier	performance	however	there	were	significant	direct	effects.	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
Variable	
Mediating		
Variable	
Dependent		
Variable	
Direct	Effect		
(no	mediator)	
Direct	Effect		
(with	mediator)	
Indirect	 Result	
SelfDirect	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 -0.13***	 -0.13***	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
SelfDirect	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 -0.18***	 -0.18***	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
SelfDirect	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.08***	 	0.09***	 -0.01	 No	mediation	
SelfDirect	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 -0.01	 -0.01	 	0.00	 No	effect	
SelfDirect	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 	0.17***	 	0.17***	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
CustomerFocus	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 	0.00	 -0.02	 -0.02**	 Indirect	effect	
CustomerFocus	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 	0.09*	 0.09**	 	0.00**	 No	mediation	
CustomerFocus	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.03	 -0.04	 -0.07***	 Indirect	effect	
CustomerFocus	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 	0.15***	 	0.10**	 	0.05***	 Partial	mediation	
CustomerFocus	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 	0.00	 -0.05	 	0.05***	 Indirect	effect	
SuppMotivation	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 	0.21***	 	0.21***	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
SuppMotivation	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 	0.24***	 	0.24***	 	0.00	 No	Mediation	
SuppMotivation	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.03	 	0.05	 -0.02	 No	effect	
SuppMotivation	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 	0.26***	 	0.27***	 -0.01	 No	mediation	
SuppMotivation	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 -0.15***	 -0.15***	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
SupplierAbility	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 	0.11***	 	0.11**	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
SupplierAbility	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 	0.11***	 	0.11**	 	0.00	 No	mediation	
SupplierAbility	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.03	 	0.03	 	0.00	 No	effect	
SupplierAbility	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 	0.00	 	0.00	 	0.00	 No	effect	
SupplierAbility	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 	0.02	 	0.02	 	0.00	 No	effect	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*.	The	shaded	boxes	identify	the	relationships	that	have	either	
partial	mediation	or	indirect	effects.	
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7.4.6 Influence	of	relationship	attributes	on	performance	
The	relationship	attribute	variables	were	more	complex	and	diverse	in	their	effects	on	
supplier	performance.	This	was	because	relationship	quality	played	a	significant	mediating	
role	in	the	interactions	between	the	relationship	attributes	and	supplier	performance.	This	
was	somewhat	different	from	the	supplier	characteristics	variables	where	the	primary	
influence	on	supplier	performance	occurred	directly	without	mediation.		
Table	7-17:	Effects	of	relationship	characteristics	of	supplier	performance	variables	(with	and	
without	mediation)		
Variables		 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
Variable	
Mediating		
Variable	
Dependent	
Variable	
Direct	Effect	
(no	
mediator)	
Direct	Effect	
(with	
mediator)	
Indirect	 Result	
ProcDependence	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 -0.04	 0.04	 	0.01	 No	effect	
ProcDependence	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 -0.02	 0.03	 0.02**	 Indirect	effect	
ProcDependence	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 -0.01	 -0.01	 0.05***	 Indirect	effect	
ProcDependence	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 	0.05	 0.02	 0.03***	 Indirect	effect	
ProcDependence	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 	0.05	 0.02	 0.03***	 Indirect	effect	
SuppDependence	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 	0.06	 0.06	 0.004	 No	effect	
SuppDependence	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 	0.04	 0.03	 0.01**	 Indirect	effect	
SuppDependence	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.20***	 0.16***	 0.04***	 Partial	mediation	
SuppDependence	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 	0.11**	 0.09***	 0.02***	 Partial	mediation	
SuppDependence	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 -0.16***	 -	0.18***	 0.02***	 Partial	mediation	
SpecificInvest	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 	0.04	 0.03	 0.01	 No	effect	
SpecificInvest	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 	0.02	 -0.02	 0.04**	 Indirect	effect	
SpecificInvest	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.22***	 0.11***	 0.11***	 Partial	mediation	
SpecificInvest	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 0.16***	 0.10***	 0.06***	 Partial	mediation	
SpecificInvest	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 -0.03	 0.03	 0.07***	 Indirect	effect	
Power	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 0.01	 0.03	 -0.02	 No	effect	
Power	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 0.03	 0.09	 -0.06***	 Indirect	effect	
Power	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 -0.42***	 -0.24***	 -0.18***	 Partial	mediation	
Power	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 0.06	 0.04	 -0.10***	 Indirect	effect	
Power	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 -0.10*	 0.02	 -0.11***	 Full	mediation	
SupplierNetValue	 RQ	 DeliveryQuantity	 	0.04	 	0.02	 	0.06***	 Indirect	effect	
SupplierNetValue	 RQ	 DeliveryQuality	 	0.07	 	0.01	 	0.02	 No	effect	
SupplierNetValue	 RQ	 SupplierLoyalty	 	0.31***	 	0.13***	 	0.18***	 Partial	mediation	
SupplierNetValue	 RQ	 SupplierComm	 	0.23***	 	0.13***	 	0.10***	 Partial	mediation	
SupplierNetValue	 RQ	 SupplierProfit	 	0.24***	 	0.13***	 	0.11***	 Partial	mediation	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*.	The	shaded	boxes	identify	the	relationships	that	have	either	partial	
mediation,	indirect	effects	or	full	mediation.	
The	addition	of	relationship	quality	as	a	mediator	created	a	number	of	effects	on	the	
interactions	between	supplier	characteristics	and	supplier	performance.	Firstly,	power	had	a	
fully	mediated	effect	in	the	relationship	between	power	and	supplier	profitability.	This	
means	the	effect	of	power	on	supplier	profitability	only	occurred	through	relationship	
quality.	Secondly,	partial	mediation	occurred	between	some	of	the	relationship	attributes	
and	supplier	performance	variables.	For	example,	supplier	dependence	and	supplier	net	
value	had	partially	mediated	effects	on	supplier	loyalty,	communication	and	profitability.	
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There	was	also	partial	mediation	between	specific	assets	and	supplier	loyalty	and	
communication.	Furthermore,	the	relationship	between	power	and	supplier	loyalty	was	
partially	mediated	by	relationship	quality.	For	these	relationships,	there	are	both	a	direct	
effect	on	supplier	performance	as	well	as	an	indirect	effect	mediated	by	relationship	quality.		
The	remainder	of	the	variables	had	only	indirect	effects	through	relationship	quality	or	had	
no	effect	on	supplier	performance.	Processor	dependence	had	most	indirect	effects,	with	
indirect	relationships	with	supplier	loyalty,	communication	and	profitability.	Other	indirect	
effects	were	between	specific	investments	and	supplier	profitability,	as	well	as	a	negative	
indirect	effect	between	power	and	supplier	communication.		
Finally,	none	of	the	relationship	attributes	had	any	effect	on	delivery	quality.	This	result	
signified	that	the	relationship	variables	had	no	impact	on	the	quality	of	stock	delivered.	It	
can	be	concluded	that	relationship	quality	does	not	play	a	major	mediating	role	between	the	
supplier	characteristics	variables	and	performance.	In	contrast,	relationship	quality	was	an	
important	mediating	variable	for	nearly	all	the	relationship	attribute	variables.	Customer	
focus	was	the	only	exception	for	supplier	characteristics;	and	delivery	quality	was	the	only	
exception	for	relationship	attributes.	The	next	section	takes	the	results	from	the	direct	and	
mediated	effects	and	combines	them	in	a	re-specified	model.	
7.4.7 Model	5:	Re-specified	model	
Model	5	is	the	re-specified	model.	A	full	outline	of	the	respecified	model	is	presented	in	
Appendix	F.	This	is	based	on	the	results	of	model	3	by	including	only	the	statistically	
significant	direct	and	mediated	effects.	Therefore,	this	model	incorporated	the	direct,	
mediated	and	indirect	paths	that	were	still	statistically	significant	(p<0.01).	Due	to	the	
complexity	of	the	relationships	in	the	re-specified	model	each	of	these	relationships	are	
explained	separately	in	the	next	section.	Firstly,	the	effect	of	each	independent	variable	on	
the	supplier	performance	variables	is	described,	as	shown	in	Figure	8-1.	Secondly,	the	
antecedents	of	each	supplier	performance	are	presented	(Figure	9-1)
	 173	
	
Figure	7-10:	Model	5	-	respecified	model
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Chapter	8: Results	–	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	
attributes	
8.1 Re-specified	model:	Effects	of	supplier	characteristics	on	supplier	
performance	
This	section	describes	how	each	of	the	supplier	and	relationship	variables	influence	
relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	(Table	8-1).	This,	in	effect,	shows	the	impact	
of	only	one	independent	variable	on	relationship	quality	and	all	of	the	dependent	supplier	
performance	variables	(Figure	8-1).	As	the	model	still	incorporates	the	other	independent	
variables	then	these	act	like	control	variables,	enabling	the	unique	effect	of	each	supplier	or	
relationship	variable	to	be	evaluated	in	isolation.	This	enables	the	specific	relationships	
within	the	respecified	model	(Figure	7-10)	to	be	explained	in	detail.	
Table	8-1:	Summary	of	direct	and	indirect	effects	on	supplier	performance	
Supplier	
characteristics	 Delivery	quality	 Delivery	quantity	 Loyalty	 Communication	 Profitability	
Self-direction	 Direct	(-0.18***)	 Direct	(-0.13***)	 Direct	(0.09***)	 	 Direct	(0.17***)	
Customer	focus	 Direct	(0.09***)	 Indirect	(0.02**)	 Indirect	(0.07***)	 Direct	(0.0.10***)	Indirect	(0.04***)	 Indirect	(0.05***)	
Supplier	
motivation	 Direct	(0.21***)	 Direct	(0.24***)	 	 Direct	(0.27***)	 Direct	(-0.15)	
Supplier	ability	 Direct	(0.11***)	 Direct	(0.11**)	 	 	 	
Relationship	
attributes	 	 	 	 	 	
Supplier	net	
value	 	 Indirect	(0.06***)	
Direct	(0.13***)	
Indirect	(0.18***)	
Direct	(0.13***)	
Indirect	(0.10***)	
Direct	(0.13***)	
Indirect	(0.11***)	
Processor	
dependence	 	
Indirect	(0.02***)	 Indirect	(0.05***)	 Indirect	(0.03***)	 Indirect	(0.03***)	
Supplier	
dependence	 	 Indirect	(0.04***)	
Direct	(0.16***)	
Indirect	(0.11***)	
Direct	(0.09**)	
Indirect	(0.02***)	
Direct	(-0.18***)	
Indirect	(0.02***)	
Specific	assets	 	 Indirect	(0.04***)	 Direct	(0.11***)	Indirect	(0.11***)	
Direct	(0.10***)	
Indirect	(0.06***)	 Indirect	(0.07***)	
Power	 	 Indirect	(0.06***)	
Direct	(-0.24***)	
Indirect	(-
0.18***)	
Indirect	(-0.10***)	 Indirect	(-0.11)	
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Specific	assets	had	positive	direct	effects	on	supplier	loyalty	and	communication	(Figure	8-9),	
as	well	as	positive	indirect	effects	on	all	the	supplier	performance	variables,	other	than	
delivery	quality.	This	shows	the	importance	of	specific	assets	in	improving	supplier	
performance.	The	dilemma	for	suppliers	is	that	specific	assets	by	definition	have	less	value	
with	alternative	processors.	Therefore,	these	investments	create	greater	dependence	on	the	
processor	and	increase	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour.	This	was	confirmed	by	the	high	
correlation	between	specific	investments	and	supplier	dependence	(0.47***)	and	power	
(0.68***)	(Table	9-1).	At	the	same	time	investments	in	specific	assets	increase	the	supplier’s	
profitability	either	through	increased	efficiency	or	improving	the	quality	of	output.	Specific	
investments	were	also	correlated	with	several	supplier	characteristics,	including	customer	
focus	(0.36**),	supplier	motivation,	(0.19***)	and	supplier	ability	(0.13***).	Suppliers	with	
these	characteristics	are	more	likely	to	invest	in	specific	assets	that	will	enable	them	to	
better	meet	the	processors’	specifications.	
A	small,	indirect	relationship	existed	between	specific	assets	and	delivery	quantity	(0.04***)	
and	supplier	profitability	(0.07***).	This	indirect	relationship	to	supplier	profitability	implied	
that	specific	assets,	by	themselves,	did	not	improve	supplier	profitability.	It	was	only	when	a	
positive	relationship	with	the	buyer	existed	that	these	specific	investments	had	a	positive	
effect	on	supplier	profitability.	These	relationships	are	in	line	with	the	literature	on	specific	
assets.	This	literature	states	that	specific	assets	increase	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour	
by	the	buyer	and	that	dimensions	of	relationship	quality,	such	as	trust,	can	act	as	
governance	mechanisms	to	mitigate	opportunistic	behaviour	(Ba	&	Pavlou,	2002;	Cavusgil,	
Deligonul,	&	Zhang,	2004;	Nooteboom,	1996).	Finally,	there	was	a	small	indirect	relationship	
with	delivery	quantity.	This	effect	means	that	specific	assets	only	result	in	suppliers	
delivering	the	required	quantity	of	stock	if	there	is	a	high	level	of	relationship	quality	
between	the	supplier	and	the	buyer.	
In	summary,	specific	assets	had	a	substantial,	direct	effects	on	both	supplier	loyalty	and	
communication.	Furthermore,	relationship	quality	played	an	important	role	in	mitigating	the	
effects	of	suppliers’	investments	in	specific	assets.	The	mediating	effect	of	relationship	
quality	enhanced	the	effect	of	specific	investments	on	loyalty	and	communication.	
Relationship	quality	was	also	a	prerequisite	for	specific	assets	to	affect	supplier’s	willingness	
to	meet	delivery	timing	specifications	and	to	increase	profitability.		
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performance	need	to	avoid	the	use	of	power	even	though	specific	assets	and	supplier	
dependence	may	provide	the	opportunity.	The	largest	impact	of	this	was	on	supplier	loyalty,	
communication	and	supplier	profitability.	
8.2.6 Summary	of	effects	of	supplier	and	relationship	variables	on	supplier	
performance.	
Supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	play	a	significant	role	as	antecedents	to	
supplier	performance.	Furthermore,	relationship	quality	has	an	important	mediating	effect	
on	these	relationships.	The	role	of	relationship	quality	was	more	significant	with	the	
relationship	variables.	All	the	supplier	characteristics,	other	than	customer	focus,	had	no	
significant	effect	on	relationship	quality	and	therefore	no	mediating	effect	on	supplier	
performance.	This	outcome	suggests	that	relationship	quality	does	not	play	a	major	role	in	
the	interaction	between	supplier	characteristics	and	performance.	Supplier	characteristics	
had	both	positive	and	negative	direct	effects	on	supplier	performance.	Customer	focus	and	
supplier	ability	were	the	only	variables	that	had	solely	positive	effects	on	the	supplier	
performance.	The	other	supplier	characteristics	had	at	least	one	negative	effect	on	supplier	
performance.	This	result	shows	that	improving	supplier	performance	by	focusing	on	supplier	
characteristics	is	complex.	It	requires	an	understanding	of	the	specific	relationships	between	
the	aspects	of	supplier	performance	and	the	effect	that	these	individual	supplier	
characteristics	have	on	supplier	performance.	For	example,	supplier	motivation	was	an	
important	characteristic	for	meeting	quality	specifications.	However,	these	suppliers	are	less	
likely	to	be	loyal	to	the	processor	nor	are	they	more	likely	to	be	more	profitable	than	other	
suppliers.		
The	interaction	between	relationship	attributes	and	supplier	performance	were	varied	and	
complex.	In	contrast	to	the	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	quality	had	a	significant	
mediating	effect	with	the	relationship	attributes.	These	variables	also	had	direct	effects	
independent	of	relationship	quality.	An	important	result	was	that	relationship	quality	played	
a	role	in	reducing	the	negative	effects	of	power	and	supplier	dependence.	Supplier	
dependence	had	a	direct	negative	effect	on	supplier	profitability	however	this	changed	to	a	
positive	effect	when	mediated	by	relationship	quality.	The	results	also	highlighted	the	strong	
negative	impact	of	coercive	power	on	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	with	
negative	impacts	on	all	the	supplier	performance	variables.		
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Though	these	relationships	tended	to	be	complex	and	varied,	they	are	in	line	with	the	
findings	of	Morgan	and	Hunt	(1994)	who	comment	that	it	is	this	complexity	and	causal	
ambiguity	which	enable	buyers	to	develop	a	sustained	competitive	advantage.	This	is	also	
supported	by	Palmatier,	Dant,	Grewal,	and	Evans	(2006)	who	found	that	relationship	
management	strategies	and	exchange	outcomes	were	more	complex	than	suggested	by	
current	research.	They	also	found	support	for	the	fundamental	premise	that	relationship	
management	and	strong	relationships	positively	affect	performance.		
	
	
	
	
.		
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Similar	to	delivery	quality,	supplier	characteristics,	such	as	supplier	ability,	supplier	
motivation	and	self-direction,	were	important	antecedents	with	only	direct	effects	on	
delivery	quantity	(Table	7-15).	All	the	remaining	variables	were	mediated	by	relationship	
quality,	including	the	supplier	characteristic	of	customer	focus.	Although	these	indirect	
effects	were	significant	they	were	relatively	small	in	comparison	to	the	direct	effects.	This	
was	a	result	of	the	lower	effect	of	relationship	quality	on	supplier	performance.	These	
results	show	that	if	buyers	want	suppliers	who	deliver	the	right	number	of	animals	when	
required	they	needed	motivated	suppliers	with	superior	farm	management	ability	and	they	
also	needed	to	build	high	levels	of	relationship	quality.	As	delivery	timing	had	a	greater	
impact	on	the	suppliers’	management	flexibility,	it	was	not	surprising	the	relationship	quality	
played	some	role.	Suppliers	will	want	to	know	that	they	can	trust	their	processor	and	know	
that	they	will	be	rewarded	for	the	extra	cost	and	management	effort	involved	in	delivering	
stock	when	the	processors	required	them.	All	the	relationship	characteristics	had	an	
influence	on	delivery	quality	because	of	the	mediating	effect	of	relationship	quality.		
In	summary,	to	achieve	the	required	delivery	quantity	processors	need	to	select	suppliers	
with	superior	farm	management	ability,	high	motivation	and	low	self-direction.	
Furthermore,	this	effect	can	be	increased	by	developing	closer	relationships	with	these	
suppliers.	With	closer	relationships,	delivery	quantity	is	affected	by	all	the	relationship	
attributes	as	well	as	customer	focus.		
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relationship	will	improve	their	farm	profitability	to	some	degree	without	a	strong	
relationship	with	their	processor.	However,	with	relationship	quality,	this	effect	almost	
doubled	its	impact	on	farm	profitability.	This	shows	that	relationship	quality	plays	an	
important	part	in	supplier	profitability.	This	may	be	because	suppliers	were	more	
comfortable	making	specific	investments	and	adapting	their	production	system	to	meet	the	
processors’	requirements.		
Supplier	dependence	had	a	direct	adverse	effect	on	profitability.	What	is	of	note	here	was	
that	there	was	a	small	positive	indirect	effect	(0.02***)	with	mediation	by	relationship	
quality.	This	result	suggests	that	without	relationship	quality,	supplier	dependence	was	
detrimental	to	profitability.	However,	with	an	improved	quality	relationship	with	their	
processor,	dependence	had	a	small	positive	impact.	This	highlighted	the	fact	that	
dependence	exposed	the	supplier	to	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour	that	was	
detrimental	to	their	profitability.	Furthermore,	it	provided	evidence	for	the	proposition	that	
relationship	quality	had	a	mitigating	effect	on	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour.		
The	remaining	four	variables	had	only	indirect	effects	on	supplier	profitability	(Table	7-15).	
The	positive	effect	of	specific	assets	shows	that	suppliers	benefit	financially	from	adapting	
their	production	systems	to	meet	the	processors’	requirements;	this	benefit	was	only	
realised	with	higher	relationship	quality.	Conversely,	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	
profitability	was	only	realised	if	there	was	an	existing	quality	relationship	with	the	processor.	
In	summary,	higher	levels	of	relationship	quality	will	improve	supplier	profitability.	
Processors	who	wanted	to	improve	supplier	profitability,	first	needed	to	build	stronger	
relationships	with	their	suppliers	and	select	suppliers	with	a	high	degree	of	self-direction	and	
customer	focus.	Secondly,	they	needed	to	encourage	investment	in	specific	assets	at	the	
same	time	to	help	reduce	dependence	and	avoid	the	use	of	power	in	the	relationship.	
Finally,	they	needed	to	ensure	suppliers	experience	positive	benefits	from	the	relationship.	
9.1.6 Summary	of	antecedents	of	supplier	performance	
The	results	presented	in	this	section	show	that	the	all	the	relationship	attributes	other	than	
power	and	dependence	had	a	positive	effect	on	supplier	performance.	Dependence	had	a	
adverse	effect	only	on	supplier	profitability	and	power	had	a	negative	effect	on	all	the	
performance	variable	other	than	delivery	quality.		
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The	supplier	characteristics	also	had	mostly	positive	impacts	on	the	performance	variables	
except	self-direction	and	motivation.	Self-direction	had	negative	effects	on	delivery	quality	
and	quantity.	The	negative	effect	of	motivation	was	on	supplier	profitability.	Relationship	
quality	had	a	role	in	the	interaction	with	nearly	all	the	performance	variables;	delivery	
quality	was	the	only	exception.	Though	some	of	these	effects	were	relatively	small	
relationship	quality	did	play	a	significant	role	in	achieving	some	of	the	supplier	performance	
variables.	It	had	a	major	effect	on	all	the	relationship	attributes	and	their	effect	on	supplier	
loyalty.	It	also	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	relationship	between	supplier	net	value	and	
supplier	profitability.	Supplier	communication	was	only	moderately	affected	by	relationship	
quality.	The	supplier	characteristics	in	contrast	were	not	influenced	by	relationship	quality	
but	had	a	direct	influence	on	supplier	performance.	Customer	focus	was	the	only	exception	
to	this.		
These	results	suggest	that	to	improve	supplier	performance	processors	need	to	consider	
both	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes.	Utilising	the	supplier	characteristics	
requires	careful	supplier	selection.	This	process	involves	identifying	and	attracting	suppliers	
who	have	superior	farm	management	ability,	a	high	level	of	motivation	and	customer	focus.	
They	also	need	to	avoid	suppliers	with	high	levels	of	self-direction	as	they	are	less	likely	to	
meet	their	quality	specifications.	Furthermore,	relationship	quality	plays	an	important	role	
with	the	relationship	attributes	and	their	effect	on	supplier	performance.	Processors	need	
suppliers	to	invest	in	specific	assets,	allow	themselves	to	become	dependent	and	received	
positive	net	benefits	from	the	supply	relationship.	To	do	this,	they	need	to	try	to	influence	
these	attributes	but	also	develop	strong	relationships	with	these	suppliers.	They	also	need	to	
avoid	the	use	of	coercive	power	even	though	specific	assets	and	dependence	may	give	the	
opportunity	to	do	this.	
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9.1.7 Correlations	
This	section	presents	the	correlations	between	each	of	the	exogenous	variables.	These	
values	identify	variables	that	were	highly	correlated.	Although	this	does	not	establish	
causation,	it	is	possible	to	identify	interdependent	relationships	between	variables.	
Table	9-1	:	Correlations	between	exogenous	variables	
Variables	 Estimate	 P	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Self-direction	 -0.03	 0.37	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Supplier	Motivation	 0.42	 ***	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Net	Value	 0.12	 ***	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Power	 0.19	 ***	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Specific	Assets	 0.36	 ***	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Processor	dependence		 0.17	 ***	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 0.11	 ***	
Customer	focus	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.26	 ***	
Net	Value	 <-->	 Power	 -0.37	 ***	
Net	Value	 <-->	 Processor	dependence		 0.03	 0.26	
Net	Value	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 0.1	 ***	
Net	Value	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.11	 ***	
Power	 <-->	 Specific	Assets	 0.68	 ***	
Power	 <-->	 Processor	dependence		 0.23	 ***	
Power	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 0.29	 ***	
Power	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.03	 0.38	
Processor	dependence	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 0.11	 ***	
Processor	dependence	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.13	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Supplier	Motivation	 -0.14	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Net	Value	 0.23	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Power	 -0.2	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Specific	Assets	 -0.1	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Processor	dependence		 -0.09	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 -0.18	 ***	
Self-direction	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.03	 0.41	
Specific	Assets	 <-->	 Processor	dependence		 0.35	 ***	
Specific	assets	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 0.47	 ***	
Specific	assets	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.13	 ***	
Supplier	dependence	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.02	 0.63	
Supplier	motivation	 <-->	 Net	Value	 0.13	 ***	
Supplier	motivation	 <-->	 Power	 0.07	 **	
Supplier	motivation	 <-->	 Specific	Assets	 0.19	 ***	
Supplier	Motivation	 <-->	 Processor	dependence		 0.14	 ***	
Supplier	Motivation	 <-->	 Supplier	Dependence	 0.13	 ***	
Supplier	Motivation	 <-->	 Supplier	Ability	 0.59	 ***	
	
There	were	some	significant	correlations	between	variables	that	provided	further	insight	
into	the	relationships	in	the	model.	There	was	a	strong	correlation	between	customer	focus	
and	supplier	motivation	(0.42***),	indicating	that	suppliers	who	were	highly	motivated	were	
also	likely	to	be	customer	focused.	Furthermore,	there	was	also	a	strong	correlation	
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between	specific	assets	and	customer	focus	(0.36***).	This	would	suggest	that	suppliers	
who	were	customer-focused	were	also	more	likely	to	invest	in	specific	assets	to	achieve	their	
goals.	Self-direction	had	strong	negative	correlation	with	power	(-0.19***)	and	a	positive	
correlation	with	net	value	(0.22***).	As	self-directed	suppliers	make	more	independent	
decisions,	therefore,	they	were	less	likely	to	enter	into	a	relationship	with	asymmetrical	
power	relationships.	This	outcome	was	confirmed	by	the	negative	correlation	between	self-
direction	and	supplier	dependence	(-0.18***).	Self-directed	suppliers	clearly	wished	to	
maintain	their	independence.	The	positive	correlation	with	supplier	net	value	indicates	that	
these	suppliers	were	more	likely	to	enter	into	supply	relationships	where	there	were	positive	
net	benefits	from	the	relationship.	Processor	dependence	had	a	number	of	significant	
correlations	including	specific	investments	(0.35***),	power	(0.23***),	supplier	motivation	
(0.14***)	and	customer	focus	(0.17***).	Processor	dependence	implied	that	the	processor	
had	become	reliant	on	the	supplier.	Processor	dependence	and	supplier	dependence	were	
positively	correlated	(0.11***).	This	result	implies	that,	to	some	degree,	interdependent	
relationships	occur	where	both	supplier	and	processor	were	dependent	on	each	other.	
Processor	dependence	was	likely	to	be	a	result	of	suppliers	having	specific	characteristics	
that	benefitted	the	processor.	For	example,	suppliers	who	were	highly	motivated,	customer-
focused	and	who	had	made	specific	investments	were	likely	to	be	highly	valuable	to	the	
processor.	As	not	all	suppliers	had	these	characteristics	the	processor	then	became	
dependent	on	these	suppliers.		
Supplier	dependence	has	significant	correlations	with	processor	dependence	(0.11***),	
specific	investments	(0.47***),	power	(0.28***),	net	value	(0.12***),	supplier	motivation	
(0.13***),	customer	focus	(0.12***),	and	a	negative	correlation	with	self-direction	(-0.18).	
These	correlations	indicate	that	supplier	dependence	is	increased	by	investment	in	specific	
assets	which,	in	turn,	result	in	power	asymmetry.	Motivated	suppliers	may	be	more	willing	
to	become	dependent	to	achieve	their	goals.	This	relationship	may	also	occur	with	customer	
focus.	These	suppliers	may	realise	that	dependence	is	the	price	to	pay	to	meet	customers’	
needs.	This	was	supported	by	the	correlation	with	net	value.	This	relationship	showed	that	
supplier	dependence	was	related	to	net	value.	The	negative	correlation	with	self-direction	
demonstrated	that	these	suppliers	will	tend	to	remain	independent	only	entering	into	a	
supply	relationship	if	there	were	certain	of	positive	net	benefits.		
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Supplier	ability	was	positively	correlated	with	net	value	(0.12***),	specific	investments	
(0.13***),	processor	dependence	(0.13***),	customer	focus	(0.26***)	and	supplier	
motivation	(0.59***).	Most	significantly,	supplier	ability	and	supplier	motivation	were	
strongly	correlated.	These	suppliers	also	appeared	to	be	more	customer-focused	and	willing	
to	make	specific	investments	therefore	were	more	likely	to	realise	a	positive	net	benefit	
from	the	relationship.	The	processor	was	likely	to	become	more	dependent	on	these	
supplier’s	due	to	their	motivation	and	ability,	customer	focus	and	willingness	to	make	
specific	investments.	
9.1.8 Control	variables	
	Table	9-2	shows	the	standardised	regression	weight	and	significance	of	the	control	variables	
and	supplier	performance	outcomes.	In	the	model,	these	were	used	as	controls	to	remove	
their	influence	on	the	model	variables.	By	analysing	these	relationships,	it	enabled	
identifying	which	of	these	would	have	a	significant	effect	if	included	in	the	model.		
Table	9-2:	Regression	weights	for	control	variables	–	mediated	model		
Variables	 Regression	weight	 P	
DelNum	 <---	 Farm	Size	 0.03	 ns	
DelNum	 <---	 UncertProd8mth	 0.11	 ***	
DelQual	 <---	 Farm	Size	 -0.06	 *	
DelQual	 <---	 UncertProd8mth	 0.08	 **	
FarmPerf	 <---	 ClimSpring	 0.11	 ***	
FarmPerf	 <---	 ClimSum	 -0.03	 ns	
FarmPerf	 <---	 Farm	Size	 0.07	 **	
FarmPerf	 <---	 EducationMax	 -0.09	 ***	
FarmPerf	 <---	 SoilFert	 0.06	 **	
FarmPerf	 <---	 ClimWint	 -0.02	 ns	
Loyalty	 <---	 Shares	 0.21	 ***	
SuppCom	 <---	 Shares	 0.06	 **	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
There	were	a	number	of	significant	effects	of	the	control	variables.	For	example,	farm	
performance	was	positively	related	to	spring	climate,	farm	size	and	soil	fertility.	These	
relationships	indicate	that	a	warm	spring	climate,	a	large	farm	size	and	high	soil	fertility	all	
contribute	to	improved	farm	performance.	A	favourable	spring	climate	resulted	in	early	
pasture	growth,	which	enabled	early	lambing	or	calving.	These	farm	characteristics	enable	
stock	to	be	produced	on	the	shoulders	of	the	season	and	consequently	are	able	to	attract	a	
greater	premium.	Surprisingly,	farm	performance	was	negatively	affected	by	educational	
level.	This	result	seemed	to	infer	that	higher	education	did	not	necessarily	result	in	improved	
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farm	performance.	Farming	is	a	practical	enterprise	that	involved	considerable	tacit	
knowledge.	Education	was	also	negatively	correlated	with	age	which	may	mean	younger	
farmers	with	higher	educational	levels	may	have	less	on-farm	experience.	Owning	shares	
was	positively	correlated	with	supplier	loyalty	and	supplier	communication.	This	result	
indicates	that	the	existence	of	vertical	integration	by	suppliers	means	they	are	more	loyal	
and	are	more	willing	to	communicate	and	share	information.	
Both	delivery	quality	and	quantity	were	affected	by	production	uncertainty.	This	suggests	
that	uncertainty	in	production	made	it	more	difficult	to	deliver	the	quality	and	number	of	
stock	required.	This	was	likely	because	where	production	uncertainty	existed	there	was	
increased	risk	of	not	being	able	to	meet	the	processors’	requirements.	These	suppliers	will	
require	greater	flexibility	in	the	quality	and	timing	of	delivery.		
9.2 Summary	of	results	and	conclusions	
Table	9-3	presents	a	summary	of	the	results	of	hypotheses	proposed	in	Table	3-1.	A	
considerable	number	of	these	hypothesis	were	supported	suggesting	that	the	theoretical	
model	substantially	supported	by	the	empirical	analysis.	Table	9-3	presents	the	outcome	of	
the	hypotheses	proposed	in	Table	3-1	and	Figure	3-9.	The	first	series	of	hypotheses	
evaluated	the	structure	and	connection	of	relationship	quality	and	social	capital.	The	only	
one	of	these	propositions	not	supported	was	that	relationship	quality	and	social	capital	were	
distinct	constructs.	The	six	other	propositions	were	all	supported.	These	results	confirmed	
the	structure	of	these	two	constructs	and	that	they	were	not	in	fact	significantly	different	
concepts.	The	other	supported	hypotheses	provided	evidence	that	relationship	quality	and	
social	capital	could	be	configured	in	multiple	ways	that	were	equally	valid.	
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	Table	9-3:	Hypotheses	outcomes	
H1a-g:	Relationship	quality	is	a	construct	with	the	sub-dimensions	of:	Structural	social	capital,	
relational/cognitive	social	capital,	trust,	commitment,	satisfaction	with	communication,	
satisfaction	with	price	and	satisfaction	with	the	organisation.	
Supported	
H2a:	Social	capital	and	relationship	quality	are	distinct	constructs	 Not	supported	
H2	b,c:	Social	capital	made	up	of	sub-dimensions	of	structural	and	relational/cognitive	social	
capital.	 Supported	
H2g-1:	Satisfaction	is	made	up	of	sub-dimensions	that	include	satisfaction	with	performance,	
communication	and	price.	 Supported	
H2d-i:	Relationship	quality	made	up	of	sub-dimensions	of	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction.		 Supported	
H3a-g:	Relationship	quality	is	a	construct	that	consists	of	social	capital,	trust,	commitment	and	
satisfaction.		 Supported	
H4a-g:	Social	capital	is	a	construct	that	consists	of	social	relationship	quality,	trust,	commitment	
and	satisfaction.		 Supported	
H5a	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	dependence	on	delivery	
quality.	 Not	supported	
H5b	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	dependence	on	delivery	
quantity.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H5c-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	dependence	on,	supplier	
loyalty,	supplier	communication,	supplier	profitability.	 Supported	(partial	mediation)	
H6a:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	[processor]	dependence	on	delivery	
quality.	 Not	supported	
H6b-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	[processor]	dependence	on	delivery	
quantity,	supplier	loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H7a:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	specific	assets	on	delivery	quality.	 Not	supported	
H7b:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	specific	assets	on	delivery	quantity,	
and	profitability.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H7c-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	specific	assets	on	supplier	loyalty,	
supplier	communication.	 Supported	(partial	mediation)	
H8a:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	delivery	quality.	 Not	supported	
H8b:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	delivery	quantity.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H8c:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	supplier	loyalty.	 Supported	(partial	mediation)	
H8d:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	supplier	communication.		 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H8a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	negative	effect	of	power	on	supplier	profitability.	 Supported	(full	mediation)	
H9a	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	net	value	on	delivery	quality.	 Not	supported	
H9b	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	net	value	on	delivery	quantity.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H9c-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	net	value	on	supplier	
loyalty,	supplier	communication	and	suppler	profitability.		 Supported	(partial	mediation)	
H10a:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	customer	focus	on	delivery	quality.		 Supported	(direct	effect)	
H10b:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	customer	focus	on	delivery	quantity,	
profitability	and	supplier	loyalty.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H10c-d:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	customer	focus	on,	supplier	
communication.	 Supported	(partial	mediation)	
H10e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	customer	focus	on	supplier	
profitability.	 Supported	(indirect	effect)	
H11a-b:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	ability	on	delivery	quality,	
delivery	quantity.	 Not	supported	(direct	effect	only)	
H11c-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	ability	on,	supplier	loyalty,	
supplier	communication	and	supplier	profitability.	 Not	supported	(no	effect)	
H12a-e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	motivation	on	delivery	
quality,	delivery	quantity,	communication,	loyalty	and	profitability.	
Not	supported	(direct	effects	only)	
Negative	effect	on	profitability	
H13a-c:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	self-direction	on	delivery	
quality,	delivery	quantity,	supplier	and	loyalty.	
Not	supported	(direct	effects	only)	
Negative	effect	on	delivery	
quantity	
H13d:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	self-direction	on	supplier	
communication.	 Not	supported	(no	effect)	
H13e:	Relationship	quality	mediates	the	positive	effect	of	supplier	self-direction	on	supplier	
profitability.	 Not	supported	(direct	effect	only)	
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The	remainder	of	the	hypotheses	proposed	that	relationship	quality	mediated	the	
interaction	between	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	supplier	
performance.	Most	of	these	hypotheses	were	supported.	This	result	provides	evidence	that	
relationship	quality	plays	a	significant	role	in	mediating	the	effect	these	variables	on	supplier	
performance.	There	were,	however,	a	number	that	were	not	supported.	For	example,	none	
of	the	propositions	involving	delivery	quality	were	supported.	This	variable	had	only	direct	
effects	on	supplier	performance.	This	suggests	that	relationship	quality	has	no	effect	on	
suppliers	delivering	a	quality	product.	The	other	propositions	that	were	not	supported	
involved	supplier	motivation,	ability	and	self-direction.	These	variables	had	a	number	of	
direct	effects	on	supplier	performance,	but	relationship	quality	did	not	influence	their	
impact	on	supplier	performance.	These	results	confirm	that	relationship	quality	does	play	a	
major	role	in	influencing	supplier	performance.	However,	this	is	mostly	with	relationship	
attributes	as	there	are	a	number	of	the	supplier	characteristics	that	have	no	influence	from	
relationship	quality.	
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Chapter	10: Discussion	and	conclusion		
10.1 Introduction	
The	preceding	chapters	have	explained	the	context	and	purpose	of	the	research,	reviewed	
the	relevant	literature,	described	the	research	methodology	and	presented	the	results	of	the	
data	analysis.	This	discussion	chapter	addresses	the	central	aim	of	this	research	which	was	to	
investigate	buyer-supplier	relationships	in	order	to	improve	supplier	performance.	This	is	
achieved	by	addressing	each	of	the	research	questions	in	the	light	of	the	results.	Section	10.2	
contains	a	discussion	on	the	question	regarding	the	conceptualisation	and	measurement	of	
relationship	quality	and	its	connection	to	social	capital.	Following	this,	Section	10.3	presents	
an	evaluation	of	the	relationship	and	supplier	variables	that	were	found	to	be	antecedents	
of	relationship	quality.	Section	10.4	then	considers	the	manner	in	which	supplier	
characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	relationship	quality	interact	to	effect	supplier	
performance.	Some	possible	ways	that	processors	can	influence	supplier	performance	is	
discussed	within	each	section.	Section	10.5	summarises	the	discussion	and	conclusions.	
Finally,	Section	10.6	discusses	the	theoretical	and	managerial	contributions	of	the	research,	
the	limitations	of	the	thesis	and	directions	for	future	research.	
10.2 Conceptualisation	and	dimensional	structure	of	relationship	quality	
The	first	research	question	addressed	the	structure	and	conceptualisation	of	relationship	
quality.	The	results	showed	little	difference	in	model	fit	and	p	values	between	the	various	
models	of	relationship	quality	and	social	capital.	This	outcome	was	not	surprising	given	the	
high	correlations	between	social	capital	and	relationship	quality.	The	finding	implies	that	the	
respondents	did	not	discriminate	between	the	scale	items	that	make	up	social	capital	and	
relationship	quality34.	They	did	however	distinguish	between	social	capital	and	the	other	
dimensions	of	relationship	quality	(trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction).	The	implication	is	
that	relationship	quality	can	be	understood	as	a	higher-level	construct	that	has	four	distinct	
dimensions	including	social	capital,	as	well	as	trust,	commitment	and	satisfaction	(Figure	
7-3).	Furthermore,	social	capital	has	two	dimensions	structural	and	relational/cognitive	
social	capital;	the	results	indicated	that	it	would	be	equally	valid	to	include	relationship	
quality	as	a	third	dimension	(Figure	7-4).	The	exploratory	factor	analysis	also	failed	to	
																																																																		
34	Although	suppliers	may	not	relate	to	the	constructs	such	as	social	capital	and	relationship	quality	they	identify	
the	scale	items	that	make	these	up.	
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separate	relational	and	cognitive	social	capital	(Table	6-2)	suggesting	that	the	respondents	
did	not	differentiate	between	these	two	constructs.	In	addition,	the	satisfaction	construct	
has	three	dimensions,	which	are	satisfaction	with	price,	communication	and	the	
organisation.	A	significant	outcome	of	the	research	was	that	social	capital	could	be	a	
dimension	of	the	relationship	quality	construct	(Figure	7-3),	and	that	it	would	be	just	as	valid	
to	include	relationship	quality	as	a	dimension	of	social	capital.		
Combining	relationship	quality	and	social	capital	provides	a	broader	measure	of	the	
relationship	resources	included	in	buyer-seller	relationships.	While	the	empirical	research	on	
relationship	quality	has	not	explicitly	included	social	capital	in	its	dimensions,	there	are	a	
number	of	authors	who	define	relationship	quality	in	broad	terms	that	reflects	the	“overall	
strength	of	a	relationship”	(Lages	et	al.,	2005,	p.	1041).	Based	on	this	perspective	it	can	be	
argued	that	social	capital	measures	important	aspects	of	the	overall	strength	of	the	
relationship	which	are	not	included	in	the	other	relationship	quality	dimensions.		
Empirical	evidence	that	relationship	quality	and	social	capital	are	highly	related	constructs	is	
rare.	There	is,	however,	some	justification	for	this	in	the	literature.	For	example,	there	are	
studies	in	the	relationship	marketing	literature	have	included	constructs	similar	to	social	
capital	in	the	formulation	of	relationship	quality.	For	instance,	they	incorporate	the	
construct	“similarity”	which	is	defined	in	terms	of	relationships	with	similar	cultures,	values	
and	goals.	This	definition	is	almost	indistinguishable	from	the	cognitive	social	capital	
construct	(Table	4-20).	Furthermore,	relationship	quality	variables	similar	to	social	capital	
constructs	can	be	seen	in	the	work	of	Dwyer	et	al.	(1987)	and	Morgan	and	Hunt	(1994)	who	
refer	to	shared	values	and	similarity	of	beliefs	as	being	necessary	for	relationship	
development.	In	a	similar	way,	reciprocity	and	relational	bonds	(relational	social	capital)	
were	studied	in	the	context	of	relationship	quality	by	Wulf	and	Odekerken-Schröder	(2001).	
Finally,	structural	social	capital	is	captured	in	a	number	of	studies	by	incorporating	frequency	
of	interaction	with	customers	(Bagozzi,	1995;	De	Wulf,	Odekerken-Schröder,	&	Iacobucci,	
2001).	These	studies	suggest	that	there	is	theoretical	support	for	this	view	of	social	capital	
and	relationship	quality	as	being	closely	related	hence	should	not	be	treated	as	separate	
constructs.	
The	findings	of	this	research	were	somewhat	novel	in	bringing	together	concepts	from	the	
relationship	marketing	and	the	social	network	perspective.	This	approach	enabled	a	broader	
definition	of	relationship	quality	to	be	used	in	the	structural	equation	modelling	analysis	of	
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this	research.	As	a	result,	a	more	comprehensive	measure	of	the	overall	strength	of	the	
relationship	was	able	to	be	modelled.	
10.3 Antecedents	of	relationship	quality	
The	second	research	question	aimed	to	identify	the	antecedents	of	relationship	quality	
(Figure	7-6).	First	of	all,	the	results	showed	that	the	supplier	and	relationship	variables	in	the	
model	captured	a	significant	amount	of	the	variation	in	relationship	quality	(R2	value	of	
0.60).	The	significant	antecedences	(p<0.001)	identified	were	supplier	and	processor	
dependence,	specific	assets,	power,	net	value,	and	customer	focus.	Power	(-0.47***)	and	
net	value	(0.46)	had	the	greatest	influence	on	relationship	quality	followed	by	specific	assets	
(0.27***)	and	customer	focus	(0.19***).	Supplier	(0.10***)	and	processer	dependence	
(0.12***)	had	the	least	significant	influence.	The	supplier	characteristics	of	self-direction,	
supplier	motivation	and	ability	had	no	significant	influence	as	antecedents	to	relationship	
quality.		
These	results	are	similar	to	those	identified	by	Athanasopoulou	(2009)	who	reviewed	the	
literature	on	relationships	quality	and	noted	that	there	was	considerable	variation	in	the	
antecedents	of	relationship	quality	in	the	literature.	Despite	this,	a	number	of	factors	were	
common	to	a	large	number	of	studies	(Table	10-1).	Most	of	these	variables	were	
incorporated	into	this	research,	though	in	some	cases	they	were	included	as	outcomes	of	
relationship	quality	rather	than	antecedents	or	as	control	variables.	For	example,	
environmental	uncertainty	was	treated	as	a	control	variable	as	was	the	duration	of	the	
relationship.	The	reason	for	this	was	because	this	research	focused	specifically	on	
relationship	quality	and	attributes,	supplier	characteristics	and	performance;	this	required	
controlling	for	variables	such	as	environmental	uncertainty.	As	noted	earlier,	variables	such	
as	effective	communication	and	information	sharing	were	included	as	supplier	performance	
variables	and	therefore	were	an	outcome	of	relationship	quality	rather	an	antecedent.	Most	
of	the	remainder	of	the	variables	were	essentially	the	same	as	Athanasopoulou	(2009)	
reported	from	the	literature.	Hence,	this	research	aligns	with	many	previous	studies	on	
relationship	quality.	For	example,	the	positive	relationship	between	specific	investments	and	
relationship	quality	is	consistent	with	the	findings	of	Anderson	and	Weitz	(1992),	as	was	the	
positive	relationship	between	dependence	and	relationship	quality.	Furthermore,	they	
established	a	positive	relationship	between	relationship	termination	costs,	relationship	
benefits	and	commitment.	Relationship	termination	costs	can	be	related	to	specific	assets	
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and	relationship	benefits	to	supplier	net	value.	Although	Morgan	and	Hunt	(1994)	only	use	
the	commitment	dimension	of	relationship	quality,	commitment	is	likely	to	be	closely	
correlated	to	the	broader	relationship	quality	construct	used	in	this	research.	
Table	10-1:	Commonality	of	antecedents	between	research	and	previous	studies	
Antecedents	identified	from	the	literature	 Antecedents	found	in	this	research	
Specific	investments	 Included	
Level	of	environmental	uncertainty	 Control	variable	
Effective	communication	and	sharing	of	information,	 Included	as	outcome	of	RQ	
Mutual	dependence	 Supplier	and	processor	dependence	included	as	separate	
variables	
Perceived	benefits	and	costs	 Included	as	supplier	net	value	
Shared	goals	 Included	in	definition	of	RQ	
Duration	of	the	relationship	 Control	variable	
Absence	of	opportunistic	behaviour	 Included	as	Power	
Customer	focus	 Novel	to	this	research	
	
As	an	antecedent	of	relationship	quality,	customer	focus	was	a	novel	variable	that	has	not	
previously	been	identified	in	this	capacity	in	the	literature.	This	may	be	because	it	is	a	
supplier	characteristic	rather	than	relationship	variable	and	most	research	has	focused	on	
relationship	factors.	This	research	provides	some	evidence	that	supplier	characteristics	such	
as	customer	focus	can	influence	relation	quality.	By	implication,	buyers	may	be	able	to	
improve	relationship	quality	by	selecting	suppliers	who	are	customer	focused.	It	is	also	
important	to	note	that	none	of	the	other	supplier	characteristics	contributed	to	relationship	
quality	including	supplier	ability	and	self-direction.	Further	research	could	seek	to	identify	
supplier	characteristics	other	than	customer	focus	that	may	impact	relationship	quality.	This	
would	provide	greater	insight	into	other	supplier	characteristics	that	buyers	could	use	to	
select	suppliers	who	are	more	likely	to	build	higher	quality	relationships.	For	example,	
Athanasopoulou	(2009)	identified	relationship	orientation	as	an	important	characteristic	of	
both	supplier	and	buyer	that	influences	relationship	quality.	
10.4 The	effect	of	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	
relationship	quality	on	supplier	performance	
The	remainder	of	the	research	focused	on	testing	the	theoretical	model	(Figure	7-5).	This	
model	addressed	the	research	questions	focused	on	identifying	which	supplier	and	
relationship	attributes	affected	supplier	performance	and	how	relationship	quality	
influences	these	relationships.	In	discussing	these	questions	there	is	consideration	of	how	
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processors	might	influence	supplier	performance	by	understanding	these	relationships35.	To	
achieve	this	the	discussion	covers,	firstly,	an	explanation	of	the	direct	(unmediated)	effects	
between	the	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	supplier	performance.	After	
this,	relationship	quality	is	included	as	a	mediator	to	understand	how	this	affects	these	
relationships.	Following	this,	the	discussion	evaluates	each	of	the	supplier	and	relationship	
variables	and	their	effect	on	supplier	performance.	Finally,	the	supplier	and	relationship	
antecedents	of	each	of	the	supplier	performance	outcomes	are	discussed.	
10.4.1 Unmediated	(direct)	effects	on	supplier	performance	
The	first	step	in	this	process	was	to	identify	the	unmediated	direct	effects	between	the	
relationship	attributes,	supplier	characteristics,	and	supplier	performance	(Figure	7-9).	This	
analysis	showed	positive,	negative	as	well	as	non-significant	effects	on	supplier	
performance.	For	example,	processor	dependence	had	no	significant	direct	effect	on	any	of	
the	performance	variables	(Table	7-11).	In	contrast,	all	other	variables	affected	at	least	two	
of	the	supplier	performance	outcomes.	Supplier	net	value,	supplier	dependence,	supplier	
motivation	and	self-direction	had	the	greatest	impact,	influencing	at	least	four	of	the	
supplier	performance	outcomes	(Table	7-11).	Furthermore,	some	of	these	factors	explained	
a	considerable	proportion	of	the	variance	in	the	supplier	performance	outcomes.	For	
example,	supplier	loyalty	(R2	=	0.42)	and	supplier	communication	(R2	=	0.32)	had	the	highest	
values.	Supplier	profitability	(R2	=	0.22),	delivery	quantity	(R2	=	0.20)	and	delivery	quality	(R2	=	
0.16)	all	had	less	of	an	influence.	This	confirmed	that	both	relationship	and	supplier	variables	
have	significant	direct	effects	on	supplier	performance.	The	strength	and	effect	of	these	
antecedents	varied	considerably	with	no	two	variables	having	the	same	relationship	with	the	
performance	outcomes.	This	means	it	is	important	to	understand	the	individual	effects	of	
each	of	the	antecedents	and	their	impact	on	supplier	performance.	The	next	stage	of	the	
research	was	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	relationship	quality	as	a	mediator	on	these	
relationships.	
10.4.2 Mediated	(indirect)	effects	
Adding	relationship	quality	as	a	mediator	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	effects	of	the	
supplier	and	relationship	variables	on	supplier	performance.	For	example,	the	R2	value	
																																																																		
35	Though	the	study	was	focused	on	the	supplier’s	perspective	on	the	relationship	and	self-reporting	on	supplier	
characteristics	and	performance	it	is	possible	to	speculate	as	to	how	these	may	affect	processors	even	though	
this	cannot	be	specifically	proven	from	the	data.	
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increased	for	several	of	the	supplier	performance	variables	including	supplier	loyalty,	
profitability,	and	communication.	This	suggests	that	there	is	an	increase	in	the	explanatory	
power	of	the	model	when	relationship	quality	is	included,	though	the	goodness-of-fit	
measures	were	essentially	unchanged.	A	number	of	the	direct	effects	decreased	in	value	
implying	partial	mediation	by	relationship	quality.	Consequently,	the	model	showed	several	
mediated	effects	through	relationship	quality.	Relationship	quality	also	had	a	direct	effect	on	
all	the	supplier	performance	outcomes	with	the	exception	of	delivery	quality.	This	confirmed	
hypotheses	H5	–	H13	that	relationship	quality	plays	an	important	mediating	role	between	
the	relationship	and	supplier	characteristics	and	the	performance	outcomes	(Table	9-3).	
Furthermore,	the	relationship	characteristics	variables	were	all	antecedents	of	relationship	
quality.	In	contrast,	customer	focus	was	the	only	supplier	characteristics	that	influenced	
relationship	quality.	This	suggests	that	relationship	quality	has	a	greater	mediating	role	with	
relationship	attributes	than	with	than	with	supplier	characteristics.	This	is	similar	to	the	
findings	of	Morgan	and	Hunt	(1994)	who	identified	that	relationship	quality,	which	they	
defined	as	trust	and	commitment,	was	an	important	mediating	variable	between	a	number	
of	antecedents,	such	as	relationship	termination	costs,	relationship	benefits	and	
performance	outcomes.	Carey	et	al.	(2011)	also	found	that	the	antecedents	of	supplier	
performance	were	partially	mediated	by	relational	capital.		
These	results	provide	insights	into	the	complex	interactions	that	exist	in	supplier	–	buyer	
relationships.	Each	independent	variable	has	a	unique	combination	of	associations	with	the	
supplier	performance	variables.	This	makes	any	easy	summarisation	of	results	difficult.	It	
does	however	reflect	the	existing	understanding	of	intangible	relationship	resources	
whereby	these	are	these	are	characterised	by	complexity	and	causal	ambiguity	(Morgan	&	
Hunt,	1994).	Furthermore,	Nahapiet	and	Ghoshal	(1998)	state	that	it	is	this	complexity	which	
enables	buyers	who	develop	these	resources	to	gain	a	sustainable	competitive	advantage.		
10.4.3 Supplier	characteristics	
The	supplier	characteristics	had	considerable	effects	on	supplier	performance.	These	were	
mostly	unmediated,	direct	effects	on	supplier	performance.	This	means	that	their	influence	
on	supplier	performance	was	independent	of	the	quality	of	the	relationship	(Table	7-15).	
This	suggests	that	for	the	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	quality	does	not	have	a	major	
impact	on	supplier	performance.	Furthermore,	these	supplier	characteristics	are	likely	to	be	
based	on	the	supplier’s	capabilities	and	personality,	which	are	difficult	to	change.	All	the	
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supplier	characteristics	had	positive	effects	on	performance	with	the	exception	of	self-
direction	and	motivation.	This	suggests	that	buyers	may	need	to	put	emphasis	on	supplier	
selection	if	they	want	to	get	the	full	benefit	of	these	supplier	characteristics.		
Customer	focus	
Customer	focus	was	an	important	supplier	characteristic	affecting	supplier	performance.	
This	was	because	it	was	the	only	supplier	characteristic	that	had	indirect	effects	on	supplier	
performance	(mediated	by	relationship	quality).	Though	these	effects	were	relatively	weak	
(range	0.02**	to	0.07***)	they	still	indicate	that	relationship	quality	plays	a	significant	
mediating	role	in	the	effect	that	customer	focus	has	on	supplier	performance.	The	indirect	
effects	had	significant	relationships	with	all	the	supplier	performance	variables	other	than	
delivery	quantity.	In	contrast,	the	direct	effects	only	affected	communication	and	delivery	
quality	(Figure	8-3).	Between	the	direct	and	indirect	effects	customer	focus	affected	all	the	
supplier	performance	outcomes,	illustrating	the	importance	of	customer	focus	as	a	supplier	
characteristic.	
Loyalty	and	profitability	were	not	directly	affected	by	customer	focus	however,	they	were	
affected	by	customer	focus	when	relationship	quality	as	a	mediator.	This	result	suggests	to	
achieve	loyalty	and	profitability	customer	focused	suppliers	also	need	a	strong	relationship	
with	the	buyer.	This	link	to	profitability	was	consistent	with	research	by	Narver	and	Slater	
(1990)	who	found	that	market	(customer)	orientation	was	an	important	determinant	of	
supplier	profitability.	This	was	also	consistent	with	previous	findings	by	Micheels	and	Gow	
(2008)	and	Verhees	and	Meulenberg	(2004)	who	show	that	market	(customer)	orientation	
improved	supplier	performance.	Micheels	and	Gow	(2009),	also	note	the	difficulty	in	
developing	customer	orientation	in	the	meat	industry	due	to	the	complex	nature	of	
agricultural	production	and	the	length	of	the	supply	chain.	This	may	explain	the	weaker	
effect	that	customer	focus	has	on	performance	compared	to	some	of	the	other	supplier	
characteristics.	The	conclusion	from	these	results	provides	evidence	that	customer	focus	is	
an	important	supplier	characteristic	variable,	which	impacts	all	the	supplier	performance	
variables.	Therefore,	improving	supplier	performance	requires	suppliers	who	are	customer	
focused	suppliers	and	who	have	high-quality	relationships	with	their	buyers.	
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Motivation	
Motivation	positively	influences	supplier	communication	as	well	as	delivery	quality	and	
quantity.	Somewhat	surprisingly,	however,	it	had	a	negative	effect	on	profitability	(Figure	
8-4).	This	at	first	seems	counterintuitive	as	it	would	be	expected	that	motivated	suppliers	
would	be	more	likely	to	be	more	profitable.	A	potential	explanation	is	that	profitability	may	
not	be	the	only	objective	that	highly	motivated	suppliers	aim	to	achieve.	This	is	consistent	
with	the	findings	of	Elliott	and	Wakelin	(2016)	and	Wilson	et	al.	(2012)	who	found	that	
farmers	were	motivated	by	a	range	of	factors	with	profitability	being	a	means	to	achieving	
these	objectives	rather	than	a	goal	in	itself.	Figure	10-1	may	also	provide	some	explanation.	
This	graph	shows	an	inverted	U	relationship	between	dependence	and	motivation.	At	one	
end,	low	levels	of	dependence	are	associated	with	moderately	motivated	suppliers.	Then	
moderate	levels	of	dependence	corresponds	to	low	levels	of	motivation.	Finally,	high	levels	
of	dependence	on	the	processor	are	associated	with	high	levels	of	motivation.	As	high	levels	
of	dependence	are	likely	to	decrease	profitability,	this	may	impact	on	these	high	
motivation/high	dependent	suppliers.	
	
Figure	10-1:	Relationship	between	dependence	on	the	processor	and	supplier	motivation.	
Motivated	suppliers	may	accept	a	more	dependent	relationship	as	this	provides	them	with	
other	benefits	even	though	it	may	affect	their	profitability.	There	is	some	evidence	of	these	
benefits	in	the	positive	relationship	between	supplier	motivation	and	net	value	(0.15***).	
This	relationship	shows	that	these	suppliers	are	receiving	significant	benefits	from	the	
relationship	even	though	they	are	not	measured	in	terms	of	profitability.	For	example,	these	
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suppliers	may	receive	strategic	benefits	from	the	relationship	such	as	reducing	market	risk	or	
accessing	new	technologies.	As	a	result,	they	may	be	willing	to	accept	a	reduction	in	financial	
return.	The	suppliers	with	low	levels	of	dependence	but	who	have	moderate	levels	of	
motivation	may	represent	a	group	of	motivated	suppliers	who	are	wary	of	being	dependent	
on	the	processor	because	of	the	potential	negative	effects	of	dependence.		
Further	evidence	is	presented	in	Table	10-2	which	shows	the	correlation	between	the	
individual	scale	items	for	supplier	motivation	and	profitability.	This	gives	some	indication	of	
why	motivated	suppliers	are	likely	to	have	lower	profitability.	The	three	items	that	have	a	
significant	negative	correlation	with	profitability	all	relate	to	striving	to	improve	animal	
production,	quality	of	stock	and	farm	performance	(Table	10-2).	This	suggests	that	these	
suppliers	may	be	investing	to	improve	these	factors	and	this	may	impact	on	short	term	
profitability.	For	example,	a	farmer	who	want	to	increase	the	number	of	stock	on	his	farm	
needs	to	hold	back	stock	from	sale	or	buy	in	stock	which	will	decrease	revenue	in	the	short-
term.	
Table	10-2:	Correlation	coefficients	between	individual	scale	items	for	supplier	motivation	and	
supplier	profitability.	
Dimension	 Code	 Description	 Correlation	
with	supplier	
profitability	
Farm		 SuppPerf1
	 	
We	continually	strive	to	improve	our	farm	performance.	 -.12**	
Quality	stock	 SuppPerf2	 	
We	continually	strive	to	improve	the	quality	of	our	
stock.	 -.09**	
Animal	
production	
SuppPerf3
	 	
We	continually	try	to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	
improving	yields	(animal	production).	 -.10**	
Quality	stock	 SuppPerf5
	 	
We	would	aim	to	produce	the	best	quality	stock	even	if	
we	were	not	able	to	get	a	premium	for	it.	 -0.02	ns	
Efficiency	 SuppPerfF6	 We	have	consistently	managed	to	improve	our	farm	
efficiency.	 -0.04	ns	
Higher	
market	
returns	
SuppPerfF7
	 	
Regarding	you	and	your	farm	business?	We	continually	
try	to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	achieving	
higher	market	returns	for	our	products.	
0.02	ns	
These	items	were	measured	using	a	6	point	Likert	scale	ranging	from:	Strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree.	
	
Another	explanation	of	the	negative	relationship	between	motivation	and	profitability	could	
be	that	it	is	the	result	of	measurement	error.	Though	the	construct	is	labelled	motivation,	it	
may	in	fact	be	measuring	something	else.	In	the	CFA,	there	were	some	issues	with	
convergent	validity	(Table	6-16).	This	indicates	that	the	construct	may	be	measuring	more	
than	one	thing.	This	can	also	be	seen	with	Table	10-2	where	three	items	have	a	significant	
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negative	association	with	profitability	and	the	other	three	have	no	significant	relationship.	
More	work	needs	to	be	done	on	this	construct	to	clarify	what	it	is	in	fact	measuring.	
A	motivated	supplier’s	willingness	to	communicate	with	the	processor	is	also	likely	to	be	
related	to	this	desire	to	achieve	the	quality	outcomes	as	this	helps	them	align	their	quality	
and	delivery	with	the	processor’s	requirements.	Supplier	motivation	is	likely	to	be	a	valuable	
supplier	characteristic	from	the	processors	perspective	because	of	its	effect	on	the	quality	
outcomes	and	communication.	The	negative	association	with	profitability,	indicates	that	
processors	may	need	to	ensure	that	these	suppliers	are	sufficiently	rewarded	for	their	
efforts.	It	may	be	also	important	that	processors	can	achieve	a	sufficient	market	premium	
for	their	quality	requirements.	Without	this,	it	is	possible	that	the	returns	to	suppliers	will	be	
insufficient	to	justify	their	extra	costs	and	effort,	and	this	may	affect	their	long	term	financial	
viability.	
Supplier	ability		
The	results	showed	that	the	supplier’s	management	ability	had	no	direct	or	indirect	effects	
on	profitability,	loyalty	or	communication	(Figure	8-5).	This	implies	that	ability	is	not	a	
guarantee	of	performance	and	other	factors	may	be	of	greater	importance	especially	in	
regard	to	loyalty	and	communication.	Supplier	ability	was	the	only	variable	that	affected	the	
two	quality	outcomes.	This	suggests	that	supplier	ability	effects	the	supplier’s	capability	to	
meet	the	processors	requirements	for	quality	and	delivery.	The	lack	of	mediated	effects	
implies	that	relationship	quality	is	not	associated	with	a	supplier’s	capacity	to	achieve	these	
quality	outcomes.	Furthermore,	there	are	no	mediated	or	unmediated	interactions	with	the	
other	performance	variables.	These	results	are	consistent	with	the	study	by	Kannan	and	Tan	
(2002)	who	established	that	supplier	capability	was	positively	correlated	with	product	
quality.	They	also	note	that	quality	variables	are	operational	in	nature	and	therefore	less	
likely	to	be	influenced	by	relational	factors.		
It	is	of	note	that	there	is	no	significant	relationship	between	supplier	ability	and	profitability.	
It	might	be	expected	that	more	capable	suppliers	would	also	be	more	profitable	due	to	their	
superior	farm	management	ability.	However,	these	results	show	that	supplier	profitability	is	
not	improved	by	either	the	supplier’s	ability	or	motivation.	Though	the	result	could	
potentially	be	affected	by	measurement	errors,	there	is	some	evidence	for	this	relationship.	
For	example,	Kannan	and	Tan	(2002)	also	found	that	factors	such	as	a	suppliers	willingness	
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to	share	information	and	their	commitment	to	the	buyer	were	more	important	to	supplier	
performance	than	supplier	capability.		
Self-direction	
	Self-direction	is	associated	with	independent	thought	and	action	(Schwartz	&	Bilsky,	1990).	
This	variable	showed	a	negative	effect	on	delivery	quantity	and	quality	plus	a	positive	
influence	on	the	supplier	profitability	and	loyalty.	These	results	suggest	that	when	making	
decisions	about	quality	and	delivery	timing,	self-directed	suppliers	focus	on	maximising	
profitability.	The	difference	in	the	effects	on	performance	of	the	different	supplier	
characteristics	discussed	so	far	indicates	that	suppliers	pursue	divergent	goals.	Some	
suppliers,	such	as	those	who	are	self-directed	choose	to	maximise	profitability	while	others,	
such	as	the	motivated	suppliers,	aim	to	meet	the	processor’s	quality	requirements	but	at	a	
cost	to	their	profitability.	While	there	is	little	research	on	self-direction	and	supplier	
performance,	a	study	by	Parminter	and	Perkins	(1997)	showed	that	self-directed	farmers	
have	values	which	include	a	desire	to	see	the	results	of	their	own	efforts,	being	self-reliant	
and	flexible	in	managing	time.	These	results	are	supported	by	the	negative	correlation	found	
between	self-direction	and	supplier	dependence,	processor	power	and	specific	investments.	
These	correlations	suggest	that	self-directed	suppliers	want	to	act	independently	and	avoid	
becoming	dependent	on	the	processor.	Consequently,	self-direction	benefits	the	supplier	in	
terms	of	increased	profitability,	however,	it	has	a	negative	effect	on	delivery	quality	and	
quantity.	In	this	way,	this	variable	creates	a	tension	between	what	is	best	for	the	processor	
and	what	is	best	from	the	supplier’s	perspective.		
This	difference	between	profitability	and	delivering	to	the	processors’	specifications	
indicates	that	attempting	to	meet	these	may	not	be	the	most	economically	rational	strategy	
for	suppliers.	A	self-directed	supplier’s	sense	of	control	over	their	destiny	was	more	likely	to	
mean	they	will	make	economically-rational	decisions	about	when	to	sell	stock.	In	New	
Zealand’s	dry	land	pastoral	agricultural	system	stock	are	used	to	balance	pasture	supply	and	
demand.	One	strategy	is	to	sell	stock	when	it	becomes	dry	and	retaining	or	buying	in	stock	
when	there	was	a	surplus	of	pasture.	Therefore,	it	may	be	difficult	to	meet	or	time	
processors’	needs	and	specifications	as	well	as	balance	on-farm	management	objectives.	
Often	processors	are	supplying	to	customers	who	wanted	a	consistent	year-round	supply	or	
specific	numbers	and	quality	of	product	at	a	certain	time.	This	may	be	in	conflict	with	farm	
management	priorities.	Self-directed	farmers	were	likely	to	be	more	confident	in	their	ability	
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to	achieve	a	good	price	when	trading	stock	on	the	spot	market	or	negotiating	with	the	
processor.	Less	self-directed	suppliers	may	look	for	a	closer	relationship	with	the	processor	
to	mitigate	market	risks	and	may	accept	lower	farm	profitability	as	a	trade-off	for	reduced	
uncertainty.	
Supplier	selection	
The	results	of	the	supplier	characteristics	discussed	above	confirmed	the	importance	of	
identifying	supplier	characteristics	as	a	way	to	improve	supplier	performance.	It	also	
identifies	some	important	characteristics	that	could	potentially	help	processors	when	
selecting	suppliers.	The	results	of	this	study	are	consistent	with	a	number	of	previous	studies	
that	show	the	importance	of	supplier	selection	for	performance	(Kannan	&	Tan,	2002;	
Vonderembse	&	Tracey,	1999;	Zeydan,	Çolpan,	&	Çobanoğlu,	2011).	However,	while	there	is	
considerable	literature	on	supplier	selection	criteria,	most	of	these	studies	are	from	
manufacturing	industries	(Choi	&	Hartley,	1996;	Wilson,	1994).	Some	of	the	specific	supplier	
characteristics	in	this	study	have	also	been	identified	in	other	research.	For	example,	
Bensemann	et	al.	(2011)	found	that	more	committed	suppliers	in	lamb	supply	chains	were	
likely	to	have	high	market	focus	(customer	focus)	and	low	autonomy	scores	(self-direction).	
In	another	study	Wilson	(1994)	indicates	that	a	supplier’s	customer	orientation	is	an	
important	selection	criteria.	Finally,	Kannan	and	Tan	(2002)	established	that	supplier	
capability	(ability)	ranked	among	the	more	important	selection	criteria	used	by	buying	firms.		
Supplier	selection	is	clearly	an	important	activity	based	on	the	link	between	supplier	
characteristics,	supplier	performance	and	a	buyer’s	competitive	advantage.	It	becomes	more	
important	as	processors	become	increasingly	dependent	on	their	suppliers.	As	a	result,	
supplier	management	becomes	more	important.	This	not	only	includes	supplier	selection,	
but	also	supplier	development	and	evaluation	of	performance	(Kannan	&	Tan,	2002;	Prajogo,	
Chowdhury,	Yeung,	&	Cheng,	2012).	The	results	of	this	current	study	suggest	that	to	improve	
performance,	supplier	selection	needs	to	focus	on	suppliers	with	high	levels	of	customer	
focus,	motivation	and	ability	and	low	levels	of	self-direction.		
10.4.4 Relationship	attributes	
In	contrast	to	the	supplier	characteristics,	the	relationship	attributes	had	a	considerable	
number	of	indirect	as	well	as	direct	effects.	This	signifies	that	relationship	quality	is	more	
important	for	the	relationship	attributes	than	the	supplier	characteristics.		
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Processor	and	supplier	dependence	
Dependence	between	suppliers	and	processors	is	a	sign	that	the	other	party	has	valuable	
resources	required	by	the	other	and	that	there	is	limited	availability	of	alternatives.	Both	
supplier	dependence	and	processor	dependence	affected	the	same	performance	variables.	
These	were	supplier	profitability,	communication,	delivery	quantity	and	loyalty	(Figure	8-7	
and	Figure	8-8).	The	only	performance	variable	that	was	not	affected	by	either	was	delivery	
quality.	The	difference	between	processor	and	supplier	dependence	was	in	the	strength	and	
direction	of	the	effects,	as	well	as	the	level	of	mediation	by	relationship	quality.	For	example,	
the	results	showed	that	supplier	dependence	influenced	supplier	performance	directly,	as	
well	as	with	mediation	by	relationship	quality	(Figure	8-8).	Supplier	dependence	had	the	
greatest	effect	on	supplier	loyalty	with	strong	direct	and	indirect	effects.	This	direct	effect	
suggests	that	dependent	suppliers	may	still	be	loyal	even	if	they	have	a	poor	relationship	
with	their	processor.	The	direct	effect	is	likely	to	be	based	on	a	lack	of	alternatives	rather	
than	an	independent	choice	based	on	a	valued	relationship	with	the	processor.	This	result	is	
similar	to	that	found	by	Sriram	and	Mummalaneni	(1990).	The	mediated	effect	of	supplier	
dependence	indicates	that,	with	an	improved	relationship	with	the	processor,	suppliers	will	
have	an	even	higher	level	of	loyalty.		
The	other	indirect	effects	were	relatively	small	and	therefore	indicate	that	relationship	
quality	did	not	play	a	major	mediating	role	between	supplier	dependence	and	supplier	
performance	(other	than	supplier	loyalty).	In	addition	to	loyalty,	there	were	significant	direct	
effects	on	supplier	communication	and	profitability.	Of	particular	significance	was	the	
negative	impact	of	supplier	dependence	on	profitability.	This	negative	direct	effect																	
(-0.16***)	indicates	that	although	dependence	may	improve	supplier	communication	
(0.11**)	and	loyalty	(0.20***)	it	was	detrimental	to	the	supplier’s	profitability.	This	is	
consistent	with	the	findings	of	Heide	and	John	(1988)		who	showed	that	financial	
performance	was	improved	as	dependence	decreased.	This	suggests	that	suppliers	should	be	
cautious	about	becoming	too	dependent	on	their	processor.	Although	supplier	dependence	
may	result	in	positive	outcomes	for	the	processor	in	terms	of	loyalty,	communication	and	
delivery	quality,	this	effect	is	negative	from	the	perspective	of	the	supplier’s	economic	
performance.	It	is	significant	that	mediation	by	relationship	quality	reverses	this	effect.	
While	the	mediated	effect	was	small	(0.02***)	this	positive	indirect	effect	on	profitability	
shows	that	a	quality	relationship	with	the	buyer	can	moderate	the	negative	impact	on	
supplier	profitability.	
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Processor	dependence	had	no	direct	effects	on	supplier	performance,	however,	it	had	weak	
indirect	effects	on	the	same	variables	as	supplier	dependence.	This	included	positive	
relationships	with	loyalty,	communication,	delivery	quantity	and	profitability.	Though	these	
effects	were	weak,	it	shows	that	processor	dependence	only	effects	supplier	performance	
when	there	is	a	positive	relationship	with	the	processor.	The	positive	effect	of	processor	
dependence	on	relationship	quality	was	consistent	with	previous	research	by	who	found	
that	buyer	dependence	had	a	positive	impact	on	relationship	quality.		
The	results	discussed	in	this	section	indicate	that	supplier	and	processor	dependence	are	
important	for	supplier	performance.	They	also	suggest	that	suppliers	face	a	dilemma.	By	
forming	a	dependent	relationship,	they	improve	their	performance	in	terms	of	loyalty	and	
communication.	However,	as	dependence	increases,	they	are	vulnerable	to	the	negative	
effect	of	this	on	their	financial	performance.	In	some	cases,	suppliers	may	have	little	choice	
as	there	are	few	alternatives.	Nonetheless,	it	is	clear	that	a	quality	relationship	combined	
with	a	level	of	processor	dependence	moderates	the	negative	effect	profitability.		
Specific	assets	
Many	of	the	impacts	of	specific	assets	on	supplier	performance	were	similar	to	those	
exhibited	by	supplier	dependence	(Figure	8-9).	This	was	seen	by	the	positive	direct	effect	on	
communication	and	the	strong	direct	and	indirect	effects	on	loyalty.	Though	there	was	no	
negative	effect	on	supplier	profitability.	This	similarity	between	specific	assets	and	supplier	
dependence	is	not	surprising	given	the	high	correlation	(0.47***)	found	in	this	current	study	
between	these	two	variables.	This	result	was	also	consistent	with	the	work	of	Heide	and	
John	(1988)	and	Payan	and	Svensson	(2007).	One	of	the	main	differences	was	that	
relationship	quality	played	a	much	greater	role	with	specific	assets	than	with	supplier	
dependence.	Specific	assets	had	indirect	effects	ranging	from	(0.04***)	for	delivery	quantity	
to	(0.07***)	for	profitability.	This	positive	indirect	effect	of	specific	assets	on	profitability	is	
in	contrast	to	the	negative	direct	effect	on	profitability	as	was	found	with	supplier	
dependence.	This	may	explain	some	of	the	supplier’s	dilemma	regarding	dependence	on	the	
processor.	Investment	in	specific	assets	has	a	positive	effect	on	supplier	profitability	
(0.07**),	however,	because	they	can	also	create	dependence	on	the	processor,	suppliers	
then	become	vulnerable	to	the	potential	negative	effect	on	profitability	caused	by	
dependence	(Ganesan,	1994).	The	significant	role	played	by	relationship	quality	suggests	
that	it	is	an	important	variable	mediating	the	impact	of	specific	assets	on	supplier	
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performance.	These	results	indicate	that	increasing	relationship	quality	when	there	are	
investments	in	specific	assets	will	improve	delivery	quantity	and	profitability	as	well	as	
further	increasing	loyalty	and	communication.		
A	considerable	number	of	studies	have	shown	that	investing	in	specific	assets	enable	firms	
to	reduce	production	costs,	meet	product	specifications,	innovate	and	produce	
differentiated	products	(Dyer,	1996;	Ebers	&	Semrau,	2015).	These	findings	are	consistent	
with	this	research,	for	example,	Yeung	et	al.	(2013)	found	that	the	relationship	between	
supplier	partnership	and	operational	cost	performance	was	strengthened	by	specific	
investments.	Furthermore,	the	strong	relationship	between	specific	assets	and	relationship	
quality	(0.27***)	is	consistent	with	research	by	Palmatier	et	al.	(2006)	who	found	that	
relational	investments	were	one	of	the	most	influential	factors	affecting	relationship	quality.		
Investment	in	specific	assets	are	important	for	both	suppliers	and	processors,	however	they	
also	create	risks	for	the	supplier	associated	with	dependence.	Relationship	quality	plays	an	
important	part	in	ensuring	that	investment	in	specific	assets	are	translated	into	performance	
benefits	for	the	processor.	It	is	also	important	for	the	supplier	to	realise	the	financial	
benefits	of	their	investment.	Relationship	quality	is	also	important	for	mitigating	the	risk	of	
opportunistic	behaviour	associated	with	specific	investments.	For	example,	Dyer	and	Singh	
(1998)	demonstrated	that	relational	capital	reduced	the	expectation	of	opportunistic	
behaviour	and	increased	the	confidence	of	both	parties.		
Power	
Power	had	a	consistent	negative	impact	on	all	the	supplier	performance	variables	with	the	
exception	of	delivery	quality	(no	effect).	The	most	harmful	effect	was	between	power	and	
supplier	loyalty.	This	had	a	large	negative	direct	effect	(-0.24***)	and	also	a	negative	indirect	
effect	(-0.18***)	resulting	in	a	total	effect	of	(0.42***).	This	is	consistent	with	a	considerable	
body	of	research	on	the	impact	of	coercive	power	in	buyer/supplier	relationships.	For	
example,	Maloni	and	Benton	(2000)	demonstrated	a	significant	negative	effect	of	coercive	
power	on	buyer	supplier	relationships	and	that	stronger	buyer	supplier	relationships	had	a	
positive	effect	on	supplier	performance.	In	this	research	power	was	also	highly	correlated	
with	specific	assets	(0.68***)	and	supplier	dependence	(0.28***)	which	indicates	that	it	is	
specific	assets	and	dependence	which	provide	the	basis	to	exert	coercive	power	in	the	
supply	relationship	(Ganesan,	1994).	This	further	illustrates	the	dilemma	for	the	supplier.	
Their	investment	in	specific	assets	benefits	their	performance,	including	profitability.	
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However,	it	also	creates	dependence	on	the	processor	and	therefore	causes	vulnerability	
that	the	processor	may	use	coercive	power.	Such	findings	suggest	that	processors	need	to	be	
very	careful	in	their	use	of	power	even	though	specific	investments	and	dependence	may	
provide	them	with	the	opportunity	to	do	so.	Use	of	coercive	power	may	achieve	short	term	
benefits	for	the	processor,	but	in	the	long	run,	this	will	be	detrimental	to	supplier	
relationships	and	performance.	
Supplier	net	value	
Supplier	net	value	had	a	strong	influence	on	both	relationship	quality	and	supplier	
performance.	In	fact,	supplier	net	value	was	second	only	to	power	in	terms	of	its	impact	on	
supplier	performance.	Supplier	net	value	had	a	direct	impact	on	supplier	loyalty	(0.13***),	
supplier	profitability	(0.13***)	and	supplier	communication	(0.13***).	All	three	of	these	
variables	also	had	strong	indirect	effects	through	relationship	quality.	In	contrast	to	these	
variables,	delivery	quantity	was	only	affected	indirectly	(0.06**)	and	there	was	no	effect	on	
delivery	quality.	These	results	highlight	the	importance	of	supplier	net	value	on	performance	
and	also	the	significant	role	played	by	relationship	quality.	Supplier	net	value	is	important	
because	it	reflects	the	strategic	benefits	the	suppliers	receive	in	relation	to	the	costs	and	risk	
involved	in	the	relationship.	These	are	non-financial	costs	such	as	increased	management	
effort	and	stress	and	non-financial	benefits	such	as	access	to	premium	markets	or	reduced	
market	risk.	Supplier	net	value	had	the	most	significant	positive	antecedent	of	relationship	
quality	(0.46**).	The	positive	influence	of	supplier	net	value	on	relationship	quality	is	
consistent	with	previous	research	which	has	shown	that	relationship	benefits	have	a	positive	
impact	on	relationship	quality	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	Furthermore,	Ulaga	and	Eggert	(2006)	
also	demonstrated	a	positive	correlation	between	relationship	value	and	relationship	
quality.	In	another	study,	Ravald	and	Grönroos	(1996)	suggested	that	the	value	of	a	
relationship	is	based	on	the	perceived	benefits	in	relation	to	perceived	costs.	Ulaga	and	
Eggert	(2005)	also	demonstrated	that	the	higher	the	net	value	expected	or	received	then	the	
stronger	the	motivation	to	continue	the	relationship.	The	link	between	social	capital	and	
performance	is	also	identified	in	some	studies,	for	example,	Villena	et	al.	(2011)	identify	the	
positive	effects	of	social	capital	on	performance.	This	body	of	research	along	with	this	
current	study	supports	the	important	role	supplier	net	benefit	has	in	improving	relationship	
quality	and	supplier	performance.	
	 218	
10.4.5 	Supplier	performance	
Supplier	performance	was	conceptualised	in	terms	of	supplier	behaviours	and	outcomes	that	
create	value	and	competitive	advantage	for	the	processor	(Dyer	&	Singh,	1998).	A	number	of	
tangible	and	intangible	performance	criteria	were	identified	from	the	literature	and	from	
interviews	with	key	informants	from	the	processors.	In	doing	this,	the	concerns	of	Siguaw	
and	Simpson	(2004)	were	addressed.	They	criticise	many	programmes	that	assess	supplier	
performance	by	only	evaluating	tangible	aspects	such	as	product	quality.	
Delivery	quality	and	quantity	
The	delivery	quality	and	quantity	variables	relate	to	the	quality	of	stock	and	the	quantity	and	
timing	of	the	product	delivered	to	the	processor.	These	variables	are	important	to	the	
processor	as	they	directly	affect	product	quality	and	delivery	reliability.	Though	these	
variables	were	highly	correlated	(0.49***)	they	were	identified	as	distinct	constructs	in	the	
exploratory	factor	analysis.	They	also	had	quite	different	relationships	with	the	antecedents	
of	supplier	performance.	For	example,	relationship	quality	had	no	influence	on	delivery	
quality	whereas	it	had	a	significant	impact	on	delivery	quantity.	They	were,	however,	similar	
in	their	direct	effects.	For	both	variables,	it	was	the	supplier	characteristics	had	the	greatest	
impact.	The	common	direct	effects	were	with	self-direction,	supplier	motivation	and	ability.	
For	both	theses	variables,	self-direction	had	a	negative	impact.	This	implies	that	more	
independent	suppliers	were	less	focused	on	quality	outcomes.	Customer	focus	was	
important	for	delivery	quality	but	had	only	weak	indirect	effects	on	delivery	quantity.	This	
suggests	that	suppliers	who	are	customer	focused	concentrate	on	producing	quality	stock	
and	do	not	see	the	timing	of	delivery	as	an	important	aspect	of	meeting	customer	
requirements.	This	may	be	due	to	the	seasonality	of	supply	and	the	use	of	stock	numbers	to	
manage	pasture.	
The	results	relating	to	delivery	quantity	and	quality	suggest	that	processors	who	require	
higher	quality	stock	delivered	at	specific	times	may	need	to	choose	suppliers	based	primarily	
on	their	supplier	characteristics.	These	suppliers	need	to	be	high	on	ability	and	motivation	
and	low	on	self-direction	as	these	factors	have	the	greatest	impact	on	these	quality	variables	
and	are	unaffected	by	relationship	quality.	In	addition	to	ability,	motivation	and	self-
direction	there	are	other	indirect	factors	that	affect	delivery	quantity,	but	not	delivery	
quality.	The	factors	that	affect	delivery	quantity	through	relationship	quality	are	specific	
investments,	net	value,	supplier	dependence,	processor	dependence	and	power	(Figure	9-3).	
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This	finding	suggests	that	relationship	quality	is	more	important	for	delivery	quantity	than	
quality.	This	may	be	because	delivery	of	the	required	numbers	of	stock	at	specific	times	in	a	
pastoral	system	is	more	complex	than	meeting	quality	specifications.	Less	flexible	delivery	
schedules	can	directly	affect	profitability	by	increasing	costs	and	effort.	Relationship	quality	
therefore	becomes	more	important	as	suppliers	need	to	trust	that	they	will	be	sufficiently	
rewarded	for	meeting	these	delivery	schedules.	As	a	result,	to	improve	the	reliability	of	
delivery,	supplier	selection	must	go	hand	in	hand	with	building	relationship	quality.	In	
contrast,	the	quality	of	the	stock	delivered	is	a	result	of	specific	supplier	characteristics	and	
is	independent	of	relationship	quality.	Kannan	and	Tan	(2002)	indicate	that	it	is	easier	to	
address	supplier	delivery	problems	if	there	is	a	good	relationship	between	buyer	and	
supplier.	They	also	reinforce	the	need	to	see	suppliers	as	an	extension	of	the	buying	firm	
itself	and	not	as	individual	entities.	The	importance	of	quality	and	delivery	reliability	for	
supplier	performance	is	consistent	with	some	empirical	evidence.	For	example,	Kannan	and	
Tan	(2002)	state	that	while	cost	may	be	an	important	criteria	for	buyers	outcomes	such	as	
quality,	delivery	and	service	are	also	important.	Other	research	highlights	the	importance	of	
not	just	focusing	on	these	quality	outcomes.	This	is	clearly	stated	by	Simpson,	Siguaw,	and	
Baker	(2001)	who	argues	that	“Though	a	certain	level	of	quality	may	be	necessary	to	
compete,	quality	in	and	of	itself	may	not	necessarily	provide	a	competitive	advantage	in	
today’s	marketplace”	(p.120).	
Communication	and	loyalty	
Supplier	communication	and	supplier	loyalty	are	two	important	intangible	performance	
outcomes	that	directly	relate	to	the	nature	of	the	relationship	with	the	processor	(Figure	9-4	
and	Figure	9-5).	They	are	moderately	correlated	(0.37***),	and	the	results	showed	that	the	
direct	and	indirect	effects	captured	a	significant	amount	of	the	variance	in	these	variables	
(R2	-	loyalty	0.48,	R2	-	communication	0.32).	
The	importance	of	loyalty	is	highlighted	by	Palmatier	et	al.	(2006)	who	emphasised	that	
increased	loyalty	is	one	of	the	most	common	outcomes	resulting	from	relationship	
management	efforts.	Supplier	loyalty	is	also	important	for	maintaining	security	of	supply,	
reducing	supplier	acquisition	costs	and	for	processors	to	capture	the	benefits	of	supplier	
development	efforts.	Loyalty	is	influenced	by	direct	and	indirect	effects	from	specific	assets,	
supplier	dependence,	power	and	supplier	net	value.	Of	the	other	variables,	only	self-
direction	had	a	direct	effect,	whereas	customer	focus	and	processor	dependence	had	only	
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indirect	effects.	Communication	was	affected	by	both	direct	and	indirect	effects	involving	
supplier	dependence,	specific	assets,	supplier	net	value	and	customer	focus.	Supplier	
motivation	had	only	a	direct	effect	while	power	only	effects	communication	when	mediated	
by	relationship	quality.	Most	of	the	antecedents	of	communication	and	loyalty	were	
relationship	characteristics.	This	may	suggest	that	the	relationship	attribites	have	a	greater	
effect	on	the	intangible	variables	involving	human	interaction.	Relationship	quality	had	a	
greater	impact	on	loyalty	(0.38***)	than	any	other	variable	in	the	study.	Supplier	ability	did	
not	affect	loyalty	and	communication,	nor	does	supplier	motivation	affect	loyalty,	though	it	
does	have	a	direct	effect	on	communication.		
The	complexity	of	these	relationships	explains	why	it	can	be	difficult	to	develop	a	base	of	
loyal	suppliers	with	high	levels	of	communication.	For	example,	a	self-directed	supplier’s	
loyalty	is	independent	of	relationship	quality.	In	contrast,	most	of	the	other	antecedents	
have	some	direct	influence	on	loyalty	and	have	an	additional	influence	through	relationship	
quality.	Communication	and	information	sharing	is	believed	to	be	a	critical	factor	for	
improving	supply	chain	performance	by	facilitating	planning,	and	scheduling.	This	reduces	
the	need	to	carry	inventory	and	improving	the	nature	and	speed	of	communication	between	
supplier	and	buyers.	The	importance	of	communication	and	information	sharing	has	been	
frequently	emphasised	for	effective	organisational	relationships	(Modi	&	Mabert,	2007;	
Mohr	&	Nevin,	1990;	Monczka	et	al.,	1998).	The	results	of	this	study	are	consistent	with	
previous	research	that	show	supplier’s	willingness	to	share	information	has	a	significant	
effect	on	the	buyer	firms	performance	(Hsu,	Kannan,	Keong	Leong,	&	Tan,	2006;	Kannan	&	
Tan,	2002;	Paulraj	et	al.,	2008).	Cousins	and	Menguc	(2006)	also	argue	that	supply	chain	
integration	and	stronger	relationships	lead	to	higher	levels	of	communication	as	well	as	
operational	performance.	Micheels	and	Gow	(2011)	emphasise	the	importance	of	
communication	for	providing	benefits	to	buyers	by	sharing	production	information	which	
can	decrease	product	variation	and	reduce	sorting	costs.	
Supplier	profitability	
Supplier	profitability	is	different	to	the	other	performance	outcomes	as	it	directly	benefits	
the	supplier	as	well	as	the	processor.	From	the	processor’s	perspective,	they	want	profitable	
suppliers	to	ensure	access	to	long	term	sustainable	producers	and	therefore	security	of	
supply.	For	example,	Cheraghi,	Dadashzadeh,	and	Subramanian	(2011)	review	the	literature	
on	supplier	selection	and	conclude	that	“buyers	and	sellers	are	looking	for	partners	that	are	
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viable,	ongoing	concerns	that	will	contribute	to	the	relationship	both	for	the	present	and	in	
the	future”.	It	is	of	note	that	profitability	is	influenced	by	a	number	of	supplier	and	
relationship	characteristics.	This	suggests	that	supplier	profitability	is	affected	by	the	
relationship	with	the	processor	as	well	as	a	supplier’s	individual	characteristics.	It	was	also	
somewhat	surprising	that	the	results	showed	no	significant	effect	of	supplier	ability	on	
profitability	(Figure	8-5),	and	there	was	a	negative	relationship	with	motivation.	This	implies	
that	supplier	ability	and	motivation	does	not	necessarily	result	in	improved	profitability.	
Though	this	is	a	somewhat	surprising	result,	this	is	consistent	with	other	recent	findings.	For	
example,	Elliott	and	Wakelin	(2016)	in	their	research	on	New	Zealand	sheep	and	beef	
farmers,	found	that	the	core	drivers	of	top	performing	farmers	were	family	and	way	of	life.	
While	profit	was	important	to	these	farmers’	financial	performance,	this	was	a	means	to	
provide	opportunities	to	for	their	families	and	to	live	the	farming	way	of	life.	Besides	these	
two	factors,	there	was	a	complex	and	diverse	range	of	motivations	that	affected	farmers’	
profitability.	This	is	likely	to	affect	the	drivers	of	profitability	where	there	may	be	top	
performing	farmers	may	not	be	driven	to	maximise	profitability	but	have	other	objectives	
and	motivations.	
Self-direction	was	the	main	supplier	characteristic	that	had	a	positive	effect	on	supplier	
profitability.	This	suggests	that	self-directed	suppliers	seek	profitability	over	other	outcomes	
such	as	communication,	delivery	quality	and/or	quantity.	Supplier	dependence	also	had	a	
negative	effect	profitability,	though	it	also	had	a	positive	indirect	effect	with	the	presence	of	
relationship	quality	(Figure	8-8).	The	impact	of	relationship	quality	on	supplier	profitability	is	
one	of	the	significant	findings	of	the	research.	Only	with	mediation	by	relationship	quality,	is	
supplier	profitability	positively	affected	by	processor	dependence,	specific	investments,	
customer	focus,	supplier	dependence	and	supplier	net	value	and	negatively	by	power.	
10.5 Summary	
This	discussion	argued	that	in	order	to	improve	supplier	performance,	a	holistic	approach	is	
needed	that	involves	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	relationship	quality.	
This	suggests	that	to	improve	supplier	performance,	processors	not	only	need	to	select	
suppliers	with	high	levels	of	ability,	motivation	and	customer	focus,	but	they	also	may	need	
to	avoid	suppliers	who	are	highly	self-directed.	Also,	building	closer	relationships	with	their	
suppliers	will	further	benefit	the	supplier’s	performance.	They	can	also	benefit	from	
influencing	relationship	attributes.	An	important	component	of	improving	relationship	
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attributes	is	ensuring	that	suppliers	experience	positive	value	from	the	relationship.	This	
involves	reducing	the	costs	and	risks	and	maximising	the	benefits	involved	in	supplying	the	
processor.	For	example,	this	may	involve	providing	suppliers	access	to	premium	markets,	
reduced	production	and	market	risk	and	providing	access	to	new	technologies	(Table	4-1	and	
Table	4-2).	The	final	aspects	of	relationship	attributes	are	related	to	dependence,	specific	
assets	and	power.	Most	importantly,	buyers	need	to	avoid	the	use	of	coercive	power.	The	
ability	to	use	power	is	closely	related	to	the	supplier’s	investments	in	specific	assets	and	
their	dependence.	This	suggests	that	processors	may	need	to	encourage	suppliers	to	invest	
in	specific	assets,	as	these	can	have	a	considerable	impact	on	loyalty	and	communication	as	
well	as	lesser	effects	on	reliable	delivery	and	supplier	profitability.	Specific	assets	are	also	
closely	related	to	supplier	dependence,	which	also	has	a	considerable	positive	influence	on	
communication	and	loyalty	but	has	a	negative	effect	on	supplier	profitability.	Processors,	
therefore,	need	to	manage	supplier	dependence	to	minimise	the	effect	this	has	on	
profitability	and	avoid	taking	advantage	of	the	opportunity	to	exercise	coercive	power.	
Finally,	relationship	quality	is	an	important	mediating	variable	between	the	supplier	and	
relationship	factors	and	supplier	performance.	This	means	that	building	strong	relationships	
with	suppliers	will	augment	the	direct	effects	on	supplier	performance.	This	is	particularly	
important	for	the	relationship	attributes	but	also	affected	the	supplier	characteristics	of	
customer	focus.	
10.6 Implications	
This	next	section	summarises	the	implications	of	the	research	results.	It	covers	the	
contribution	that	this	research	makes	to	theory	as	well	as	considering	the	implication	of	the	
research	for	managers.		
10.7 Theoretical	implications	
This	study	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	sits	within	the	broader	
framework	of	buyer-seller	exchange	relationships.	In	this	context,	the	research	contributes	
to	the	literature	on	exchange	relationships	in	several	ways.	Firstly,	the	study	addressed	some	
of	the	theoretical	and	conceptual	challenges	associated	with	exchange	relationships	that	
have	been	highlighted	by	recent	authors	(Hald	et	al.,	2009;	Halldorsson	et	al.,	2007;	Ireland	
&	Webb,	2007;	Leonidou	et	al.,	2006;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2005).	These	challenges	refer	to	the	
broad	range	of	definitions	and	theoretical	concepts	being	applied	to	exchange	relationships.	
The	research	addressed	part	of	this	by	investigating	how	to	better	conceptualise	the	overall	
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strength	and	quality	of	buyer-seller	relationships.	The	analysis	involved	combining	constructs	
from	social	capital	and	relationship	quality	(see	section	10.7.1	below).		
Secondly,	the	research	addressed	how	increasing	the	overall	strength	and	quality	of	the	
buyer-seller	relationship	can	improve	supplier	performance	(see	section	10.7.2	below).	
There	is	a	significant	amount	of	research	that	shows	the	multiple	benefits	of	improving	
supplier	relationships,	for	example,	this	is	demonstrated	by	Benton	and	Maloni	(2005),	
Cannon	and	Homburg	(2001),	Yeung	et	al.	(2013),	Cao	and	Zhang	(2011)	and	Dyer	(1997).	
However,	the	empirical	findings	of	improving	relationship	quality	are	not	always	positive	
(Anderson	&	Jap,	2005;	Villena	et	al.,	2011;	Yeung	et	al.,	2013).	This	research	contributes	to	
the	theoretical	understanding	of	the	positive	and	negative	impact	of	relationship	quality	on	
specific	supplier	performance	criteria.	
Thirdly,	the	research	contributes	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	how	supplier	characteristics	
and	relationship	attributes	influence	supplier	performance	(see	sections	10.7.2,	0	and	0	
below).	This	provides	insight	into	the	specific	factors	that	affect	supplier	performance	and	
has	implications	for	a	number	of	theories	that	relate	to	exchange	relationships.		
Fourthly,	the	research	adds	to	an	understanding	of	supply	chain	management	theory	by	
defining	performance	constructs	that	are	relevant	to	suppliers	and	processors	in	the	agri-
food	sector	(see	section	10.7.3	below).	These	were	linked	back	to	the	supplier	and	
relationship	factors	specifically	relevant	to	this	industry.	Despite	the	importance	of	
relationships	quality	in	agri-food	supply	chains,	there	have	been	relatively	few	studies	that	
have	specifically	addressed	this	issue.	Fischer	(2013),	Schulze,	Wocken,	and	Spiller	(2006)	
and	Schulze	and	Schlecht	(2009)	are	some	of	the	few	authors	to	focus	on	this.	
Finally,	the	research	adds	to	the	growing	body	of	literature	that	draws	on	a	broad	range	of	
managerial,	economic	and	sociological	theories	to	explain	exchange	relationships.	The	
research	identified	and	validated	common	constructs	from	multiple	theories	and	applied	
these	to	the	research	model	(see	section	10.7.4).	
10.7.1 Relationship	quality	and	social	capital	
A	significant	focus	of	the	research	was	evaluating	the	structure	and	measurement	of	the	
relationship	quality	construct.	The	study	makes	a	specific	theoretical	contribution	by	
providing	evidence	that	social	capital	and	relationship	quality	are	in	fact	closely	related	
concepts	(Figure	7-2).	This	has	direct	implications	for	the	theoretical	understanding	of	both	
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relationship	quality	(Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	Dyer	&	Singh,	1998;	Lusch	&	Brown,	1996)	and	social	
capital	theory	(Granovetter,	1992;	Krause	et	al.,	2007;	Nahapiet	&	Ghoshal,	1998;	Villena	et	
al.,	2011).	The	research	is	important	as	there	have	been	few	published	studies	that	have	
included	both	these	concepts,	with	Chen,	Tzeng,	Ou,	and	Chang	(2007)	and	Yli-Rnko,	Autio	
and	Sapienza	being	the	exceptions.		
The	CFA	demonstrated	that	the	two	constructs	were	highly	correlated	and	did	not	meet	the	
criteria	for	discriminant	validity	(Table	7-1).	This	result	suggests	that	they	are	both	
measuring	very	similar	concepts.	The	research	also	tested	different	models	involving	social	
capital	and	relationship	quality	(Figure	7-1,	Figure	7-2,	Figure	7-3	and	Figure	7-4).	These	
different	models	suggest	that	there	are	potentially	multiple	ways	of	structuring	these	
constructs	that	are	equally	valid.	The	combined	models	enable	a	more	comprehensive	
conceptualisation	of	relationship	quality	and	social	capital	to	be	developed	(Figure	7-3).	This	
outcome	has	significant	theoretical	implications	for	future	research	on	relationship	quality	
and	social	capital.	In	particular,	combining	these	two	constructs	enabled	this	research	to	
incorporate	a	more	comprehensive	measurement	of	the	“overall	strength	of	a	relationship”	
(Lages	et	al.,	2005,	p.	1041).	This	result	was	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	the	sub-
dimensions	of	relationship	quality	and	social	capital	were	in	fact	distinct	constructs	and	
achieved	the	required	measures	of	discriminant	validity.	This	outcome	suggests	that	
although	social	capital	and	relationship	quality	seem	to	be	very	similar	concepts,	the	
dimensions	are	clearly	measuring	different	constructs.	For	example,	relationship	quality	
does	not	include	the	structure	dimension	of	the	relationship	and	social	capital	does	not	
include	satisfaction.	Consequently,	this	implies	that	these	constructs	add	to	the	
measurement	of	the	strength	and	quality	of	the	relationship.		
These	findings	also	imply	that	the	existing	relationship	quality	and	social	capital	constructs	
are	an	incomplete	measurement	of	the	overall	strength	and	quality	of	the	relationship.	For	
example,	social	capital	theory	does	not	include	the	measurement	of	the	satisfaction	and	
commitment	in	the	relationship.	In	a	similar	way,	relationship	quality	omits	the	structural	
strength	of	the	relationship	in	terms	of	frequency	and	depth	and	breadth	of	interaction	
(structural	social	capital).	Relationship	quality	also	does	not	specifically	measure	the	
cognitive	aspects	of	common	values	and	goals.	Though	both	theories	measure	trust	in	the	
relationship,	the	relational	aspect	of	social	capital	focuses	more	on	two-way	trust	and	
mutual	friendship.	Future	research	should	continue	to	explore	the	relationship	between	
these	two	constructs.	Rather	than	being	viewed	as	competing	theoretical	constructs,	the	
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potential	exists	to	understand	how	these	two	constructs	can	be	combined	to	give	a	more	
complete	measure	of	the	strength	and	quality	of	these	relationships.		
10.7.2 Understanding	of	antecedents	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	
performance	
This	study	adds	to	the	knowledge	of	the	antecedents	of	supplier	performance.	While	there	is	
considerable	body	of	research	on	relationship	quality	and	aspects	of	performance,	many	of	
these	studies	measure	relationship	quality	and	then	assume	a	performance	benefit	
(Athanasopoulou,	2009;	Kee-Hung	et	al.,	2005;	Petroni	&	Panciroli,	2002;	Srinivasan	et	al.,	
2011;	Wei,	Wong,	&	Lai,	2012;	Yan	&	Dooley,	2013).	Other	studies	only	focus	on	measuring	
the	effect	of	relationship	quality	on	a	limited	number	of	dimensions	such	as	speed	of	
product	development	or	improved	purchasing	strategy	(Crosby	et	al.,	1990;	Doney	&	
Cannon,	1997;	Hewett	et	al.,	2002;	Hunt	&	Davis,	2008).	This	study	adds	to	the	literature	on	
supplier	performance	by	analysing	the	effects	on	supplier	performance	of	supplier	
characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	combined	with	the	effects	of	mediation	by	
relationship	quality.	The	study	builds	on	the	theoretical	framework	proposed	by	
Athanasopoulou	(2009),	(see		Figure	3-1)	which	includes	relationship	attributes,	relationship	
quality,	buyer-supplier	characteristics	and	performance.	The	research	further	developed	this	
framework	by	defining	the	constructs	that	make	up	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	
attributes.	Furthermore,	this	study	was	able	to	confirm	some	of	the	relationships	in	this	
theoretical	framework.	The	research	confirmed	that	the	supplier	characteristics,	relationship	
attributes	and	relationship	quality	were	all	antecedents	of	supplier	performance.	While	
there	has	been	considerable	quantitative	research	that	has	evaluated	a	range	of	antecedents	
of	relationship	quality,	there	is	little	consensus	on	these.	This	research	was	able	to	
contribute	to	the	understanding	of	these	antecedents	of	relationship	quality	(Table	10-3)	by	
including	a	wide	range	of	variables	used	in	previous	research	(Crosby	et	al.,	1990;	Dwyer	&	
Oh,	1987;	Kumar	et	al.,	1995;	Leonidou	et	al.,	2006;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1994;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	
2006).	
Table	10-3:	Antecedents	of	relationship	quality	
Antecedents	of	relationship	quality	 Weight	and	significance	
Supplier	dependence	 0.10***	
Processor	dependence	 0.12***	
Specific	assets	 0.27***	
Power	 -0.47***	
Supplier	net	value	 0.46***	
Customer	focus	 0.19***	
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The	effect	of	specific	assets	
The	relationships	between	these	variables	added	to	several	of	the	theories	described	in	the	
literature	review.	For	example,	specific	assets	is	an	important	concept	in	transaction	costs	
economics	(Coase,	1937;	Williamson,	1979)	the	resource-based	view	(Barney,	1991;	Poppo	&	
Zenger,	1997;	Wernerfelt,	1984)	and	the	relational	view	(Dwyer	et	al.,	1987;	Dyer	&	Singh,	
1998;	Molina	&	Dyer,	1999;	Morgan	&	Hunt,	1999).	According	to	transaction	cost	economics	
investment	in	specific	assets	creates	dependence	and	the	potential	for	opportunistic	
behaviour	which	can	include	the	use	of	coercive	power.	These	relationships	were	confirmed	
by	the	high	correlation	between	specific	assets,	supplier	dependence	and	power.	This	
suggests	that	suppliers	who	invest	in	specific	assets	become	more	dependent	on	their	buyer	
and	are	therefore	more	vulnerable	to	buyers	using	coercive	power	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	
This	research	confirms	this	view	by	showing	that	that	a	supplier’s	investment	in	specific	
assets	benefits	supplier	performance,	but	only	when	mediated	by	relationship	quality.	For	
example,	specific	assets	only	improved	supplier	profitability	when	mediated	by	relationship	
quality.	This	relationship	was	also	the	case	for	reliable	delivery	(delivery	quantity).	Loyalty	
and	supplier	communication	were	partially	mediated	by	relationship	quality.	This	confirms	
that	relationship	quality	can	mitigate	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour	associated	with	
investments	in	specific	assets	and	then	produce	benefits	in	terms	of	supplier	performance.	
This	contributes	to	the	view	of	transaction	cost	economics	where	relational	governance	can	
be	an	effective	way	of	mitigating	the	risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour.		
Supplier	dependence	
Supplier	dependence	is	an	important	concept	in	resource	dependence	theory	(Davis	&	Cobb,	
2010;	Emerson,	1962;	Pfeffer	&	Salancik,	2003).	The	results	show	that	dependence	can	
actually	lead	to	decreased	supplier	profitability.	This	suggests	that	buyers	were	taking	
advantage	of	the	dependence	of	their	suppliers.	The	study	also	showed	that	relationship	
quality	mitigates	these	effects.	This	was	because	there	was	a	positive	relationship	between	
dependence	and	profitability	when	mediated	by	relationship	quality.	This	result	supports	the	
transaction	cost	perspective	and	resource	dependence	theory	where	trusting	relationships,	
shared	goals	and	values	act	as	relational	(hybrid)	governance	mechanisms	that	mitigate	the	
risks	of	dependence	(Casciaro	&	Piskorski,	2005;	Ouchi,	1980;	Williamson,	1979).	The	results	
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also	contribute	to	the	relational	view	and	resource-based	view	whereby	specific	assets,	in	
particular,	human	assets,	are	critical	to	a	firm’s	performance.	
This	research	supports	the	RBV	literature	by	showing	the	value	of	the	supplier’s	access	to	
strategic	resources.	For	example,	supplier	net	value	directly	affected	the	supplier’s	
profitability	and	other	performance	variables.	This	is	a	measure	of	a	supplier’s	access	to	
strategic	resources	and	suggests	that	these	can	directly	benefit	both	the	supplier	in	terms	of	
profitability	as	well	as	the	processer	in	terms	of	improved	supplier	performance.	The	
importance	of	suppliers	experiencing	positive	net	benefits	(net	value)	from	their	relationship	
with	the	buyer	was	a	significant	finding	of	this	study.	This	advances	the	work	of	Ulaga	and	
Eggert	(2006),	who	identify	value	as	the	trade-off	between	the	benefits	and	costs	of	the	
relationship.		
Relationship	quality	also	played	an	important	role	in	mediating	these	relationships	indicating	
that	relational	resources	are	an	important	part	of	realising	the	benefits	of	access	to	strategic	
resources.	A	number	of	studies	from	the	RBV	perspective	argue	that	inter-firm	relationships	
of	themselves	are	a	valuable	resource	contributing	to	a	firm’s	competitive	advantage.	For	
example,	Martín-de-Castro,	Delgado-Verde,	López-Sáez,	and	Navas-López	(2011)	describe	
relational	capital	as	the	value	to	an	organisation	of	the	relationships	it	maintains	with	agents	
connected	to	it	business.	RBV	research	has	not	tended	to	explore	the	nature	of	these	
relational	resources	and	how	they	provide	value	to	suppliers	and	buyers.	This	research	
addresses	this	gap	by	providing	a	comprehensive	model	of	these	complex	relational	
resources	and	their	impact	on	supplier	performance.	
A	further	contribution	to	the	RBV	framework	is	that	the	supplier’s	characteristics	can	be	
viewed	as	valuable	human	resources	that	to	some	extent	become	available	to	the	buyer	
through	their	relationship	with	their	suppliers.	However,	the	results	showed	that	customer	
focus	was	the	only	supplier	characteristic	that	was	influenced	by	relationship	quality	with	all	
the	other	supplier	characteristics	directly	affecting	supplier	performance.	This	outcome	is	
significant	from	a	transaction	cost	and	RBV	perspective	as	it	suggests	the	majority	of	human	
resources	do	not	require	the	development	of	relational	resources	to	utilise	these	
characteristics.	This	is	likely	to	be	because	supplier	characteristics,	such	as	ability	and	
motivation,	do	not	become	specific	assets	as	these	characteristics	can	easily	be	transferred	
to	other	supply	relationships.	Therefore,	these	do	not	require	the	relational	safeguards	to	
mitigate	against	opportunistic	behaviour.	On	the	other	hand,	customer	focus	does	create	
some	level	of	specific	assets	as	the	supplier	builds	up	knowledge	of	the	specific	requirements	
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of	their	customer.	Therefore,	this	part	of	customer	focus	can	be	viewed	as	a	specific	asset.	
These	results	were	consistent	with	transaction	costs	economics	and	the	RBV.	This	shows	that	
when	suppliers	develop	characteristics	that	are	specific	assets	they	also	look	to	developing	
stronger	relationships	to	mitigate	against	the	associated	risk.	In	contrast,	where	specific	
supplier	characteristics	are	not	specific	assets	the	supplier	does	not	need	to	seek	a	closer	
relationship	with	their	buyer.	This	is	consistent	with	Williamson	(1991)	who	states	that	
increases	in	asset	specificity	are	only	justified	if	an	increase	in	efficiency	or	revenue	offset	
the	added	governance	costs.	
Consistent	with	this	theory,	the	relationship	attributes	can	be	viewed	as	intangible	relational	
resources	that	influence	supplier	performance.	All	these	attributes	are	to	some	degree	
mediated	by	relationship	quality.	This	result	also	supports	the	view	that	these	relationship	
attributes	are,	to	some	degree,	specific	assets.	As	a	result,	relationship	quality	is	required	to	
fully	realise	the	benefit	of	these	relational	resources	or	is	necessary	to	mitigate	against	the	
risk	of	opportunistic	behaviour.	For	example,	supplier	net	value	is	a	measure	of	the	degree	
to	which	the	supplier	receives	strategic	non-economic	benefits	from	the	buyer.	To	ensure	
that	these	benefits	are	fully	realised,	and	to	mitigate	against	the	potential	loss	of	these	
benefits,	the	supplier	will	want	to	ensure	they	have	a	long-term	quality	relationship	with	
their	buyer.		
Furthermore,	the	supplier	will	want	to	mitigate	against	the	risk	of	the	use	of	coercive	power	
and	therefore	will	work	to	build	a	strong	relationship	with	their	buyer.	In	this	research,	
power	was	a	significant	relationship	attribute	that	had	a	considerable	negative	effect	on	
relationship	quality	as	well	as	a	direct	negative	effect	on	loyalty.	Power	is	an	important	
variable	in	a	number	of	theoretical	frameworks	including	resource	dependency	theory	
(Molm,	1997)	and	transaction	cost	economics	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	This	research	
validates	these	theories	by	identifying	the	negative	role	coercive	power	has	on	relationship	
quality	and	supplier	performance	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	The	research	has	also	shown	the	
correlation	of	between	specific	assets,	dependency	and	power.	These	results	are	consistent	
with	resource	dependence	theory	and	transaction	cost	economics.	
10.7.3 Agri-food	supply	chains	
The	research	also	contributed	to	supply	chain	theory	by	developing	a	greater	understanding	
of	buyer-seller	relationships	that	are	relevant	to	the	agri-food	sector.	There	has	been	little	
empirical	research	on	supplier	performance	in	agri-food	supply	chains.	Hence	this	study	
addressed	these	issues	by	adapting	established	measures	and	where	necessary	developing	
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new	measures	of	supplier	performance	with	specific	relevance	to	agri-food	supply	chains.	
This	process	addressed	some	of	the	attributes	of	agri-food	supply	chains	that	are	different	to	
manufacturing	supply	chains.	For	example,	a	significant	difference	in	agri-food	supply	chains	
is	the	large	number	of	individual	suppliers	all	supplying	the	same	commodity	to	the	buyer.	
As	a	result,	the	supplier	relationships	are	with	a	large	pool	of	suppliers	who	produce	the	
same	undifferentiated	product.	The	supplier	characteristics	of	ability,	motivation,	self-
direction	and	customer	focus	are	the	attributes	of	individuals	rather	than	a	firm.	Research	
has	shown	people	make	different	judgements	when	evaluating	an	individual	rather	than	a	
group	(Hamilton	&	Sherman,	1996;	Palmatier	et	al.,	2006).	This	adds	to	the	supply	chain	
literature	and	the	RBV	by	identifying	the	human	resources	of	individual	farmer	suppliers	and	
the	way	these	effect	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.		
In	addition,	some	of	the	supplier	performance	criteria	are	specifically	related	to	agri-food	
supply	chains.	For	example,	two	quality	criteria	were	adapted	for	this	context.	These	related	
to	the	unique	characteristics	of	the	production	of	red	meat	products.	For	example,	quality	
generally	relates	to	producing	animals	of	a	specific	size	and	fat	composition	as	well	as	less	
tangible	criteria	such	as	animal	welfare	and	environmental	stewardship.	Achieving	these	
specifications	requires	suppliers	with	high	levels	of	ability	and	motivation.	Delivery	quantity	
involves	delivering	the	numbers	of	stock	when	required.	This	had	a	similar	relationship	to	
supplier	ability	and	motivation,	however,	was	also	influenced	by	relationship	quality.	The	
influence	of	relationship	quality	on	delivery	quantity	may	be	due	to	production	factors.	
Delivering	the	number	of	stock	required	is	especially	difficult	because	of	the	seasonal	nature	
of	production	in	a	pasture	based	system.	There	is	a	peak	of	production	in	summer	and	
autumn	and	low	levels	of	output	in	winter	and	early	spring.	Often	processors	prefer	stock	
delivered	out	of	season	to	meet	customer	requirements	for	a	year-round	global	supply.	
These	requirements	can	involve	significant	extra	costs	to	suppliers	as	they	need	to	supply	
additional	feed	and	management	resources,	thus	creating	a	risk	that	they	will	not	be	
sufficiently	compensated	for	this.	Accordingly,	suppliers	need	to	pursue	closer	relationships	
with	their	buyers	to	mitigate	against	this	risk.	These	factors	highlight	some	of	the	specific	
differences	to	manufacturing	supply	chains	which	have	significantly	more	control	over	the	
quality	of	inputs	and	outputs.	This	research	contributes	to	supply	chain	theory,	as	even	
though	some	of	the	performance	criteria	were	specifically	adapted	to	red	meat	supply	
chains,	many	of	the	relationships	were	consistent	with	existing	theoretical	frameworks	such	
as	the	resource-based	view,	transaction	cost	economics	and	resource	dependence	theory.	
	 230	
Although	these	supply	chains	have	distinct	characteristics,	these	theoretical	frameworks	still	
apply.		
10.7.4 Common	concepts	from	different	theoretical	frameworks	
Finally,	the	study	contributed	to	a	growing	body	of	research	that	identifies	a	significant	
overlap	between	the	economic,	managerial	and	sociological	theories	relating	to	exchange	
relationships	(Halldorsson	et	al.,	2007;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2005;	Wulf	&	Odekerken-Schröder,	
2001).	Despite	the	apparent	differences	of	these	theories,	they	in	fact	have	many	similarities	
and	share	a	number	of	common	constructs	(Table	2-12).	This	finding	supports	the	multi-
paradigm	and	multi-theory	approach	to	the	supply	chain	research	(Gioia	&	Pitre,	1990).	
There	is	a	significant	amount	of	empirical	research	that	has	taken	a	multi-theoretical	
approach	to	buyer-seller	relationships,	for	example	Ireland	and	Webb	(2007).	However,	
there	is	a	dearth	of	studies	that	have	attempted	a	comprehensive	synthesis	covering	the	
economic,	managerial	and	sociological	perspectives.	This	study	furthers	previous	studies	that	
are	use	multiple	theories	to	address	the	issues	of	relationship	quality	and	supplier	
performance	(Ireland	&	Webb,	2007).	The	development	and	validation	of	common	
constructs	significantly	adds	to	the	theory	of	exchange	relationships	by	identifying	a	
common	basis	for	exploring	factors	that	affect	exchange	relationships.	
10.8 	Summary	
This	research	makes	a	significant	theoretical	contribution	by	providing	evidence	that	social	
capital	and	relationship	quality	are	in	fact	closely	related	concepts.	Combining	these	two	
constructs	enabled	a	more	complete	measurement	of	the	overall	strength	of	a	relationship.	
Therefore,	rather	than	viewing	these	as	competing	theoretical	constructs,	there	is	the	
potential	to	understand	how	these	two	constructs	can	be	combined	to	give	a	more	complete	
measure	of	the	strength	and	quality	of	these	relationships.		
This	study	also	adds	to	the	understanding	of	the	antecedents	of	relationship	quality	and	
supplier	performance.	The	research	also	showed	significant	effects	of	relationship	attributes	
on	relationship	quality.	Moreover,	this	study	demonstrates	the	positive	effect	of	relationship	
quality	on	supplier	performance.	Also,	this	research	has	also	identified	the	direct	effects	of	
the	supplier	characteristics	as	well	relationship	attributes	of	on	supplier	performance.	It	has	
shown	that	these	effects	were	consistent	with	a	number	of	theoretical	frameworks.	In	
particular,	it	showed	the	impact	of	specific	assets,	dependence,	power	and	net	value	on	
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supplier	performance	and	the	role	of	relationship	quality	in	mitigating	the	risk	of	the	adverse	
effects	of	these	factors.	
The	research	also	contributed	to	an	understanding	of	buyer-seller	relationships	by	defining	
performance	constructs	that	were	relevant	to	processors	in	the	agri-food	sector.	The	
research	demonstrated	that	although	red	meat	supply	chains	have	may	distinct	
characteristics	the	accepted	theoretical	frameworks	still	applied.	
Finally,	the	study	contributes	to	a	growing	body	of	research	that	identifies	a	significant	
overlap	between	the	economic,	managerial	and	sociological	theories	relating	to	exchange	
relationships.	The	identification	and	validation	of	common	constructs	significantly	adds	to	
the	theory	of	exchange	relationships	by	identifying	a	common	basis	for	exploring	factors	that	
affect	buyer-supplier	relationships.	
10.9 Managerial	implications	
This	study	set	out	to	address	challenges	faced	by	managers	who	are	attempting	to	build	
closer	relationships	with	their	suppliers	and	improve	their	performance	(see	section	1.1).	
The	research	showed	that	relationships	between	buyers	and	suppliers	and	the	performance	
of	these	suppliers	is	a	critical	component	of	supply	chain	performance	and	a	firm’s	
competitive	advantage	(Tracey	&	Vonderembse,	2000;	Ulaga	&	Eggert,	2006).		
This	study	provides	managers	with	an	understanding	of	how	to	improve	the	quality	of	
relationships	with,	and	the	performance	of,	their	suppliers.	In	doing	this,	it	provides	buyers	
with	an	understanding	of	where	to	focus	their	efforts	in	supplier	selection	and	how	to	
manage	these	relationships.	This	research	was	novel	in	identifying	supplier	characteristics,	
and	relationship	attributes,	that	affect	relationship	quality	and	subsequently	supplier	
performance	(Figure	1-4).	This	provides	managers	with	a	greater	understanding	of	how	to	
influence	supplier	performance	and	improve	their	competitive	advantage.	
10.9.1 Relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance	
One	of	the	aims	of	this	research	was	to	show	how	improving	relationship	quality,	supplier	
characteristics	and	relationship	attributes	affect	supplier	performance.	Many	buyers	wish	to	
develop	closer	relationships	with	their	suppliers	to	improve	supplier	performance.	Though	
the	motivation	for	this	may	often	be	based	on	self-interest	rather	than	a	desire	to	benefit	
the	supplier.	These	assertions	imply	that	they	take	a	calculative	approach	to	these	
relationships	and	seek	to	maximise	the	benefits	of	the	relationship,	whilst	minimising	the	
costs	and	risks.	However,	in	achieving	this,	they	do	not	necessarily	know	how	best	to	invest	
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in	building	relationships	with	their	suppliers,	or	how	this	will	affect	supplier	performance.	
This	uncertainty	means	it	is	difficult	to	know	what	their	return	on	investment	will	be	from	
developing	closer	relationships	with	suppliers.	In	particular,	they	may	be	unsure	as	to	where	
to	focus	their	efforts	and	what	characteristics	to	look	for	in	selecting	suppliers	who	will	best	
respond	to	relationship	development	(Cox,	2001).	By	addressing	these	issues,	this	research	
contains	some	important	implications	for	managers.	It	provides	them	with	an	understanding	
of	the	role	of	relationship	quality	in	improving	the	performance	of	their	suppliers.	The	
research	also	shows	how	relationship	attributes	and	supplier	characteristics	can	affect	both	
relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.		
This	research	also	identifies	the	complex	interactions	between	the	supplier	and	relationship	
variables,	and	their	impact	on	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	This	complexity	
makes	managing	supplier	relationships	and	performance	challenging	as	no	simple	pattern	
emerges	in	the	relationships	between	these	variables.	The	benefits	of	understanding	these	
complex	relationships	have	been	noted	by	Morgan	and	Hunt	(1999)	and	Hunt	and	Davis	
(2008).	They	claim	that	it	is	this	complexity	and	casual	ambiguity	in	buyer-supplier	
relationships	that	make	them	hard	to	copy	and	therefore	can	provide	firms	with	a	
sustainable	competitive	advantage.	This	research	has	measured	and	explained,	in	part,	some	
of	this	ambiguity	and	will	hopefully	make	the	manager’s	job	somewhat	clearer.		
In	addition,	this	research	highlights	that	relationship	quality	plays	a	major	role	in	improving	
the	performance	of	suppliers.	The	research	went	further	by	identifying	factors	that	influence	
relationship	quality.	Most	of	these	antecedents	were	relationship	attributes	including,	
supplier	dependence,	specific	assets,	power	and	supplier	net	value.	Customer	value	was	the	
only	supplier	characteristic	that	influenced	relationship	quality.	Supplier	net	value	and	use	of	
power	had	the	greatest	impact	on	relationship	quality.	Supplier	net	value	measures	the	
strategic	non-financial	benefits	suppliers	receive	(Villena	et	al.,	2011).	This	indicates	that	
suppliers	may	enter	into	long	term	relationships	for	non-financial	benefits	such	as	access	to	
premium	markets,	reduced	market	risk	and	access	to	new	technology	(Table	4-1	and	Table	
4-2).	This	supports	the	long-term	view	that	suppliers	are	not	necessarily	just	seeking	a	short	
term	economic	return	but	are	also	motivated	to	seek	long	term	strategic	benefits.	These	
may	involve	developing	their	farm	business,	but	also	may	mean	meeting	stakeholder	
demands	to	be	a	responsible	social	actor	and	develop	long	term	relationships	with	their	
buyer.	The	implication	for	managers	is	that	developing	strategic	non-economic	benefits	for	
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suppliers	is	an	important	part	of	building	relationship	quality.	Without	these	benefits,	long-
term	partnerships	and	the	subsequent	impacts	of	relationship	quality	on	supplier	
performance	are	unlikely	to	be	achieved.		
Power	was	the	only	relationship	attribute	that	had	a	negative	effect	on	relationship	quality	
and	supplier	performance.	This	is	consistent	with	a	significant	amount	of	existing	research	
that	shows	the	use	of	coercive	power	having	a	considerable	negative	effect	on	relationship	
quality	and	performance	(Maloni	&	Benton,	2000;	Molm,	1997;	Yeung,	Selen,	Zhang,	&	Huo,	
2009;	Zhao	et	al.,	2008).	This	consistent	negative	effect	clearly	shows	that	improving	supplier	
relationships	and	performance	requires	actors	to	avoid	the	use	of	coercive	power.	While	
specific	assets	and	supplier	dependence	can	provide	buyers	with	the	opportunity	to	exercise	
coercive	power,	the	result	will	be	a	decrease	in	the	quality	of	the	supplier	relationships	
consequently	supplier	performance.		
The	study	was	also	distinctive	in	that	it	took	into	consideration	specific	supplier	
characteristics	as	well	as	attributes	of	the	relationship	and	measured	the	effect	of	these	
variables	on	relationship	quality	and	supplier	performance.	The	study	showed	that	there	
were	considerable	differences	in	the	effects	of	the	supplier	characteristics	compared	to	the	
relationship	attributes.	Supplier	characteristics	mostly	had	no	effect	on	relationship	quality	
except	for	customer	focus.	This	outcome	was	a	significant	finding	as	it	highlights	that	there	
are	few	supplier	attributes	that	improve	relationship	quality.	This	result	indicates	the	
difficulty	buyers	have	in	selecting	suppliers	with	characteristics	that	will	positively	influence	
the	quality	of	their	relationship.	Buyers	may	want	to	identify	and	attract	high	performing	
suppliers	who	have	the	potential	to	form	long-term	quality	relationships.	This	would	enable	
them	to	maximise	the	return	from	their	investment	from	developing	a	closer	relationship	
with	their	suppliers.	This	research	shows	that	it	is	difficult	to	identify	these	suppliers	other	
than	those	who	are	customer	focused.	These	customer	focused	suppliers	look	to	meet	the	
requirements	of	their	immediate	buyer	in	the	supply	chain,	and	also	the	end	consumer.	
Suppliers	with	a	focus	on	customers	are	likely	to	want	a	closer	relationship	with	the	buyer,	
so	they	can	adapt	their	production	to	better	meet	customer	requirements.	This	was	
supported	by	the	positive	relationship	between	customer	focus	and	delivery	quality.	Though	
most	of	the	supplier	characteristics	did	not	affect	relationship	quality,	they	did	have	
important	direct	effects	on	supplier	performance.	This	finding	means	they	had	an	effect	on	
supplier	performance	independent	of	relationship	quality.	Consequently,	to	improve	the	
	 234	
quality	of	the	relationships	with	their	suppliers,	managers	need	to	develop	interdependent	
relationships,	ensure	suppliers	experience	positive	net	benefits	from	the	relationship,	
encourage	supplier	to	invest	in	specific	assets	and	avoid	the	use	of	power.		
10.9.2 Supplier	performance	
This	research	has	direct	managerial	implications	for	processors	who	want	to	improve	
supplier	performance	and	consequently	improve	their	competitive	advantage.	The	research	
addressed	the	question	of	how	processors	can	influence	supplier	performance,	as	improving	
supplier	performance	is	an	important	goal	for	many	buyers.	A	supply	base	with	higher	
performing	suppliers	can	provide	buying	firms	with	a	competitive	advantage.	The	specific	
performance	aspects	are	discussed	in	the	following	sections.	
10.9.3 Quality	
Product	quality	is	an	important	supplier	performance	goal	for	buyers	(Siguaw	&	Simpson,	
2004).	This	requires	meeting	the	buyer’s	requirements	for	quality	and	delivery.	These	are	
important	to	buyers	as	improved	quality	and	reliable	delivery	can	have	a	direct	impact	on	
their	ability	to	meet	their	own	customers’	requirements.	These	two	quality	variables	had	
some	significant	differences	in	their	antecedents.	The	research	showed	that	meeting	buyer	
quality	specifications	were	affected	only	by	supplier	characteristics.	This	finding	implies	that	
supplier	selection	is	an	important	strategy	for	improving	quality.	In	contrast,	delivery	
quantity	was	influenced	by	relationship	quality	as	well	as	supplier	characteristics.	The	
implication	for	managers	of	these	results	is	that	reliable	delivery	requires	investment	in	
relationship	quality	as	well	as	selecting	suppliers	with	ability	and	motivation.	On	the	other	
hand,	meeting	quality	specifications	is	not	influenced	by	relationship	quality.	This	means	
that	improving	product	quality	requires	selecting	suppliers	with	ability,	motivation	and	
customer	focus.		
10.9.4 Loyalty	and	communication	
Loyalty	and	communication	are	two	supplier	performance	variables	that	have	significant	
implications	for	managers.	This	is	because	these	variables	can	directly	affect	the	buying	
firm’s	profitability	and	competitive	advantage	(Ahmad	&	Buttle,	2001).	Therefore,	
understanding	the	variables	that	influence	loyalty	and	communication	is	an	important	
objective	for	firms	who	wish	to	improve	these	two	aspects	of	supplier	performance.	Loyalty	
and	communication	were	influenced	by	a	considerable	number	of	variables	involving	
supplier	characteristics,	relationship	attributes	and	relationship	quality	(Figure	9-4	and	
	 235	
Figure	9-5).	Relationship	quality	had	a	strong	positive	impact	on	loyalty	and	communication.	
This	means	to	have	suppliers	who	are	loyal	and	are	willing	to	share	information	requires	
managers	to	make	an	effort	to	improve	the	quality	of	their	relationship	with	their	suppliers.	
Relationship	quality	also	mediates	a	large	number	of	effects	on	loyalty	and	communication.	
These	included	supplier	dependence,	processor	dependence,	specific	assets,	supplier	net	
value	and	power.		
As	well	as	the	mediated	effects,	there	are	a	number	of	direct	effects	on	loyalty	and	
communication.	Most	of	these	were	relationship	attributes	except	self-direction.	This	is	both	
directly	as	well	as	through	the	mediated	effect	of	relationship	quality.	Therefore,	improving	
loyalty	and	communication	requires	attracting	and	developing	self-directed	and	customer	
focused	suppliers	in	addition	to	developing	quality	relationships	with	these	suppliers.		
Though	there	are	significant	differences	in	the	relationship	between	the	antecedents,	some	
common	conclusions	can	be	drawn.	For	example,	both	loyalty	and	communication	are	
influenced	by	the	quality	of	the	relationship	with	their	suppliers,	and	this	in	turn	is	affected	
by	relationship	attributes.	Furthermore,	there	are	some	common	direct	effects	including	
relationship	attributes	(supplier	dependence,	specific	assets	and	net	value),	and	supplier	
characteristics	(supplier	motivation	and	customer	focus).	
10.9.5 Supplier	profitability	
Improving	supplier	profitability	is	important	for	buyers.	After	having	invested	in	developing	
long	term	relationships	with	their	suppliers,	they	also	want	them	to	be	economically	viable	
to	ensure	security	of	supply.	Profitability	is	also	of	paramount	importance	to	suppliers	as	
they	also	want	to	maintain	their	economic	viability.	The	profitability	construct	displayed	a	
complex	set	of	relationships	with	the	supplier	characteristics	and	relationship	attributes.	It	
showed	that	relationship	quality	had	a	significant	mediating	role	within	these	relationships	
(Figure	9-6).	This	suggests	that	suppliers	who	develop	closer	relationships	with	their	
processor	are	more	likely	to	experience	improved	profitability.	The	reason	for	this	seems	to	
be	that	a	closer	relationship	with	their	processor	mitigates	some	of	the	risk	of	investing	in	
specific	assets	and	becoming	more	dependent,	hence,	both	of	which	can	increase	
profitability.		
Profitability	was	affected	both	directly	and	indirectly	by	supplier	net	value.	This	indicates	
that	suppliers	who	have	closer	relationships	with	their	processor	may	receive	non-financial	
benefits	such	as	access	to	premium	markets	or	opportunities	for	higher	value	supply	
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contracts.	From	a	managerial	perspective,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	suppliers	who	
develop	closer	relationships	also	receive	both	financial	and	non-financial	benefits	from	the	
relationship.		
As	predicted,	suppliers	who	are	dependent	on	their	processor	had	a	negative	effect	on	
profitability.	This	suggests	that	buyers	may	be	taking	advantage	of	supplier	dependence	to	
reduce	the	price	paid	to	suppliers	therefore	also	exercising	coercive	power	(Cox,	2001).	This	
negative	relationship	with	dependence	changed	to	a	positive	effect	when	mediated	through	
relationship	quality.	This	result	indicates	that	suppliers	with	a	closer	relationship	with	their	
buyer	were	not	taken	advantage	of,	and	in	fact,	benefited	from	the	dependent	relationship.	
This	has	important	implications	for	suppliers	as	it	shows	that	relationship	quality	mitigates	
against	the	risk	of	opportunism	that	arises	from	dependence	on	the	processor.		
10.9.6 Summary	
This	study	provides	managers	with	an	understanding	of	how	to	improve	the	quality	of	their	
relationships	and	the	performance	of	their	suppliers.	In	doing	this,	it	offers	buyers	an	
understanding	of	where	to	focus	their	efforts	in	supplier	selection	and	how	to	manage	these	
relationships	(Wilson,	1995).	This	research	confirmed	that	relationship	quality	does	play	an	
important	role	in	improving	supplier	performance.	Therefore,	managers	who	wish	to	
improve	the	performance	of	their	suppliers	need	to	also	focus	on	the	quality	of	these	
relationships.		
The	research	went	further	by	identifying	factors	that	influence	relationship	quality.	Most	of	
these	variables	were	relationship	attributes.	Therefore,	to	improve	relationship	quality	they	
need	to	be	aware	of	the	attributes	of	their	relationship	and	how	they	can	improve	these	
variables.	These	actions	include	improving	the	non-economic	value	that	suppliers	receive.	
This	can	include	increasing	the	benefits	such	as	access	to	new	technology	or	to	premium	
markets.	as	well	as	reducing	the	costs	and	risks	of	the	supply	relationship.	They	also	need	to	
avoid	the	use	of	coercive	power	to	manage	suppliers.	They	need	to	work	to	develop	
interdependent	relationships	and	encourage	suppliers	to	invest	in	specific	assets.		
Processors	also	need	to	understand	the	supplier	characteristics	and	the	direct	effects	they	
have	on	the	supplier	performance	and	use	these	as	supplier	selection	criteria.	The	research	
therefore	provides	managers	with	information	on	how	to	identify	and	attract	suppliers	who	
will	meet	the	buyer’s	performance	requirements.	Furthermore,	it	identifies	relationship	
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attributes	that	can	enable	processors	to	improve	the	quality	of	their	relationships	as	well	as	
directly	improving	supplier	performance.		
10.10 Limitations	
Although	this	study	presents	some	important	findings	and	contributions,	there	are	some	
limitations	which	open	up	avenues	for	future	research.	Firstly,	given	that	relationships	are	
dependent	upon	cultural	context	(Putnam,	1993;	Villena	et	al.,	2011)	the	research	may	not	
be	generalisable	beyond	the	New	Zealand	Meat	Industry	sample	frame.	Different	contexts	
can	result	in	significant	differences	in	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	buyer	and	
supplier,	in	particular	where	the	product	is	less	consistent	and	more	perishable	(Zeithaml,	
Berry,	&	Parasuraman,	1996).	It	would	be	valuable	to	repeat	the	research	in	other	cultural	
contexts,	industries	and	with	different	products.	It	would	be	especially	interesting	to	see	if	
the	research	produced	consistent	results	in	a	manufacturing	industry	context	and	therefore	
generalizable	to	other	supply	chains.	
A	second	limitation	is	that	the	sample	was	mostly	made	up	of	individuals	who	were	
owner/managers,	rather	than	being	part	of	larger	more	complex	organisations.	For	example,	
Palmatier	et	al.	(2006)	demonstrates	that	relationships	have	a	greater	impact	on	factors	such	
as	loyalty	when	the	target	of	the	relationship	is	an	individual	person.	Other	research	shows	
that	when	people	evaluate	another	individual,	they	make	stronger,	quicker,	and	more	
confident	judgments	than	when	they	evaluate	a	group.	These	judgments	are	also	more	
strongly	related	to	outcomes	and	behaviours	(Hamilton	&	Sherman,	1996;	Palmatier	et	al.,	
2006).	Given	this,	it	would	be	worthwhile	to	see	if	the	results	could	be	replicated	where	the	
suppliers	were	larger	companies	with	multiple	individuals	interacting	with	the	buyer.	Thirdly,	
the	research	surveyed	only	one	side	of	the	supplier-processor	dyad.	Because	the	data	was	
only	collected	from	suppliers	it	did	not	capture	the	processors’	view	of	the	relationship.	
Furthermore,	the	supplier	performance	and	relationship	quality	variables	were	self-reported	
judgements	from	the	supplier’s	perspective.	The	processor	may	have	had	a	different	
perspective	on	the	suppliers’	performance	and	other	variables.	Also,	the	research	looked	at	
only	one	network	connection,	it	did	not	take	into	account	that	the	suppliers	and	processors	
are	connected	into	wider	network	of	relationships	(Choi	&	Kim,	2008;	Villena	et	al.,	2011).	
The	nature	of	these	networks	may	affect	the	performance	of	the	supplier	(Rowley,	Behrens,	
&	Krackhardt,	2000).	Fourthly,	due	to	the	cross-sectional	nature	of	the	data,	it	is	not	possible	
to	draw	definite	causal	interpretations	from	the	data.	Longitudinal	data	would	be	necessary	
to	overcome	some	of	these	problems.	A	longitudinal	data	set	with	matched	samples	would	
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allow	more	deductions	on	changes	over	time	and	identify	trends.	This	however	was	not	the	
objective	of	this	research.	Finally,	SEM	has	some	limitations	in	terms	of	methodology.	SEM	
requires	a	priory	assumptions	as	to	which	variables	affect	other	variables	and	the	direction	
of	these	(Kline,	2005).	Though	these	assumptions	should	be	based	on	theory,	there	is	often	
not	sufficient	accepted	theory	to	clearly	determine	these	relationships.	This	research,	where	
possible,	used	existing	theory	to	define	the	causal	relationships,	yet	there	were	some	
situations	where	this	was	not	possible	and	it	was	necessary	to	make	a	“best	attempt”	at	
relationships	between	variables.	
10.11 Directions	for	future	research	
This	study	provides	a	good	platform	for	future	research.	The	study	did	not	focus	on	supplier	
development	despite	there	being	a	significant	amount	of	literature	on	this	(Hahn,	Watts,	&	
Kim,	1990).	Future	research	could	focus	on	identifying	supplier	development	strategies	that	
might	affect	the	independent	variables.	For	example,	how	do	processors	develop	greater	
customer	focus	among	suppliers?	It	would	also	be	useful	to	validate	the	model	of	supplier	
performance	in	other	agri-food	sectors	such	as	dairy	or	horticulture,	as	well	as	different	
cultural	and	geographical	environments.	The	model	could	also	be	adapted	and	tested	in	non-
agricultural	industries.	Confirming	the	results	in	other	contexts	would	enable	differences	
between	industries	to	be	identified	and	the	validity	of	the	model	to	be	tested.	As	the	study	
only	surveyed	suppliers	it	was	not	possible	to	make	empirical	conclusions	from	the	buyer’s	
perspective.	For	example,	surveying	buyers	may	be	able	to	identify	which	of	the	supplier	
performance	criteria	were	most	important	from	the	buyer’s	perspective.	Future	work	could	
also	be	done	to	identify	how	processors	can	identify	and	select	suppliers	that	will	have	
higher	performance	and	develop	tools	to	identify	these	suppliers.	Also,	how	they	can	
identify	poor	performing	suppliers?	Furthermore,	processors	need	to	know	if	they	should	
end	their	supply	relationship	with	these	suppliers	or	whether	there	are	methods	to	improve	
their	performance.	This	study	identified	the	close	association	between	social	capital	and	
relationship	quality.	This	has	important	theoretical	implications;	more	work	needs	to	be	
done	to	evaluate	these	two	constructs	and	provide	understanding	of	the	similarities	and	
differences	of	these	constructs.		
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10.12 Final	comment		
This	study	was	able	to	clarify	some	of	the	conceptual	challenges	associated	with	exchange	
relationships.	This	was	achieved	by	improving	the	way	relationship	quality	is	conceptualised	
and	how	it	is	related	to	social	capital.	This	has	filled	a	significant	gap	in	the	study	of	these	
two	variables	and	provides	an	improved	measure	of	the	overall	strength	of	the	buyer-
supplier	relationship.		
Furthermore,	this	research	identified	some	of	the	relational	resources	that	contribute	to	
supplier	performance.	Specifically,	the	study	identified	the	supplier	characteristics	and	
relationship	attributes	that	drive	supplier	performance.	The	research	also,	identified	the	
significant	role	that	relationship	quality	plays	in	improving	performance.	The	importance	of	
these	findings	is	well	recognised	but	not	elaborated	on	in	the	literature	on	buyer-seller	
relationships.	For	example,	Lambert	(2006)	has	argued	that	the	ultimate	success	of	an	
individual	business	is	its	ability	to	manage	and	integrate	the	company’s	complex	network	of	
relationships.	This	research	contributes	to	the	theoretical	understanding	of	buyer-seller	
relationships,	as	well	as	providing	managers	with	an	increased	understanding	of	how	to	
manage	relationships	with	their	suppliers.		
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Appendix	A -	Representativeness	and	test	for	non-Response	
bias	
Table	A:	1	Response	rate	to	first	survey	mail	out	
		 Follow	up	survey	
Follow	up	(surveys)	 Follow	up	(respond	rates)	%	
Complete	 Incomplete	 Total	 Complete	 Incomplete	 Total	
Deer	 611	 50	 49	 99	 8%	 8%	 16%	
Beef	 1416	 73	 54	 127	 5%	 4%	 9%	
Sheep	&	
Beef	 2693	 184	 127	 311	 7%	 5%	 12%	
Total	 4720	 307	 230	 537	 7%	 5%	 11%	
	
Table	A:	2	Total	sample	size	for	first	time	and	follow	up	survey	
	Farm	type	 Sent	first	time	 Follow	up	 Total	
Deer	 833	 611	 1444	
Beef	 1707	 1416	 3123	
Sheep	&	Beef	 3404	 2693	 6097	
Total	 5944	 4720	 10664	
	
Table	A:	3	Response	rate	for	different	farm	types	
		 Total	Surveys	Completed	 Total	Response	rate	%	
Deer	 242	 29%	
Beef	 233	 14%	
Sheep	&	Beef	 730	 21%	
Total	 1205	 20%	
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Table	A:	4	Regional	response	rate	compared	to	Agribase	
Region	 Agribase	%	 Survey	Responses	%	 Difference	
Auckland	 8.5%	 1.8%	 6.7%	
Bay	of	Plenty	 3.4%	 3.2%	 0.2%	
Canterbury	 18.8%	 16.2%	 2.6%	
Gisborne	 3.9%	 3.9%	 0.0%	
Hawke's	Bay	 7.4%	 10.4%	 -3.0%	
Nelson-Marlborough	 4.8%	 5.4%	 -0.6%	
Northland	 5.6%	 4.3%	 1.3%	
Otago	 8.60%	 13.60%	 -5.00%	
Southland	 10.80%	 13.80%	 -3.00%	
Taranaki	 3.20%	 1.40%	 1.80%	
Waikato	 9.50%	 10.10%	 -0.60%	
Wanganui-Manawatu	 10.40%	 12.20%	 -1.80%	
Wellington	 3.80%	 3.40%	 0.40%	
West	Coast	 1.30%	 0.30%	 1.00%	
	
Table	A:	5	Distribution	of	farms	by	size	and	type	
Farms	by	size	(ha)	of	farm	and	farm	type	(ANZSIC06)	At	30	June	2012.	Percentage	in	each	category	
Farm	size	(ha)	(ANZSIC06)	 60–79	 80–99	 100–199	 200–
399	
400–
599	
600–
799	
800–
999	
1,000–
1,999	
2,000–
3,999	
4,000	and	
over	
Total	
A0141	Sheep	farming	
(specialised)	(%)	
4%	 5%	 17%	 31%	 14%	 8%	 5%	 8%	 5%	 3%	 100%	
A0142	Beef	farming	
(specialised)	(%)	
16%	 13%	 34%	 22%	 7%	 3%	 2%	 3%	 0%	 0%	 100%	
A0144	Sheep-beef	
farming	(%)	
3%	 3%	 14%	 24%	 17%	 10%	 7%	 14%	 5%	 3%	 100%	
A0180	Deer	farming	(%)	 13%	 11%	 32%	 25%	 7%	 4%	 2%	 3%	 4%	 1%	 100%	
TOTAL	New	Zealand	(%)	 8%	 7%	 22%	 26%	 13%	 7%	 4%	 8%	 4%	 2%	 100%	
Farm	types	are	classified	by	the	Australian	and	New	Zealand	Standard	Industrial	Classification	2006	ANZSIC06).	
Source	(Statistics	New	Zealand,	2013)	
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Table	A:	6	Comparison	of	farm	sample	farm	size	with	2012	agricultural	census	for	specialised	sheep	
farms	and	sheep	and	beef	farms	
Farm	Size	Class	
(Ha)	
Agricultural	Census	
2012	(%)	
Sheep	Survey	
Responses	(%)	
Difference	(%)	
	10–19	 	 	 	
	20–39	 	 0%	 0%	
	40–59	 	 1%	 1%	
	60–79	 4%	 2%	 -2%	
	80–99	 4%	 4%	 -1%	
	100–199	 16%	 13%	 -3%	
	200–399	 28%	 32%	 4%	
	400–599	 15%	 16%	 1%	
	600–799	 9%	 8%	 0%	
	800–999	 6%	 5%	 -1%	
1,000–1,999	 11%	 12%	 1%	
	2,000–3,999	 5%	 4%	 -1%	
	4,000	and	over	 3%	 3%	 0%	
	
Table	A:	7	Comparison	of	farm	sample	farm	size	with	2012	agricultural	census	for	specialised	beef	
farms.	
Farm	Size	Class	
(Ha)	 Agricultural	Census	2012	(%)	 Beef	Survey	Responses	(%)	 Difference	(%)	
	10–19	 		 1.4	 		
	20–39	 		 0	 0%	
	40–59	 		 3%	 3%	
	60–79	 16%	 8%	 -7%	
	80–99	 13%	 6%	 -7%	
	100–199	 34%	 24%	 -10%	
	200–399	 22%	 28%	 6%	
	400–599	 7%	 9%	 2%	
	600–799	 3%	 5%	 2%	
	800–999	 2%	 3%	 2%	
1,000–1,999	 3%	 10%	 7%	
	2,000–3,999	 0%	 1%	 1%	
	4,000	and	over	 0%	 2%	 2%	
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Table	A:	8	Comparison	of	farm	sample	farm	size	with	2012	agricultural	census	for	specialised	deer	
farms	
Farm	Size	
Class	(Ha)	 Agricultural	Census	2012	(%)	 Deer	Survey	Responses	(%)	 Difference	(%)	
	10–19	 		 		 		
	20–39	 		 1%	 1%	
	40–59	 		 1%	 1%	
	60–79	 13%	 9%	 -4%	
	80–99	 11%	 8%	 -2%	
	100–199	 32%	 26%	 -5%	
	200–399	 25%	 32%	 7%	
	400–599	 7%	 8%	 1%	
600–799	 4%	 6%	 2%	
800–999	 2%	 3%	 1%	
1,000–1,999	 3%	 4%	 1%	
2,000–3,999	 4%	 2%	 -2%	
	 1%	 1%	 0%	
	
Table	A:	9	Distribution	of	farms	by	region	and	type	:	Source	(Statistics	New	Zealand,	2013)	
Region	
Total	number	
of	Sheep-
beef-deer	
farms	
%	Sheep	
farming	
(specialised)	
%	Beef	cattle	
farming	
(specialised)	
%	Sheep-
beef	cattle	
farming	
%	Deer	
farming	
(specialised)	
Total	%	
sheep-
beef-deer	
farms	
Northland		 2,238	 1%	 16%	 5%	 1%	 9%	
Auckland		 1,545	 2%	 10%	 4%	 4%	 6%	
Waikato		 3,570	 4%	 21%	 14%	 8%	 14%	
Bay	of	Plenty		 1,113	 1%	 7%	 3%	 6%	 4%	
Gisborne		 564	 1%	 1%	 6%	 2%	 2%	
Hawke's	Bay		 1,728	 5%	 5%	 13%	 6%	 7%	
Taranaki		 1,017	 1%	 6%	 4%	 1%	 4%	
Manawatu-Wanganui		 3,252	 15%	 8%	 19%	 10%	 13%	
Wellington		 1,026	 5%	 3%	 5%	 4%	 4%	
TOTAL	North	Island	 16,050	 36%	 77%	 73%	 42%	 62%	
	
Nelson-Marlborough		 1,023	 5%	 4%	 4%	 4%	 4%	
West	Coast		 258	 0%	 1%	 1%	 2%	 1%	
Canterbury		 4,128	 22%	 13%	 13%	 27%	 16%	
Otago		 2,109	 17%	 3%	 6%	 10%	 8%	
Southland		 2,157	 19%	 2%	 4%	 15%	 8%	
TOTAL	South	Island	 9,711	 64%	 23%	 27%	 58%	 38%	
TOTAL	New	Zealand	 25,773	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	
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Table	A:	10	:	Comparison	of	sample	farm	location	with	2012	agricultural	census	for	specialised	
sheep	farms	and	combined	sheep	and	beef	farms	
Sheep	farms	(specialised)	and	sheep	and	beef	farms	
Region	 Agricultural	Census	2012	(%)	 Survey	Responses	(%)	 Difference	(%)	
Northland		 3%	 1%	 -1%	
Auckland		 3%	 1%	 -2%	
Waikato		 8%	 7%	 -1%	
Bay	of	Plenty		 2%	 3%	 1%	
Gisborne		 3%	 4%	 1%	
Hawke's	Bay		 9%	 11%	 3%	
Taranaki		 2%	 1%	 -1%	
Manawatu-Wanganui		 17%	 13%	 -4%	
Wellington		 5%	 4%	 -1%	
Nelson-Marlborough		 4%	 6%	 1%	
West	Coast		 0%	 0%	 0%	
Canterbury		 18%	 16%	 -2%	
Otago		 13%	 16%	 3%	
Southland		 13%	 17%	 4%	
	
Table	A:	11	Comparison	of	sample	farm	location	with	2012	agricultural	census	for	specialised	beef	
cattle	farms	
Beef	cattle	farming	(specialised)	
Region	 Agricultural	Census	2012	(%)	 Survey	Responses	(%)	 Difference	(%)	
Northland		 16%	 15.6%	 0%	
Auckland		 10%	 7.1%	 -3%	
Waikato		 21%	 24.7%	 4%	
Bay	of	Plenty		 7%	 5.8%	 -1%	
Gisborne		 1%	 1.3%	 0%	
Hawke's	Bay		 5%	 9.1%	 4%	
Taranaki		 6%	 2.6%	 -4%	
Manawatu-Wanganui		 8%	 14.9%	 6%	
Wellington		 3%	 1.3%	 -1%	
Nelson-Marlborough		 4%	 5.8%	 2%	
West	Coast		 1%	 0.0%	 -1%	
Canterbury		 13%	 9.7%	 -3%	
Otago		 3%	 1.3%	 -2%	
Southland		 2%	 0.6%	 -2%	
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Table	A:	12	Comparison	of	sample	farm	location	with	2012	agricultural	census	for	specialised	deer	
farms	
Deer	farming	(specialised)	
Region	 Agricultural	Census	2012	(%)	 Survey	Responses	(%)	 Difference	(%)	
Northland		 1%	 1%	 0%	
Auckland		 4%	 2%	 -2%	
Waikato		 8%	 6%	 -2%	
Bay	of	Plenty		 6%	 4%	 -3%	
Gisborne		 2%	 3%	 1%	
Hawke's	Bay		 6%	 8%	 2%	
Taranaki		 1%	 0%	 -1%	
Manawatu-Wanganui		 10%	 9%	 -1%	
Wellington		 4%	 2%	 -2%	
Nelson-Marlborough		 4%	 5%	 1%	
West	Coast		 2%	 1%	 -2%	
Canterbury		 27%	 25%	 -2%	
Otago		 10%	 19%	 9%	
Southland		 15%	 15%	 0%	
	
Table	A:	13	Comparison	of	survey	sample	with	EU	sheep	meat	quota	allocation	
Company	
EU	Sheep	Quota	
Allocation	(tonnes)	 %	Quota	 %	Survey	 Difference	(%)	
Alliance	Group	 	65,845		 29%	 27%	 -1%	
Silver	Fern	Farms	 	53,309		 23%	 28%	 5%	
AFFCO		 	28,109		 12%	 15%	 3%	
ANZCO	Foods	(CMP)	 	20,442		 9%	 8%	 -1%	
Ovation	 	14,635		 6%	 5%	 -1%	
Taylor	Preston	 	12,417		 5%	 4%	 -2%	
Blue	Sky	Meats	 	6,727		 3%	 3%	 0%	
Lean	Meats	 	5,733		 3%	 1%	 -1%	
Crusader	Meats	 	4,944		 2%	 2%	 -1%	
Wilson	Hellaby	(Auckland	MP)	 	4,786		 2%	 1%	 -1%	
Other	 	4,726		 2%	 4%	 2%	
Te	Kuiti	Meat	Processors	 	3,882		 2%	 2%	 0%	
Prime	Range	Meats	 	2,360		 1%	 	 -1%	
Total	Quota	Allocation	 	227,914		 100%	 100%	 	
(Source	NZ	Meat	Board)	 	 	 	 	
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Table	A:	14	:	Comparison	of	survey	sample	with	USA	beef	quota	allocation	
Company	
USA	Beef	
Quota	
Allocation	
(tonnes)	 %	Quota	 %	Survey	 Difference	
Silver	Fern	Farms	 	63,450		 30%	 21%	 -8%	
ANZCO	Foods	(CMP,Riverlands)	 	42,095		 20%	 16%	 -4%	
AFFCO	 	37,097		 17%	 21%	 4%	
Alliance	Group	 	18,535		 9%	 6%	 -3%	
Greenlea	 	17,896		 8%	 11%	 3%	
Wilson	Hellaby	(Auckland	MP)	 	15,948		 7%	 10%	 2%	
UBP	Limited	 	10,720		 5%	 5%	 0%	
Taylor	Preston	 	5,224		 2%	 2%	 0%	
Other	 	2,432		 1%	 4%	 3%	
Local	Trade	 	 	 2%	 2%	
Total	 	213,397		 100%	 100%	 	
(Source	NZ	Meat	Board)	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.	1	:Test	for	non-response	bias	–	farm	management	role36		
	
																																																																		36	Farm	management	role	specifies	the	type	of	ownership	and	management	role.		
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Figure	A.	2:	Test	for	non-response	bias	–	processor	
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Figure	A.	3:	Test	for	non-response	bias	–	stage	of	the	business	cycle	
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Figure	A.	4:	Comparison	of	trust	for	different	supplier	groups	in	the	sheep	and	beef	industry		
(Scale	ranged	from	1	=	low	trust	to	5	high	trust)
	
Figure	A.	5:	Comparison	of	commitment	for	different	supplier	groups	in	the	sheep	and	beef	
industry		
Scale	ranged	from	1	=	low	commitment	to	5	=	high	commitment	
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Figure	A.	6:	Comparison	of	satisfaction	for	different	supplier	groups	in	the	sheep	and	beef	industry		
Scale	ranged	from	1	=	low	satisfaction	to	5	=	high	satisfaction	
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Appendix	B -	Exploratory	factor	analysis	
Table	B:	1	Communalities	for	relationship	items	
Item	 Initial	 Extraction	 	 Item	 Initial	 Extraction	
ProcAbi1_Mktg	 1	 0.75	 	 Value1_GrowBus	 1	 0.67	
ProcAbil2_SChain	 1	 0.75	 	 Value2_Premium	 1	 0.68	
ProcAbil3_Prem	 1	 0.78	 	 Value3_NewTech	 1	 0.66	
CommitL1_OptRev	 1	 0.56	 	 Value4_Customer	 1	 0.67	
CommitL3_PriceRev	 1	 0.67	 	 Value5_ReduceCost	 1	 0.65	
CommitL4_SpotMktR	 1	 0.56	 	 Value6_Profit	 1	 0.74	
Commit_L5_SuplOne	 1	 0.62	 	 Value7_ProdRisk	 1	 0.72	
Commit2_Resource	 1	 0.50	 	 Value8_MktRisk	 1	 0.65	
SuppCost2_Flex	 1	 0.67	 	 C.SocCap10_Freq	 1	 0.76	
SuppCost3_Incr	 1	 0.79	 	 C.SocCap1_Goals	 1	 0.85	
SuppCost4_Stress	 1	 0.75	 	 C.SocCap2_Values	 1	 0.87	
SuppCost7_ProdRisk	 1	 0.81	 	 C.SocCap3_Bonds	 1	 0.85	
SuppCost5_LessProfit	 1	 0.78	 	 R.SocCap4_Friend	 1	 0.83	
SuppCost6_MktRisk	 1	 0.65	 	 R.SocCap5_Pers	 1	 0.89	
Power1_Treat	 1	 0.70	 	 R.SocCap6_Recip	 1	 0.85	
Power2_Favoured	 1	 0.71	 	 R.SocCap7_Trust	 1	 0.90	
Power3_Profit	 1	 0.52	 	 S.SocCap8_Funct	 1	 0.84	
Satisf9_Expect	 1	 0.62	 	 S.SocCap9_Level	 1	 0.83	
Satisf10_PriceStock	 1	 0.60	 	 Commit3_Proud	 1	 0.70	
Satisf1_NetReturn	 1	 0.73	 	 Commit_RelLongTerm	 1	 0.61	
Satisf2_Support	 1	 0.66	 	 SpecInv1_Reqs	 1	 0.69	
Satisf3_Policies	 1	 0.67	 	 SpecInv2_Know	 1	 0.71	
Satisf4_Price	 1	 0.77	 	 SpecInv3_Modify	 1	 0.81	
Satisf5_PriceSched	 1	 0.65	 	 Trust1_Expl	 1	 0.68	
Satisf6_Support	 1	 0.71	 	 Trust2_Welfare	 1	 0.77	
Satisf7_CommQuant	 1	 0.84	 	 Trust3_Agree	 1	 0.73	
Satisf8_CommQual	 1	 0.81	 	 Trust4_Fair	 1	 0.77	
	 	 	 	 Trust5_Advantge	 1	 0.73	
	 	 	 	 Tust6_Returns	 1	 0.71	
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	Figure	B	1:	Scree	plot	for	relationship	factors	 	
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Table	B:	2	Communalities	supplier	scale	items	
	 	 	
Code	 Initial	 Extraction	
SuppAbil4_Inn	 1.00	 0.79	
SuppAbil1_Quality	 1.00	 0.74	
SuppAbil2_Mgmt	 1.00	 0.83	
SuppAbil3_Effic	 1.00	 0.80	
SuppComm_Inform1	 1.00	 0.83	
SuppComm_Inform2	 1.00	 0.85	
Costomer1_Needs	 1.00	 0.66	
Customer2_Soln	 1.00	 0.67	
Customer3_Mod	 1.00	 0.45	
Customer4_know	 1.00	 0.47	
Customer5_InnMkt	 1.00	 0.54	
Customer7_Reqs	 1.00	 0.46	
SuppIndep1	 1.00	 0.62	
SuppIndep2	 1.00	 0.66	
ProcDepend1	 1.00	 0.85	
ProcDepend2	 1.00	 0.84	
SuppDepend1	 1.00	 0.80	
SuppDepend2	 1.00	 0.81	
FarmPerf1_ProfitR	 1.00	 0.72	
FarmPerf3_SatProd	 1.00	 0.44	
FarmPerf4_$1SatFin	 1.00	 0.81	
SuppPerf1_Farm	 1.00	 0.71	
SuppPerf2_QLStock	 1.00	 0.64	
SuppPerf3_Yield	 1.00	 0.56	
SuppPerf4_AWelfare	 1.00	 0.50	
SuppPerf5_NoPremium	 1.00	 0.41	
SelfDirect1_Profit	 1.00	 0.68	
SelfDirect2_Prod	 1.00	 0.67	
SelfDirect3_Constr	 1.00	 0.55	
UncertMkt1_Comp	 1.00	 0.61	
UncertMkt2_Cust	 1.00	 0.69	
UncertMkt3_Price	 1.00	 0.59	
Extraction	Method:	Principal	Component	Analysis.	
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Figure	B	2:	Scree	plot	for	supplier	factors	
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	Table	B:	1	Comparison	of	two	methods	structuring	EFA	
	 256	
Appendix	C –	Constructs	and	confirmatory	factor	analysis	
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Table	C:	1-	Variable	codes	and	descriptions	
Scale	item	code	 Description	of	scale	item	
SuppAbil4_Inn	 Management	ability	to	implement	innovation	and	new	technology	
SuppAbil1_Qual	 Management	ability	to	produce	high-quality	stock	
SuppAbil2_Mgmt	 Overall	farm	management	skills	
SuppSuppAbil3_Eff	 Management	ability	to	reduce	production	costs	and	increase	farm	efficiency	
ProcAbi1_Mktg	 Their	marketing	and	sales	skills.	
ProcAbil2_SChain	 Their	skills	for	improving	quality	and	efficiency	in	the	supply	chain.	
ProcAbil3_Prem	 Their	ability	to	get	a	premium	price	from	the	market	
Clim_SPRG	 Spring	temperature	of	your	[product]	unit?	
Clim_SUM	 Summer	climate	of	your	operation	
Clim_WINT	 Winter	temperature	of	your	operation	
SupplyContr	 In	the	last	year	have	you	supplied	[product]	on	contract	(with	quality	and	or	delivery	specifications).	
SupplyContrYrs	 For	how	many	years	have	you	supplied	[product]	on	contract	to	your	[processor]?	
SupplyContr%	 What	%	of	your	[product]	sales	were	supplied	on	contract?	
SupplyContr%	 What	percent	of	your	total	[product]	sales	were	supplied	on	contract?	
CommitOpt	 It	is	important	to	have	more	than	one	option	to	sell	our	stock	
CommitL1_OptRev	 Reverse	Score	of:	It	is	important	to	have	more	than	one	option	to	sell	our	stock	
CommitL2_PriceComp	 How	would	you	react	if	one	of	your	processors	competitors	consistently	offered	a	higher	price	for	your	animals.	
CommitL3_PriceRev	 Reverse	score	of:	If	the	price	was	good	it	doesn’t	matter	who	we	supply	our	stock	to	
CommitL4_SpotMktR	 Reverse	Score	of:	You	will	always	get	better	prices	over	the	season	if	you	play	the	market	
CommitRep1	 If	our	current	livestock	buyer	moved	to	another	[processor]	we	would	change	also	
CommitRep2	 The	commitment	we	have	to	our	livestock	buyer	is	more	important	than	the	commitment	to	our	[processor]	
CommitPrice	 If	the	price	was	good	it	doesn’t	matter	who	we	supply	our	stock	to	
Commit1_LTermRel	 We	expect	our	relationship	with	Processor	to	continue	for	a	long	time	
Commit2_Resource	 We	are	willing	to	dedicate	time,	effort	and	resources	to	support	Processor	in	growing	their	markets	and	sales	
Commit3_Proud	 We	are	proud	to	tell	other	farmers	that	we	are	a	supplier	to	[processor]	
Commit4_LTInv	 We	are	willing	to	make	long	term	investments	to	better	meet	the	requirements	of	our	[processor]		
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Scale	item	code	 Description	of	scale	item	
Commit5_Outcome	 The	business	outcomes	achieved	by	supplying	[processor]	are	more	attractive	than	those	of	other	companies.	
CommFace	 How	often	would	you	have	face	to	face	contact	with	someone	from	your	[processor].	
CommPhone	 How	often	would	you	have	contact	with	someone	from	[processor]	(by	phone,	email	or	text).	
SuppComm_Inform1	 Keeping	[processor]	informed	on	our	production	plans	is	very	important	to	us.	
SuppComm_Inform2	 We	always	let	[processor]	know	as	soon	as	possible	of	any	unexpected	problems.	
SuppCost1_Risk	 The	costs	and	risks;	involved	in	supplying	[processor]	are	greater	than	the	benefits.	
SuppCost2_Flex	 Reduced	flexibility	in	our	farming	operation.	
SuppCost3_Incr	 Increased	production	costs.	
SuppCost4_Stress	 Extra	management	effort	stress.	
SuppCost7_ProdRisk	 Increased	production	risk	on	our	farm	(production	uncertainty).	
SuppCost5_LessProfit	 Reduced	farm	profitability.	
SuppCost6_MktRisk	 Increased	market	risk	involved	in	selling	our	[product]	(price	uncertainty).	
CostFocus2	 Reducing	the	costs	on	our	farm	is	the	most	important	thing	to	us.	
CostFocus1_ProdCost	 We	continually	try	to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	lowing	our	costs	of	production.	
Customer_Underst	 We	try	to	understand	customers	to	recognise	their	needs.	
Costomer1_Needs	 We	continually	try	to	understand	the	needs	of	our	customers	even	ones	of	which	they	are	unaware.	
Customer2_Soln	 We	try	incorporate	solutions	to	future	customer	needs	into	to	farming	operation.	
Customer3_Mod	 We	are	willing	to	modify	our	production	practices	to	meet	customer	requirements	even	if	it	increases	our	costs.	
Customer4_know	 It	is	important	for	me	to	know	who	the	customer	of	our	[product]	is.	
Customer5_InnMkt	 We	are	always	looking	for	innovative	ways	to	market	our	products.	
Customer7_Reqs	 We	have	made	significant	changes	to	our	farming	operation	to	better	meet	customer	requirements.	
Customer8_Diff	 We	are	always	looking	for	ways	to	differentiate	our	farm	products	and	gain	a	premium	price.	
SuppDep%_Inc	 Approximately	what	%	of	your	total	farm	income	comes	from	[processor]?	
SuppIndep1	 As	a	farm	business,	we	try	to	remain	as	independent	as	possible.	
SuppIndep2	 We	are	always	wary	of	becoming	too	locked	in	to	one	company	that	buys	our	stock.	
SuppOptions	 How	many	other	companies	are	there	in	your	area	that	you	could	potentially	supply	your	stock	to?	
ProcDepend1	 Our	[processor]	is	more	dependent	on	us	than	we	are	on	them.	
ProcDepend2	 Regarding	your	current	[product]	[processor]:	Our	[processor]	is	very	dependent	on	us.	
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Scale	item	code	 Description	of	scale	item	
SuppDepend1	 As	a	business,	we	feel	very	dependent	on	[processor]?	
SuppDepend2	 We	are	more	dependent	on	[processor]	than	they	are	on	us.	
EduAgOrg	 If	you	have	completed	agricultural	training	or	education	which	organisation	did	you	attend?	
EducationMax	 What	was	the	highest	level	of	education	you	attained?	
FarmPerf$2_Profit	 The	profitability	of	our	[product]	operation	was	not	satisfactory	last	year.	
FarmPerf2CompProfit	 Compared	the	profitability	of	your	[product]	operation	over	the	last	3	years?	
FarmPerf3_SatProdn	 We	were	very	satisfied	with	the	overall	performance	of	our	[product]	operation	last	year?	
FarmPerf4_1SatFin	 We	were	very	satisfied	with	the	overall	financial	performance	of	our	[product]	operation	last	year?	
FarmPerf1_$2ProfitR	 Reverse	of	the	profitability	of	our	[product]	operation	was	not	satisfactory	last	year?	
FarmSize_TotUnit	 Total	farm	size	per	stock	unit.	
FarmSize_Prod	 Farm	size	[product]	effective	Area	(Hectares).	
FarmSize_Total	 Farm	Effective	Area	(Hectares).	
Farm_Units	 Distinct,	geographically	separate	blocks	(more	than	½	km	apart)	comprise	y	farm	operation?	
FarmSizeStatsNZ	 Farm	size	classified	by	Stats	NZ	Categories.	
Gender	 Gender.	
Infl1_Strat	 How	much	influence	do	you	have	for	long	term	strategic	decisions?	
Infl2_Tact	 How	much	influence	do	you	have	for	day	to	day	(tactical)	management	decisions?	
Irrigation	 Irrigation	on	you	farm?	
Irrigation%	 Approximately	what	%	area	of	your	operation	is	irrigated?	
LabourUnits	 Full	time	labour	units	are	working	on	your	farm	(including	yourself)?	
LocationIsland	 Island	farm	located?	
LStockBuyer	 Livestock	buyer	an	employee	of	your	[processor]	or	are	they	an	independent	livestock	buyer?	
NthIsFarmClass	 Which	North	Island	farm	class	best	describes	your	deer	unit?	
Ownership	 Which	best	describes	the	ownership	arrangement	of	your	farm?	
SuppPerf1_Farm	 We	continually	strive	to	improve	our	farm	performance.	
SuppPerf2_QLStock	 We	continually	strive	to	improve	the	quality	of	our	stock.	
SuppPerf3_Yield	 We	continually	try	to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	improving	yields	(animal	production).	
SuppPerf4_AWelfare	 I	would	take	steps	to	improve	animal	welfare	even	if	it	wasn't	important	to	our	customers.	
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Scale	item	code	 Description	of	scale	item	
SuppPerf5_NoPremium	 We	would	aim	to	produce	the	best	quality	stock	even	if	we	were	not	able	to	get	a	premium	for	it.	
SuppPerf6_Effic	 We	have	consistently	managed	to	improve	our	farm	efficiency.	
SuppPerf7_ImpReturn	 We	continually	try	to	improve	our	farm	performance	by	achieving	higher	market	returns	for	our	products.	
SuppPerf8_QLMkt	 Our	farm	business	operates	in	a	market	where	above	average	quality	is	important.	
Power1_Treat	 If	we	did	not	do	what	processor	asked	we	would	not	have	received	very	good	treatment	from	them.	
Power2_Favour	 We	felt	that	by	going	along	with	what	processor	asked,	we	would	have	been	favoured	on	other	occasions.	
Power3_Profit	
Our	processor	has	hinted	that	they	would	take	certain	action	that	would	affect	our	profitability	if	we	didn’t	meet	their	
requests.	
QualDel_Numbers	 We	always	deliver	the	number	animals	we	agree	to	supply	to	processor.	
QualDel_Quality	 We	always	deliver	the	quality	of	animals	the	processor	requires.	
Region	 What	region	is	your	farm	located?	
RiskDbtAsset	 Total	farm	debt	as	percentage	of	total	farm	assets-Percent	(%).	
RiskDbtServ	 Debt	servicing	as	a	percentage	of	total	farm	income-Percent	(%).	
RiskOffFarmInc	 Proportion	of	non-farm	income	as	percentage	of	your	total	gross	income.	
Role	 What	role	best	describes	you?	
Satisf9_Returns	 How	do	you	rate	your	returns	compared	to	what	you	would	expect	to	achieve	for	your	animals?	
Satisf10_PriceStock	 The	returns	we	received	for	our	stock	were	satisfactory	last	year.	
Satisf_PriceStock3yr	 How	does	the	price	received	for	you	[product]	over	the	last	3	years	compare	to	other	farmers?	
Satisf1_NetReturn	 Net	return	to	supplying	stock.	
Satisf2_Support	 Support	services	provided.	
Satisf3_Policies	 Reasonable	policies.	
Satisf4_Price	 The	price	received	for	the	animals	you	supply.	
Satisf5_PriceSched	 The	seasonal	structure	of	the	pricing	schedule.	
Satisf6_Support	 The	support	provided	by	the	stock	buyer	supply	manager.	
Satisf7_CommQuant	 The	quantity	(amount,	frequency)	of	communication.	
Satisf8_CommQual	 The	timeliness	of	communication.	
SelfDirect1_Profit	 The	main	things	that	affect	our	farm	profitability	are	outside	of	my	control	(eg	weather,	price).	
SelfDirect2_Prod	 When	the	farm	has	shown	poor	production	or	profit	have	been	due	to	circumstance	totally	out	of	my	control.	
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Scale	item	code	 Description	of	scale	item	
SelfDirect3_Constr	 There	is	little	room	to	make	improvements	in	our	farm	operation	due	to	natural	production	constraints.	
Shares_Decisions	 Owning	shares	in	our	processor	means	I	can	influence	the	decisions.	
Shares_Influence	 The	main	benefit	from	owning	shares	in	a	processor	is	ensure	you	are	treated	fairly.	
Shares_Yes_No	 Is	your	farm	business	a	shareholder	in	your	current	[product]	processor?	
SharesYrs	 How	many	years	has	your	farm	business	been	a	shareholder	of	your	[processor]?	
SI_FarmClass	 Which	South	Island	farm	class	best	describes	your	deer	unit?	
C.SocCap10_Freq	 Frequent	and	intensive	interaction	between	both	parties.	
C.SocCap1_Goals	 Having	compatible	goals	and	objectives.	
C.SocCap2_Values	 Having	similar	values.	
C.SocCap3_Bonds	 Having	strong	personal	bonds.	
R.SocCap4_Friend	 Involving	personal	friendship	between	both	parties.	
R.SocCap5_Pers	 Involving	a	close	personal	interaction	between	both	parties.	
R.SocCap6_Recip	 Involving	give	and	take	(reciprocity)	between	both	parties.	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 Having	strong	mutual	trust	between	both	parties.	
S.SocCap8_Funct	 Processor	promotes:	Interaction	between	different	functions	of	staff	in	both	businesses.		
S.SocCap9_Level	 Processor	promotes:	Interaction	between	different	levels	and	functions	of	staff	in	both	businesses.	
Soil_Fert	 Fertility	of	the	soils	on	your	[product]	unit?	
SpecInv1_Reqs	 We	have	made	significant	investments	in	order	to	specifically	meet	the	requirements	of	[processor].	
SpecInv2_Know	
There	has	been	a	considerable	specific	knowledge	we	have	had	to	learn	to	meet	the	requirements	of	supplying	
[processor].	
SpecInv3_Modify	
We	have	made	significant	modifications	our	farming	system	specifically	to	meet	the	requirements	of	supplying	the	
[processor].	
SpotMkt	 You	will	always	get	better	prices	over	the	season	if	you	play	the	market.	
SpotMkt_Best	 We	seem	to	have	the	ability	to	know	how	to	buy	and	sell	stock	to	get	the	best	price	from	the	market.	
StageBus	 At	what	stage	of	the	farm	business	cycle	would	you	describe	yourself?	
Trust1_Expl	 Even	if	Processor	gives	us	a	rather	unlikely	explanation	we	are	confident	that	they	are	telling	the	truth.	
Trust2_Welfare	 When	making	important	decisions,	Processor	is	always	concerned	about	our	welfare.	
Trust3_Agree	 We	can	rely	on	[processor]	to	help	us	in	ways	not	required	by	our	agreement	with	them.	
Trust4_Fair	 We	believe	that	Processor	will	always	treat	us	fairly.	
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Scale	item	code	 Description	of	scale	item	
Trust5_Advantge	 We	can	rely	on	our	processor	without	any	fear	they	will	take	advantage	of	us	even	if	the	opportunity	arises.	
Tust6_Returns	 We	can	rely	on	our	processor	to	always	deliver	the	best	returns	from	the	market.	
Trust8_HonComm	 Communications	from	our	processor	are	open	and	honest.	
Trust9_InformComm	 I	feel	informed	about	the	organisation	and	the	activities	of	processor.	
UncertMkt1_Comp	 The	nature	of	competition	in	the	international	market	for	our	[product]	is	intense.	
UncertMkt2_Cust	 There	are	rapid	changes	in	consumer	needs	and	preferences	for	our	[product].	
UncertMkt3_Price	 The	market	price	for	[product]	on	the	international	market	is	highly	volatile.	
UncertProd_8mth	 The	numbers	and	weight	of	the	animals	you	can	supply	to	[processor]	8	months	ahead?	
UncertProd1_8mthR	 Reverse	of	the	numbers	and	weight	of	the	animals	you	can	supply	to	[processor]	8	months	ahead?	
UncertProd_Cost3y	 Your	production	costs	over	3	years?	
UncertProd2_Cost3yR	 Reverse	of	Your	production	costs	over	3	years.	
Value1_GrowBus	 Grow	our	farming	business.	
Value2_Premium	 Access	premium	markets	for	our	farm	products.	
Value3_NewTech	 Adopt	new	technologies	into	our	farming	system	(genetics,	crops	etc).	
Value4_Customer	 Adapt	our	production	to	meet	the	requirements	of	customers	for	our	products.	
Value5_ReduceCost	 Reduce	our	costs	of	production.	
Value6_Profit	 Increase	our	farm	profitability.	
Value7_ProdRisk	 Reduce	the	production	risk	on	our	farm	(production	uncertainty).	
Value8_MktRisk	 Reduce	the	market	risk	involved	in	selling	our	[product]	(price	uncertainty).	
Yrs_Age	 Age	in	years?	
Yrs_Farm	 Total	years	farming?	
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Table	C:	2	Significance	levels	and	regression	weights	for	relationship	quality	-	Model	1	
Constructs	–	Model	1	 Standardised	
regression	weight	
P	
Trust	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.92	 	
Commitment	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.81	 ***	
Social	capital	-	rel/cog	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.71	 ***	
Social	capital	-	structural	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.70	 ***	
Sat	org	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.67	 ***	
Sat	price	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.65	 ***	
Sat	comm	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.64	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
Table	C:	3	Significance	levels	and	regression	weights	for	relationship	quality	-	Model	2	
		
	Constructs	–	Model	2	
		
Standardised	
regression	weight	 P	
Satisfaction	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.92	 ***	
Sat_Org	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.72	 	
Sat_Price	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.72	 ***	
Sat_Comm	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.71	 ***	
Social	capital_structural	 <---	 Social	capital	 0.82	 	
Social	capital	-	RelCog	 <---	 Social	capital	 0.79	 ***	
Trust	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.95	 	
Commitment	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.83	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
	
Table	C:	4	Significance	levels	and	regression	weights	for	relationship	quality	-	Model	3	
Constructs	–	Model	3	
Standardised	
regression	
weight	
P	
Satisfaction	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.91	 ***	
Social	capital	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.91	 ***	
Trust	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.93	 	
Commitment	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.81	 ***	
Sat	org	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.70	 	
Sat	price	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.69	 ***	
Sat	comm	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.68	 ***	
Social	capital	structural	 <---	 Social	capital	 0.74	 	
Social	capital	rel/cog	 <---	 Social	capital	 0.76	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	C:	5	Significance	levels	and	regression	weights	for	relationship	quality	-	Model	4	
Constructs	–	Model	4	
Standardised	
regression	
weight	
P	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 Social	capital	 0.91	 ***	
Satisfaction	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.92	 ***	
Sat	org	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.72	 	
Sat	price	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.72	 ***	
Sat	comm	 <---	 Satisfaction	 0.71	 ***	
Social	capital	structural	 <---	 Social	capital	 0.82	 	
Social	capital	rel/cog	 <---	 Social	capital	 0.79	 ***	
Trust	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.95	 	
Commitment	 <---	 Relationship	quality		 0.83	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	C:	6	Standardised	regression	weights	for	relationship	constructs	
	Scale	tem										Construct	 Estimat
e	
P	 	 	Scale	tem																			Construct	 Estimat
e	
P	
Trust2_Welfare	 <---	 Trust	 0.85	 		 		 ProcAbil3_Prem	 <---	 SAT	 0.90	 		
Trust4_Fair	 <---	 Trust	 0.88	 ***	 		 Satisf1_NetReturn	 <---	 SAT	 0.74	 ***	
Trust5_Advantge	 <---	 Trust	 0.84	 ***	 		 ProcAbi1_Mktg	 <---	 SAT	 0.78	 ***	
Trust3_Agree	 <---	 Trust	 0.83	 ***	 		 ProcAbil2_SChain	 <---	 SAT	 0.78	 ***	
Trust1_Epl	 <---	 Trust	 0.78	 ***	 		 Satisf3_Policies	 <---	 SAT	 0.77	 ***	
Tust6_Returns	 <---	 Trust	 0.82	 ***	 		 Satisf2_Support	 <---	 SAT	 0.75	 ***	
C.SocCap3_Bonds	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.90	 		 		 S.SocCap8_Funct	 <---	 SoCAPSt	 0.90	 		
R.SocCap4_Friend	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.88	 ***	 		 C.SocCap10_Freq	 <---	 SoCAPSt	 0.82	 ***	
C.SocCap2_Values	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.89	 ***	 		 S.SocCap9_Level	 <---	 SoCAPSt	 0.91	 ***	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.94	 ***	 		 Satisf7_CommQuant	 <---	 SATCom	 0.94	 		
C.SocCap1_Goals	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.87	 ***	 		 Satisf8_CommQual	 <---	 SATCom	 0.91	 ***	
R.SocCap5_Pers	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.94	 ***	 		 Satisf6_Support	 <---	 SATCom	 0.61	 ***	
R.SocCap6_Recip	 <---	 SCRelCog	 0.92	 ***	 		 SpecInv3_Modify	 <---	 SpecificI
nvest	
0.82	 		
Commit2_Resource	 <---	 Commit	 0.65	 		 		 SpecInv2_Know	 <---	 SpecificI
nvest	
0.84	 ***	
Commit3_Proud	 <---	 Commit	 0.87	 ***	 		 SpecInv1_Reqs	 <---	 SpecificI
nvest	
0.76	 ***	
Commit1_RelLongTer
m	
<---	 Commit	 0.75	 ***	 		 CommitL3_PriceRev	 <---	 Loyalty	 0.77	 		
Value6_Profit	 <---	 Value	 0.77	 		 		 CommitL1_OptRev*	 <---	 Loyalty	 0.54	 ***	
Value7_ProdRisk	 <---	 Value	 0.78	 ***	 		 CommitL5_SuplOne	 <---	 Loyalty	 0.68	 ***	
Value5_ReduceCost	 <---	 Value	 0.67	 ***	 		 CommitL4_SpotMktR	 <---	 Loyalty	 0.62	 ***	
Value8_MktRisk	 <---	 Value	 0.72	 ***	 		 Satisf10_PriceStock	 <---	 SATPrice	 0.53	 		
Value1_GrowBus	 <---	 Value	 0.75	 ***	 		 Satisf4_Price	 <---	 SATPrice	 0.87	 ***	
Value3_NewTech	 <---	 Value	 0.74	 ***	 		 Satisf5_PriceSched	 <---	 SATPrice	 0.80	 ***	
Value4_Customer	 <---	 Value	 0.74	 ***	 		 ProcDepend1	 <---	 ProcDep
end	
0.67	 		
Value2_Premium	 <---	 Value	 0.83	 ***	 		 ProcDepend2	 <---	 ProcDep
end	
0.96	 ***	
SuppCost7_ProdRisk	 <---	 Cost	 0.88	 		 	 Power1_Treat	 <---	 Power	 0.61	 		
SuppCost3_Incr	 <---	 Cost	 0.83	 ***	 	 Power2_Favoured*	 <---	 Power	 0.33	 ***	
SuppCost4_Stress	 <---	 Cost	 0.78	 ***	 	 Power3_Profit	 <---	 Power	 0.69	 ***	
SuppCost5_LessProfit	 <---	 Cost	 0.87	 ***	 	 *	deleted	items	 	 	 	 	
SuppCost2_Flex	 <---	 Cost	 0.69	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SuppCost6_MktRisk	 <---	 Cost	 0.73	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	C:	7:	Correlations	between	relationship	factors	
	Correlations	 		 		 Estimate	 	 	Correlations	 		 		 Estimate	
Trust	 <-->	 SCRelCog	 0.67	 	 SAT	 <-->	 SoCAPSt	 0.47	
Trust	 <-->	 Commit	 0.78	 	 SAT	 <-->	 SATCom	 0.49	
Trust	 <-->	 Value	 0.65	 	 SAT	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.10	
Trust	 <-->	 Cost	 -0.41	 	 SAT	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.32	
Trust	 <-->	 SAT	 0.59	 	 SAT	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.50	
Trust	 <-->	 SoCAPSt	 0.65	 	 SAT	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.12	
Trust	 <-->	 SATCom	 0.55	 	 SAT	 <-->	 Power	 -0.23	
Trust	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.13	 	 SoCAPSt	 <-->	 SATCom	 0.53	
Trust	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.44	 	 SoCAPSt	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.32	
Trust	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.63	 	 SoCAPSt	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.33	
Trust	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.15	 	 SoCAPSt	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.39	
Trust	 <-->	 Power	 -0.25	 	 SoCAPSt	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.27	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 Commit	 0.55	 	 SoCAPSt	 <-->	 Power	 -0.01	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 Value	 0.48	 	 SATCom	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.05	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 Cost	 -0.19	 	 SATCom	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.33	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 SAT	 0.46	 	 SATCom	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.50	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 SoCAPSt	 0.58	 	 SATCom	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.03	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 SATCom	 0.45	 	 SATCom	 <-->	 Power	 -0.25	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.14	 	 SpecificInvest	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.11	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.31	 	 SpecificInvest	 <-->	 SATPrice	 -0.11	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.41	 	 SpecificInvest	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.36	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.15	 	 SpecificInvest	 <-->	 Power	 0.54	
SCRelCog	 <-->	 Power	 -0.13	 	 Loyalty	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.24	
Commit	 <-->	 Value	 0.61	 	 Loyalty	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.09	
Commit	 <-->	 Cost	 -0.45	 	 Loyalty	 <-->	 Power	 -0.22	
Commit	 <-->	 SAT	 0.55	 	 SATPrice	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.05	
Commit	 <-->	 SoCAPSt	 0.52	 	 SATPrice	 <-->	 Power	 -0.29	
Commit	 <-->	 SATCom	 0.53	 	 ProcDepend	 <-->	 Power	 0.31	
Commit	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.16	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Significance	levels:		
p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
	
Commit	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.52	 	
Commit	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.48	 	
Commit	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.11	 	
Commit	 <-->	 Power	 -0.26	 	
Value	 <-->	 Cost	 -0.26	 	
Value	 <-->	 SAT	 0.54	 	
Value	 <-->	 SoCAPSt	 0.61	 	
Value	 <-->	 SATCom	 0.44	 	
Value	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.42	 	
Value	 <-->	 Loyalty	 0.39	 	
Value	 <-->	 SATPrice	 0.52	 	
Value	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.29	 	
Value	 <-->	 Power	 0.01	 	
Cost	 <-->	 SAT	 -0.32	 	
Cost	 <-->	 SoCAPSt	 -0.18	 	
Cost	 <-->	 SATCom	 -0.34	 	
Cost	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.29	 	
Cost	 <-->	 Loyalty	 -0.40	 	
Cost	 <-->	 SATPrice	 -0.42	 	
Cost	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.13	 	
Cost	 <-->	 Power	 0.55	 	
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Table	C:	8	Standardized	regression	weights	and	significance	for	supplier	constructs	
Scale	items		 		 Construct		 Estimate	 P	
SuppPerf1_Farm	 <---	 SuppMotivation	 0.85	 	
SuppPerf3_Yield	 <---	 SuppMotivation	 0.65	 ***	
SuppPerf2_QLStock	 <---	 SuppMotivation	 0.72	 ***	
SuppAbil2_Mgmt	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.88	 	
SuppAbil3_Efficiency	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.86	 ***	
SuppAbil1_Quality	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.78	 ***	
SuppAbiI4_Inn	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.84	 ***	
Customer2_Soln	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.58	 	
Customer4_know	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.64	 ***	
Customer7_Reqs	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.67	 ***	
SelfDirect2_Prod	 <---	 SelfDirect	 0.68	 	
SelfDirect1_Profit	 <---	 SelfDirect	 0.73	 ***	
FarmPerf4_$1SatFin	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.97	 ***	
FarmPerf1_$2ProfR	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.67	 ***	
FarmPerf3_SatProd	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.60	 ***	
SuppComm_Inform2	 <---	 SuppCom	 0.75	 	
SuppComm_Inform1	 <---	 SuppCom	 0.94	 ***	
ProcDepend1	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.75	 ***	
ProcDepend2	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.77	 ***	
SuppDepend2	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.77	 ***	
SuppDepend1	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.88	 	
UncertMkt1_Comp	 <---	 Uncert	 0.49	 	
UncertMkt2_Cust	 <---	 Uncert	 0.95	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	C:	9	Correlations	between	supplier	constructs	
	 	 	 	
Construct		 		 Construct		 Estimate	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.45	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 CustomerFocus	 0.39	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 SelfDirect	 0.11	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 FarmPerf	 -0.14	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 SuppCom	 0.34	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 CustomerFocus	 0.36	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 SelfDirect	 -0.13	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 FarmPerf	 0.00	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 SuppCom	 0.23	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SelfDirect	 -0.02	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 FarmPerf	 0.02	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SuppCom	 0.50	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 FarmPerf	 -0.12	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SuppCom	 0.00	
FarmPerf	 <-->	 SuppCom	 0.03	
SuppCom	 <-->	 DepSuppProc	 0.21	
FarmPerf	 <-->	 DepSuppProc	 0.01	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 DepSuppProc	 0.12	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 DepSuppProc	 0.27	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 DepSuppProc	 0.13	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 DepSuppProc	 0.12	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.12	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 -0.02	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.21	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.21	
FarmPerf	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 -0.08	
SuppCom	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.28	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.20	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.18	
SuppCom	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.10	
FarmPerf	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.04	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.09	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.27	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.08	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.10	
SupplierDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.03	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Appendix	D -	Invariance	tests	
The	factor	structure	and	loadings	are	sufficiently	equivalent	across	groups	as	shown	below.	If	
the	constructs	do	not	meet	the	test	of	invariance	then	they	may	be	measuring	different	
latent	constructs	for	each	group.		
Table	D:	1	Invariance	test	supplier	factors:	Beef	and	Sheep	data	
		 		 		 Beef		 		 Sheep	 		 		
	Measure	 		 	Construct	 Estimate	 P	 Estimate	 P	 -stat	
SuppAbil3_Efficiency	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 1.064	 0.000	 0.935	 0.000	 -1.540	
SuppAbil1_Quality	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.945	 0.000	 0.950	 0.000	 0.052	
SuppAbiI4_Inn	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 1.056	 0.000	 0.918	 0.000	 -1.608	
SuppPerf2_QLStock	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.793	 0.000	 0.861	 0.000	 0.642	
SuppPerf3_Yield	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.647	 0.000	 0.833	 0.000	 1.739*	
SuppPerf4_AWelfare	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.458	 0.000	 0.721	 0.000	 2.036**	
SuppPerf5_NoPremium	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.459	 0.000	 0.767	 0.000	 2.258**	
Customer4_know	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 1.178	 0.000	 1.304	 0.000	 0.579	
Customer7_Reqs	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 1.287	 0.000	 1.239	 0.000	 -0.227	
Customer3_Mod	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.743	 0.000	 0.964	 0.000	 1.211	
Customer5_InnMkt	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 1.166	 0.000	 0.890	 0.000	 -1.373	
Customer8_Diff	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 1.078	 0.000	 0.927	 0.000	 -0.792	
SelfDirect1_Profit	 <---	 SelfDirect	 1.107	 0.000	 1.156	 0.000	 0.219	
SelfDirect3_Constr	 <---	 SelfDirect	 0.950	 0.000	 0.916	 0.000	 -0.167	
FarmPerf4_$1SatFin	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
FarmPerf1_$2ProfR	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
FarmPerf3_SatProd	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
UncertMkt1_Comp	 <---	 Uncert	 0.585	 0.000	 0.987	 0.000	 2.496**	
UncertMkt3_Price	 <---	 Uncert	 1.012	 0.000	 0.797	 0.000	 -1.114	
SuppDepend1	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.739	 0.000	 1.104	 0.000	 1.741*	
ProcDepend1	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
ProcDepend2	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
SuppIndep1	 <---	 SuppInd	 1.309	 0.003	 0.508	 0.000	 -1.781*	
Notes:	***	p-value	<	0.01;	**	p-value	<	0.05;	*	p-value	<	0.10	 	 	 	
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Table	D:	2:	Invariance	Test	–	Supplier	factors:	Sheep	and	Venison	supplier	data	
		 		 		 Sheep		 Venison	 		
	Measure	 		 	Construct	 Estimate	 P	 Estimate	 P	 -stat	
SuppAbil3_Efficiency	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.935	 0.000	 0.900	 0.000	 -0.504	
SuppAbil1_Quality	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.950	 0.000	 1.026	 0.000	 0.853	
SuppAbil4_Inn	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.918	 0.000	 0.894	 0.000	 -0.326	
SuppPerf2_QLStock	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.861	 0.000	 0.745	 0.000	 -1.176	
SuppPerf3_Yield	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.833	 0.000	 0.889	 0.000	 0.475	
SuppPerf4_AWelfare	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.721	 0.000	 0.882	 0.000	 1.259	
SuppPerf5_NoPremium	 <---	 SuppPerf	 0.767	 0.000	 0.584	 0.000	 -1.368	
Customer4_know	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 1.304	 0.000	 1.057	 0.000	 -1.159	
Customer7_Reqs	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 1.239	 0.000	 0.864	 0.000	 -2.002**	
Customer3_Mod	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.964	 0.000	 0.608	 0.000	 -2.003**	
Customer5_InnMkt	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.890	 0.000	 1.009	 0.000	 0.625	
Customer8_Diff	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.927	 0.000	 0.720	 0.000	 -1.188	
SelfDirect1_Profit	 <---	 SelfDirect	 1.156	 0.000	 0.883	 0.000	 -1.417	
SelfDirect3_Constr	 <---	 SelfDirect	 0.916	 0.000	 0.744	 0.000	 -0.975	
FarmPerf4_SatFin	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
FarmPerf1_ProfR	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
FarmPerf3_SatProd	 <---	 FarmPerf	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
UncertMkt1_Comp	 <---	 Uncert	 0.987	 0.000	 0.931	 0.000	 -0.343	
UncertMkt3_Price	 <---	 Uncert	 0.797	 0.000	 0.532	 0.000	 -1.926*	
SuppDepend1	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 1.104	 0.000	 1.113	 0.000	 0.035	
ProcDepend1	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
ProcDepend2	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.973	 0.000	 0.973	 0.000	 0.000	
SuppIndep1	 <---	 SuppInd	 0.508	 0.000	 1.036	 0.000	 1.699*	
Notes:	***	p-value	<	0.01;	**	p-value	<	0.05;	*	p-value	<	0.10	
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Table	D:	3	Invariance	test	supplier	factors:	Beef	and	sheep	supplier	data	
	 		 		 Beef		 Sheep	 		
	Measure	 		 	Construct	 Estimate	 P	 Estimate	 P	 -stat	
R.SocCap5_Pers	 <---	 SocialCapital_RelCog	 1.180	 0.000	 1.297	 0.000	 1.178	
C.SocCap1_Goals	 <---	 SocialCapital_RelCog	 0.975	 0.000	 0.950	 0.000	 -0.336	
R.SocCap7_Trust	 <---	 SocialCapital_RelCog	 1.189	 0.000	 1.364	 0.000	 1.795*	
R.SocCap6_Recip	 <-	 SocialCapital_RelCog	 1.165	 0.000	 1.225	 0.000	 0.610	
R.SocCap4_Friend	 <---	 SocialCapital_RelCog	 1.036	 0.000	 1.162	 0.000	 1.198	
C.SocCap3_Bonds	 <---	 SocialCapital_RelCog	 1.137	 0.000	 1.269	 0.000	 1.234	
Value7_ProdRisk	 <---	 Value	 1.067	 0.000	 1.167	 0.000	 0.862	
Value6_Profit	 <---	 Value	 1.101	 0.000	 1.293	 0.000	 1.648	
Value1_GrowBus	 <---	 Value	 1.207	 0.000	 1.289	 0.000	 0.622	
Value3_NewTech	 <---	 Value	 0.935	 0.000	 1.215	 0.000	 2.206**	
Value4_Customer	 <---	 Value	 1.112	 0.000	 1.105	 0.000	 -0.055	
Value8_MktRisk	 <---	 Value	 1.056	 0.000	 1.168	 0.000	 0.868	
Value2_Premium	 <---	 Value	 1.209	 0.000	 1.414	 0.000	 1.451	
SuppCost3_Incr	 <---	 Cost_Risk	 0.995	 0.000	 1.009	 0.000	 0.201	
SuppCost4_Stress	 <---	 Cost_Risk	 1.017	 0.000	 0.993	 0.000	 -0.330	
SuppCost5_LessProfit	 <---	 Cost_Risk	 1.031	 0.000	 1.035	 0.000	 0.047	
SuppCost2_Flex	 <---	 Cost_Risk	 0.761	 0.000	 0.871	 0.000	 1.456	
Cost6_MktRisk	 <---	 Cost_Risk	 0.886	 0.000	 0.861	 0.000	 -0.377	
Trust2_Welfare	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 1.047	 0.000	 1.047	 0.000	 0.000	
Trust1_Epl	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 0.899	 0.000	 0.915	 0.000	 0.189	
Trust4_Fair	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 0.982	 0.000	 1.104	 0.000	 1.600	
Tust6_Returns	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 0.956	 0.000	 0.953	 0.000	 -0.045	
Trust3_Agree	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 1.006	 0.000	 1.022	 0.000	 0.196	
Commit1_RelLongTerm	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 0.676	 0.000	 0.600	 0.000	 -1.040	
Commit3_Proud	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 0.778	 0.000	 0.759	 0.000	 -0.238	
Commit2_Resource	 <---	 Trust_Commit	 0.678	 0.000	 0.580	 0.000	 -1.126	
ProcAbil3_Prem	 <---	 Sat_Org	 1.223	 0.000	 1.042	 0.000	 -1.635	
ProcAbil2_SChain	 <---	 Sat_Org	 1.060	 0.000	 1.016	 0.000	 -0.450	
Satisf1_NetReturn	 <---	 Sat_Org	 1.111	 0.000	 0.953	 0.000	 -1.481	
Satisf3_Policies	 <---	 Sat_Org	 1.320	 0.000	 0.921	 0.000	 -3.335***	
Satisf2_Support	 <---	 Sat_Org	 1.291	 0.000	 0.873	 0.000	 -3.44***	
Satisf4_Price	 <---	 Sat_Price	 1.029	 0.000	 1.835	 0.000	 4.421***	
Satisf9_Ep$	 <---	 Sat_Price	 0.436	 0.000	 0.733	 0.000	 3.406***	
Satisf5_PriceSched	 <---	 Sat_Price	 0.810	 0.000	 1.599	 0.000	 4.561***	
Satisf8_CommQual	 <---	 Sat_Comm	 1.032	 0.000	 0.877	 0.000	 -2.382**	
Satisf6_Support	 <---	 Sat_Comm	 0.786	 0.000	 0.641	 0.000	 -1.975**	
CommitL4_SpotMktR	 <---	 Loyalty	 0.738	 0.000	 0.774	 0.000	 0.309	
CommitL5_SuplOne	 <---	 Loyalty	 0.732	 0.000	 0.858	 0.000	 1.051	
SpecInv2_Know	 <---	 Spec_Inv	 0.882	 0.000	 0.824	 0.000	 -0.700	
SpecInv1_Reqs	 <---	 Spec_Inv	 0.949	 0.000	 0.834	 0.000	 -1.151	
S.SocCap9_Level	 <---	 SocialCapital_Struct	 1.099	 0.000	 1.009	 0.000	 -1.420	
C.SocCap10_Freq	 <---	 SocialCapital_Struct	 1.006	 0.000	 0.880	 0.000	 -1.76*	
Power3_Profit	 <---	 Power	 0.889	 0.000	 1.131	 0.000	 1.458	
Notes:	***	p-value	<	0.01;	**	p-value	<	0.05;	*	p-value	<	0.10	 	 	 	 	
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Appendix	E -	Antecedents	of	relationship	quality	
Table	E:	1	Standardized	regression	weights	for	antecedents	of	relationship	quality	
		 		 	Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.12	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SupplierNetValue	 0.47	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 Power	 -0.48	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.19	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SuppMotivation	 -0.04	 0.12	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.10	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SpecificInvest	 0.28	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SelfDirect	 -0.01	 0.54	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.00	 0.91	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
	
Table	E:	2	Regression	weights	for	control	variables	–	unmediated	model	
Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
FarmPerf	 <---	 ClimSpring	 0.12	 ***	
FarmPerf	 <---	 ClimSum	 -0.05	 0.098	
FarmPerf	 <---	 Farm	Size	 0.08	 0.008	
DelNum	 <---	 Farm	Size	 0.04	 0.241	
DelQual	 <---	 Farm	Size	 -0.06	 0.059	
SuppCom	 <---	 Shares	 -0.06	 0.024	
Loyalty	 <---	 Shares	 -0.21	 ***	
FarmPerf	 <---	 EducationMax	 -0.11	 ***	
FarmPerf	 <---	 SoilFert	 0.06	 0.046	
FarmPerf	 <---	 ClimWint	 -0.02	 0.507	
DelNum	 <---	 UncertProd8mth	 0.11	 ***	
DelQual	 <---	 UncertProd8mth	 0.08	 0.005	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	3	Correlations	for	control	variables	
Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 EducationMax	 0.12	 ***	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 EducationMax	 0.09	 0.003	
ClimSpring	 <-->	 ClimSum	 -0.20	 ***	
ClimSpring	 <-->	 Farm	Size	 -0.06	 0.037	
ClimSpring	 <-->	 ClimWint	 0.47	 ***	
SoilFert	 <-->	 ClimWint	 0.03	 0.327	
ClimSum	 <-->	 ClimWint	 -0.11	 ***	
EducationMax	 <-->	 Age	 -0.28	 ***	
Age	 <-->	 DebtServ	 -0.04	 0.237	
SupplierDepend	 <-->	 DebtServ	 -0.03	 0.289	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 DebtServ	 -0.03	 0.315	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 DebtServ	 -0.07	 0.027	
SupplierNetValue	 <-->	 DebtServ	 0.05	 0.089	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Age	 0.05	 0.094	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 Age	 0.01	 0.81	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 Age	 -0.09	 0.003	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 Age	 -0.11	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 -0.08	 0.015	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.16	 ***	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.08	 0.002	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.09	 0.002	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.10	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.11	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 UncertProd8mth	 0.12	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 UncertProd8mth	 0.07	 0.018	
SuppMotivation	 <-->	 UncertProd8mth	 0.10	 0.003	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 UncertProd8mth	 0.13	 ***	
SupplierNetValue	 <-->	 UncertProd8mth	 0.12	 ***	
SupplierNetValue	 <-->	 Farm	Size	 -0.07	 0.022	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 Farm	Size	 0.07	 0.004	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
	
Table	E:	4	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	power:	Standardised	regression	weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	
Mediating	
variable	
Dependent	
variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
Power	 	 Relationship	quality	 		 -0.47***	 		 		
Power	 RelQual	 SupplierComm	 0.06	(ns)	 0.04	(ns)	 -0.10***	 indirect	
Power	 RelQual	 SupplierProfit	 -0.10*	 0.02	(ns)	 -0.11***	 indirect	
Power	 RelQual	 SuppLoyalty	 -0.42***	 -0.24***	 -0.18***	 Partial	
Power	 RelQual	 DeliveryQual	 0.01	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	 no	mediation	
Power	 RelQual	 DeliveryQuant	 0.03	(ns)	 0.09	(ns)	 -0.06**	 indirect	
RelQual=Relationship	quality																			Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	5	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	supplier	dependence:	Standardised	
regression	weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	
Dependent	
variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
SupplierDepend	 	 Relationship	quality	 	 0.10***	 	 	
SupplierDepend	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm_	 0.11**	 0.09**	 0.02***	 partial	
SupplierDepend	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 -0.16***	 -0.18***	 0.02***	 partial	
SupplierDepend	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 0.20***	 0.16***	 0.04***	 partial	
SupplierDepend	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 0.06	(ns)	 0.06	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SupplierDepend	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 0.04	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 0.01**	 indirect	
	
Table	E:	6	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	processor	dependence:	Standardised	
regression	weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	 Dependent	variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	
with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
ProcDepend	 	 Relationship	quality	 	 0.12***	 0.00	(ns)	 	
ProcDepend	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm_	 0.05	(ns)	 0.02	(ns)	 0.03***	 indirect	
ProcDepend	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 0.05	(ns)	 0.02	(ns)	 0.03***	 indirect	
ProcDepend	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 -0.01	(ns)	 -0.05	(ns)	 0.05***	 indirect	
ProcDepend	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 -0.04	(ns)	 -0.05	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
ProcDepend	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 -0.02	(ns)	 -0.03	(ns)	 0.02**	 indirect	
	
Table	E:	7	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	specific	investment:	Standardised	regression	
weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	 Dependent	variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	
with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediato
r	
Type	of	
Mediation	
SpecificInvest	 	 RQ	 	 0.27***	 0.00	(ns)	 	
SpecificInvest	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm_	 0.16***	 0.10*	 0.06***	 partial	
SpecificInvest	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 0.03	(ns)	 -0.03	(ns)	 0.07***	 indirect	
SpecificInvest	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 0.22***	 0.11**	 0.11***	 partial	
SpecificInvest	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 0.04	(ns)	 0.03	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SpecificInvest	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 0.02	(ns)	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.04**	 indirect	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
	 275	
	
Table	E:	8	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	supplier	net	value:	Standardised	regression	
weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	 Dependent	variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	
with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
SuppNetValue	 	 Relationship	quality	 	 0.46***	 	 	
SuppNetValue	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm_	 0.23***	 0.13***	 0.10***	 partial	
SuppNetValue	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 0.24***	 0.13**	 0.11***	 partial	
SuppNetValue	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 0.31***	 0.13***	 0.18***	 partial	
SuppNetValue	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 0.04	(ns)	 0.017	(ns)	 0.02	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SuppNetValue	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 0.07	(ns)	 0.01	(ns)	 0.06**	 indirect	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
Table	E:	9	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	supplier	motivation:	Standardised	regression	
weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	
Dependent	
variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	
with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
SupplierProfit	 	 Relationship	quality	 	 -0.04	(ns)	 	 	
SupplierProfit	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm	 0.26***	 0.27***	 -0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SupplierProfit	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 -0.15***	 -0.14***	 -0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SupplierProfit	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 0.03	(ns)	 0.05	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SupplierProfit	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 0.21***	 0.21***	 0.00	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SupplierProfit	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 0.23***	 0.24***	 0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
Table	E:	10	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	self-direction:	Standardised	regression	
weights	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	
Dependent	
variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
SelfDirect	 	 Relationship	quality	 	 	 	 	
SelfDirect	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm	 -0.01	(ns)	 -0.01	(ns)	 0.00	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SelfDirect	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 0.17***	 0.17***	 0.00	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SelfDirect	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 0.08**	 0.09***	 -0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SelfDirect	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 -0.18***	 -0.18***	 0.00	(ns)	 no	mediation	
SelfDirect	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 -0.13***	 -0.13***	 0.00	(ns)	 no	mediation	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	11	Mediation	effects	of	relationship	quality	on	customer	Focus	
Variables	 Mediation	Effects	
Independent	
variable	 Mediating	variable	
Dependent	
variable	
Direct	
without	
mediator	
Direct	with	
Mediator	
Indirect	
through	
mediator	
Type	of	
Mediation	
CustomerFocus	 	 Relationship	quality	 	 0.19***	 	 	
CustomerFocus	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierComm	 0.15***	 0.10**	 0.04***	 partial	
CustomerFocus	 Relationship	quality	 SupplierProfit	 0.01	(ns)	 -0.05	(ns)	 0.05***	 indirect	
CustomerFocus	 Relationship	quality	 SuppLoyalty	 0.03	(ns)	 -0.04	(ns)	 0.07***	 indirect	
CustomerFocus	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQual	 0.09*	 0.09**	 0.01	(ns)	 no	mediation	
CustomerFocus	 Relationship	quality	 DeliveryQuant	 0.00	(ns)	 -0.02	(ns)	 0.02**	 indirect	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
Table	E:	12	Standardised	regression	weights	–	mediation	by	relationship	quality	without	direct	
effects	
Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.10	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.12	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SpecificInvest	 0.27	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 ProcDepend	 -0.47	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SuppNetValue	 0.46	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.00	 0.906	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 Uncertainty	 0.05	 0.022	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SupplierProfit	 -0.04	 0.118	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.19	 ***	
Relationship	quality	 <---	 SelfDirect	 -0.01	 0.537	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 RQ	 0.10	 0.002	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 RQ	 0.13	 ***	
SupplierComm	 <---	 RQ	 0.39	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 RQ	 0.60	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 RQ	 0.28	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
Table	E:	13	Standardised	regression	weights	-	controls	
Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Clim_SPRG	 0.11	 0.002	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Clim_SUM	 -0.05	 0.082	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 FarmSize_TotUnit	 0.05	 0.137	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 FarmSize_TotUnit	 0.06	 0.059	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 FarmSize_TotUnit	 -0.02	 0.47	
SupplierComm	 <---	 Shares_Yes_No	 -0.12	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 Shares_Yes_No	 -0.22	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Soil_Fert	 0.06	 0.07	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Clim_WINT	 0.01	 0.842	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.12	 ***	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.09	 0.003	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	14	Correlations	–	mediation	by	relationship	quality	only	(no	direct	effects)	
	Variables	 		 		 Regression	weights	 P	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SelfDirect	 -0.03	 0.41	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SupplierProfit	 0.42	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SupplierProfit	 -0.14	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SuppNetValue	 0.14	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.06	 0.056	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.20	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SuppNetValue	 0.14	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.18	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.36	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SuppNetValue	 0.22	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.19	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 -0.10	 0.003	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.67	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.04	 0.267	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.36	 ***	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.35	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.23	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.04	 0.19	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.14	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.17	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.09	 0.005	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.11	 ***	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.47	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.28	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.12	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.13	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.12	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 -0.18	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.12	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.03	 0.376	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.13	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.13	 ***	
SupplierDepend	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.02	 0.59	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.03	 0.404	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.26	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.59	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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	Table	E:	15	Correlations	for	control	variable	–	mediation	by	relationship	quality	(no	direct	effects)	
Control	Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 EducationMax	 0.12	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 EducationMax	 0.09	 0.003	
Clim_SPRG	 <-->	 Clim_SUM	 -0.20	 ***	
Clim_SPRG	 <-->	 Farm_Size_	 -0.06	 0.037	
Clim_SPRG	 <-->	 Clim_WINT	 0.47	 ***	
Soil_Fert	 <-->	 Clim_WINT	 0.03	 0.327	
Clim_SUM	 <-->	 Clim_WINT	 -0.11	 ***	
EducationMax	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 -0.28	 ***	
Yrs_Age	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.04	 0.237	
SupplierDepend	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.03	 0.289	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.03	 0.315	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.07	 0.027	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 0.05	 0.089	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 0.05	 0.094	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 0.01	 0.81	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 -0.09	 0.003	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 -0.11	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 -0.08	 0.015	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.16	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.08	 0.002	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.09	 0.002	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.10	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.11	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.12	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.07	 0.018	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.10	 0.003	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.13	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 UncertProd1_8mthR	 0.12	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 FarmSize_TotUnit	 -0.07	 0.022	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 FarmSize_TotUnit	 0.07	 0.004	
	 Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	16	Standardised	regression	weights	–	Re-specified	model	
Variables	 Regression	weights	 P	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 ProcDepend	 0.12	 ***	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 SuppNetValue	 0.46	 ***	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 Uncertainty	 0.05	 0.02	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 ProcDepend	 -0.47	 ***	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.19	 ***	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 SupplierProfit	 -0.04	 0.058	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.10	 ***	
Relationship	quality		 <---	 SpecificInvest	 0.27	 ***	
SupplierComm	 <---	 SpecificInvest	 0.13	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 SpecificInvest	 0.10	 0.011	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 ProcDepend	 -0.26	 ***	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 SuppNetValue	 0.00	 0.911	
SupplierComm	 <---	 SuppNetValue	 0.12	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 SuppNetValue	 0.15	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 SuppNetValue	 0.13	 ***	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 SupplierProfit	 0.22	 ***	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 SupplierProfit	 0.24	 ***	
SupplierComm	 <---	 SupplierProfit	 0.27	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 SupplierProfit	 -0.15	 ***	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.11	 ***	
SupplierComm	 <---	 CustomerFocus	 0.11	 ***	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 SelfDirect	 -0.19	 ***	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 SelfDirect	 -0.13	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 SelfDirect	 0.09	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 SelfDirect	 0.17	 ***	
SupplierComm	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.09	 0.006	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.11	 0.004	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 SupplierAbility	 0.10	 0.006	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 RQ	 0.08	 0.026	
SupplierComm	 <---	 RQ	 0.20	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 RQ	 0.35	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 RQ	 0.22	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 -0.20	 ***	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 SupplierDepend	 0.17	 ***	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	17	Correlations	between	variables	-	Respecified	model:	Standardised	regression	weights	
	Variables	 		 		 Regression	weights	 P	 	 	Variables	 		 		
Regression	
weights	 P	
CustomerFocus	 ß>	 SelfDirect	 -0.03	 0.371	 	 ProcDepend	 ß>	 SupplierDepend	 0.11	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 ß>	 SupplierProfit	 0.42	 ***	 	 SpecificInvest	 ß>	 SupplierDepend	 0.47	 ***	
SelfDirect	 ß>	 SupplierProfit	 -0.14	 ***	 	 ProcDepend	 ß>	 SupplierDepend	 0.28	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 ß>	 SuppNetValue	 0.13	 ***	 	 SuppNetValue	 ß>	 SupplierDepend	 0.11	 ***	
	SupplierProfit	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.06	 0.059	 	 SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.13	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.19	 ***	 	 CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 0.11	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SuppNetValue	 0.13	 ***	 	 SelfDirect	 <-->	 SupplierDepend	 -0.18	 ***	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.18	 ***	 	 ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.03	 0.393	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.36	 ***	 	 SpecificInvest	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.13	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SuppNetValue	 0.22	 ***	 	 ProcDepend	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.13	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.20	 ***	 	 SupplierDepend	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.02	 0.636	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 -0.10	 0.001	 	 SelfDirect	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.03	 0.414	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 SpecificInvest	 0.68	 ***	 	 CustomerFocus	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.26	 ***	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.38	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.35	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.23	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.03	 0.321	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.14	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 0.17	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 ProcDepend	 -0.09	 0.003	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
	
Table	E:	18	Relationship	between	controls	and	model	variables:	Standardised	regression	weights	
	Variables	 		 		 Regression	weights	 P	 	 		Variables	 		 		
Regression	
weights	 P	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 EducationMax	 0.12	 ***	 	 SelfDirect	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 -0.08	 0.015	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 EducationMax	 0.09	 0.003	 	 CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.16	 ***	
Clim_SPRG	 <-->	 Clim_SUM	 -0.20	 ***	 	 SupplierProfit	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.08	 0.002	
Clim_SPRG	 <-->	 Farm_Size	 -0.06	 0.036	 	 ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.09	 0.002	
Clim_SPRG	 <-->	 Clim_WINT	 0.47	 ***	 	 SpecificInvest	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.10	 ***	
Soil_Fert	 <-->	 Clim_WINT	 0.03	 0.327	 	 ProcDepend	 <-->	 Uncertainty	 0.11	 ***	
Clim_SUM	 <-->	 Clim_WINT	 -0.11	 ***	 	 SelfDirect	 <-->	 UncertProd	 0.12	 ***	
EducationMax	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 -0.28	 ***	 	 CustomerFocus	 <-->	 UncertProd	 0.07	 0.018	
Yrs_Age	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.04	 0.237	 	 SupplierProfit	 <-->	 UncertProd	 0.10	 0.002	
SupplierDepend	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.03	 0.278	 	 SupplierAbility	 <-->	 UncertProd	 0.13	 ***	
SpecificInvest	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.03	 0.287	 	 SuppNetValue	 <-->	 UncertProd1	 0.12	 ***	
ProcDepend	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 -0.07	 0.025	 	 ProcDepend	 <-->	 Farm_Size	 0.07	 0.004	
SuppNetValue	 <-->	 RiskDbtServ	 0.05	 0.082	 	 SuppNetValue	 <-->	 Farm_Size	 -0.07	 0.026	
CustomerFocus	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 0.05	 0.094	 	 SuppNetValue	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.11	 ***	
SelfDirect	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 0.01	 0.81	 	 SupplierProfit	 <-->	 SupplierAbility	 0.59	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 -0.09	 0.003	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SupplierAbility	 <-->	 Yrs_Age	 -0.11	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Table	E:	19	Standardised	regression	weights	–	Control	variables:	Standardised	regression	weights	
		 		 		 Estimate	 P	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Clim_SPRG	 0.11	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Clim_SUM	 -0.04	 0.221	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Farm	Size	 0.07	 0.011	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 Farm	Size	 0.04	 0.175	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 Farm	Size	 -0.05	 0.088	
SupplierComm	 <---	 Shares_Yes_No	 -0.06	 0.018	
SuppLoyalty	 <---	 Shares_Yes_No	 -0.21	 ***	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 EducationMax	 -0.09	 0.001	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Soil_Fert	 0.06	 0.03	
SupplierProfit	 <---	 Clim_WINT	 -0.02	 0.535	
DeliveryQuant	 <---	 UncertProd	 0.11	 ***	
DeliveryQual	 <---	 UncertProd	 0.09	 0.003	
Significance	levels:	p<0.001	***,	p<0.05	**,	p<0.10	*	
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Appendix	F -	Full	respecified	model	
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Appendix	G -	Survey	questionnaires	
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Table	G:	1	Survey	Questionnaire	–	Sheep	industry					
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Survey	Questionnaire	–	Beef	industry					
	 	
Table	G:	1	Questionnaire	–	Beef	industry		
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Section	A:	Relationship	with	Venison	Processor	
(By	venison	processor	we	mean	the	processor	or	cooperative/company	that	you	sell	your	
venison	to.	This	may	be	a	processor	and/or	exporter	and	marketer	of	your	venison)	
	
Table	G:	2	Survey	Questionnaire	–	Deer	industry			
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Appendix	H -	Published	paper	on	qualitative	research:	Case	
study	analysis	on	supplier	commitment	to	added	value	agri-
food	supply	chains	in	New	Zealand	
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